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What

is

the role of philosophy in education? This timeless question

answered by examining Plato's

earliest dialogues in

as the centerpiece of education.
interpret the

Apology,

Crito,

I call this effort

which he makes a case

may

for

Plato's project for education

best be

philosophy

and

Charmides, Laches, Ion, Hippias Minor, Euthyphro, and

Lysis as an integrated attempt to promote philosophy as education in ancient Athens.
Plato accepted arete (excellence, virtue) as the proper goal of education, but his
interpretation of arete as a distinctly moral quality required a

new approach

to

education.
Plato recognized that the quality in a doctor that makes her aim at what
for her patient

is

distinct

from the

skill

is

good

that enables her to choose the most effective

treatment. Against traditional education, which emphasized social standing, professional

skill,

and the accumulation

human

of information, Plato focused

beings and prescribed philosophy as a means for developing

information and tuition in practical

little

on the moral dimension

skills

may help

it.

us in our particular

of

Memorization of
crafts,

but

it

does

to improve us morally. This task must be undertaken separately through examination

V

and

reflection.

Success will be judged not by one's peers, or even
by one's government,

but by the gods themselves

who adhere to a

universal idea of goodness.

Plato's conception of arete as the health of the
soul precipitates a

to education that focuses

Health of the soul,
attention,

on philosophy and presents Socrates

like health of the

and yet may never be

body,

is

as

its

new approach

hero and martyr.

something that requires constant labor and

perfected. In Plato's project, the ignorant Socrates

and

the dialogues themselves become indirect teachers by exhorting
students to care for their
souls

and

to appreciate the task.

pursuit of moral

wisdom

is

The promise

that arete can be achieved through the

given in the words and actions of Socrates. Like his ancient

friends, the reader struggles to

understand Socrates and from

this struggle

emerges

philosophy: the love and pursuit of wisdom; the proper education for aiete.

VI
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CHAPTER

1

PLATO AS AN EDUCATIONAL REFORMER
History has

come

to revere Plato as a philosopher, political
visionary,

literary stylrst. All of these things

he was.

If

we

ask

and

how Plato saw himself, however, the

answer might be: as an educator, even an educational revolutionary.
While
founding of the Academy
education, there

is,

perhaps the most concrete indication of his

is

behind

all

great

Plato's

interest in

of his writings, a project for educational reform. Plato's

educational interests are explicit in the Republic and Laws, and
education

is

generally

recognized as a key topic in the I^tagoias, Meno, Euthydemus, and
Goigias. This
dissertation will focus, however,

on

Plato's educational project in his earliest, shortest,

and most Socratic dialogues: Apology,
Euthyphio, and Lysis.

1.1

Co nn e ct in g Pl ato a n d Education

them has considered

Dialogues

The

fact

is,

Plato never announces an educational

and only occasionally addresses pedagogical

earliest dialogues focus

it is

in the Earliest

about Plato's theory of education, but almost none of

his earliest works.

project in these dialogues

ethical works, but

lEppias Minor, Charmides. Laches,

^

Many scholars have written

The

Ciito, Ion,

on arete [dpexfj,

excellence, virtue]

issues directly.

and so

precisely their concern with arete that identifies

educational. During Plato's lifetime, the nature of arete and
topic of a large social debate

now poetic, aristocratic, and

approaches to arete were facing

off

on center stage

in

them

as

how to achieve it was the

— one ultimately about education.

accepted goal of education, and

are thought to be

Arete had long been the

sophistic accounts

and

Athens. Plato entered the debate

with a moral account of arete and a prescription of philosophy as the best activity

‘

For an explanation of

my selection

and characterization of these dialogues, see the appendix.
1

for

achieving
Plato

s

His defense of this view against

it.

accounts and methods makes up

rival

project for education in the early Socratic dialogues.

l l rl Cpnnecting Philosophy an d Education with
.

Existing scholarship

on

Plato's theory of education largely ignores the earliest

dialogues, but the intimate connection Plato

widely recognized. Field (1930,

saw between philosophy and education

p. 18) says Plato

"was before anything

is

else a teacher."

Friedlander (1958, p. 85) suggests that Plato inherited philosophy and education
as a

connected whole from Socrates. In many ways, Plato's works cany on Socrates'
educational mission. Even scholars

who

concentrate on the Republic and

acknowledged that the educational theories expressed
elsewhere in Plato.
focus well beyond

Nettleship's

its

works reverberate

Theoiy ofEducation in Plato's Republic widens

namesake dialogue, concluding

philosophy

for Plato just

and Laws

are educational treatises

is

in these

Laws have

at

its

one point that the study of

"true education" (1935, p. 155).

Noting that the Republic

on education w'hich perform the very

services they

examine. Lodge (1947, p. 169) asks, "And as to the other dialogues, of which of them
not the same statement approximately true?"

In his comprehensive

is

work on Greek

education, Paideia. Jaeger (1943, p. 85) concurs, concluding that Plato always focused

"on the problem of the philosophical assumptions underlying

all

education."

Havelock and more recently Robb recognize a connection between
dissatisfaction with traditional education

Republic.

and

his

famous attack on poetry

Interpreting the attack in light of research

Homeric epic

in

Greek education, they see

it

on the

of thinking"

(Robb 1994,

in the

roles of literacy, orality,

and

not as an aberration, but as a reasoned move

against the "custodians of the traditional Hellenic paideia"

shoddy forms

Plato's

p. 173).

2

and "perpetuators

of the

Explains Havelock (1963, p. 12),

"Once

It IS

appreciated that the poets are central to the educational
apparatus, the

successive critiques of poetry

into place." Plato recognizes

fall

and

criticizes the

educational use of poetry in the earliest dialogues as well.

The few commentators who venture beyond the Republic and
Plato

educational theory

s

still

Protagoras and Goigias.

gravitate

in

examining

toward the more complex early works: Meno,

While Teloh’s Socratic Education in Platons Early Dialogues

focuses on Socrates the teacher rather than Plato the educational
theorist,

it still

recognizes the educational theme of several early dialogues, concluding
that "what does

hold together these dialogues

The

real

is

a picture of Socrates the educator" (Teloh, 1986, p.

educator in these early dialogues, however,

character of Socrates to breathe educational

The

fact that research

on

life

is

Plato,

into the

who

medium

brilliantly

3).

develops the

of literature.

Plato's educational theory has virtually ignored the earliest

dialogues reveals a failure to recognize the importance of arete in ancient Greek

educational theory.
illustrated at

Arete was the traditional goal of education

Euthydemus 273d where

arete a "godsend"

Socrates calls the sophists' alleged ability to teach

and declares himself and

all his

friends in

accepts arete as the proper goal of education but has his

how

it

might be achieved. Hence the

prescribe philosophy as a

and education together
working on

^

its

earliest

Whenever

it.

Arete

arete

own

instruction.^ Plato

ideas about

what

it is

and

is

is

the glue that binds philosophy

discussed in the dialogues, Plato

is

his theory of education.^

translation of arete as 'virtue' has contributed to the tendency to

educational significance. Alternative translations such as 'excellence', and

For more on arete as the goal of education see:

^This

need of

dialogues seek to define arete and

for achieving

for Plato.

The conventional
overlook

means

in ancient Greece, as

is

recognized by Grube (1980, ch.

7).

3

Hippias Major 283

-

284; and Tiniaeus 87b.

'goodness' better suggest the role of an educational
objective/ In fact, agathos [ayaQoq,

good]

is

the adjective corresponding to the noun arete and
the idea that education

should produce good people

is

anything but controversial.

Socrates agree that they want Cleinias' education to

275a and 282e, they

had everything
quality

to

reinforce the idea that he

do with performing good

which enables a person

to

as the "desire for beautiful things

do good
and the

is

When the sophists and

make him agathos

to acquire arete.

actions, arete

things.^

is

Indeed

at

Euthydemus

Since being agathos

profitably understood as that

Meno

defines aiete at 77b

ability to attain them." This ancient

Greek

connection between arete and the making of good choices and doing of good actions

shows the scholarly description
that arete

was the

of the early dialogues as ethical to be accurate.

central goal of education,

shows these

The

fact

ethical dialogues to be an

integral part of Plato's educational project.

Every educational theory had

its

own

idea of

what arete

and how

is

it

can be

acquired. Plato criticizes these theories in the earliest dialogues then reestablishes arete
as excellence of the soul

for Plato there

was

and

really

prescribes philosophy as the

no important

As the

great philosopher of education

Plato,

"However

far apart

their beginnings they

were

ancient and modern alike,

distinction

means

for achieving

p.

30) said in lecturing on

philosophy and educational theory may

when he

Hence,

between education and philosophy.^

John Dewey (1993,

Perhaps Plato

strictly identical."

it.

is

later

have become,

in

addressing his readers,

has Laches say to Lysimachus:

"

'Marrou (1956, p. 1 1) calls the translation of arete as 'virtue' "ludicrous," preferring 'valor' in the
chivalric sense of the word — the quality of the hero." Nettleship (1935, p. 146) explains arete as doing one's
specific work well. Field (1930, p. 103) secs arete simply as the noun corresponding the adjective 'good'.
Vlastos, (1991, p. 210 - 21 1) explains Socrates' principle of the sovereignty of virtue as the making
^

of

good choices. Sec

also

‘Jaeger (1943,

p.

ApoJogv 28b, and Crito 48cd.
85) says Plato's philosophy seeks a solution to the problem of educating people.
4

Tm

surprised that you're asking us for advice
on your sons' education and you
arent asking Socrates here
(^Laches. 180bc)^
.

LI -2 The

.

.

His torical Motivation for Plato's Prniprt

That Plato's early philosophical thought should focus on
education was made nearly
inevitable by his historical circumstances.
a time

when Greek education was

social

and

political

athletic field

assembly.

As

fate

would have

it,

Plato

came

already at a crossroads, struggling to adapt to massive

changes in Athens.®

Heroic performances on the battlefield and

were losing importance compared with eloquent performances

As education became

of age during

in the

available to more than the aristocracy, the battle raged

over whether arete could be taught. Meanwhile, the sophists arrived
hawking education

designed to win glory in the
inherited

trait to

a

new Athens. Aiete seemed

commodity

becoming widespread and

it

for sale in the agora.

to go from

an

At the same time,

aristocratically

literacy

was

looked as though the future of education would revolve

around the written rather than the spoken word. For Plato, these changes pointed

to a

moral relativism that threatened (and perhaps eventually destroyed) Athens. Education

was important
It

to Plato because arete

would be

many of

was such an obvious

social priority.

a mistake to paint Plato as a complete educational revolutionary since

his efforts

aimed to preserve threatened educational

traditions.

Although he

disdained the aristocrats' emphasis on reputation and physical appearance, Plato
cherished their tradition of sunousia (a\)VO\)aia, association, mentoring). Similarly, he

approved of Homer's attempt to provide moral standards but he disapproved of the

Homeric

criteria for arete

and the way poetry was used

to indoctrinate youth. Finally,

Plato shared the sophists' intellectualism, but he sensed that they lacked worthwhile
Laches in this chapter arc by Lane (1987) unless otherwise noted.
noted by several classical scholars including: Beck (1964), Havelock (1963), Robb (1994),

^All translations of

“This fact

Kagan (1991

),

is

Dover (1974), Marrou (1956), and

Field (1930).
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standards and balked from their attempts to
Plato's educational project so innovative
effort to preserve the best aspects of

Plato's worries

about the

sell

was

arete as a commodity.

What made

that he adapted rising technology in an

educational traditions.

state of

Greek education were part of a widely-held

concern about moral decline in Athens, especially among
the youth.^ Part of the problem

stemmed from democratic reforms
state

and

less

requiring more time to be spent on the affairs of the

on the care and education

laments in the Laches

of the youth, as the concerned father

Lysimachus

:

Now, we have decided

to take these boys in hand, in so far as

we

possibly can,

and not — as most parents do when their children have reached their teens — let
them do whatever they want; now is the time to start doing our utmost to take care
of them
we blame our fathers for allowing us to run wild once we became
.

.

.

teenagers, while they were busy with other people's affairs. (179b-d)

The general Laches

agrees at

180b

that neglect of the children

is

a

problem

for

"everyone

involved in the affairs of our state" and then points to Socrates as one of the few elders

who

still tries

youths

who

to improve the youth. Ironically, Socrates' Platonic interlocutors include

later

go bad. As

I

argue below, however, these dialogues reveal the youths'

moral flaws rather than Socrates' apparent failure as a teacher. The problem, as Plato saw
it,

was

that there wasn't

enough

of Socrates to go around.

A second problem precipitated by democratic reform and the rise of the sophists was
the erosion of moral standards derived from epic and myth.
writing

enhanced the accuracy

inconsistencies

and eroded

The advent

of verse

of preserved poetry, but that accuracy revealed

its reliability

as a moral guide.

Both Protagoras

and then

its

(at

339

-

’Field (1930, p. 116) notes happily that this moral decline spawned some great contributions to ethics.
‘“Dover (1974, p. 130): "It was recognized that poets had from the very first told many irreconcilable
versions of the same myth, so that mythology in their hands had always been a creative art, not the transmission
of a sacrosanct tradition with different embellishments."

current needs [Plato]
in

order to reject

it

was content

See also Havelock (1963,

p. 97): "In

the context of

to identify the previous functional role of poetry with clarity and

as a dangerous obstacle to intellectual progress."
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vehemence

347) and Socrates

Meno

(at

95

-

poets' reliability as moral guides.

reports of contradictions

96) point out poetic contradictions to challenge
the

Worse than the

among the Gods which

decline in Plato's Athens."

poets'

own

contributed to widespread religious

among the

gods.

Euthyphro's conviction of his rightness, a characteristic
is

common

further evidence of the religious decline.
Explains

the Greeks had a keen sense of

human

fallibility

think of superhuman powers as reacting against

in Socrates'

Dover (1974,

Yet Euthyphro, Plato's most religious character,

human

success "had the great advantage

is

so convinced of his

he doesn't ponder the consequences of unjustly prosecuting his

father.

own

own

fallibility

despite the oracle's declaration that he

keen respect

for the limits of

is

rightness."

rightness that

While Plato does

not explicitly associate the infallible with the divine, he clearly makes
an

human

p. 133),

which, combined with the tendency to

of tending to discourage in the individual unshakable
conviction of his

early dialogues to contrast

their

Socrates comes out at Euthyphro 6bc as
seriously doubting

the poetic accounts of enmity

interlocutors,

was

contradictions

effort in the

with the ideal. Socrates' avow'al of ignorance,

wisest

among men ( Apology

21a),

shows

a

human knowledge.

While Athenian doubts about poetry and myth may have been well founded, they
left

a moral

vacuum

that

was

filled

with the volatile replacement of mass opinion.

Socrates and Plato are legendary in their disdain for hoi polJoi [oi TCO^^oi, the many].
In Laches,

Socrates expressly rejects the recommendations of the multitude:

Yes, because

I

think that

if

a decision

is

to be

on the basis of knowledge and not numbers

The problem with hoipolio!

is

p.

52) says

properly, then

it

must be made

a majority]. (184e)

that they are easily influenced by clever arguments

emotional appeals. The sophists,
"Dcspland (1985,

made

[i.e.

in fact, specialized in

Apology shows

teaching

skills

and

such as rhetoric

the "moral bankruptcy of the traditional religious ethos."
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and enstic

specifically designed to influence the masses

Athens. Plato makes the situation tragically clear

blames

his conviction

Socrates' trial

Athens was

in

at

and so win favor

new

in the

Apology' 38d, where Socrates

on an unwillingness to sway the massive jury
by emotional means.

and conviction was perhaps the most powerful
indication

need of educational reform.

But

several factors converged to

to Plato that

make

the age

during which Plato lived and wrote a time of great
educational change in Greece.^^
Historical events such as democratic reforms, the rise of
literacy, the demise of religion,

and the

arrival of the sophists,

combined

to produce a moral crisis

and doubts about

education in ancient Athens. As the flawed dogmatism of the
poets was giving way to the
pragmatic relativism of the sophists, Plato saw that

crisis spiraling

system had failed to support cultural change and a

new system was needed.

what

role Plato

played

in

out of control. The old

We can see

educational change by exploring the role educational change

plays in Plato's early dialogues.

1.1.3

The Mythopoetic
The towering

Ideal of Arete

figure in the history of

communication and

cultural unity,

Greek education, indeed

in the history of

was Homer. Since Homer's poetry was understood

and shared by nearly every Greek tribe long before they could understand each
dialects,

it

Greek

other's

gave Greece a cultural and moral uniformity long before such a thing seemed

possible.^^ Furthermore, epic poetry provided moral leadership

ancient Greece.

and

ethical standards in

A fragment from Xenophanes of Colophon (ca. 550 b.c.) reveals this

‘^Beck (1964,

p.

313)

450

calls

350

-

b.c.

an era of educational revolution. "In

this period, the

emerging

educational trends of the previous thousand years crystallized into their definitive form... Mythopoetic thought

has given

way

to philosophic exposition

‘^Plato’s eventual theory of

(1930,

p.

116) says Plato

was

"See Robb (1994,

just

p. 54):

."
.

forms

.

may

also be profitably interpreted as a response to this crisis. Field

one of many "laboring

"No

to inculcate a respect, pan-Hellenic

to rediscover

some standard

of right conduct."

small part of the function of the Odyssey as paideia

and deeply

felt,

for the institution of xenia. "

8

in oral

Greece was

function proclaiming that, "Since the beginning
from Homer,

conduct.

own

The prevalence

all

have learned proper

of poetic quotations in the ethical conversations
of Plato's

dialogues only confirms epic's role as the ethical touchstone
of Ancient Greece.'^

Promoters of musical education thought that ai^te could
be achieved by following
the example of epical heroes,^^ Several of Plato's
characters appeal to epical precedent or

memorized verse when considering an

phenomenon

is

ethical matter.

The most famous example

of this

Euthyphro's m)rthopoetic belief that he should prosecute his father:

For these same people worship Zeus as the best and most righteous of
the gods.
agree that he put his own father in bonds for unjustly swallowing his

They

children; yes,

and that

reasons. Yet

me

that father

had

in turn castrated his father for similar

they are angry at for indicting my father for his injustice. So they
contradict themselves: they say one thing about the gods and another about me.
(

Euthyphro 5e

-

6b)^®

Strangely, Euthyphro never bothers to question the story about Zeus, nor does he worry
that the analogy

between Zeus' situation and

confidence in treating a myth

like

-

own

might not hold. Socrates mocks his

knowledge, but Euthyphro's attitude was a normal

consequence of the way poetry was used

At Protagoras 325d

his

in education.

326a, the role of poetry in education

is

explained:

and when the boys have learned their letters and are ready to understand the
word as formerly the spoken, [their teachers] set the works of good poets
before them on their desks to read and make them learn them by heart, poems
containing much admonition and many stories, eulogies, and panegyrics of the
good men of old, so that the child may be inspired to imitate them and long to be
.

.

.

written

like them.*’

Quote IS Robb's translation from J. Lcsher, Xenophanes of Cohphon: Fragments (Toronto, 1992).
Sec Robb (1994, p. 81-2). Sec also Marrou (1956, p.lO) and Kagan (1991, p. 20-21); "Homer wais the fountain
of wisdom and the model of Greek behavior."
“Havelock (1963, p. 43): "If Plato could deal with poetry as though it were a kind of reference library'
vast
tractate in ethics and politics and warfare and the like, he is reporting its immemorial function in an
or as a
oral culture and testifying to the fact that this remained its function in Greek society down to his own day."
'^Scc, for example, Protagoras 325d - 326a.
“All translations of Euthyphro and Apology are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise noted.
“All translations of Protagoras are by Guthrie (1956).
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Homenc verse was

recited to

heroic models they

would be compelled

[u.lM-'naiq, imitation]

and memorized by schoolboys

was renowned

account of the education of his
effectiveness of

mimesis

(in

own

to imitate. This

education because of the ivay

it

way of teaching

for its effectiveness^®

via

them with
mimesis

and reinforced by Homer's

Although Plato acknowledges the

heroes.^^

Repubiic IH,

in order to present

for example),

works on the

he

criticizes

it

heavily as moral

soul:

There

is a third form of possession or madness,
of which the muses are the source.
This seizes a tender, virgin soul and stimulates it to rapt
passionate expression,

especially in lyric poetry, glorif>ang the countless mighty deeds
of ancient times for
the instruction of posterity. Phaedrus 245a)^^
(

Poetry influences the emotional part of the soul, bringing
aesthetic rapture

and therefore bypassing

and memorization exacerbates
performance of the
offers vivid

critical reason.

that problem

stories rather

and compelling examples, but they

as educators. Plato

whose

role as entertainers

makes the absurdity

p.

less

drifted further from the world of

and

true

less effective.

aim was to please

their audience.^^

brought into question their ulterior motives

of this situation clear in the Ion,

rhapsode readily admits that he appeals to

^“Robb (1994,
education and control.

indoctrination

are fbced in the circumstances of another

As Athens

In addition, poets were stoiytellers

and rhapsodes'

The emphasis on

by pushing wholesale acceptance and

Odysseus, the analogies stretched and became

poets'

audience into a state of

than analysis and discussion. As an ethical guide poetry

time and of dubious help as reference.

The

its

his listeners'

where the

emotions to draw them

in

and

33) calls epical verse "a complex and surpassingly successful discourse of social

The

later

Greek word

for this

phenomenon was

paideia,

a near perfect choice [since]

paideia involves an unconscious, willing acceptance of ancestral models, even as a pais,

on

his

male

best athletes.
telling."

a boy, models himself
most admired peers, normally the best warriors or
a process as old as our species and, .especially for adolescent males, effective beyond

elders, his father and his older brothers,
It is

See also Jaeger (1939, p. 310).
At Iliad ix 524 ff., for example, Achilles'

him dunng a

and

his

tutor Cheiron tells the story of a mythic

battle.

“All translations of Phaedrus are by Hackforth (1952) unless otherwise noted.
“a similar point is made by Beck (1964, p. 205).
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warnor

to counsel

transmit his message almost subliminally.
his ability to

Ion

is

not bashful about acknowledging that

manipulate emotions directly affects his income:

At each performance,

weep and look

at

me

down on them from up there on the platform as they
with dire emotion in their eyes, in amazement
at my stoiy.
I

look

^
attention to them - since if I make them
ciy I shall
the bank, whereas if I provoke their
laughter, it's I who'll do
the crying, for loss of money. (
SSSe)^'*
1

Even

if

augh

n’
all

the

way to

the poet or rhapsode's message comes through
him from the god, he

analyze the message and unwilling to
its

field questions.

The

verse

is

is

unable to

accepted as doctrine,

authority unquestioned.

Poetry hadn't always been so unyielding.
to preserve the ideals of

In

its

oral form,

Homeric poetry managed

while simultaneously letting them evolve.^®

Oral stories

designed to indoctrinate morally are normally changed by the speaker
to be most relevant
to their intended target.

and the hero

and remain
in

A grandfather emphasizes the similarities between his grandson

of his bedtime story. This technique allows the ethical examples
to evolve

relevant to successive generations. Writing a story

time and stops the evolution that keeps

began when the epic was
accuracy.

The advent

set to verse

of writing

relevant. For

which made

it

now threatened

Homeric verse was surely among the
it's

it

first

down, however,

Homeric poetry,

freezes

it

this process

easy to memorize and recite with

to grind the process to a halt.

of lengthy things to be written

down, but

transmission, like most of the rest of Greek education, remained primarily oral even

into Plato's day.^^ In fact, Plato's attack

All translations of

on mousike

[fiOtiaiKT),

music

--

which includes

Jon arc by Saunders (1987) unless otherwise noted.

(1964, p. 32 - 33) calls Homer "both conservative and progressive - conservative inasmuch as
the older standards tended to become embedded in the formulae of the epos, and progressive in the sense that

“Beck

newly evolving standards also found their place, in some cases displacing, in others existing with, the old."
“See Havelock (1963, p. 43).
“Kagan (1991, p. 162): "Most citizens could read to some degree, but there was not much to read, and
they did not read much. Most learning took place by listening to speeches, usucilly in poetic meter, or by seeing
what there was to sec. The Athenians heard rhapsodes sing Homer's epics, choruses and individuals sing lyric
and elegiac poetry, and they saw and heard tragedies and comedies, which involved speech, song, and dance."
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poetry] in the Republic

still

used

for

moral indoctrination.^* Additionally, while the
existence of writing allowed

the stories to be written
setting

evidence that the rhythmic recitation of
Homeric verse was

is

poems

down and memorized

with even more accuracy and precision,

to music helped to bypass the critical intellect
during the educational

process:

The music-masters by analogous methods

[to the school masters who make the
children learn epic poetry by heart] instill self-control
[aco(ppocTV)vr|c;] and deter
the young from evil-doing; and when they have learned to
play the lyre, they teach
them the work of good poets of another sort, namely the lyrical, which
they

accompany on the lyre, familiarizing the minds [dvayKOt^ODaiv oiKeio\)CT0ai
xaiq v|/v^aT(;] of the children with the rhythms and melodies. By this means
they
become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so
more capable

in

whatever they say or do;

are essential to the

whole

of

human

Note that anangkazo [dvayKOC^co] means
oikeio [OIKBIOCO] means "to

make

graphically replaced by 'forced to

life.

for

rhythm and harmonious adjustment
326ab)

( Protagoras

"to force, compel, or constrain;" while

one's own." Guthrie's 'familiarize'

make

may be more

one's own' or 'forced to accept'. This

method

of

teaching morality via absorption and performance of epical stories was effective and

hence accepted despite

its

and the Platonic method

drawbacks. The Socratic idea of teaching by asking questions

of writing dialogue, were drastic revisions to this poetic

tradition.

1.1.4

The

Aristocratic Tradition

In addition to destroying the adaptability of educational poetry, the rising tide of

literacy threatened to

sweep away two

aristocratic educational traditions that Plato

to preserve: the educational mentoring called sunous/a

known

as the

^®See

symposion

Robb

[cri)|i7c6aiov,

and the roundtable discussion

symposium]. Plato worried that the act of

(1994), p. 191.

12

hoped

discussing issues with one's mentors or peers
would be replaced by the solitary act of
reading.

As much

as

was

possible, however, Plato attempted to
adapt

these traditions into his reforms^’

and, as

far as

Where

we know,

they survived

in Plato's dialogues

academy

at his

Plato disagreed with the aristocrats was on their
conception of arete.

championed the
schooling.^^

Sunousia and symposia survive

and incorporate

aristocratic

The

view that arete was acquired through bloodlines and
not

aristocrats therefore believed that education could

help a nobleman achieve his destiny; hence

was sympathetic

to

Pindar

some aspects

all

do

more than

little

others should be excluded.^^

of aristocratic education, his focus

While Plato

on the excellence

of

the soul rather than the excellence of the body sets him apart.

The

aristocrats

go so

body. As Marrou (1956,

far as ic

p.

connect the arete of a

the moral aspect of being good (agatkos

He

This concept

[Lysis]

was

is

criticized in

Upon

it

clear,

is

with a reverence

)

for

and good."

rather

is

ff.)

and

206c:

L}sis,

interested in the beauty of souls not bodies.

face

and look

at

it

and hearing others remark

rather than his

” Ironically Socrates and Plato are both responsible
familial

and

tribal circle

and

that the

his soul

and

body (154de). The constant

for eroding the traditions of

sunousia since they

initiated the institutionalization of education in

Academy. See Robb (1994, p. 35 and 204).
Robb(1994, p. 35)
"'See Pindar, Nc/ncans (111,57-8); Oiympics (VIII, 59-61); P^ihian Odes (II, 131,
”See Marrou (1956, p. 40),Perk.inson (1980, p. 5), and Jaeger (1939, ch.lO).
Still

combined

being physically beautiful

even greater, Socrates inquires about the beauty of

removed education from the

It

and deserved to be called not just
handsome and good [KCxXog xe KOtyaOog].^^

young Charmides’

suggests that they strip that

Athens.

beautiful

both Charmides (157

however, that he

seeing the beauty of

beauty of his body

man both

easily the best looking,

handsome [KoXog] but
Socrates makes

with the beauty of his

44) explains, the central ideal of aristocratic education was

kalokagathia [KOt^tomyaeia] or "being a

or kaJos.

man

Plato retained both traditions in his

’"See

”AI1 translations of Lysis are by Watt (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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176).

reminders that Socrates lacked physical beauty
despite the beauty of his soul further
betray Plato's disagreement with the ideal of
kaJokagathia.

Plato appears to agree with the aristocratic idea that
a man's arete manifests
battle,

however, since

sign of his arete.

arete,

Laches 181ab

at

There

a crucial difference between a

is

and what merely appears

appearances and

fails to

Socrates' past performance in battle

to be a

good

act.

The

good action

aristocratic ideal focuses

distinguish between a good reputation

and

gave way to the athletic

and a

truly

belief that

and as the

common

athletic ideal

political arena

gave

when the

was taking hold

a political one, the ambition to

itself

in Athens,^^

do well

in the

supplanted the desire for glory in battle or on the athletic field.” But the

political arete

made

the same mistake that the heroic and athletic ideals had:

confused the appearance of arete with
describes sophrosune in terms of

its

its

true existence in the soul.

in logical knots before

an audience.^* While he

’^See, for example, Alcibiades'

has the images of gods within

(

Charmides

it

first

outward appearance as quietness (159b).

Euthydemus and Dionysodorous think they can teach

up

good man.

Olympic Games.^^

citizens could achieve arete

way to

on

arena where arete would manifest

athletes of lesser birth arrived victorious at the

The

new

field as the

taken as a

resulting from true

Aristocrats themselves found their theory self-contradictory, however,
battlefield

is

itself in

arete by showing

how to tie

a

man

tried to preserve the aristocratic

comparison of Socrates to a silene statue that

is

ugly on the outside but

Symposium, 215ab)..

arete with the cast of characters in the Laches. The
were prominent generals, both of whom eventually died in battle. Lysimachus
94a) to have been given the best education his city could provide while Melesias is said to

Plato illustrates this changing of the guard of

oldest pair, Nicias and Laches,

reputed

(at

Meno

have been trained as a top wrestler; but both men lament their
’‘Jaeger (1939, p. 239, 275) sees dramatic evidence of

failure to pass arete genetically to their sons.
this fact in the plays of

Aeschylus and

Sophocles: "Aeschylus connects Pindar and Plato; his plays are an educational depiction of how a noble spirit
could be reborn in the new spirit of freedom... Sophocles taught through his plays by painting a cultural (as

opposed to

aristocratic) ideal in his characters. TTiis reflected the attempt to deliberately form

human

character."

” See Marrou (1956, p. 470): Political power turned out to be much greater than the physical strength
which the athlete and warrior were esteemed and politics became "the noblest, the most highly prized
activity in the eyes of every Greek, the ultimate aim of his ambition." See also Protagoras 316b, 319a.
for

”See

for

example ( Euthydemus, 278b)
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is

tradition of sunousta.

Plato straggled to shift the conception of
arete

appearance. The whole culture of looking

away from

for arete externally is

an

techne [te^VTl,

and made

aristocratic tradition

Plato lobbied hard to overturn.

1.1.5

The Sophistic Revolution
The

teaching

sophists connected ^rete with

it

for a price.^^

through practical
aristocratic

skills like rhetoric,

was

a business of

Since social, political, and financial success could be
achieved

such

skills

were taken to yield

and poetic connection between arete and

interpretation

skill]

reputation, the sophistic

a natural development. Plato viewed the connection

appearance and techne as a mistake, however, and
confused social success and skillfulness with
sophistical skills as education in the

arete.

Given the

arete.

felt

between

that these traditions erroneously

Socrates harshly criticizes

Euthydemus:

These things are the frivolous part of study (which is why I also tell you that the
men are jesting); and I call these things "frivolity" because even if a man were to
learn many or even all such things, he would be none the wiser as to how matters
stand but would only be able to make fun of people, tripping them up and
overturning them by means of the distinctions in words, just like the people
pull the chair out from under a
gleefully

The center

when they see him

man who

461

b.c.

was

right to speak,

^’Sce, for example,

sit
(

down and

training in oratory.

Almost

few possessed the

skill

skills

278b)^*

directly as a

to settle all

became invaluable. While

and confidence

who

then laugh

Euthydemus

which empowered the assembly

matters of public policy by decree, rhetorical

had the

going to

sprawling on his back.

of a sophistic education

result of Ephialtes reforms in

is

all

to exercise this

major

citizens

power the

Protagoras 249a.

Beck, (1964, p.296) explains that rhetoric was the favored subject of Plato’s chief
educational rival: Isocrates. "Throughout his whole career Isocrates never ceased to proclaim the pnmacy or
rhetoric to all other forms of intellectual training, conceding with increasing years a provisional value only to
philosophy, as a preparation for the study of rhetoric. Plato's view of the place of philosophy was equally
resolute, but he does appear to have become more tolerant to the teaching of rhetoric in the Academy toward
^“Frederick.

the latter part of his

life,

and

^‘All translations of

this change was no doubt influenced by the obvious success of Isocrates' school.”
Eut/iydowus are by Sprague (1992) unless otherwise noted.
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fullest.

The

could (and

sophists taught

still

effectively.

A good speaker

can) manipulate his audience and so greatly
influence public policy.

may even persuade
So he

how to speak confidently and

the assembly or a jury

you

away from the

truth, as

He

Euthyphro recognizes:

making innovations in religious matters and hales you into
knowing full well how easily such things are misrepresented
the multitude. ( Euthyphro 3bc)
indicts

for

court to slander you,
to

The very

fact that Socrates

Apology 38de shows

must defend

fact.

Predictably, a

p. 33,

speech despite

its

weakness

in court at

that Athenians simultaneously recognized the moral
hollowness of

letting persuasion outdistance truth

gained from this

his honest

and the undeniable

Ultimately, persuasion

skill

fact that great

was more powerful than

power could be
truth.

more powerful than truth did not come cheaply. Marrou (1956,

49) notes that Protagoras charged ten thousand drachmas, one drachma being

equivalent to a

fair daily

wage,

for a three to four year course.

the aristocrats had been that the

man who made

Although the opinion

of

a business out of teaching should be

despised, the cost of a sophistic education indirectly validated their idea that knowledge

should be reserved for the

elite

few. Plato rarely misses a chance to contrast Socrates'

poverty and refusal to accept payment with the sophists' greed.
speculate that his indictment

is

partly based

on

his refusal to

Socrates goes so far as to

be selective about his

pupils:

But

I

out in

my own generosity is such that they think I am willing to pour myself
speech to any man — not only without pay, but glad to pay myself if only

fear

someone

will listen.

(

Euthyphro 3d)

Although competition eventually brought

prices

down,

continued to compromise the sophists' educational goals.

free

market pressures

A sophist's success depended

heavily on his ability to persuade people to pay for his course. Sophists did their
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own

advertising; they

As Marrou (1956,

their services.

omniscience,

would go out and

infallibility, or

Truth doesn't matter

air."

doubt has sophists
There

are,

p.

49

you

see,

-

much when

their skill

and sold

50) points out, a sophist was not beyond claiming

"pronouncing

mind when he

in

sample lectures that displayed

offer

his decisions from a throne high

the ultimate goal

is

getting paid.

up

in the

Lysimachus no

says:

some people who

scoff at

men

like yourselves,

and

if

someone

asks for advice, they won't say what they really believe.
They aim at what they
think the person consulting them wants to hear, and offer
him something quite
different from their real opinion. {l3cJies 178ab)

It

was not so much the sheer pragmatism

of the sophistic education that irked Plato.

Rather he was worried about the relativism engendered by the "might

The sophists

insisted

on the moral neutrality of

precisely the objective of education for arete.
ideals

made

their tuition,

The fading

of

right " attitude."^

yet moral guidance

Homeric and

is

aristocratic

the need for moral guidance urgent, but the sophists contributed to the

growing relativism. Plato recognized that he lived
could, "like tyrants, put to death any

banish whomsoever

it

seems best"

(

man

they

Goigias

in a

will,

world where good rhetoricians

and deprive

of their fortunes

would be based on something he shared with the

the sophists, Plato rejected the idea that
aristocratic inheritance

it

and

466c).'’^

Ironically, Plato's attempt to reshape the conception of arete

pursuits

is

was impossible

and

direct moral

sophists; intellectualism. Like

to acquire arete except

and agreed with what Jaeger (1939,

p.

287)

by

calls the central

claim of the sophistic movement: "that arete should be founded on knowledge and not
blood." In his attempt to

awaken minds

etherized by the rhythmic indoctrination of

^^See Hippias Minor 368bd, Corgias 447c, 448a., and Protagoras 315c.
^^Contrast

Beck (1964,

p.

199)

who

takes Plato to be as relativistic as the sophists.

^^Sce Crorgias 456d. where the teacher
Isocrates uses a similar argument at

is

not to blame for the misuse of the rhetoric he teaches.

Antidosjs 252.

All translations of Gorgias are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise noted.
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mythopoetic education, Plato holds up the sophistic model
of a techne or
skill

that allows a person to judge particulars.

distinguishing

both

moral from technical knowledge

greatness

its

Where

and our own ignorance

of

(i.e.

Once

it.

intellectual

Plato departs from the sophists
of rhetoric)

is

in

and acknowledging

this deficiency

is

recognized, the

philosophical pursuit of arete, directed by an ideal conception of the
good, can begin.

L2

Plato's Educational Objective s in the Rarliest Dialog ues

There are three key components

in Plato's project for

educational reform: Awaken,

Acknowledge, and Aim. Since Plato sees arete as perfection of the soul which
individual

is

unique and therefore cannot be taught

self-determination.

The

first

task

assumption of moral knowledge
Poetry and technical

is

awaken

to

in order to

the

engage

directly, his project will

mind from the rapture
it

actively in inquiry

quotes verse and praises craftsmen

in his

argument.

He

insists,

and

analysis.

however, that verse be

questioned and analyzed and that his interlocutors represent their
those borrowed from poets or anyone

human

emphasize

of poetry

and

each

not disdained in the early dialogues; Socrates frequently

skills are

acknowledged as a moral

for

else.

Second, Plato

ideal connected to

own

beliefs rather

insists that arete

than

be

knowledge rather than reputation, and that

beings acknowledge their ignorance with respect to that ideal. Once the greatness

of arete

and the deficiency

of

than teach the student to aim
in its literal sense --

is

human

for

beings

is

acknowledged, education can do no more

wisdom. The love and pursuit

Plato's educational ideal.
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of

wisdom

— philosophy

Awa kening the Mind; The

1.2. 1

As

I

explained above, Plato had serious doubts about
the use of poetry, an

artistically inspired creation

bothered him most was

aimed to enchant audiences, as moral education/^
What

how

poetry taught morality, namely by mimesis

of heroes. Unquestionably, this

it

Release from Poetry

method

effectively inspires behavior; the

diminishes the agent’s ability to solve his

agent can

problems.

imitation

problem

To some

is

that

degree, the

separate himself from his idol and must rely on analogy
in making ethical

t

decisions.

own unique

- the

Even then he

can’t evaluate a situation

the story, and Plato makes

it

any

better than the poet

clear that poetic inspiration

who created

by nature mindless.^^ The

is

poets connection with the divine endows their verse with valuable meaning,
but that

meaning must be approached through analysis and

When

poetry does appear in the early dialogues,

by Socrates asking the interlocutor to evaluate or
question their beliefs in light of poetic conflicts

scheme.

It

interpretation not acceptance.

makes poetry an

ally rather

is

it is

interpret

almost invariably accompanied
it.'*®

Asking interlocutors to

a proper use of poetry on Socrates’

than an obstacle in investigation. The mnemonic

techniques used in traditional poetic education, in contrast, effectively paralyzed the
critical

capacity of the mind. Socrates can’t

mnemonic

great

abilities to his

intellectual weakness.*®

own

The rhythm and rhyme

’‘Many commentators consider
(1956,

who

that

we

retain

them

is

uncritically

Plato's rejection of poetry hypocritical since

clearly tried to present a moral

’^See i^/7 534

it

is

of poetry or musical lyrics

highly

and with

he was a poet and
for example, Marrou

message by poetic means. See

p. 72).

as a form of rhetoric;

and

the chance to contrast Ion and Hippias’

’’forgetfulness” while in the process of revealing their

conducive to retaining them; the problem

dramatist himself

resist

is

it

ff.

Plato had similar fears about tragedy, says Irwin (1992, p. 68):

makes

written by writers

’’See Charmides

"He

criticizes tragedy

particular moral views appear attractive to the ignorant and irrational audience,

who do

not understamd the moral questions any better than their audiences do."

Lysis 2 12de, 214b, and 216a.

”See Ion 368d, and Hippias Minor 539e - 540a.
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nearly

no idea

of

what we

are learning.

Plato's

push

for rational inquiry entailed

an

attack on poetry as uncritically accepted
moral doctrine.^®
Greece’s attachment to

her secunty blanket.

by a

The

its

Homeric heroes was

ability to

irrational, like a child’s

absorb poetic paradigms was invariably accompanied

great capacity for action in accordance with
those paradigms, but the

individual reason

was absent from the equation. Greeks

dramatic heroes, and his ideals with

theirs.

chanot, cure the sick, and lead an army
things himself.^^

attachment to

Ion thinks

when

it’s

middleman

of

often confused the poet with his

Homer

unlikely that

has taught him to race a

Homer did any

of those

Other times Greeks used contradictory interpretations of verse to

construct an inconsistent moral belief system accepted on the authority
of the poet.^^

To wean Greece from

its

poetic security blanket, Plato needed to distinguish

individuals from their poetic idols and force them to take responsibility for their
moral
beliefs.” Interlocutors are asked to ”say

what they

believe"

and discouraged from

defending their views by appeal to authority. Socrates sardonically compliments a

confused Ion

them and

at

530bc

insists that

for his (non)ability to

understand the poets rather than just mimic

Hippias defend his beliefs rather than appeal to Homer’s authority:

let's leave Homer out of this, since it's impossible to question him about his
poetic intentions in these lines; but you can answer for Homer as well as yourself,
since you’re obviously undertaking the responsibility of doing so, and you agree

Well,

with Homer's words as you see them.

(

Hippias Minor 365cd)”

In his effort to distinguish an interlocutor's personal beliefs from the field of

information (including poetry and experience) from which he derives those beliefs, Plato

^“Havelock (1963,
possible by a

mechanism

p.

199) explains that Poetry’s "acceptance and retention are

situations and the stories related in performance.

powers be

fully

for

Only when the

spell is fully effective

can his mnemonic

xiii)

example, Protagoras 339

-

347, and

Mono

95

-

96.

what Havelock (1963, p. 201) calls "separating the knower from the known."
translations of Hippias Minor are by Waterfield (1987) unless otherwise noted.

think this
^^All

psychologically

mobilized.”

^‘Sce Jaeger (1943, p.

”Scc,

made

of self-surrender to the poetic performance and of self-identification with the

is
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employed the

tool of Socratic questioning

” Long

lectures

ideas going in one direction and leave their
audience
before receiving

it.

But

it

would be bad

little

and speeches keep the flow

of

time to reflect upon an idea

form, not to mention fruitless, to break
into a

speech or recitation of poetry and ask what a
certain statement means, as Socrates laments
at

Hippias Minor 364b. Once the conversation begins,
however, Socrates questions

Hippias'

own views

rather than those

prepared speeches (363bc). As

I

expounded by Homer (365cd)

show

in

Chapter

3,

or in Hippias’

Hippias’ interpretation of

turns out to reveal his personal confusion about arete,

but

it is

own

Homer

only through Socratic

questioning that this confusion emerges.

Ask any

electoral strategist

and you

will find that

people often base actions such as

voting or buying on poetic phrases like "Putting power back in the
hands of the American
People’’ or

"It’s

the right one

now" while being almost

those phrases mean. Of course they think they

Laches

at 190c,

totally at a loss to explain

know wLat

what

the phrases mean, but like

they are at a loss to explain them. The Socratic question asks

interlocutors to explain the principles

on which they base action.

When

principles are

swallowed whole with the sweetener of some poetic turn of phrase, the answerer often
can’t explain them.

escape.

The

Appeal

to poetic or even political authority

knowledge being perhaps the

1,2.2 Establishing Arete as

some ways,

greatest obstacle to inquiry.

Moral

Plato’s project for educational reform

intellectualism that swept through

erstwhile enemies the sophists

“For a

not an acceptable

Socratic question destroys the illusion of knowledge fostered by poetic

rapture; illusions of

In

is

similar observation see

all

Athens during

was

part of a larger

wave

his lifetime. Socrates, Plato,

and

of

their

shared the mantle of intellectualism with Xenophanes

Havelock (1963,

p.

21

234

-

235).

of

who W'as

Colophon,

perhaps the

new

with a

first

to challenge the traditional militaiy

and

athletic

based on the intellect.^ Although they
agreed that arete was of

the mind, they disagreed sharply over

how

it

should be achieved. Plato hoped to replace

the emotional pleasures of poetic education
with intellectual ones, but he found that

Greek minds, once denied the security blanket of
poetic
intellectual security of false conceit

Whereas Socrates seems

to

and hid behind

rapture, groped for the

that in their resistance to inquity.

draw immense pleasure from

his search for the truth, his

interlocutors often need to be goaded. Euthyphro's
"wealth of

lazy and soft

in discussion (lie)

while Laches

fails to

inquiry once he realizes that his expertise in this area
is

is

wisdom" (12a) makes him

show courage and endurance

being challenged (193e). Inquiry

pleasurable for Socrates because he has no false conceit of wisdom.
For the others

it is

wearing, because they are reluctant to give up the security of thinking
themselves wise
worse, their reputations for wisdom. Socrates lays out

however, insisting that
instances the

way

it

in

strict criteria for

enable a person to make reliable judgments

wisdom

or,

in Ion,

in particular

a craftsman can reliably judge instances of his craft.

This intellectual and technical conception of arete was favored by the sophists

connected arete with achievement

in practical skills like oratory

needed to show, however, that the formal

similarity

who

and shoemaking. Plato

between arete and techne does

not extend to equivalence, as the sophists would have

it.

For Plato, arete

is

a moral

achievement distinct from social and professional success. Hippias, however, confounds
the practical knowledge implied in a techne with the moral knowledge needed for arete

and so

finds himself with the paradoxical conclusion that a

good criminal

is

a

good

person. In the Hippias Minor Plato must establish a separate moral category.

^‘Scc Marrou (1956, pp. 46

”Sce

-

47).

section 3.1., below.
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If

(

Hippias’ confusion between being good
morally

techne

)

arete

)

and being good

seems naive, consider the sophistic approach
to education.

the sophists,

on

(

was one who succeeded

specific skills

(

technai

the sophists liked to point

)

new democracy, and

in the

at a craft

A good man, for

this success

depended

such as the ability to speak and argue persuasively.
Indeed

up

their

goodness by showing

how many different

technai

they had acquired.^® The sophists were intellectualist
because their society rewarded

mental

skill rather

than battlefield prowess or

aristocratic hentage, but they

arete with the appearance of or reputation for

Democracy encouraged

it.

seeking truth in the opinion of the many.®^

Since

popular esteem, and political power,

oratory could

The Charmides and Laches,
aristocratic

By

skill in

as

I

show

emphases on appearance and

in

skill in

Chapter

still

equated

this error

by

oratory could bring wealth,

make you

a good man.

4, criticize the sophistic

in the process reveal arete in a

and

new dimension.

pointing out that, for example, the techne a doctor uses to cure his patients
does not

enable him to decide whether

its

better for

them

to live or die, Plato distinguishes

technical knowledge from the kind of knowledge required for arete.

When the

exploration of the intellectual basis for two parts of arete leads to the same "knowledge
of

good and

sort of

evil," arete

knowledge

this

looks to be something unified.®^

could be, arete emerges as some

Finally,

new kind

when

it is

of ideal

asked what

and demands

reevaluation of the very concept of teaching.

1.2.3 Eliminating False Conceit

Like alcoholics
eradicate

it,

who must

admit their dependence before they can even begin to

Greeks needed to admit their ignorance with respect to arete

^®Sce, for example, Hippias Minor 368b, ff.

” Something specifically resisted by Socrates,

for

“See Laches 195cd.
‘'See Laches 195 ff., Charmides

Mena

174c, and
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example
87d.

at

Laches 184de.

in

its

moral

a

dimension before they could begin to pursue or even
understand

need

for

I

denchus
do seem

separate,
together.

in

education

it.

Plato explains the

Sophist 229c, where the Eleatic Stranger complains

at

to myself to see one very large and bad
sort of ignorance which is quite
and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts
of ignorance

put

When

a person supposes that he knows, and does
not
appears to be the great source of all the errors of the
intellect.^^

Such

:

.

.

false conceit

.

abounds

know;

this

in the dialogues. Interlocutors frequently
justify their actions

with epical precedent, the authority of poets or prophets or
scholars, or their

own

authority based on their beauty, bloodlines, or social success.

Socrates combats his interlocutors' complacency with questions,
asking them to

judge or defend the statements as

if

they were their own.^^ This was not an easy task since

the poetic statement by nature invites one to emotionally identify
with
repeat

it.

reflected

The
on

interlocutor has

its

meaning.

memorized

Wisdom

contests, or the approval of the

it

and can

parrot

it,

it

and then

to

but has never really

acquired by aristocratic inheritance, victories in

many, was equally unsecured by

eristic

When

reflection.

Socrates asks interlocutors to say what they mean, he abruptly disturbs the
self-satisfaction of

having memorized a story or achieved the reputation

Hippias, for example, quotes a passage from

between honesty and
concludes.

deceit. "It

Homer

wisdom.^^

as evidence for the difference

would be monstrous" not

to agree with the poet, he

Here Socrates forces Hippias to separate himself from Homer or

undergo questioning in Homer's name. Similarly,
his distinction

is

p.

208

-

Charmides 163b that

based on the writings of Hesiod

Sophist are by Comford (1935) unless otherwise noted.
example, Lysis 212de, 214b, 216a; Euthyphro 5e - 6b.

“Havelock (1963,

else to

to agree with Hesiod as well. His appeal to

^^All translations of

for

Critias reveals at

between making, doing, and working

and he expects every knowledgeable person

“Sec,

for

209) makes a similar point.
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poetic authority does not free him
from elenctic questioning, however.

another,

principles

all

One way

or

must be questioned and evaluated.

Showing the knowledge

that corresponds to arete to be
moral

producing judgment would have no educational
people that they hadn’t achieved

it.

Hence

effect unless Plato

and capable

could also convince

Plato’s insistence that the

many couldn’t

determine a person's arete evolved into a crusade
against doxa [56^a, opinion]
of a stncter kind of knowledge.^^

multitude,

it

Because doxa

is

number

could be changed by the performance of a

inquiry)

eternal,

of people believing that they

would be astronomical. For
and abstract enough

brilliant orator.

had knowledge (and

therefore

Plato, the truth about justice

to apply across time

in favor

only as stable as the whims of the

Worse,

if

judgments about knowledge could be made by the multitude
or even the knower
the

of

had

no need

herself,

for

to be fixed,

and space.

1.2.4 Dire cting the Pursuit of Arete

As

I

explained in section

1.1,

beginning to spin out of control.

Plato faced a world where the moral compass was

The discovery

paradigms obsolete and fostering relativism

who were

often foreigners themselves.

-

of other cultures

a doctrine

espoused especially by sophists

Hippias, for example, claimed to

nature of things" through wide and many-sided leaming.^^
justice could be based

surely did

its

part to

was rendering old

He

felt

on the observation of the customs of many

undermine poetic paradigms, but what

it

"know the

that a concept like

people.^^ This theory

offered in return

was too

doxa also reflects his concerns about poetr>'. Sec Havelock (1963, p. 250
doko are truly baffling to modern logic in their coverage of both the
subjective and objective relationship. [ Do.\a \ would appear therefore to be the ideal term to describe that
“Plato’s crusade against

251): "Both the noun and the verb

fusion or confusion of the subject with the object that occurred in the poetized performance and

mind created by
within

me

this

performance.

It is

the 'seeming

show

of things,’

or outside of me."

“Sec,

for

example, Hipp/as Minor 368b, ff.

“See Protagoras 337d;

also

Beck (1964,

pp. 183
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-

186)

whether

this

panorama

is

in

the state of

thought of as

unstable for Plato.

The idea

that justice

was

just the

sum

of

its

many worldly

manifestations did more to encourage the rejection
of any ideals than to foster better ones.

who

Like those
better than

any

criticize

modem

other, Plato

pushed

but not be divorced from them.

The

multiculturalists for holding that

analysis of arete in

for

some

He was

ideal that

no one ideology

is

would transcend worldly examples

looking for an ethical North Star.

Laches established

that moral

knowledge must be

eternal

(199bc) and universal (195a). This belief conflicted with poetic
and technical knowledge

which

shown

are

Ion and Laches to be applicable only to particular problems

in

particular situations.

materialism.

in

A higher ideal of knowledge was equally discouraged by

Whether the extreme view

that nothing at all exists except

what can be

touched, or weaker view that anything else has only a derivative and dependent
existence,
materialism challenged the push for ideals by eliminating

Plato

s

hopes

for ideal

knowledge were

all

but temporal objects.

by the prevalence of

similarly diminished

Protagorean relativism.^® Protagoras' educational doctrines included "man the measure"
or

metron anthropos which held that

reality

depends on man's measure of

it;®®

"the better

argument" or kreitton Jogos, which taught that man, mastering multiple propositions,
chooses the more advantageous as knowledge;’’® and the "twofold argument" or dissoi
Jogoi,

a relativistic doctrine. Plato also

rhetorical tricks

and unscrupulous use

saw skepticism inherent

of oratory. Eristic, for example,

finding truth to Plato but nothing more than a competitive

Although they

rallied

De Sophisticis EJenchis

‘*Beck(1964,

p.

“cf. TJieaetetus
^“cf.

game

mnemonics

into their

shows evidence

152- 155)
160a.

Theaetetus 167a.
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that

conniving

was

a

means

for

to the sophists.

with Plato against the memorization of

the sophists were not above integrating

Aristotle's

in the

own

Homer

for education,

pedagogical scheme.

some sophists had

their students

memonze

particular arguments for

can answer any question
skill

and against

- on which

particular theses. Hippias boasts that he

he has a lecture prepared (363d). His mnemonic

(alluded to at 368d) suggests that he had a good

in contrast, disdains

speeches and

insists

many such

lectures ready. Socrates,

on discussing the actual

interlocutors.

Knowledge

argument;

something to be loved, pursued, and recognized as

it is

is

not something to be memorized, or defended or w'on in

Just as he used dialogue to transcend the

communicate with

his

beliefs of his

medium

ideal.

of the written

word and

audience interactively, Plato needed to transcend the use of

ordinary language to communicate the nature of the ideal. Whereas poets
and rhapsodes

used language to enchant and indoctrinate youth, sophists and rhetoricians used
services

and sway audiences.

definition

failure of

their

shows language

By

contrast, Socrates' insistence

to be incapable of directly

conventional idea of what

The

communicating the

failed

push

suggests that arete

is

if

sort of thing arete

for definitions

having

it,

ideal.

arete,

The

to articulate

but also on the

is.

and standards,

as

I

show

in

Chapter

5,

ultimately

incapable of being possessed, articulated or taught by conventional

means. Even Socrates,

knowledge)

their actually

to sell

on explanation and

Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides, reputed possessors of

"knowledge" throws doubt not only on

it

whom

there ever

Plato sees as a mortal embodiment of arete (and

was one, can

neither say

what

it is

nor teach

it

to others.

It is

his

ideal conception of arete that leads Plato to reject the transmission theory of education

w’hether the teacher

-

transmitter be

Homer, Solon,^^ or even

Socrates.^^

The new

ideal of

^‘Despland (1985, p. 23) says the abuse of words had "become a social crisis and a moral problem."
” Solon filled his Elegies with moral injunctions designed to educate his fellow citizens by providing
them with an ethical authority. "It seems clear,” says Marrou [1956, p.42], "that he was looked upon as the
national spokesman — consider, for instance, the way he was quoted in the law courts and the Assembly by any
orator in need of authority, even by Clcophon and Demosthenes."

”Beck

(1964,

revolution of the

first

p. 197), says

This rejection of the transmission theory, "represents an educational

magnitude."
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arete

demands

a

new

ideal of education;

perhaps incrementally approached,

wage

battles against

if

one where knowledge

never actually achieved.

each other or they can use words,

one another, to pursue the

ideal. Socrates clearly

is

Men

in dialogical

had the

loved, pursued,

and

can use language to

communication with

latter intention.

Ultimately, Plato's purpose in reforming education with
philosophy

is

not to turn

everyone into a Socrates, or even into a philosopher in the academic
sense. Plato regards

philosophy

in its

most

literal

sense as the love and pursuit of wisdom. Plato's purpose

to use philosophy to mobilize the minds of Athens

is

which had been etherized from

thinking by the hypnotic rhythms of the Homeric rhapsode and sold by sophistry
on the
idea that quality of a man's character

Once mobilized,

is

determined by his performance

in the

assembly.

these minds could recognize arete as a unified intellectual ideal and so

the needles of their moral compasses

themselves and of their

rivals,^'*

would be

By

set.

asking questions, both of

these minds might ascend the path towards the ideal and

through their progress achieve practical

arete.

The

initial steps in this

ascent toward

arete form the educational theme of Plato's earliest dialogues.

1.2,5

Approaching

a

Popular Audience

For his educational project to have practical

audience

in a climate hostile to philosophy.

Apology,

Crito, Ion.

He

effect,

Plato needed to reach a large

did this primarily by writing the

Hippias Minor, Charmides. Laches, Euthyphro, and

thing that most distinguishes this group of works

is

itself

The

their accessibility to the untrained.

Their subjects and characters are popular and recognizable, their style

humorous, and entertaining, and

Lysis.

their structure dispels false

is

colloquial,

complacency while

^'Nettlcship (1935, p. 137) says 'This capacity which the mind possesses of rising above itself, asking
its own results [is] the real condition and source of progress,

questions, feeling dissatisfaction with

intellectual

and moral.”
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motivating and encouraging further inquiry.
Whether performed, recited, or read, these
dialogues better than any others attract
an unsophisticated audience to philosophy
the

way

Socrates lured a crowd to his conversations
in the Agora.

My contention

that the earliest Socratic dialogues
were written for a popular

is

audience and with a consciously pedagogical
motivation.

A more colorful theory about

the intended audience of Plato's dialogues,
rather dramatically espoused by Ryle^^ but
not

by

ruled out

others,

is

that they were performed at dramatic festivals

and competitions,

or

otherwise recited to the general public. Ryle
(1966, p. 24) also describes the dialogues
using Aristotle's term
ones.

The

'exoteric',

which distinguishes popular discourses from academic

part of Ryle's performance theory that jibes so well
with the textual evidence

is

the implication that the dialogues were written for a
popular audience. Their dramatic

nature and short length would

make them

who, though probably

was

literate,

accessible to the average Athenian citizen,

unlikely to

own

or read booksJ^

Whether

or not the

dialogues were meant to be performed, they have survived and prospered
as reading
material for a variety of classes

The

and

cultures.

relative simplicity of these early dialogues

write more complex works, but rather

reached

at a simpler level.

None

by the

is

explained not by Plato's inability to

fact that his

intended audience needed to be

of Socrates' respondents in the early dialogues

philosopher and philosophical jargon

is

largely avoided.

The

is

a

interlocutors of these

dialogues are familiar characters representing familiar views in contrast to Socrates,

who

represents the rival view of philosophy. These earliest dialogues can be seen as a kind of
bait for philosophical thought intended to attract the less than philosophically inclined.^^

’^Ryle (1966) Ryle’s theory that the dialogues were performed includes the dubious proposition that
Plato himself took the role of Socrates, and eliminated the character
‘'‘See

Havelock (1963,

”See Kahn [1981,
and outside the school

-

p.

when he became

to old to play

it.

p. 38).

39]

who

says Plato was "writing to prepare the minds of his audience

for the reception of this

mature philosophy;" and Scintas (1979,

29

p.

67)

who

-

both inside

calls the

Accordingly, they were probably used as textbooks
in Plato’s

Greek schools/® The task of
or layman,

was predictably

selling

own Academy and

in other

philosophy to the non philosopher, whether a
student

a crucial element in Plato’s educational
project.

Further evidence that the earliest dialogues were
intended to influence popular ideas

about education can be found

The

issues of

sopA/is

in the

methods and

wisdom], and technosune [xej^voa'bvr), expertise]

[crotpia,

were of educational and hence popular
philosophical debate.

The

issues of the dialogues themselves.

interest,

but were not specifically items for

later dialogues, in contrast,

were probably written

academic audience since they take on more technical and specialized
dialogues represent a non-dogmatic

way to

issues.

for

The

an
earliest

teach both students and the general public

about philosophy. They provided an enlightening contrast to the agonistic use of

argument and dialogue found

in the

popular practice of

same time they presented an example
about

issues. Plato

hoped

of the right

that his audience

eristic

moots contests. At the

way to approach problems and

would embrace

this

method and he made

sure that his students did, asking them to write dialogues of their own.
dialogical

1.3

homework can be seen

in the

think

Some

of Aristotle’s

Fragments.

How Would the Earliest Dialogues Achieve Plato’s Agenda?
Once

the objectives and motivation for Plato’s educational project are understood,

the idiosyncrasies of his literary style begin to

combines Socratic

orality with the

didacticism of poetry.

The use

fall

permanence

into place.

of the written

of character, setting,

The use

of dialogue

word while avoiding the

and other dramatic techniques allows

early dialogues "dramatic introductions to philosophic subjects and philosophic techniques."

Lodge (1947, p. 169) claims they were memorized and acted out for educative purposes. See also:
Kahn (1981, p. 44), Robb (1994, p. 238 - 239) and Laws (811 de).
”See Field (1930, p. 189), who agrees that the earliest dialogues were directed to the ordinary educated
public of Athens and aimed at stimulating them to think clearly and examine their assumptions. Even the

philosophical issues that arise

in

the early dialogues "would probably be familiar to every educated
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man"

(p.59).

Plato to enhance his philosophical message
while keeping the works palatable to a

popular audience. The Socratic method of
eJenchus
product 3pori3 [dtropia perplexity] are included
virtually performed

[^xoc;,

in the text in

on the audience while irony and paradox

examination] and

such a way that they are

force reflection.

the character of Socrates emerges from these
dialogues as larger than

who

its

life

-

Above

all,

an Odysseus

navigates the soul, a philosopher-hero.

Ii3fl Plato's

P

Use

of the

D ialogue Form

same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though
they were
but if you ask them anything about what they say, from
a desire to be
instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing
forever. {Phaedrus 275e)
is

the

intelligent,

Plato

is

spoke. Plato

distinguished from his mentor Socrates in that he wrote while
Socrates only
is

dialogue form.

distinguished in the history of western philosophy in that he wrote in

While Plato invented neither philosophy nor dialogue, he fused them

unforgettably in an effort to keep philosophy afloat in the rising tide of literacy. For
his worries

about the educational legacy of oralism, Plato was equally worried about

writing, as attested

by

his

comments

at

Protagoras 329a, Phaedrus 275e, and the

Seventh Letter 341d where he

says: "I certainly

[philosophical topics], nor shall

I

words

all

like other studies."

ever

do so

have composed no work

in future, for there

Plato's use of dialogue

is

is

no way

in regard to

of putting

it

in

best seen as an effort to adapt the

essentially oral character of philosophical discussion to the

medium

of literature without,

so to speak, writing doctrine in stone.

®“As

much

as Plato's use of dialogue stands out for us,

in its

Irwin (1992, p.74) and Vlastos (1991, p.51) note that dialogue

Herodotus and Thucydides as well as
Eunpides and Sophocles.

citing precedent in the histones

drama

of

own day

was a
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may not have been so unique.
medium for ethical discussion,
Aristophanes' comedy and the tragic
it

traditional

Plato's cnticism of writing

and wrote

may be

He seems

extensively.

to

surprising since he rebelled from Socrates'
policy

have compromised

need to wnte by adopting and perfecting the dialogue
ethical

and educational

As

writing.

when

force

it

literacy increased, ideas

became

frozen,

his worries

form.®^

first

were being trapped

abandoning

literature.

Homer's work

rhythm of verse and

way to

The dialogues would

minds the way Socratic discussions had. They would

offer a

his

lost its

later in

in the tar pit of the written

waiting to be passed up by time. Plato's dialogues were a
of writing without

in

about writing with

word,

transcend the stagnancy

try to

way to

awaken and engage
read that

discouraged the passive acceptance of ideas and encouraged the active investigation
of
them.®^

Plato's use of dialogue reflects

from Socrates;
philosophy.

I

it

more than the suspicion about writing he inherited

also expresses his belief in the importance of multiple voices for

say "voices" because Plato makes

it

clear that separate

minds are not

required.

At Sophist 263e he defines thinking as "the inward dialogue carried on by the

mind with

itself

without spoken sound.

Socrates converses with himself

interlocutor isn't available, won't cooperate, or refuses to answer. He's not

personifying an entity like the

issue.®'’

Laws

of

Athens

in his dialogical effort to

when an
beyond

understand an

Plato writes in dialogue form in an attempt to teach his audience to think

philosophically, that

is,

to hold a dialogue

— even with oneself.

Part of Plato's educational purpose in the early dialogues

philosophical dialogue from the

eristic

games espoused by

is

to distinguish

While

his rivals the sophists.

®‘For a similar view sec Griswold (1985, p. 161).

Kraut’s (1992,

p.

27) rhetorical question: "What better way to give expression to this warning
make each of one’s works a dialogue?”

against the misuse of books than to

”AI1 translations of Sophist are by Comford in Hamilton and Cairns (1961).
“'Jaeger (1939, p. 12) says that such internal dialogue begins with Archilochus’ monologue
Odyssey. ’’ See also Dewey (1993, p. 43), Ncttleship (1935, p.l 15), and Santas (1979, p. 59).
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in

the

both techniques represented a
challenge to the poetic tradition.
Plato worried about
eristic’s

methods and

other as answ-erer.

goals.»> In the

The

game

of eristic, one person acts as
questioner and the

answerer’s objective

limited to answers of yes

is

to

defend some conceptual

and no. The questioner tnes

tradition

was

memorize

its

emphasis on

One way

rote

specific arguments for

in the

is

a winner, a loser,

p.l04

-

105) that Plato

and against popular theses.
their

In this way. they could

opponents took up.

logical tricks rather

s dialectic is

and often mocks

A list of such

actually based on the

eristic tactics.*^

odds with the methods and goals

Most

game

of eristic, a close look at

and Euthydemus

telling is Socrates'

what they

of eristic.®®

reveals that Plato

requirement that

truly believe; this rule

Plato's intended audience

noticed the similarities between Socratic dialogue and
differences.

game which

than truth. Although Ryle insisted (1966,

interlocutors resolve conflicts only in light of

would have noticed the

win

Dissoi Logoi.

Socrates' behavior in such works as Hippias Minor
rejects

and

memorization. Students w-ere apparently
required to

Plato needed to distinguish philosophic
dialogue from this competitive

rewarded deception and

is

that eristic failed to depart from
the poetic

an enstic competition no matter which side
arguments survives

he

to extract inconsistent theses
from

the answerer by a carefully constructed
series of questions. There

recognized fouls in this game.“

thesis;

eristic,

is

clearly at

would have

but more important they

In a subliminal way, Plato battles eristic by wielding

Socratic dialogue as a counterexample.

See Asmis( 1992, p. 340).
more on enstic, see Aristotle’s Topics.

'‘For

'^On Hippias Minor see sec.

3.2.

Ryle (1966,

p.

didactic purpose of explaining to

203)

later

admits that Euthydemus has, "double

Athens the unobvious distinction between prize-fighting eristic and tutorial
dialectic; and of interesting the young students and would-be students of dialectic in the tasks of detecting and
rebutting fallacies that were already extant and already giving trouble. What Aristotle tnes to do scientifically in
his De Sophisticis E/enchis Plato tries to do dramatically in his EutJiydemus. " WTiilc I don’t agree with
Ryle’s whole characterization of how eristic was used, he may be right here.
"See chapter 4 and Irwin (1995, p. 20)
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The dialogue form may

also be an effort to preserve
su„ous,s> In a

the reason for having another "voice"

when doing philosophy

new

form. Part of

stems from the tradition of

mentoring, of having someone to ask
questions. While sunous/a was
controversial

because of

its

association with pederasty, Plato
approved of the convemational and

motivational aspects of the tradition,”

Plato's nostalgia for

sunousia was no doubt

heightened by the fact that the democratization
of education and the

making it necessary

fact that Plato's readers often feel as

they are having a conversation with Socrates shows
how successful

L3.2

Plato's

literature

Use

of

were

that students be taught in large groups
rather than enjoy one on one

exchange between student and master.* The

sunousia to

rise of literacy

though

his adaptation of

was.

Dramat ic Technique.^

In addition to dialogue, Plato employs such dramatic
elements as setting

characters to increase the popular appeal of his works

and

to

enhance

and

their educational

message. Whether the dialogues were performed or read, their
characters and setting give

them an entertaining aura which

attracts traditional students as well as adults,

be more reluctant to be "taught" a
his educational

climate that

message

was

new

attitude about virtue.^^ Furthermore,

in dramatic form, Plato

hostile to philosophy.^^

It's

managed

is

without forcing

seductive but not superficial;

it

down

Beck (1964,

it

by putting

intellectual

its

educational

rivals. Plato's

opens the reader up to philosophy

his or her throat. Since Plato's

®’Netfle.ship (1935, p. 5) says the

’“See

an

might

not coincidental that the early dialogues

resemble a dramatized battle between philosophy and
dramatic style

to infiltrate

who

audience

for the earliest dialogues

essence of education for Plato can be expressed

in

the

word

"nurture."

p. 197).

’‘As Seeskin (1987,

p. 10)

came

notes "If the reader

teacher, then from Plato’s perspective, the text would

fail.”

’“See Jaeger (1943).
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to

approach the text as a student approaches a

For Plato's belief

in lifelong

education, see sec. 4.1.

was

neither philosophical nor academic,
Plato needed to cast philosophy
in a positive

light dramatically before

he could argue

The educational theme
settings. Socrates

accordingly,

is

for

directly.

it

of the dialogues

always questions people

a public enterprise.

is

frequently reflected in their dramatic

Athens and

in

in

public.” Education,

In addition to being public, the
settings of the earliest

dialogues are frequently places of persuasion
and education. Socrates meets Ion and

Hippias

at the

agora and at an Olympic oratory

performance. Euthyphro

is

festival, their respective places of

met on the porch of the King Archon's court, where

persuaded. The Inches takes place overlooking
a military exercise which
considered for

way from

its

educational value. At the opening of the Lysis,
Socrates

Academy, the

the

is

future site of Plato’s school, to the

juries are

being

is

making

Lyceum, the eventual

his

site

of Aristotle's school; both sites were gymnasia at the
dramatic time.

The main action

of both the

where, according to Hippothales,
(^Lysis 204a).

setting,

Charmides and Lysis takes place

"We spend

most of our time

.

.

.

in wrestling schools

having discussions."

Several commentators have noted the significance of the

which Plato uses

in several other dialogues,

including Euthydemus.

appropriate that the intellectual gymnastics Plato hoped would gain

Athenian education should be exercised

The nonacademic

settings

may also

in buildings

reveal Plato's

gymnasium

”

It

seems

new prominence

designed for physical education.

hope

to extend education

and

philosophy beyond the boundaries of schools and youth and into the realm of every
in

everyday

”This

in

man

life.

is

noted by Santas (1979,

p.

67)

’Tor example: Marrou (1956, p. 45) claims that Socrates goes to the gymnasium to "drag [students]
away from it and to submit them to the hard discipline of mathematics and dialectics.” Jaieger (1943, p. 35)
says that the mind-to-mind contact at gymnasia "generated an intellectual heat which made them the most
receptive soil for any new thought or enthusiasm." Friedlander (1958, v. I, 159) adds that when Plato moves the
setting from the wrestling floor to the dressing room in Lysis, he was trying to create "a concrete image of the
intellectual undressing with which he liked to play.”
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An

important component in the dialogues,
part setting and part character,

group that surrounds Socrates and
conventional

men

listens to the

convemation. Dramatically,

or boys representing conventional
values

audience Plato wants to influence. Like the
reader, they

sit

is

is

this

the

group of

an extension of the

on the

sidelines in

judgment

while silently participating in the conversation.
Their presence reminds us that observing
a Socratic dialogue can be as educational
as participating in one.''

The distance may

even heighten the educational experience.
Because observers are

less

involved than interlocutors, they are more likely
to see his

They can then

similar contradictions in their

own

belief sets

errors.

emotionally

from the safety of anonymity and

blood. While Socrates and his interlocutors often
go

away unchanged,

correct

in cold

this silent third

group may reap the greatest educational value from the
exchange.

The most
interlocutors,

striking thing

is

the fact that

about Plato’s second group of characters, Socrates'

many

of

them were

historical figures familiar to the audience.

Nicias and Laches, for example, were famous generals.
Charmides and Cntias, in contrast,

were infamous members of the Thirty Tyrants. The prestige of the
interlocutors along with
the knowledge of their later careers no doubt heightens the audience's
interest in the

conversation.

One

the one hand, since Plato

is

portraying even his historical interlocutors

with the educational aim of getting his audience to identify with them,

it is

unlikely that

he intended their conversations and personalities to be historically accurate.'^ Rather, the
interlocutors represent typical viewpoints that Plato wants to refute, because they reflect

the opinions either of his educational rivals or simply those of the multitude.

’^Sec

Lodge (1947,

p. 4) for

a similar view.

’‘See Field (1930, p.l90), Marrou (1956, p.48), and Griswold (1985,
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p. 153).

The dramatization,
before they

became corrupt shows not

rather that he

I

m

then, of a Socratic elenchua
performed

saw

it

much

for their future:

myself as for you, Charmides,'

for

Crit.as

that Socrates contributed
to the.r delinquency, but

coming and feared

not annoyed so

on Charmides and

said, 'because

you
such good looks and are in addition
very self-controlled of soul, will
not
p ofit from that self-control, and because despite its presence
in y
you, it
n
won
won't
t bring
bring
you any presence at all in life! Charmides
(
1 75de)

who have

I

•

Charmides,

315

-

Critias,

and Alcibiades can be seen following

316. Plato's educational aim

is

sophists around at Protagoras

not to posthumously reform his famous
interlocutors

but to reveal the inconsistencies that
eventually misguided them.’'

audience see similar faults

in themselves,

they might

try to rectify

When members of the

them

lest

they end up

like the historical failures.^®

Put simply, Socrates' interlocutors
exemplars of virtue and education

example of temperance

who

in the early

who

fail

is

up

to the definition.^^

ends up a loose canon, Nicias

explain courage; Ion and Hippias are wise

about, and Euthyphro

to live

dialogues represent apparent

men who

don't

a military hero

is

know what

a self-proclaimed pinnacle of piety

Charmides

who

isn't

is

an

who can't

they're talking

sure

what

piety

is.

These characters represent people or doctrines that the Athenian audience
and many
audiences since W'ould put forward as examples of their idea of particular

The intended

effect of all this character assassination

In revealing the aims

and

ideals of popular personalities

is

virtues.

to challenge the audience.

and doctrines

as flawed, Plato

This process works both ways. For example, Plato has Socrates examine Theaetetus, who went
on
be a great geometer, as a young man. Here it is hoped that the audience will identify with the
benefits of
elenctic^struggle.

From the aporia produced by

to

his talk with Socrates,

Theaetetus goes on to do great things.
echoed by Robb (1994, p. 171 - 172) who claims that Plato’s
characters get the very- Socratic chastisement most Athenian intellectuals were in need of. Stokes
(1986, p. 17)
says, A proposition may look false, or true, as the case may be, to one particular kind of interlocutor, or indeed
to one particular kind of reader.”
’'This audience

-

character connection

’’Desjardins (1988, p. 122)

"“See Stokes (1986, p. 30)
"'Contrast Robinson (1953,
that the

makes a

is

similar point.

p. 14): "If

the ulterior end of the elenchus

answerer himself be convinced, and quite

indifferent
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is

to

whether anyone else

be attained,
is.

"

One

it

is

essential

strange aspect of

awakens the audience from dogmatic complacency.
Members
suddenly that what they thought worked
doesn’t work

becomes

clear to them. Plato thought that

agreeing with the interlocutor and end
a personal

mandate

it

many

at all

readers

of the audience realize

and the need

own

beliefs.

change

would begin the dialogue

in a sympathetic state of

to reexamine his or her

for

apona

The nature

or at least with

of the topic

precludes the option of simply distancing oneself
from the discussion; a choice must be

made.

1.3.3 Elenchus

and Apnria

In section 1.2.3,

1

explained Plato's need to eliminate the false conceit of knowledge.

Plato achieves that objective in the dialogues by extending
Socrates' elenchus of his
interlocutors

result of the

and the

resulting aporia to the audience. Plato explains the hoped-for

elenchus in the Sophist

:

They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying
something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of
inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectic
process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one
another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same
respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle toward others, and
thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which
is

most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good
who is the subject of the operation. (230bc)

effect

on the

person

Plato hoped that by portraying a Socratic elenchus being performed on well-known or
stereotypical characters

who

complacency would extend

represented

commonly held

to the wider audience

beliefs, the release

even when

it

from

doesn't take place for the

particular interlocutor.

this interpretations is that dialogues

seem

to

be

chose not

failures. Plato

where the

interlocutor

is

not convinced, such as the Euthyphro, would

could have ended the dialogue with Euthyphro convinced of his ignorance, but he

to.
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The objection

that Socratic

denchus can

individuals with particular belief-sets

popular ideals. In

who

Socrates

this, as in his

is

eliminate complacency only in particular

mitigated by Plato's use of typical
characters and

decision to write, Plato departs from
the historical

philosophized only orally so he could

individuals. Since Plato

making the views

is

tailor his

examination to particular

much wider audience, he must

targeting a

of his interlocutors represent unquestioned
yet

values.^°^ In the early dialogues

where

represent the ideals of the multitude.

Plato’s

Even

audience

Vlastos,

is

who

reach them by

commonly-held

the multitude, his characters

contends (1994,

p.

Socrates argued from the particular beliefs of
interlocutors as opposed to the
beliefs of

men, admits (1991,

Laches are
street

"a fair

p.

15 -160) that

common

59) that the responses of interlocutors like Euthyphro or

sample of the ones Socrates would have

elicited

from anyone on the

picked at random."

So the denchus

of the early dialogues does

more than "amuse the hearer" as the

Sophist passage suggests. By sticking to widespread views

denchus on
beliefs.

performs a kind of indirect

the hearers or readers and compels them to question their

In this

way

The educational

own unexamined

Plato can prescribe Socrates' medicine to a vast audience by

performing an indirect elenchus on them while "amusing

"

them with the

effectiveness of elenchus as a social project

refute typical viewpoints in a methodical

interesting

it

and entertaining dialogues

little-known eccentric,

it

in

way.

While Plato could

which Socrates

would not have been

depends on
still

direct one.

its

ability to

have produced

refutes the oddball view's of

some

as educationally effective.

In most of Plato's early dialogues, the Socratic elenchus ends in a state or

puzzlement or aporia.

'“^Beck (1964, p. 195)

Like the denchus

makes a

itself,

similar point.
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Plato intends this aporia to have an

educational effect on his audience.

encouraged to get on

wth

own

his

into a state of puzzlement, she

is

When

an expert

is

philosophical search.

motivated to search

the state of puzzlement concerns

reduced to aporia. the layman

how one

ought to

When

for the

live,

Now

for Socrates

^ocx^Xic aporia

refutation.

who

is

always

may very

in a state of

audience to notice

and

the search for a better answer

this, is that

to encourage inquiry.

further inquiry,

didn't. Their

and

Critias heard this,

seemed to be forced by

tries to

and saw

my

It

history

problem, and Plato wants his

they don't see the benefit of inquiry. Critias

concerned with appearances that he

When

is

is

well have the demoralizing effect of an
eristic

probably

Critias

pul

aporia and always inquiring.

Euthyphro doesn’t seem motivated to pursue

indicates that Charmides

is

answer. Furthermore, since

immediately important. The educational intention
of aporia

seems to work

the reader herself

is

is

so

conceal his aporia rather than to eradicate

that

I

was

in difficulties [6t7Copo\)VTCX],

being in difficulties [ocTCOpoiivxoq] to

fall

it:

he

into

difficulties [(XTCopiotq] himself, in the

way people who see others yawning in their
faces are affected similarly. Well, conscious that he had
a reputation to keep up,
he felt ashamed in front of the others and was unwilling to admit to me
that he
was unable to determine the points on which I was challenging him. He said
nothing
(

Charmides

Nicias, likewise,

aporia

clear, in

is

So

is

afraid to admit his perplexity.

admitting

looks to

it

when

an attempt to conceal his

difficulties [ocTCoplavl.

169cd)^'’^

The

first

step toward eliminating

it.

me

he's talking

as though Nicias

not prepared to be a gentleman and admit
nonsense: he's twisting and turning to hide the fact that he's
is

baffled [otjcoplotv]. You and I could have twisted in the same way just now if
we'd wanted not to look as though we were contradicting ourselves. If we were
arguing in court, there'd be some excuse for such behavior, but when we're having

a friendly conversation like this,

up with such frippery?

All translations of

Charmides

why would anyone

waste time dressing himself

196ab)

in this

chapter arc by Watt (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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For these and several other of Socrates’
interlocutors
to look as

exists,

if

you know than

to actually

know

it

seems to be much more important

at all. If a

spark of philosophical curiosity

however, Plato’s early dialogues usually provide
the fuel to

ignite the flame of

inquiry.

Those who are motivated by Socratic aporia see
two key
Ignorance and the possibility that an answer can be
found.

things; their

A person

own

brought into

Socratic aporia does not find herself lost at sea;
rather, she finds a point on the horizon
to be used in guiding her ship across the

ocean of

inquiry.^°^ Socrates’ conviction in the

divine nature of the soul and in arete as the moral
perfection of the soul motivates and

guides his pursuit of wisdom. Socratic aporia represents
a state in which the nature of

moral knowledge
yet achieved.

is

acknowledged simultaneously

The

fact that

Euthyphro,

Critias,

as something of greatest value

Channides and others choose to return

to the false security of popular approval rather than face their
ignorance
effort to eradicate

it

does not imply that Plato

is

and not

and join the

suggesting that route to his audience.

Their failure to admit ignorance serves as a negative example to the audience; one
reinforced in Critias

and Charmides’ case by the knowledge of their subsequent

downfall.

The

aporetic conclusions of

Euthyphro and Hippias Minor

are not diminished

by

their protagonists’ refusal to admit ignorance, since the obvious refutation of these

renowned experts encourages the lay-searcher by

some

expert has knowledge, even while

you

discrediting the experts. Believing that

don’t,

is

nevertheless an impediment to

inquiry. Part of Plato’s worry about traditional education

'"^Says Friedlander (1958, v.
'“^Says
it

Robinson (1953,

gives him for the

first

I,

p. 17):

is

that students are encouraged

'The final truth, is brought into view SiS from a distance."
"The cicnchus docs not directly give a man amy positive knowledge; but

p.l70):

time the idea of real knowledge."

‘“‘For a poignant explanation of the effects of avoiding Socratic

41

apona see Symposium 215a

-

222b.

to accept answers to puzzling (properly
philosophical) questions

authority of the person
politician,

there

isn’t

beliefs

who gives

them. The authority

even Plato. Unless one understands

much

may be

why one

on the basis of the

a parent, a poet, a

holds the opinions one does,

reason to act on those opinions. The Socratic
approach

and opinions constantly, no matter from where

or from

whom

is

to question

they come.

A reluctance to test one's opinions against those of experts reveals a dangerous
complacency. In

who

his

speech

at

183-184, Laches expresses his suspicion of military trainers

avoid Sparta, the Mecca of military training. His criticism
amounts to suspicion of

those

who

inquiries.

avoid the experts. Socrates, by contrast, goes

By showing that even

right to the experts in his

the experts haven’t got their

own

beliefs tied

opens up the question to the masses. Euthyphro, a self-proclaimed expert on
revealed to have no better idea of what
impiety.

It is

by asking

virtue. Socratic

it is

than Socrates, a

for explanations rather

man about

is

piety,

is

to be convicted of

than advice that one can learn about

method opens the realm moral inquiry to the common

Socratic sporia

down, Plato

ideally the state of a person motivated to

man.*®^

do philosophic

Admissions of aporia

in

continue the inquiry.

After having been reduced to aporia in Laches,

inquiry.

Lysis result in a pledge of friendship and a commitment to
Nicias and

Laches agree that Socrates would be the best teacher. Socrates then reminds them that no

one of them

is

better than

any other now, since they

are all in a state of perplexity.

suggests that they spare neither effort nor expense in their continued inquiry.
doesn’t advise

is

that they remain satisfied with their perplexity. Motivating

old to pursue philosophic inquiry

admission of ignorance

is

is

What he

young and

Plato’s goal in these early aporetic dialogues.

a necessary

first

He

The

step to philosophic inquiry.^®*

'“^For a similar observation see Vlastos (1971b, p. 20).

‘““Says Ryle (1966, p. 206):

"An

elenctic debate terminates in aporia.
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Philosophy starts from aporiai.

"

The educational purpose
stimulate the reader to

Lodge (1947,

to break the aporis, ideally

p. 7) agrees, calling refutation

whose function

tool

want

of the aporetic endings of Socratic
dialogues, then,

is

an educational

perplexity

is

is

pertinent question of

rather than a metaphysical

how one

ought to

One

reason the

that their subject matter

not over some disembodied proposition;

it

to

in dialectic.^®’

to stimulate people, rather than to
solve problems.

early dialogues are so effective in stimulating
readers

The

by engaging

is

is

moral.

concerns the universally

-

live one's life.“®

Rather than replacing one opinion with another,
eJenchus and aporia induce a

mind conducive

state of

first

to the search for truth.

step toward wisdom.

Socratic aporia

is

Aporia

closer to the

is

The

realization of one's ignorance

sometimes translated as being

wonder that Robinson (1953,

beginning of philosophy. Keeping in mind that Plato
to take

up philosophy

as a

way

of attaining virtue,

is

p.

the

"at a loss" but

11) describes as the

tiying to inspire the

we should

is

see elenchus

common man
and aporia

as ingenious educational tools.‘^‘

1.3.4

Pu zzles and

Irony

In the Apology,

is

Socrates calls the oracle's statement an ainigma [aiviypa] which

cognate to our 'enigma' and

is

usually translated as

Forms of the word appear elsewhere

some kind

of riddling puzzle.

in the dialogues in reference to the

words of the gods,

the poets, or even Socrates himself. At Chaimides 161c, Socrates describes the statement
that sophrosune

is

doing one's

own job as

"cryptic", literally ainigmari [aiviypaxi]

See Teloh( 1986, p.5)
"“Sec Brickhousc and Smith (1994, p. 17): "But the aporia that results from Socratic questioning gives
the interlocutor an important reason to pursue the examined life: the recognition that one is seriously confused
about how best to live."

As Jaeger
one of the
at

the end,

little

(1943, p. 90) secs

it,

they

au^c

toots that work:

"When we observe

[early Socratic] dialogues concludes with the expected result, but

we feel

all

in

reading them that not

turn into a question-mark

a philosophical excitement which has a profound educational influence."
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which

IS

the adjective from the verb ainissomai
[aiviaaouai]. The imperfect, einitteto

[fiviTTeto] appears again in reference to the
saying at 162a.

The noun ainigma

[aiviyjLia] then appears at 162b:

Well, as far as I can see, he propounded
this as a deliberate puzzle
faiviyual for
us for no other reason than that he thought
it would be difficult for
us to find out
what on earth doing one’s own job is. Charmides

162b)

(

Clearly, Plato

doing so
having

is

is

drawing our attention to the nddle

no doubt

in the

in the statement."-’

parallel to the motivation Socrates accuses
the writer of the riddle of

Charmides:

he wants us to investigate the issue

can be understood only through personal discovery."^
repeated, but the

mind

will never

internal Socratic voice,

swallow

for ourselves

because

it

A paradox may be recited or

whole. "What could that mean?" says the

it

and here inquiry begins.

What paradox does

for Plato in the early dialogues

philosophical and personal.

As

I

particular account of arete as he

on

His motivation for

argued

is

earlier,

pushing

Plato

is

is

to reveal the issue of arete as

not so

for a particular

much

arguing for a

approach to

it."^

By relying

riddles rather than doctrinal statements, Plato identifies the existence of an
answer,

hidden

in the riddle

and

as yet

unknowm, while simultaneously encouraging the

investigation of the riddle. Perhaps he thought his strategy similar to that of the gods,

who

offer their

wisdom

in the form of riddles. Plato discovered thorough Socrates

and the

cryptic tradition that nothing encourages philosophical thought better than paradox.

at

"^Notes Watt (1987, p. 186): 'The statement, "doing one's own job"
Repub/ic 433a, but there interpreted differently."
"^Desjardins (1988, p.

1

13):

is

offered as a definition of justice

"The meaning of such statement often proves to be multileveled, yielding
one be Jed from one level of understanding to another. In other

layers of interpretation normally requiring that

words, to be able

-

even correctly

‘"Secskin (1987,
of certifying the truth of

p.

-

to report beliefs or recite doctnnes

43) says Plato’s dialectic

vanous propositions."

is

is

not sufficient for understanding."

"a pathway to a philosophical stance rather than a

.Mittelstrass (1988, p.l39)

not objective knowledge but philosophical attitudes."
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way

adds that Plato "seeks to transport

Another benefit of the pedagogical use of irony
and paradox
encourage independent inquiry. The conversation
being a master

is

a kind of instructive irony.

It's

207d

at Lj^'/s

obvious, on one

is

-

their ability to

209d on the

level,

why

Lysis

allowed to dnve the chariot or the mule team
or to play with his mother's loom.
these questions of

why others

audience, so Socrates

tries to

problem out to be examined

issue of

isn't

Still,

should rule a child are vety important to the
youthful
exhort them into philosophical thought by
laying the

logically rather than emotionally. Platonic
irony

and

paradox encourage self-determination by challenging the
reader to solve the problem
within his

owm mind. The texts

to think philosophically.

don't teach philosophy so

much

as challenge the reader

That the reader become a lover of wisdom on

his

own

is

essential to Plato s project for educational reform. Rather
than impart a particular

philosophy, Plato wanted to engender a philosophical approach that
could be applied to
personalized problems.

As

each unique soul and so

it

I

will

show

in chapter 5, the pursuit of

must be undertaken on an individual

is

different for

level.

Irony and paradox also point toward the existence of solutions without entrapping

them

in a formula. Plato

be expressed completely

seems to think that absolute moral paradigms
in

exist

but cannot

words, which are frozen in time. Paradox manages to indicate

the existence of such absolutes without killing them by reducing them to formulas.^^^
Socrates' ironic self description for Hippias

Do you

see that

Fm

is

an example:

telling the truth, Hippias,

questioning clever people? This
other respects I'm pretty useless.

is

probably

when

I

say that I'm persistent in

[iciv5'Uve\)C0]

my only good

point: in

I mean, Fm ignorant about the way things are,
which just baffles me. I can easily prove this: whenever I meet anyone like you
whose wisdom is famous and vouched for by all the Greeks, my ignorance
becomes evident, because w'e disagree on almost everything. What greater proof

of ignorance can there be than disagreement with experts?

(

Hippias

Minor. 3 72 be)
Desjardins (1988, p. 122

"one

rich

enough and

flexible

-

123) says historically accurate thoughts are insufficient.

enough

to provide insight into problems current in his
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own

What

time."

is

needed

is

Socrates’ riddles

and irony help Plato

to accomplish

for educational reform. First, they
insist

two

central challenges in his project

on the engagement

of the

discourage the uncritical acceptance of doctrine
as doled out

mind and

in traditional

therefore

myth and

poetiy. Secondly, they indicate the
presence of a truth or absolute standard, a
solution to

the riddle that can be discovered
relativism that occurs

when

if

not articulated, and so they avoid the
dangerous

stated principles gets stuck in time.“^

Socrates'

quintessential irony turns out not to be an unfortunate
quirk of his personality or an

entertaining dramatic subplot, but rather a key to
his

1.3.5 Socrates as

By

as

an educator.

Hero

far Plato's greatest

character of Socrates.
extent,

uncanny success

I

weapon

in his educational project in the early dialogues

have already argued that

Plato's educational project

an adaptation of Socrates' educational method. Whether Plato

is,

to

is

the

some

offers a historically

accurate account of his former teacher or simply uses the character as a
mouthpiece for his

own

views,

the educational effect of his role remains the same. Socrates functions in

the early dialogues as a hero and martyr for philosophy

much

as he asks his interlocutors to.

Socrates,

and the

The

asks his audience to reflect as

relationship between Plato, the character of

historical Socrates forms a

The most popular

who

complex

triangle with education at

center.

solution to the question of the character Socrates' authenticity

to attribute full historical accuracy to the Socrates of the Apology,

each successive dialogue
later

its

until the character

works. Predictably there

is

a

lot of

then

less

becomes a complete mouthpiece

and

is

less in

for Plato in

dissension about just where the transition takes

place and which doctrines can be attributed to w'hom at what time. Tfie division between

‘“Desjardins (1988,

p.

123) makes a similar observation.

Ryle (1966) takes the identification to an extreme, suggesting that Plato insisted on playing the role
Socrates in performed versions of the dialogues and insisting that the Apo/ogy is a defense not of Socrates,
but of attacks made on Plato well on in the 370’s (p. 152). For a less radical view see Kraut (1992, p. 25).
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of

the early and middle Socrates,
however,
is

is

ever merely an objective reporter.
Even

widely agreed upon.^^«
if

he

is

It is

doubtful that Plato

carrying on Socrates’ mission in
the early

dialogues or reconstructing actual
conversations he overheard, Plato does
this with
particular goals in mind.

someone

else,

Plato at least shares them. At

widely held views; but

The idea

Whether these goals were bought, borrowed,

that Plato

finds at least viable

advocate of settling

is

no

it’s

secret

which

minimum he

testing

is

or stolen from

them against more

side he wants to win."’

testing his inherited Socratic beliefs
against others that he

is

certainly consistent with his educational
project. Plato

difficult issues

internal, or imagined. In Crito,

is

through honest debate; whether the debate

a great

is

external,

the reader experiences a debate between the
characters of

Socrates and Crito while Socrates describes a parallel
debate he imagined w'ith the
personified laws of Athens. Given his enthusiasm for
dialectical discussion and his

acceptance of multi-layered debates, Plato
debates of his

own

in the early dialogues.

may very well be
Just as Socrates

dramatizing imagined

is

sympathetic to both sides

of the imagined dialectic with the personified laws, Plato himself

may be sympathetic

only to the character of Socrates, but also to his dialogical opponents.
Plato’s educational project

is

not

Accordingly,

concerned with moral dilemmas where the agent

identifies

with both sides of the issue.
It

rather

may be more

what

effect

instructive to ask not

which side

he hopes the argument as a whole

Socrates' interlocutors were

drawn

of the

will

argument Plato endorses but

have on

his audience.

Although

to represent popular or widely-recognized views, the

“®Vlastos ( 1991, p. 48 - 49) offers a list of ten theses distinguishing the early Socrates from the middle
Socrates. Irwin (1995, p. 5) looks to Aristotle for advice on the issue, noting that he "regularly treats the
dialogues as evidence for Plato’s views, and regularly attributes some of the views of the Platonic Socrates to
Plato, without seeing

out

in

any need to explain or defend the attribution."

"’Vlastos (1991, p. 50) says that since Plato shared Socrates' bcisic philosophical convictions, he sets
the early dialogues to test them, "by pitting them in elenctic encounter against the views voiced by a

vancty of interlocutors. In doing

this Plato is producing, not reproducing, Socratic philosophizing."

’^“Friedlander (1958, p.l68):

'The struggles and victones
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[Plato]

made

public

were won within himself."

conversation between characters in a dialogue

between Plato and

his audience.^^^ In this

is

different from the silent conversation

second conversation, the more important
one

for the educational project, Plato tries
to simulate the Socratic experience
for his

readers.^“

To

the extent that an audience

member

identifies

with the interlocutor, he or

she will examine the beliefs Socrates questions.
To the extent a person identifies with
Socrates he or she will better appreciate the
challenge of opposing views and be

encouraged to go on acknowledging ignorance.
Plato was motivated to recreate Socrates in the form
of literature by more than a
desire to memorialize his old teacher. Socrates' fate
discouraged Plato from pursuing a
political career

while

reform.^^^ In the

enough people

Plato found a

same time underlining Athens' desperate need

for Socratic

Apology, Socrates repeatedly laments the lack of time he has to

convince the jury.
to

at the

The suggestion
for a long

way to

carry

enough

on

is

that Socrates died because he wasn't able to talk

time.

By

using the rising technology of literature

Socrates' project

on a much grander

scale in a

more

hostile

environment. Socrates' goal was not to impart information to his students but to

encourage internal deliberation and reasoned
w'ith the specific

One
Socrates.

action.^^^ Plato

wrote the

earliest dialogues

aim to reduce complacency and encourage inquiry on a grand

of Plato's biggest assets in his project

was no doubt the memory

The closeness

trial

of the vote at Socrates'

execution was at least controversial,

if

scale.

of the historical

(see Apology' 36a) suggests that his

not a source of civic embarrassment in Athens.

Bowen ( 1 988, p. 58).
17-18) says the dialogue and biographical memoir were

For a similar view sec

new literary forms invented
by the Socratic circle to "to re-create the incomparable personality of the master who had transformed their
lives." Says Irwin (1995, p. 7), "Since Plato takes Socratic philosophy seriously, he writes Socratic dialogues."
‘“a fact suggested by the dialogues and confirmed in the Seventh Letter.
‘“At Apology 19a, Socrates laments that he has so little time to remove a prejudice that the juiy has
‘“Jaeger (1943,

p.

spent nearly a lifetime acquiring. At 24a, he says he would be surprised
against him in so short a time. At 37a, he concludes that
in

a single day, he believes the jury could be persuaded.

“^See de Nicolas (1989,

p.

440.)
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if

Athens

if

he were able to remove the prejudice

didn't insist

on deciding death penalty cases

Plato use. the

memoty

of Socrates

aad

which includes dispelling a myriad

h.s fate to

enhance

of myths. Aristophanes’

sophistical portrayal of Socrates so
compelling that

be more histoncally accurate than

his plea for reform, a project

Plato's.*-’*

Clouds contains a

some have wondered whether

The Socrates

in a single caricature that,

With Plato and Xenophon's accounts, W’as accurately
characteristics of contemporary' intellectuals.^^^

trial

made

it

difference. True to form, the distinction

difference between Socrates

at

Apology 19e
men"

able to educate

what these men
that he

-

‘^‘Even

him

how

modem

for a sophist.

in Plato's eyes.

a pet project in the early dialogues to

is

as Gorgias, Prodicus,

Similarly at

show the

ironic. Plato challenges the reader to see the

20c Socrates ironically says

it

plainly. For

w^ould be a "fine thing to be

it

and Hippias do;

Lschss 186

at

that

is, it

would be

money to pay

great to

for instruction

it.

Nicias

and

and so should have

a

best to care for souls than he does.

scholars

who depend

Beck (1964,

almost entirely on Plato for their conception of Socrates mistake

p.l64), for example, alleges that in Socratic elenchus, "Despite the pretense of

ignorance the questioner usually knows the end result and there
part,"

do

187, Socrates says (ironically)

-

liked to study with the sophists but couldn't afford

Laches, on the other hand, had the
better idea of

while inconsistent

caricature 'Socrates',

and the sophists rather than pointing

clsiin to do.

would have

all

Plato acutely aw'are of the danger of this resemblance
between

Socrates and the sophists, so he makes

example,

- things the

reflective of the general

By naming this

however, Aristophanes was making a grave mistake

The

this skill

Aristophanes' portrayal of Socrates lumped

and philosophers together

scientists, sophists

might

Clouds teaches how

of the

rhetonc can turn wrong into right and accepts
payment for teaching
Platonic Socrates specifically denounces.

it

is no genuine participation on the learner's
adding that "the sophists, too, recognized the value of indoctrination in education."

‘”See Dover (1971,

p.

54

-

65): "If

it

was Aristophanes' purpose

[sophists and philosophers] as a whole, the evidence suggests that
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it

is

to caricature the

a

fair

genus

'intellectual'

caricature in essentials."

In addition to inheriting the bulk
of his early philosophical ideals
from Socrates.

Plato used his master's

He

dialogues.

He

sophists.

Critias,

memory

tries to reveal

add dimension and weight

to the message in his

the subtle, but crucial distinctions
between Socrates and the

reinterprets Socrates' historic failure
as a teacher of

and Alcibiades

Socrates he

to

in

knew from

men

an educational way. In some ways Plato

like

is

Charmides,

defending the

the cancature drawn by Aristophanes and
perpetuated in popular

myth. In defending Socrates, however, Plato

is

defending philosophy and specifically

philosophy as education.*^®

The Socrates

of the Plato's early dialogues emerges above

all else

what moral education should achieve. Since Plato makes arete
so
to attain,

it's

What

Socrates does for Plato's educational project

image to the ethereal ideals of arete being pursued.

Charmides 153-154, he

tells

the

young men

That battle would be recognized by some of
saved Alcibiades

t

humans

Plato's

The young men want

life.*^°

help but add clout to his words.

of self-control

is

When

is

to

add

is

a concrete

he walks into the gymnasium

that he has just returned from battle.

audience as a battle

in

which Socrates

to talk about the battle, about deeds.

Socrates wants to talk about philosophy and arete.
virtue can

difficult for

important to have an example showing that the method
works. Socrates

that example.

at

as an example of

That he has

just

proven his

own

Elsew'here in the Charmides a definition

proposed:

Being self-controlled, or self-control, wouldn't be knowing what one knows and
one doesn't know, but only, it would appear, that one knows and that one doesn't
know. (170d; see also 170a, 167a)
more on Plato’s need to defend philosophy see: Griswold (1985, p. 152).
Santas (1979, p. 7) says "[Plato] saw Socrates as the star example of the virtues of wisdom,
moderation, courage, and justice, the nearest possible approximation on earth of the perfection of the Platonic
forms." Friedlander (1958, p. 15 - 16) adds that "Socrates w’as the only one who not only tried to clarify the
'^®For

meaning of the word [virtue].
but who bore witness, though his life and death, to the existence of virtue."
™Watt(1987, p.l77n.l)
‘^‘Similarly at Ladies 189b, Laches bases his willingness to be taught by Socrates on their having
.

.

been though a "dangerous experience" together and Socrates having "proved
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his mettle."

This

IS

just

how

Socrates describes himself at

clearly the virtue they are talking
about.

concept,

it's

sitting cross-legged

Just

on the ground

Apo/qg.,- 21d.

when

Here Socrates exemplifies

seems

in front of us,

like

an unfathomable

asking questions

Plato recognized that his criticism
of ordinaiy moral judgments
and standards might,
like the sophists' relativism, breed

doubt about the

reality of all

moral standards. The

educational motivation for creating such an
ideal Socrates as the central
character in the
dialogues can be seen to stem from an
effort to quell such doubts. Just
as Plato uses the
literary tool of setting the

performance

in battle,

Charmides discussion on the heels of

Socrates' historic

so he uses the fact of Socrates' exemplaryexistence to reinforce his

conceptual discussion of virtue.

Socrates adds an existential dimension to the
ideal

that transcends definition. Plato gives Socrates
the role in his dialogues that he

played in the

So
is

writer's

young

no doubt

life.

Socrates' role in the earliest dialogues

is

essentially that of the classic hero; but he

a philosophical, and not an epical hero, and as such
he

is filled

regarded by nearly everyone including the oracle as wisest

with irony.

among men,

Though

Socrates

constantly claims his ignorance. Similarly, while Socrates leads Plato's
campaign for

moral education, he claims that virtue cannot be taught. Despite his exemplary
holiness,
courage, and self-control, Socrates claims to have no idea what these things are.

by coincidence or

Plato's creative

essential to his role as the

whimsy

embodiment

that Socrates

of an ideal.

is

ironic

and paradoxical;

‘^^For a similar

view see Field (1930,

p.

8

-

not

it is

Like the virtues he explores, he

cannot be defined by words and yet his presence cannot be denied.

achievement that Plato was able to transmit

It is

this quality

It is

a great

through the medium of words.

9).

‘“Similarly, Vlastos (1991, p. 29) sees Socrates' irony as central to his philosophy: "[Socrates] changes

the

word

[

aronaa

realized in himself

]

not by theorizing about

which was the

it

but by creating something

ver>' incarnation of eironcia.

new

‘“See Lodge (1947, p.l68). For more on Socrates' irony, see section
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for

"
.

2.3.

it

to

mean: a new form of

life

In this chapter

I

have explained the motivation, objectives,
and

Plato's educational project.

pursuit of

I

In aiming at his goal to

finally

methods of

awaken, acknowledge, and aim the

have shown Plato to have various and
unexpected arrows

Plato's use of literary techniques,
including his choices of settings, characters,

dialogue form,

all

contribute to his educational goals. Socrates

centerpiece of Plato's project, a character

whose

is

historical legacy

in his quiver,

and the

revealed as the

combines with

unique character to inspire the philosophical pursuit
of srete while confirming
existence.

The remaining chapters

will

examine the

specific

ways

in

his

its

which Plato wields

these tools and techniques to further his educational
goals in the Apology^ Crito. Ion,

Hippias Minor, Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, and
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Lysis.

CHAPTER

2

A PUSH FOR CHANGE IN THE APOLOGY AND
CRITO
The Apology and Onto

are widely considered to be the
earliest

historically accurate of Plato’s writings.

and most

But whether Plato acted as an unbiased
reponer

or sly social reformer in producing
these works, key aspects of his
educational project

emerge from them.* Both works

criticize

popular morality while depicting Socrates as
a

counterexample and prescribing philosophy as
an antidote. In the Apo/ogy. Socrates
not so

is

less

guide.

much on

tnal as

an ^po/ogj^

The

Athens and her educational and moral structures

for Socrates

are.

is

The Defense

than a defense of philosophy as education and
as a moral

Crito reinforces the lessons of the

of intellectual virtue in the real-life

Apology by showcasing the

good deeds of a philosopher

in action.

practical use

These

dialogues contrast standard Athenian justice, which
condemns Socrates as a criminal,

with a

new

philosophic ideal of justice, which exalts Socrates as a hero and
a martyr.

With the Apology and

2i l

Cha ll enge

Spcrates*

If

you

may

Crito Socrates' stoiy begins at the end.

kill

put

it

to the Education a l Establishment in

Apology

me, you will not easily find such another man as I, a man who
— has been fastened as it were to the city by the

a bit absurdly

~

if I

God

as,

so to speak, to a large and well-bred horse, a horse grown sluggish because of its
size and in need of being roused by a kind of gadfly. Just so, I think, the God has
fastened me to the City. I rouse you. I persuade you. I upbraid you. I never stop

on each one of you, everywhere, all day long. Such another will not easily
you again. Gentlemen, and if you are persuaded by me, you will spare me.
But perhaps you are angry, as men roused from sleep are angry, and perhaps you
will swat me, persuaded by Meletus that you may lightly kill. Then will you
lighting

come

to

‘Although vanous parts of the Apology are corroborated by independent historical accounts, there is
no shortage of controversy over its historical accuracy. While scholars such as Grote (1875), Kostman (1984),
and Brickhouse and Smith (1989) defend the dialogue's accuracy, others including Stokes (1992) believe that
Plato exploits the historical gravity of the event to promote his own causes. Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 5)
contend that the ApoJcg}' couldn't have strayed far from the facts because its audience would be aware of the
actual events. The accuracy issue need not affect my argument for Plato's educational project because Plato
could coherently be pushing his educational agenda while writing the most accurate portrayal possible. Allen

1984, p. 3) and Teloh (1986) agree that
educational.
(

Apo/ogv and

Crito might have been simultaneously apologetic and
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3or-r/''“'
When

Socrates warns the "Gentlemen of Athens"^

they and not he

who will

gravity of his tnal. For a

suffer from a guilty verdict,

man whose

very

guilty verdict

The defendant's almost complete
surprise

— at

first.

The Apology

dialogues; in substance, however,

refusal to

no

mount

if

he

He

rouses

his jury that

fails to

of his peers, he

them and upbraids them

surprise, not

even to Socrates himself.

a traditional defense,

however,

different in form from the other early Socratic

it

differs little. Socrates treats his jury

is

it is

grasp the

is

his interlocutors in the other dialogues. This

dogmatism, complacency, and

is

seems as

it

on the judgment

life rests

remains cunously cavalier in his treatment of
them.

and indeed they swat him. The

who make up

much

is

a

as he treats

appropriate because the jury exhibits the

failure to appreciate virtue characteristic of a typical

Socratic interlocutor. Socrates' defense turns out to be an
accusation of Athens, an

attempt by Socrates to perform his elenchus on the whole city at once.
Whether he
or succeeds

21
.

.

is

not nearly as obvious as

1 First Offense:

To what

may

first

seem.

A Failure to Pu rsue Truth and Justice

degree,

do not know.

it

fails

I

Gentlemen of Athens, you have been affected by my accusers, I
any rate, was almost led to forget who I am — so convincingly

at

did they speak. Yet hardly anything they have said

is

true. (17a)

Socrates opens the dialogue with the suggestion that by entering court, he has

entered a den of deception. His accusers have been so deceptive as to
forget

who

he

is.

Here Socrates

to attack; he can understand

offers

sympathy

to the

how they were deceived

Gentlemen

of

Athens he

into indicting him.

^All Apology translations are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise indicated.
^Socrates uses this general term to addresses his jury and audience at the tnal.

believe

it

make him

I

is

But into

about
this

adopt his term since

describes the target of both Socrates' accusations and Plato's educational reforms.
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nearly

I

den

of deception Socrates will bring
the shining ideal of truth.

recognize

it

-

for their

own good and

falsehoods, Socrates goes on.

was

not only for his.

He

challenges the jury to

The greatest

of his accusers'

to insinuate that Socrates might
be a clever speaker

and

SO a deceiver;

Amorig their many falsehoods, I was especially
surprised by one: they said you
m^ust be on guard lest I deceive you,
since I am a clever speaker. To have
no
shame at being directly refuted by facts when I show
myself in no way clever with
words - that, I think, is the very height of shamelessness.

Unless, of course, they
he speaks the truth. If that is what they mean,
why,
would even admit to being an orator - though not after
their fashion. (17ab)
call a

man

a clever speaker

few opening

In just these

if

lines,

Socrates has indicted the rhetoricians for being

fundamentally deceptive and indirectly accused the jury
of being fools
Socrates denies that he
rather than deception.

call

is

I

for their art.

a clever speaker precisely on the grounds that he aims
at truth

If a clever speaker were merely a truthful one, then he would
even

himself an orator. But orators arrange their words in the service
of persuasion not

truth

and so

them

is

-

Socrates seems to suggest

- the jury that allows itself to

either a passive slave to the orator's

over truth.

In contrasting his

own

whims, or shares

be deceived by

their priority of persuasion

straightforward speech with the floweiy' manipulations

of orators, Socrates reminds the jury that theirs

determined by the quality of performance, as

is

in a

a question of justice. Is justice to be

drama

festival?

Or

is

justice to be

determined by truth?

These men,

I

will hear the

speeches like
will hear

believe

claim, have said

whole
theirs,

me speak

what

truth.

I

sure,

it

words and phrases

say to be

ways

To be

or nothing true. But from me. Gentlemen,

you

will not be prettily tricked out in elegant
all

nicely arranged.

On the

contrary,

you

naturally in the words which

Socrates asks the jury to
lack of savvy in the

little

just,

and

let

no one

make allowances

of the court, just as they
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of

happened to occur to me. For
you expect otherwise. (17bc)

for his lack of skill in

would

I

speaking and his

for a foreigner unfamiliar

with

and

their dialect

justice system.

But Socrates

with the ways of the court than he

He

sense.

is

is less

unskilled in rhetoric

unwilling to conform to them

and unfamiliar

in their traditional

implores the juiy to look beyond their
traditional concerns and to aim their

pursuit of Justice at the higher ideal of
truth

- the truth to which

Socrates has committed

himself;

same way, I specifically ask you now, and justly so,
I think, to pay no
my manner of speech - it may perhaps be poor, but perhaps
an
mprovement - and look strictly to this one thing, whether or
not I
In just the

attention to

For that

is

the virtue of a judge, and the virtue of an orator

is

to

speak justly.
speak the truth

(18a)

The

difference between Socrates' speech

and

a traditional orator's

is,

in the end,

its

goal of

truth.

Despite his disclaimers, Socrates' defense

would be recognized by
P3lamedes.

The

his

is

a prime example of rhetorical

art that

audience as based on Gorgias' famous Apology of

irony of this antirhetorical use of rhetorical convention^ should
not

discount the sincerity of the content of Socrates' speech; his commitment
to truth
Rather, this repudiation of rhetoric

is

is real.^

a counter-indictment of a system of justice that

breeds and nurtures misunderstanding while offering

little

possibility to correct

it.^

Socrates task turns out to be less an effort to get himself acquitted, than an attempt to

show

the faults of the system of justice and of juries

who

so often reach for flattery and

'On

the Apology'?, irony, see Allen (1984, p. 61); on the connection to Gorgias. Seeskin (1987, ch. 3).
^Teloh (1986, p. 107) calls Socrates speech "an antirhetorical parody of rhetoric." Allen (1984, p. 68 69) coins the term ’philosophical rhetoric' to describe it, and distinguishes it from the 'base rhetonc' of the

sophists on the grounds that

‘Truth

it

is

aimed

at truth

and indifferent

to gratification

and pleasure.

the critenon that separates Socrates' defense from Palamedes' and also the crucial difference
between Socrates and the Sophists. See Seeskin (1987, p. 62): "Though Gorgias' Palmedes made essentially
the

same

is

claim,

we have

seen that he was concerned less with truth than with probability. For if Plato had
would have written a defense of Socrates which made ample use of the

imitated Gorgias to the letter, he

argument from

probability.

^Socrates complains repeatedly about the lack of time he has for his defense and pessimistically

prophecies his conviction. Brickhouse and Smith (1989,

p.

41) observe,

".

.

.if

the jury should take

literally

an

emerge in subsequent conversation for Socrates to correct." Reeve
(1989, p. 20) points out that Socrates must appeal to the jury itself cis witness to the truth of what he says: "He
asks them to confront their prejudicial beliefs about advanced thinkers with their actual knowledge of him."
ironic remark, their mistake could not
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emotional appeals rather than truth.
Socrates knows what the jury
insists

on force-feeding them

truth.

He

is

expecting, but he

refuses to play the game:

Hear me then. Perhaps some of you will
think [Vm playing a game
I shall tell you the whole
truth. (20d)

well assured that

Second Offensg; PoRmatic Accepta nce

2ul ,2

Socrates

is

of

(ttai^eiv)];® be

the. Fir<.t

quick to point out that courtroom rhetoricians
are not alone

in their

efforts to deceive the jury:

For the fact is that many accusers have risen
before you against me; at this point
they have been making accusations for many
years, and yet they have told no
truth. Yet I fear them more than I fear
Anytus and those around him - though
they too are clever [beivoxx;]. Still, the [first
accusers] are more dangerous
[Seivoxepoi]. (I8bc)

Now

deinos [5eiv6q,

terrible, able, skillful] is

and danger. While Anytus and Meletus seem

an ambiguous word that denotes both

to pose a danger to Socrates, the

skill

first

accusers are more directly dangerous to the jury, the Gentlemen
of Athens, for they

corrupted them as youths:

They took hold of most of you in childhood, persuading you of the truth of
accusations which were in fact quite false: "There is a certain Socrates
wise
[ao(p6q] man.
thinker on things in the Heavens.
inquirer into things beneath
.

.

Earth

.

.

.

.

.

making the weaker argument

Athens, the ones

stronger."

.

.

.

Those men. Gentlemen of

who

spread that report are my dangerous [5eivoi] accusers; for
their hearers believe that those who inquire into such things acknowledge no gods
(18bc)

This passage must be interpreted very carefully. Anytus and Meletus present the
accusation cited, but this fallacious accusation
first

accusers laid the groundwork for

®

its

to Liddell

dangerous to Socrates only because the

acceptance. The

first

accusers got hold of

I have departed from his translation for my own emphasis.
and Scott, the pnmary meaning of pajzo is to play ~ like a child or at a game or sport.

Allen translates pajzo as "I joke,";

According

is
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Socrates’ judges as youths

and indoctrinated them with the dangerous
idea

that inquiry

equals impiety.

Who are the first accusers?
says that the others cannot be

Socrates indirectly identifies Aristophanes
at 18d, but

named

or even

known. All we know

is

that they begin

working on citizens when they are youths and
continue indoctrinating them over a veiy
long time, leaving Socrates with the nearly
impossible task of removing "in this short time
that prejudice

which you have been so long

pervasiveness can
identifies as the

make these

in acquiring" (19a). Their

anonymity and

corrupters of youth none other than the
"everyone" Meletus

improvers of youth

at

25a.

It is

the educational system

and

of feeding unquestioned social values to the
youth of Athens that lays the

Socrates ultimate conviction. This

is

its

practice

groundwork

for

just as he predicts;

Gentlemen of Athens, I do not think further defense is needed to
show that, by the
very terms of Meletus' indictment, I am not
guilty; this, surely is sufficient. But as I
said before, a great deal of enmity has risen against
me from among many people,
and you may rest assured that this is true. And that is what will convict
me, if I am
convicted -- not Meletus, not Anytus, but the grudging slander of
the multitude. It
has convicted many another good and decent man; I think it will
convict me; nor
is there any reason to fear that with me it will
come to a stand. (28ab)
It is

not so

much

Aristophanes' particular portrayal of Socrates as a corrupting educator in

the Clouds that sends Socrates to his death; after

accusers have convicted and will convict

all,

Socrates makes clear that the

many other men

as well. Rather,

it is

first

the

multitude's unquestioned standards of goodness and piety that preclude any alternative

conception of these ideals, and the constricted setting of court which
opportunity to

To be

rid

fails to

provide the

the juty of these prejudiced standards.

sure, Socrates attributes part of his indictment to confusion

caused by

Aristophanes' poetry and plays, to books by other philosophers such as Anaxagoras
w'hich are bought cheaply in the agora and then mistakenly attributed to Socrates (as
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Meletiis dees at 26de),

and

to orators

who by veiy definition

Socrates' complaint about these
things

what they misrepresent him
IS

no opportunity

as,

not so

much

out to slander their target

that they misrepresent him,
or even

but rather that their ideas

to ask questions of a

result, there is little

is

set

now

book or to challenge

in a single direction.

the ideas of a play.

There

As a

motivation for their impressionable
audiences to doubt what they sayi

^am, there have teen many such accusers, and they have
now been at
®

®

work for a
- some

especially credulous

you children, some only a little older- and
they lodged their accusations quite
by default, no one appeanng in defense.
(18cd)

off

Now Socrates

must defend himself against these disembodied
accusers. He

is

fighting not only against a misconception
of his character, but also against a
narrow

dogmatic idea of piety that disallows inquiry. He
must

and

fight against his jury's faulty

education:

But those who use malicious slander

to persuade you, and those who, themselves
persuaded, persuade others - all these are most difficult
to deal with. For it is
impossible to bring any one of them forward as a witness
and cross-examine him.
must rather, as it were, fight with shadows in making my
defense, and question
where no one answers. (18d)

I

Unfortunately this education has yielded a jury that values persuasion
over truth. So

when

at

19bc, Socrates recounts Aristophanes' cancature of him and asks those
in the jury

who have

interacted with

him personally

to

tell

the others that their experience doesn't

square with the play, their counterexamples have no

effect.

has become more pervasive than the testimony of Socrates'

2.1,3 Third Offense: Failu re to

I

Somehow the
real

play's

message

acquaintances.

Acknowledg e I gnorance

have been arguing that the

real

harm done by the

"first

accusers"

was

to instill in

the jury from their youth a conception of piety so dogmatic that inquiry into the truth or
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reality of things

IS,

could be interpreted as impiety. In
assuming that they

the juty displays the kind of assumption
of

interlocutors. Indeed their

inquiry

itself

wisdom

assumption of knowledge

as heresy. Socrates

is

know what

so characteristic of Socrates'

is

so strong that they interpret

a threat because he questions things
the jury

assume they know and so challenges

their

piety

complacency. This complacency

is

members

evident

m

the charges:

Socrates

is

guilty of needless curiosity

and meddling interference, inquiring into
beneath the Earth and Sky, making the weaker
argument stronger and
teaching Others to do the same. (19c)

thmp

The very idea

that curiosity

is

"needless” and that asking questions

interference" reveals a profound resistance to
inquiry. Inquiry

The charges

that Socrates inquires after things

beyond

is

Xenophon; and Socrates immediately

Though he denies the accuracy

attributes

them

"meddling

considered criminal.

earth

the weaker argument stronger are inconsistent with the
Socrates

is

and sky and makes

we know

from Plato and

to Aristophanes' caricature.

of this caricature, he takes pains to point out that he

would not be ashamed were the charges

correct:

Mark you, I do not mean to disparage such knowledge, if anyone in fact
let me not be brought to trial by Meletus on such a charge as that!
But
Gentlemen,

I

have no share

Socrates sees crucial differences
after the earth

and teach

and sky

for a fee.

prosecution, however.

it.

among

(see 26d),

He

in

it

-

(19c)

himself, the natural philosophers

who inquire

and the Sophists who make weaker arguments

does not consider their

He

has

activities

stronger

impious or worthy of

asks the jury again to compare their experience of him with the

charges and note the discrepancy: "From that you will recognize the nature of the other
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things the multitude says about
me," he says (19d). This

reminder to the juiy of the hollowness of
their

Having presented a

own

much

a defense as a

assumptions.

diatribe against sophistic orators

and having shown himself committed instead

stronger

not so

is

who make weak aiguments

to truth, Socrates goes

on

to

distinguish himself from sophistic educators.
Again, he doesn't disparage education
directly but rather criticizes accepted
practices in the process of

And

avowing

his innocence:

you have heard from anyone that I undertake
to educate men and make
money from doing it, that is false, too. Once again, I
think it would be a fine thing
o be able to educate men, as Goigias of Leontini
does, or Prodicus
if

of Ceos, or

Hippias of Elis. For each of them. Gentlemen, can
enter any given city and
convince the youth - who might freely associate
with any of their fellow citizens
they please — to drop those associates and
associate rather with them, to pay
money for it, and give thanks in the bargain. (19d - 20a)
This statement

men

is

practically dripping with irony.

as these sophists cJaim to do; that

is it

It

would be a

would be

great

if

"fine thing" to educate

one could

in fact teach

But Socrates knows he lacks the relevant knowledge, and he suspects

virtue.

men do

as well. Noting that they are paid

reveals their motivation for deception

The anger directed

at Socrates

handsomely

for their tuition, Socrates at

and declares himself devoid
and

that these

his "teaching"

once

of such capitalism.’

cannot be based on what he

teaches, since he teaches nothing, nor on his fees, since he charges nothing.
Rather, he
explains,

it is

based on people upset with the suggestion and appearance of their own

ignorance:

As

a result, those

and say that

whom

[my

’Socrates' most tangible defense

young men, despite

followers] test

"this fellow Socrates

was

is

become angry at me, not at themselves,
and corrupts the youth."

utterly polluted,

his poverty. Since

he didn't take a fee for

his associations with

and since he devoted all his time to talking with them, he had no resources to
speak of. Part of his refusal to accept payment no doubt has to do with his claim that he had nothing to teach.
Another reason may be that Socrates' goal is truth, not profit, and going after money might cause him to stray
from the path. A student is bound to fork over more for flattery than for the insulting aporia Socrates was

wont

to produce.

their wealth,

On

the other hand, Socrates refusal of payment

reason Socrates refuses a fee, however,

is

left

him

that his activity is of a religious

Teloh(1986, p.l09).
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free to pursue truth.

The

ultimate

and not a business nature. See also

And when someone

asks them what

it is this Socrates does,
what it is he teaches
they cannot say because they do not know;
but so as not to seem at a loss, thev
mutter the kind of things that lie ready to hand
against anyone who pursues
wisdom: "Things in the Heavens and beneath the
Earth." or "not acknowledging
gods, or making the weaker argument stronger."
(23d)
’

That Socrates has personally examined many members
of the jury has already been

acknowledged

(i.e. at

19cd). Here

it is

suggested that his followers, described as wealthy

young men, have gone out and examined the

adults with

whom they associate. The jury,

the audience, and Socrates' particular accusers cannot
be dissociated from this group. So

here again Socrates

is

accusing the jury of becoming angry

at

him rather than admitting

the presence or even appearance of ignorance in themselves:

The

truth, I suppose, they would not wish to state, namely, that
it has become
quite clear that they pretend to knowledge and know nothing. And
because they

are concerned for their pride, I think, and zealous, and numerous,
and speak
vehemently and persuasively about me, they have long filled your ears with

zealous slander. (23de)

Socrates' insistence that virtue
citizenry

whom

attitude,

is

neither

known nor taught by the Athenian

Meletus identified as the improvers of youth cannot help but be

maddening to well-regarded
that virtue

is

easily

citizens

known and

and parents

alike.

He

is

upsetting the accepted idea

taught to children, by parents or by hired sophists. This

which was no doubt shared by the

jury,

is

illustrated at

20ab where Socrates

recounts asking his friend Callias about the education of his sons.
the boys were horses or calves
their appropriate virtue.

virtue appropriate to a

answer

would be easy

He then

man and

style of the sophists:^®

'“Allen (1984)

it

compares

it

to find

asks whether there

is

someone

to

He

points out that

make them

if

excellent in

anyone who has knowledge

of the

a citizen. "To be sure," replies Callias using the short

"Evenus, a Parian, Five minae."

to the style used by sophists at Gorg/as 449b, and Protagoras
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334e

-

335c.

I counted Evenus fortunate
indeed, if he really possesses that art and
teaches
so modestly. For my own part, at any rate, I
would be puffed up with vanity and
pnde II I had such knowledge. But I do not, Gentlemen."
(20bc)
It

This

a caricature of an answer.

The jury thinks

That Socrates denies having such a

virtue.

one

is

who

might possess

seriousness of the task. Socrates

have of

piety,

and the

and professes the

clearly asking the citizens of

is

Athens to question

knowledge they have

false

of virtue

and
is

into

it

now

2 1 .4 Fourth Offense; Failure to Direct
.

juiy.

him

--

or hereafter

you

in

ff.,

I

claim.

it

will turn out

in

— with various

Gentlemen of Athens, that

it is

jesting in eamest,^^ guilty of lightly bringing

Socrates' charge boils

down

reality.

Socrates

it

to be so. (24b)

many ways an

accusation of his

"crimes":

Meletus

men

to

He

youth, but Socrates here charges that
the god, but rather for his

"Grubc (1981)

who

trial,

all.

is

guilty

— guilty of

guilty of pretending a

(24c)

to a criticism of Meletus' ultimate concerns or aims; he

asking what Meletus cares about.

in light of

less

denying that they are

will find

zealous concern for things he never cared about at

charge

is

Socrates explicitly turns the tables on his chief accuser, Meletus, charging

but not him alone

But

He

Pu rsuits toward the Good

have been arguing that Socrates' defense was

At 24c

their

part of his defense with nothing less than an exhortation to inquiry:

Whether you inquire

I

teachability.

its

prosecutable and anything more than an effort to avoid aporetic
first

greatest admiration for

the false knowledge they have of him, the false knowledge
they

interested in denying that the charges apply to him, than
he

concludes the

easy to find a teacher of

it's

only highlights the Athenians' failure to recognize the

it

own complacency about

skill

that

own

is

has accused Socrates of impiety and corrupting the

it is

Meletus

who

cares not for the youth or even for

social profit.

translates this: "dealing frivolously with serious matters." This

Socrates' reputation for irony, and refusal to mount a serious defense.
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is

an interesting counter

Socrates'

first

good [PatlOTOl]

question to Meletus

whether he thinks that the young should
be as

as possible. Meletus says yes but
then cannot say

the youth better [Patriot,;] (24de).

when he means

is

I

better in a specifically moral sense,

much

which

of the rest of the Athenian citizenry)

and judged. Socrates

it

is

that

makes

believe that Plato prefers the
adjective bejtion

is

that education should aim at aiete or
moral excellence.'^

Meletus (and

who

treats arete as a divine ideal,

is

here consistent with the idea

Where
over

Socrates disagrees with

how

arete

is

determined

perhaps accurately judgable only by

gods. Meletus seems to view arete in the traditional
sense as something valued more for
the impression

At

first

made on

others than for

its

intrinsic value.^^

Meletus cannot say what or

who

improves the youth. At 24d he finally

says that the laws improve the youth, a reply that
reveals his concern with social approval
rather than independent moral ideals.*^

When

Socrates insists on a

youth, Meletus points to the judges, claiming that

all

improve the youth. Meletus here acts as though he
in flattery. After all,

of

is

them

is

are best able to educate

and

winning the case against Socrates would surely be a
loss.

social

boon

for

But the socially-aware

concerned with more than the judges; eventually he fingers the audience, the

councilors, the

assemblymen

— everyone except

Socrates as improvers of the youth.

This overwhelming abundance of educators, however,

improving the youth morally than of training horses
aren't

of

being judged by them and indulges

Meletus, while losing would be a financial (36ab) and social

Meletus

human improver

even concerned with moral

virtue,

much

less

for

is

Olympic

able to teach

no more capable
victory.

it.

of

The multitude

As Socrates

says

‘Tor more on Plato's use of bdtion see section 3.3 and Hoerber (1962, p. 127).
'Taving a reputation for arete was infinitely more desirable than hang virtuous and so people
focused on the image rather than the reality of arete. Dover (1974, p. 226) points out that Athenian
expressions such as 'I want to be seen to be honest’, or 'to be regarded as honest' were often equivalent to our
'I want to be honest,’ adding that "goodness divorced from a reputation for goodness was of limited interest."
'This initial response reflects those of Lysis and Menexenus in Lysis.
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explicitly at 36bc, the multitude are

concerned "with money or property or

militar>'

and

public honors and other office, or the secret
societies and political clubs which keep

cropping up in the City." As was typically Athenian.
Meletus
indictment of Socrates.^^

is

aiming to

profit

from his

answers to Socrates' question reveal Meletus'
misplaced

goals:

But the

fact

the youth;

cared at

Meletus
the suit

Meletus, that you sufficiently
clearly indicate

your

own

show

that

you never gave thought to
you never

lack of concern, indicate that

about these matters. (25c)

interested in social rather than moral goods.

is

is

all

is,

you

brought on behalf of his accuser's social peers

As

or the god. Meletus

was angered on behalf

of the poets,

-

Socrates explains at 23e

24a,

-

not for the benefit of the youth

Anytus on behalf of the

craftsmen and politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators.

By showing that he
is

has no reason to corrupt others, Socrates makes

it

clear that he

being prosecuted for harming the complacency and reputation of the Gentlemen of

Athens

--

not their sons or their gods.

But again, dear Meletus,

who

are good, or

surely

tell

us this:

Is

wicked [xpriaxoTt;

ask nothing hard.

Do

fj

it

better to dwell

TCOVT^potc;]?

not wicked

men do

Do

among

fellow citizens

answer, dear friend;

[KaKOv] to those
around them, and good men good things [dyaGoi dyaGov]? (25c)

Socrates

whom

I

tries to

show that he would be

in

stupid to intentionally corrupt the

men among

he dwells; he points out that none of them has come back to wreak havoc on

alleged corrupter.

little

evil things

or

The

sophists,

no personal stake

in the

by

contrast,

outcome

were often foreigners and nomads

of their teachings; Socrates

mocks

his

who had

their situation

considering exile as a penalty at 37d.

‘^Sce:

Adkins (1960,

p.

261 ):”thc Greeks generally would only do something if it was quite clear that
at the very least that calamity faced them of they did not do it."

they would benefit fairgib/y thereby, or
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In contrast to Meletus

and most of the Gentlemen

of Athens, Socrates

committed to the god and to the moral improvement
of the youth beyond
only possible

And

way he could

if I

corrupt them

is

The

all else.

unintentionally:

corrupt them unintentionally, it is not the law
to bring action here for that
but rather to instruct and admonish in private;

sort of mistake,

learn,

is

for clearly,

if I

once

what I unintentionally do. You, however, were unwilling
to
associate with me and teach me; instead, you
brought action here, where it is law
to bring those in need of punishment rather
than instruction. (26a)

The very

shall stop

I

Meletus has brought Socrates before the court shows two
things:

fact that

that Meletus

is

most interested

has embarrassed

many

him

for

improving his social status by pillorying the

of his peers; second, that Meletus has

base his indictment because
of punishing

in

if

The Penalty:

Condemnin g

My argument that
confirmed

at 30c,

no knowledge on which

being ignorant. Socrates' examination of Meletus

In

Socrates

where the

man who
to

he did, he would teach that knowledge to Socrates instead

an examination of the Athenian citizenry

2,1.5

first,

city

is

is

is

nothing

less

than

at large.

Socrates Athens

Harms

Itself

trying his peers rather than the reverse seems to be

identified as the potential victim in a conviction:

Be

well assured that if you kill me, and if I am the sort of man I claim, you will
harm me less than you harm yourselves
And so. Gentlemen of Athens, I am far
from making a defense for my own sake, as some might think; I make it for yours,
lest you mistake the gift the God has given you and cast your votes against me.

(30c)

In a way, Socrates functions as the city's conscience

you sure?"
rightness.

rules.

He

as everyone shakes

But

this

hands and mumbles

— that

in

little

voice that squeaks "Are

agreement over their mutual

annoying pip-squeak refuses to accept and go along with

society's

won't play the game of courtroom oratory and theatrics; supplication would be a

confirmation of erroneous charges. In short, Socrates refuses to view the jury as his
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ultimate judge, rather than the god.

most surprised

at

the

and conviction of

He

number of acquittal

herself,

because

it is

not surprised at his conviction

rs

He

votes (36a).

she

who will

only one

who

trial

suffer the greatest penalty.

recognize that this one thing is true: there
either in living or dying, and the gods
do not neglect

trial is less

in fact he's

sees the event as Athens'

You must

Part of the reason this

-

is

no

evil for a

good man

his affairs. (41d)

of Socrates than of Athens

is

that the city

is

the

stands to lose. Socrates' commitment to the
god (see sec. 2.2) and his

concern with justice as an ideal rather than the
capricious decision of an easily

manipulated mob, give him a kind of Teflon coating.
death will be
to

compare

like a

his life to those of

himself to others

happiness,

-

41b Socrates wonders

if

journey to another place where he will meet "true
judges" and be able

demigods and heroes. He might also be able

Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer.

companng

At 40e

"I

who had met

he concludes. Socrates

is

would

to question

find a wonderful pursuit there," he says,

unjust verdicts.

"It

would be inconceivable

convinced that the gods will judge him

justly, his

worldly judges can only penalize themselves.
Socrates believes that true justice can be found only outside the courtroom.

reason that he has led such a private

for this

defense

life

and

refuses to

mount

It is

a traditional

at his trial.

It is

man to be spared if he publicly opposes you or any other
and prevents many unjust and illegal things from occurring in

impossible for any

democratic majority,

He who intends to fight for what is just, if he is to be spared even for a
time, must of necessity live a private rather than a public life. (31e - 32a)

his city.
little

The huge jury
and slander

(see

of a classical Athenian court

Euthy^hro 3b) not

least

each other and looking good as a group.

was

easily

because of their

slick rhetoric

interest in looking

Socrates' insistence
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swayed by

on remaining a

good

to

private

man

and refusing public

life

was

as

much

as anything an attempt to
preserve his

self-determination in a democratic environment.

The Athenian system of government and

criminal justice diminished an individual's
sense of responsibility for what

was done by

the group and elevated the consideration
of community strength far above the
question of
fairness to individuals. In

some sense a vote

to acquit Socrates

amounted

to siding with

the hated guy in opposition to one's friends
and the social powers that be. These

facts,

along with Socrates' frequent expressions of
defeatism in the Apology, suggest that Plato

was out

to criticize the moral assumptions behind
Socrates' conviction at least as

much

as

the conviction itself/^

At 35b
in

ff.

Socrates explicitly spurns the tradition of bringing
his family into court

an emotional appeal to the

acquittal,

jury.

Were

Socrates to

make an emotional appeal

for

he would only prove himself guilty of the charges by looking
to the jury rather

than to god to determine what

is

pious;

We ought not accustom you, nor ought you become accustomed, to forswear
yourselves;

it is pious in neither of us. So do not
consider it right. Gentlemen of
Athens, that I do such things in your presence as I believe to be neither honorable
nor just nor holy, especially since, by Zeus, it is for impiety that I am prosecuted

by

this fellow

Meletus here. For

clearly,

if I

were to persuade and compel you by

supplication, you being sworn as judges, I would teach you then indeed not to
believe that there are gods, and in making my defense I would in effect accuse

myself of not acknowledging them. But that is far from so; I do acknowledge
them. Gentlemen of Athens, as none of my accusers does, and to you and to the

God I now commit my case, to judge
for you.

Socrates'

honor

in

whatever way

will be best for

me and

also

(35cd)

is

conferred by the god, not by the men. Hence, he does not cower before

the jury as he says he has seen other

men

do, despite their reputations,

with death, acting "as though they would be immortal

if

you did not

when

kill

threatened

them." Since

'‘For more on the implications of the Athenian democracy see Field (1930, p. 86) and Dover (1974,
Arguments from Stone (1989) and others who show why Athens was right to convict Socrates based
upon the damage he did to their laws and society, are not neccssanly in disagreement with the Platonic
158).

viewpoint, they merely

fail

to recognize Plato’s larger agenda.
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p.

Socrates' real

trial is

to

come

he

later;

insists

on adhering

to the truth

and

honor

to his

in

the face of death:

It ts true I have been
convicted tor a lack; not a lack of words,
but lack of bold
shamelessness unwtllingness to say the things
you would find it pleasant to hear
saying and doing many things I claim
to be unworthy of
me
me, r'J'I’if
but things of the sort you are accustomed
to hear from others. I did not then
think It necessary to do anything unworthy
of a free man because of danger- I
do
not now regret so having conducted my
defense; and I would far rather die with
that defense than live with the other.
(38de)

Socrates here acknowledges that

it

was not

his lack of skill in oratory that

his conviction, but rather his unwillingness
to flatter the jury. Indeed, his entire

been dedicated to showing the gentlemen of
Athens that they
themselves to be

-

he

isn't

going to

start flattering

caused

life

has

aren't as wise as they take

them now. Socrates scorns

his court for

being a place where justice has no chance of succeeding
as long as judges look to their

own

worldly interests rather than the ideal of justice in
rendering their verdict. "The judge

does not

to grant justice as a favor," he reminds them, "but
to render judgment; he has

sit

sworn no oath
There

is

to gratify those

a sense in

which

whom

he sees

fit,

but to judge according to law" (35c).

Socrates' refusal to play the

the corruption of the court system and of the city

One
that

it

offers

of the

more

overt criticisms Socrates

enough time

persuasion. There

is

for

if

of a traditional defense reveals

itself.

makes

of the

Athenian

legal system

is

emotional persuasion, but not enough for rational

a lament at 19a that Socrates has so

that the jury has spent nearly a lifetime acquiring.

surprised

game

little

time to remove a prejudice

At 24a, Socrates says that he would be

he were able to remove the prejudice against him in so short a time. At 37a

Socrates concludes that

if

Athens didn't

insist

on deciding death-penalty cases

day, he believes the jury could be persuaded. Socrates' message here
legal system, but

about impatience

in searching for truth. Belief in
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is

in a single

not just about the

an unsupported myth

or

opm.on

is

a quick

fix

and examination leads
consuming, indeed

life

intended to replace a reasoned position.
Constant questioning

to better

and

better beliefs

and decisions but

it

is

a time

consuming, project.

Socrates says explicitly that his conviction
amounts to a victory for wickedness

and

who have condemned him

that those

will, like

him, receive their just deserts:

Often in battle it becomes clear that a man may
escape death by throwing
arms and turning in supplication to his pursuers;

his

and

there are

down

many

other
devices for each of war's dangers, so that one can
avoid dying if he is bold enough
to say and do anything whatever. It is not
difficult to escape death. Gentlemen: it

more

is

difficult to

now I am

escape wickedness, for wickedness runs

faster

than death.

and slow, and I have been caught by the slower runner.
But my
clever and quick, and they have been caught by the
faster runner,

And

old

accusers are

namely Evil. I now take my leave, sentenced by you to death; they
depart,
convicted by Truth for injustice and wickedness. I abide in
my penalty, and thev
in theirs. (39ab)

What

could Socrates' accusers' penalty be? Haven't they

the spoils of victory

prophesies that
restrained

namely

-

many

them thus

relief

He warns that

and that those who wanted

in court,

won't they receive

from Socrates? At 39cd, Socrates suggests not.

other examiners will

far.

won

come

He

to take his place, saying that he has

these younger examiners will be even more harsh

to be rid of Socrates will be even

more troubled. As an

antidote to this torment Socrates offers only one solution:

If

you think by

killing to

hold back the reproach due you for not living

are profoundly mistaken. That release

which

is

rightly,

neither possible nor honorable.

you

The

both most honorable and most easy is not to cut down others, but
to take care that you will be as good as possible. This I utter as prophecy to those
of you who voted for my condemnation, and take my leave. (39d)
release

Socrates' conviction

is

and penalty

of death will

meaningfully punish him. The loser of this

end

trial is

his service to the city, but

it

will not

Athens; Socrates will be judged in the

divine realm.

But

it is

now the hour of parting —

the better

is

unclear to

all

I

to die

and you

but the God. (42a)
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to live.

Which

of us goes to

The

three general charges or criticisms
Socrates subtly levels against Athens
in the

ApoJosy^ correspond with the three central
aspects of Plato's project
early dialogues.

The unquestioning acceptance

attitude toward tradition, poetry,

and myth

of the

that Plato

accusers

first

hoped

is

for

education in the

typical of the

to eradicate

by awakening

the minds of Athens. Memorization and
dogmatic acceptance would be replaced with
critical analysis of poetry,

prophecy, literature and drama. Next, the
popular association

of virtue with wealth, gloiy,

idea of the soul

and arete

and

as

its

practical skills

would be replaced by

—

for victory in

argument, elections, or even

instrumental toward the higher good.

Under

be criminal, but rather a supremely pious

3ocratg$' Mtssionr
If

the

Apology

philosophy as a

way

of

is

A Defense o

f

this

intellectual

in court

would be

Honom confened by

— would

be

at best

scheme philosophical inquiry would not

activity.

Philosophy as a Moral Pursuit

a defense of anything

life.

new

perfection. Accordingly, intellectual pursuits

directed cooperatively toward the divine ideal
of moral perfection.

the multitude

a

it is

less

one of Socrates, than of

Socrates was charged with impiety and with corrupting the

youth, but from his description of his mission he emerges as the inversion of those
accusations. Socrates defends his philosophical activity as nothing other than a holy
pursuit, a true mission

aimed

at perfecting

man's most divine element: his soul.

explains the divine origin of his mission, exhibiting a

new

He

attitude toward divine

proclamations as riddles to be solved rather than doctrine to be accepted. Socrates proves
that he values the

god above reputation, wealth, power,

his

own

family, even his

own

A cessation of philosophy for Socrates would amount to disobedience to the god.
sticks to his post

even when his

life is

threatened. Socrates
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is

a philosopher-hero.

He

life.

L2rl

The Oracle

The Divine

Stpiy;

Origin of Snrr a tes' Missinn

Socrates offers the oracle story in response
to a hypothetical question from the
jury

asking what he has done to give nse to such
slanderous charges. In an almost shocking
departure from his habitual avowal of ignorance,
Socrates answers that he

is

being

slandered for his wisdom:

Gentlemen of Athens, I got this name through nothing
but a kind of wisdom
What kind? The kind which is perhaps peculiarly human, for
it may

be I am really
perhaps the men I just mentioned [sophists] are wise
with a
wisdom greater than human — either that, or I cannot say what.
In any case, I
have no knowledge of it, and whoever says I do is lying
^ and speaks to mv
>
slander.*^ (20de)

wise in that.

As

And

a witness to his wisdom, Socrates calls

Socrates account of wisdom, this

is

none other than the god

human wisdom

Delphi (20e). By

the only sort of witness there could be; the god

only entity wise enough to judge whether Socrates (or anyone
Socrates'

at

else) is truly wise.

disjunction

is

the

Indeed

turns out to be merely the knowledge that he does not know.

This knowledge contrasts directly with the alleged wisdom of the sophists

superhuman knowledge

is

who

either

have

or "I cannot say what." Clearly, the second half of this

the proposition to be affirmed

—

as

it

has been repeatedly by the aporectic

outcomes of Socrates' examinations.

The

oracle story itself

is

well

known.

Socrates' friend

Chaerephon went

to the

Oracle at Delphi and asked whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. The oracle

proclaimed that no one was wiser.^®

It is

not from this story that the slander against

Socrates has arisen, but rather from Socrates' reaction to

proclamation as nothing other than a riddle to be solved.

”

Does

this final claim suggest that the oracle is lying

it.

It

Socrates treats the oracle's
doesn't replace Socrates'

and slandering by claiming Socrates wise? The

question forms a Platonic nddle, the answer to which seems to be no, since the oracle claims that Socrates has

human knowledge while

the

and slanderers claim he has superhuman knowledge.
is the most free, upnght, and prudent
this is the Tredcnnick AVaterfield translation.

liars

‘“On Xenophon’s account, the oracle says Socrates

See Socrates Dc/ensr 12
'

ff.;

72

of

all

people.

conviction of his

knew that the

own

divine

ignorance, rather

word must be

it

prompts him to

true, so this

try

and reconcile the two. He

proclamation could be nothing other than

a paradox, a seeming contradiction, a riddle to be solved:

For

when I heard

it, I

reflected:

"What does the God mean? What is the sense of
I know that I am not wise at all; what
then

this riddling utterance [aiviTxexai]?*^

does the

God mean by saying I am

wisest? Surely he does not speak falsehood;

it

not permitted to him." So I puzzled [f\7COpot)V] for a long
time over what he
meant, and then, with great reluctance, I turned to inquire into the
matter in some
such way as this. (21b)
is

It s

clear that Socrates thinks

it

his

duty to

test the oracle;

one he approaches

Commentators have puzzled over how Socrates extrapolated
from the oracle's cryptic statement.^®

why

however, helps to explain

Looking

he describes

at the story

his reaction as

Athenian reaction to such a proclamation would be
need not

test his

knowledge because

Plato, however, inquiry

it

his elenctic mission

from an educational angle,

he does. The traditional

to accept

it

unquestioningly; Socrates

has been confirmed by the God. For Socrates and

the best reaction to any puzzle or dilemma.

is

reluctantly.

When the oracle

presented Socrates with a statement that could be seen as a riddling irony or paradox, he

was

sent into aporia.

He

attempted to extract himself from that aporia by dialectical

inquiry. Socrates reacted to the oracular puzzle just as Plato hopes his audience will react

to the

many

puzzles he creates in his dialogues.

Such puzzles

are not just fun

and games, these

riddling ironies

and paradoxes

indicators of divine truth that can't be expressed directly in the world of appearances;

a pious duty to inquire after them. At 21bc, Socrates describes

‘’The definition of sinissomai according to Liddell

how he tested

are

it is

the oracle:

& Scott: "to speak darkly or in riddles, to hint a

and the description of Socrates’ daJmowon in sec. 2.2.4.
thing, give to understand." See
^ Stokes (1992, p. 73), Reeve (1989), Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 99), and Vlastos (1983) agree
that Socrates does not explain how the oracle prompts him to engage in elcnchus. Teloh (1986, p. Ill)
speculates that since serving the god requires knowledge of good and evil, Socrates immediately engages in
also see. 1.3.4.

- the path to such knowledge.
Even
statement to Socrates' mission, however.

dialectic

this

explanation skips over the transition from the oracular
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I

went to someone with a reputation

anyu’here

I

oracle that

It IS

might
this

test

man

for wisdom, in the belief that
there if
[e^^^cov] the meaning of the utterance and
declare to the
is wiser than I am, and you
said I was wisest.”

(21bc)

important to understand that Socrates

accuracy. Grote translates
oracle, but there

is

[^^^cov]

no evidence

is

testing the

meaning

"refute" the oracle

of the oracle, not

and Tredennick, "disprove" the

that Socrates ever doubts

truth. In his testing, Socrates

its

adopts a questioning stance thereby, taking an
open approach to the
of the investigation

is

wisdom, not Socrates, and so he

something about wisdom.
precisely in that he

So

it

What

knows

seems, at any

know what I do

how

Socrates learns

that he does not

rate, that I

am

way to

others

and duty

is

that he

isn't to

show that he

is

is

wiser than these

men

know:

wiser in this one small respect:

I

do not think

I

not. (21d)

man who "had

seeming wiser. He learns that the man

and "most especially

to both the

The subject

he could be wiser; he wants to learn

Socrates describes his examination of a political
in conversation of

riddle.^^

interrogates those reputed to be

wise (21c): poets, politicians, and craftsmen.
Socrates' objective
wiser than his interlocutors, but to discover

its

is

not wise despite seeming that

to himself." Socrates then takes

god and to the man himself

to

the effect" on him

show him

it

as his labor (22a)

How can this

his ignorance.

be \ Once Socrates learned from testing the oracle that knowledge of one's ignorance was
a kind of wisdom, he realized that false conceit
to

improvement of the

soul,

and therefore

was an obstacle

to learning,

and

therefore

to piety. If a man's piety consists in the moral

perfection of his soul, the false belief that he has achieved such perfection cannot help

but

make him impious.

rather he

is

Socrates

trying to get others to

^'As Kierkegaard (1989,
related altogether receptively to

p.

my

is

not trying to prove his

acknowledge

their

35) points out, "Inasmuch as
subject."
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own

human

I

superiority

by

refutation,

imperfection.

ask a question,

I

know

nothing and

am

others

T

things in

^

Butt very likely, Gentlemen, it is really the
God who
oracle he means to say that 'human
nature is a thing
of

appeam

that he does not

example, as

if

mean

which I test
and by his
worth, or none It

is

little

this fellow Socrates, but uses

wise,

'

my name to offer an

he were saying that "he among you,
Gentlemen, is wisest who,
is truly worth nothing in
respect to wisdom. (23a)

like

Socrates, realizes that he

222

Socrates' Servic e to the

God

Despite the rewards he anticipates upon his
eventual divine judgment (40e),
Socrates has paid dearly in social costs for his mission:

Nevertheless,

I went on, perceiving with grief
and fear that I was becoming hated
seemed necessary to put the God first - so I had to go on,
examining
what the oracle meant by testing everyone with a reputation of
knowledge.

but

’

still, it

(21e-22a)

As

this

passage makes clear, Socrates put his duty to the god above
the approval of the

multitude and even the popular conception of piety. Here
to the jury's question about

how the

however, implies that the jury

know

slander that he
neither their

is

own

sheer stupidity that leads Socrates to denigrate the

we

impious has arisen. This answer,
ignorance, nor what piety

wisdom

educational transference of the very riddle that sparked his

member saying to
I

make

himself, "I think

of this conflict?

wisdom can

I

What

is

I

this

am

find Socrates' true answer

of his

own

own jury? Or is

says

I

I

am

not.

inspiring inquiry

riddling irony. Here, in the middle of his

aimed

trial for

mission by puzzling his jury.
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at truth

an

it

What

pit of

shall

aporia

through inquiry, the jury member could simply eliminate the source of the aporia.
is

it

claim falsely, what kind of

achieve?" Of course, rather than pull himself from the

Socrates, pious action

Is

inquiry? Imagine a jury

wise, but Socrates here says

wisdom which he

is.

For

by introducing aporia and

impiety, he

is

doggedly carrying on that

Now it's important

to notice that Socrates' ignorance
represents a philosophical

attitude that should not be confused
with empirical ignorance. Like his
audience.

Socrates

was well

imponanl

read, well informed,

things: the eternal

and experienced, but he was ignorant of the
most

and the divine^ The

poets,

whom

Athenians traditionally

consider expert in these matters, are indeed in
touch with the divine but not

knowledgeable about

it:

So presently I came to realize that poets too do not
make what they make by
wisdom, but by a kind of native disposition or divine
inspiration, exactly like
and prophets. For the latter also utter many fine things,
but

seers

know nothing of the

things they speak. That is how the poets also
appeared to me, while at the same
time I realized that because of their poetry they
thought themselves the wisest of
men in other matters - and were not. (22c)

Similarly, craftsmen

who

many another worldly
great importance,"

possess

skill fail to

all

kinds of knowledge about speaking, shoemaking, and

acknowledge

their ignorance with respect to "things of

namely virtue.

But, Gentlemen of Athens, it seemed to me that the poets and our capable
public
craftsmen had exactly the same failing: because they practiced their own arts
well,

each deemed himself wise

Socrates

is

in other things, things of great importance. (22d)

not accusing his jury of complete ignorance

important things

— only of ignorance of the most

— and a corresponding overemphasis on

less

important things like wealth

and reputation.
Socrates
quality

is

asking the gentlemen of Athens to put god, and their

— their souls—

acknowledging

above

all else.

And

he

is

asking them to do this

their ignorance with respect to the soul

pursuing arete through inquiry.

“Scc Kierkegaard (1989,

p. 169):

He

and

its

virtue,

own most godlike

first

by

and next by

does this on behalf of and in order to help the god.

"He knew

that

it

was, but he did not

know what

it

was."

Kraut

284) concurs that the knowledge Socrates lacked was divine, claiming that "should any human being
ever make the moral discoveries Socrates wishes he could maike, then he would retain the status of a god."
(1984,

p.
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That

why

I still go about even
now on behalf of the God, searching and
inquiring am^ong both citizens and
strangers, should I think some
one of them
wise, and when it seems he is not,
I help the God and
prove it. (23b)

is

is

Socrates calls this work a pursuit
[^xo'kicx^] that eliminates opportunities for
leisure,
family,

and

says(23c).

Socrates

(i.e.

political matters; "I dwell in utter
poverty
It is

may

because of

my

service to

God," he

important to note from this characterization
of his mission that while

consider divine

uisdom unachievable, he

philosophy) to be a supremely pious

believes the pursuit of

wisdom

activity.

Ever the faithful servant of the god, Socrates
suggests that the anger with which
his accusers

come

after

false accusations in

may be among the
holy

state. It is

an

him

is

better directed at themselves (23de). Instead
they

effort "not to

seem

at a loss."

make

Avoiding the appearance of aporia

highest social goals in Athens, but Socrates has

shown aporia

to be a

easy to interpret the engraved advice at Delphi to "know
thyself" as an

exhortation to acknowledge the truth of one's ignorance.
Socrates' accusers are acting

emotionally rather than rationally, however, and putting appearances
before truth. They

have charged a supremely pious man with impiety. Their behavior

illustrates Plato's

motivation for educational reform.

2,2.3 Philosophy as

P ious

Activity

Meletus' charge that Socrates

devoutly pious

man he

is

an

atheist (26c)

is

so diametrically opposed to the

takes himself to be^^ that Socrates cannot help but think the

charge some riddle like one that declared him wisest:

You cannot be
Athens,

I

believed, Meletus

think this

man who

” Commentators disagree as

—

even,

I

think, by yourself.

stands here before you

is

Gentlemen of
and unchastened,

insolent

whether Socrates actually was guilty of impiety in the legal sense.
in the words of BnckJiouse and Smith (1985, p. 29),
enemy can coherently believe that he is guilty of charges in the indictment."
to

Socrates’ direct examination of Meletus demonstrated,

"that not even his most fanatical
Oddly enough, some of Socrates' greatest friends including Kierkegaard (1989,
166) are prepared to admit that he was guilty.
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p.

160) and Vlastos (1991,

p.

and has brought this suit precisely out of
insolence and unchastened youth. He
seems to be conducting a test by propounding
a riddle [aiviy^al: "Will Socrates
he wise man, realize how neatly I contradict
myself, or will I deceive him and the’
rest of the audience?" (26e 27a)
Meletus' insolence can be nothing other than
the ubiquitous false wisdom Socrates

sworn to eradicate. Meletus
examination

was

-

but that

precipitated

by

is

is

unchastened precisely because he has avoided
Socratic

about to change. Considering the

this sort of

is

examination,

it

fact that Socrates' indictment

seems hardly an appropriate defense to

perform one before the court. Socrates' piety requires
him to reveal the ignorance of
self-appointed wisemen, however, not to defend himself
against them.

Socrates quickly shows the charge that he

is

an atheist because he acknowledges

divinities different from those of the state to be
self-contradictory:

So

believe in divinities, as

you say, and if divinities are a kind of god, there is
[aivkxeaeai] I attributed to you; you are saying that I do not
believe in gods, and again that I do believe in gods because
I believe in divinities.
Meletus, you could not have brought this indictment except in an attempt
to
test us — or because you were at a loss for any true basis
of prosecution. But as to
how you are to convince anyone of even the slightest intelligence that one and the
same man can believe that there are things pertaining to divinities and gods, and
if I

the jesting riddle

.

.

.

yet believe that there are neither divinities nor heroes

Plato's use of the verb ainissomai

- there is no way.

(27de)

[diviaao^ai] here connects Socrates' attitude toward

Meletus' contradiction with his attitude toward the oracle's proclamation. Whereas the
oracle's riddle

showed Socrates

him to have a special kind of
acknowledges

to

have a special kind of wisdom, Meletus' riddle shows

piety. Socrates

is

wise in the gods' eyes because he

his ignorance. Likewise, Socrates

looks to them, and not to the

city's

is

pious in the gods' eyes because he

approval, in his effort to be pious

Socrates' speech exposes Meletus' concealed aporia

confusion about the proper judge of piety.

^'Sec

Euthyphm lOd

ff.

for an

It

by finding

—

as he should.^^

in the irony of his

words

also challenges the jury to reconsider the

argument showing
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that gods, not

human

So

beings, determine the holy.

a

court's authority

was no place
piety,

on such

matters. Socrates'

for instruction.

was

right to

complain

at

26a that the court

Meletus can neither judge nor teach
Socrates with respect to

because he himself doesn't know what

it is.

Socrates sees the god as his only true
judge and guide. Accusations, judgments,

and penalties imposed by the
to the god.

ashamed
shows

city

and

his peers

cannot compromise Socrates' commitment

At 28b, Socrates addresses the hypothetical
question of whether he

to have pursued a course in

life

that threatens to have

is

him put to death;

that his aims are higher than the laws or
judgment of other

human

his reply

beings:

You are wrong. Sir, if you think that a man worth anything at
all would take
thought for danger in living or dying. He should look
when he acts to one thing:
whether what he does is just or unjust, the work of a good
man or

a bad one. (28b)

Socrates apparently cavalier attitude toward death
ultimate

commitment

is

to the god, but also of his pious

an outgrowth not only

acknowledgment

of his

of ignorance:

For to fear death. Gentlemen, is nothing but to think one is wise
when one
for it is to think one knows what one does not know.
(29a)

Conventional fear of death
to be evil.

Such

fear

is

human

conceit

—

a belief that

not:

we know

true.

by comparing himself

Indeed Socrates reinterprets the traditional heroic code

to Achilles in putting

what

is

right

above

his

own

life

(29cd). Socrates had insisted at 27e that his rejection of tradition did not preclude a
belief in heroes.

Here Socrates shows himself to be a new kind of hero; one

who dies

for glory or social esteem, but for virtue.

That Socrates equates
illustrated

proposed

when

at

it

usually based on literary or poetic accounts which should not be

accepted unquestioningly as
of virtue

nothing more than

is

is

his practice of

philosophy with piety

is

most vividly

a hypothetical penalty of a prohibition on philosophic activity

29cd. Socrates interprets such a ban as an affront to the god:
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is

not

If,

as

I

say,

you were

to dismiss

me on

that condition,

m fnendship and regard. Gentlemen of Athens, but
than you, and while

I

have breath and

am

able

I

I

would

shall

I

IS

rafe^
wisdom

accustomed manner...

(29cdT

Athens

hold von

I

shall not cease to pursue

‘

Socrates' reason for rejecting such a

reply that

obey ?he God

ban could not be

clearer:

god

is

his

first

commander,

second. In some strange case where Athens'
laws should conflict with those of

the god, Socrates would choose the god.

Ido know
shameful
things

that to be guilty of disobedience to a
superior, be he god or
So as against evils I know to be evils, I shall never

evil.

which

for

aught

The

cessation of philosophy

and

others' souls. Death,

preferable to a

I

is

a

know may be good.
known

because

evil

on the other hand,

is

it

amounts

known

not

to neglect of both his

to be evil

and therefore

is

own

much

ban on philosophy.^^

god so devoted that he would

Gentlemen of Athens,
that

is

(29b)

In stark contrast to Meletus' charge of atheism, Socrates
soldier to the

man,

fear or flee from

truly

it

is

so:

shows himself

rather go to his death than

Wherever a man

to be a

abandon

his post;

stations himself in the belief

wherever he is stationed by his commander, there he must I think
remain and run the risks, giving thought neither to death nor to any other
thing
it is

best,

except disgrace

when

God stationed me, as I thought and believed,
wisdom, examining myself and others -- if
then, at that point through fear of death or any other thing, I left my post. That
would have been dreadful indeed, and then in truth might I be justly brought into
court for not acknowledging the existence of gods, for willful disobedience to the
obliging

me

if

then,

the

to live in the pursuit of

oracle, for fearing death, for thinking myself wise

Philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom,

is

when I am

explicitly described here as

not. (29a)

an obligation to the god.

Indeed the abandonment of philosophy would be an ironic admission of the charges

would show Socrates

to

be impiously ignoring the

“if the penalty for philosophy were a

choose

to philosophize?

1

think he

known

would refuse

evil,

command

such as

killing

it

of the god. Rather than

one of

his children,

to perform the evil as he did with
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for

Leon

would Socrates

of Salamis.

still

renounce

his

commitment

commitment
to test

For the

gam

to philosophy

young and

old, citizen

God commands this,

in this City a greater

Z2.4

vs, Deed?;;

The

on pain of death, Socrates

and

stranger:

be well assured, and

good than my

I

back up

for a

believe that

service to the

weak defense

and importance

of philosophy unless this

his claim with truly heroic deeds.

not just theoretical. His most obvious philosophical

now been

after virtue (not things in the

can be interpreted as valuable only
that he esteems

the city, Socrates offers his poverty.

if it

results in

god over the

He

new

philosophic hero can

show

activities,

jurors'

that his philosophy

is

the examination of others

heavens and beneath the Earth, as charged) has

interpreted as heroic devotion to the god's

As evidence

yet to

of pursuing

At 32a, Socrates acknowledges the

preference for deeds rather than words and then
proceeds to

and inquiry

you have
God. (30a)

Practical TTtihtv of the Phil o sophic

All of Socrates' idealistic posturing
about the piety

wisdom makes

reaffirms his pious

command. But

this sort of activity

more conventionally virtuous deeds.
political

and

reveals that he has

financial rewards offered

inhumanly neglected

by

his

family and affairs in favor of exhorting his fellow citizens to care for virtue:

That

I

am

just that, a gift from

scarcely seems a

human

God

to the City,

matter merely, that

I

you may recognize from

should take no thought

this:

for

It

anything

my own,

endure the neglect of my house and its affairs for these long years now
and ever attend to yours, going to each of you in private like a father or elder
brother, persuading you to care for virtue. (31ab)
of

Indeed such neglect

is

only excusable

if it is

could the perpetually ignorant Socrates
right?

He

in the service of

know enough

to

some

know

greater ideal.

But how

that such asceticism

is

has a curious answer to this question: his divine sign or daimonion.

I have had it from childhood. It comes as a kind of voice, and when
always turns me away from what I am about to do, but never toward

81

it

it.

comes,
(31d)

it

The

first

think to notice about Socrates'
daimonion

divine knowledge,

it

never

Socrates what to do.''

tells

reveals something about Socrates

The divine asks you

own

- stop and

others. Socrates trusts the

-

it

The daimonion

's

its

supposed

"negativity"

's

- and

warnings, even

Socrates imposed that puzzle on

when he

doesn't understand

them. For example, the daimonion opposed
his desire to enter the public arena

warning he now

realizes preserved his

it."

doesn't give a direct answer. Likewise
the

think about this

daimonion

that despite

conception of the divine and his practice
of

to question yourself

oracle posed a puzzle

is

-a

Socrates has learned to use the daimonion

life.

's

prohibitions as confirmation of the correctness of
his actions as well. At 40b he reassures

those

who voted

speech.

for his acquittal that his

He concludes

that

it

daimonion opposed neither

must be good.

But what kind of recommendation
Given Socrates close association of

for a philosophic life

rationality with divinity, his

anything more mysterious than a rational conscience
conclusion

is

his trial nor his

wrong before one

is

— the

is

the daimonion

?

daimonion need not be

intuition

one has that

a certain

able find the fallacious part of the argument. Since
(1)

Socrates takes the product of virtuous knowledge to be virtuous behavior;
(2) the

daimonion has always warned him before he does some wrong
(3) the attempt to

knowledge,

it's

commit an unvirtuous action

is

and

frequently caused by a lack of

plausible that a reduction in daimonic prohibitions over his lifetime might

indicate to Socrates that his knowledge of virtue

^^The daimonion

commentators

or unvirtuous action;

's

negativity

is

is

improving, even

if it falls

specifically noted by Kierkegaard (1989, p. 159)

well short of

and often lamented by

ineffectiveness. Brickhouse and Smith (1989, p. 253) say that the problem with its alarms
"is not infallibility but uninformativeness." Adkins (1960, p. 261), says the daimonion was useless to Plato

since

—

it

was

or die; but

for

its

not rational and
it

endowed

was

peculiar to Socrates;

"It

endowed Socrates with

a faith

whereby he could

Plato with nothing on which he could build a political or moral theory by which

live

men

in

general could live and die." Reeve (1989, p. 70), by contrast, claims that "Socrates could not achieve certainty
[about his fate after death] except from a divine source," so we may conclude "that he uses the daimonion to

which he could not establish any other way."
Xenophon, by contrast, charactenzes Socrates' daimonion as commanding and

establish truths

(

Memorabilia.

1,1,4;

IV, 8,

1;

Apology', 12).
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not just warning

being perfect. Furthermore,

it's

likely that the reduction of
prohibitions might correlate

with his accumulation of philosophic

activity.

Socrates' story about his refusal to
capture

the philosophic

life,

which aimsat an

of justice, has indeed produced

Leon

of Salamis at 32a-e

shows that

ideal rather than a socailly-dctermined
conception

good deeds. There

is

no mention

of the daiwonion.

Rather, Socrates used his ideal conception
of justice to disobey an unjust order
from an
unjust government. In so acting he risked
death, but he avoided

government quickly took over.

Governments and

not. Socrates

result of

But

is

a

good man as a

their

it

when another

demands change, justice does

pursuing the good:

then showed again, not by words but by deeds, that
death, if I may be rather
was of no concern to me; to do nothing unjust or unholy that was my
concern. Strong as it was, that oligarchy did not so
frighten me as to cause me to
do a thing unjust. (32d)
I

blunt,

.

.

Although the philosophic
in virtuous

followers.

behavior for Socrates,

Charmides and Crito

association with Socrates.

He

life

it

(and some help from

his

daimonion

seems to have done the opposite

in particular

seem

refuses to take the

actions, however, pointing out that he

is

to

for

)

have resulted

some

have been corrupted by

blame (or praise)

of his

their

for his followers

not a teacher:

never gave way to anyone contrary to what is just - not to others, and certainly
not to those slanderously said to be my pupils. In fact, I have never been a teacher
I

to anyone.

or old,

who

speaking and tending to my own affairs, I found anyone, young
wished to hear me, I never begrudged him; nor do I discuss for a fee

If,

in

and not otherwise. To rich and poor alike I offer myself as a questioner, and if
anyone wishes to answer, he may then hear what I have to say. And if any of
them turned out to be useful men, or any did not, I cannot justly be held
responsible. To none did I promise instruction and none did I teach; (33ab)

As

a philosopher Socrates pursues

false

complacency as a

wisdom and

service to the

justice.

He

tries to rid

fellow citizens of

God, but he can no sooner replace
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their false

opinions with true ones than he can say
exactly what wisdom and justice

The moral

are.

perfection of one's soul must be achieved
individually (see sec. 5.3, below). Just
as

Socrates takes

it

upon himself to

to take responsibility for their

solve riddles from the gods, he
expects his interlocutors

own

escapes from sporia.

Socrates goes on to point to several pupils
teaching: philosophy does not
rejection of

it

make

a

bad man;

does. True, the pursuit of

who have not been

corrupted by his

he seems to suggest, the

rather, as

wisdom may earn the scorn

of others

who think

themselves more deserving authorities, such as parents
and governments. Such problems
occur, however, only where there

is

a conflict between their

demands and what

is just.

These things.

Gentlemen of Athens, are both true and easily tested. For if I am
corrupting some of the youth, and have corrupted others,
it must surely be that
some among them, grown older, if they realize that I counseled them
toward evil
while young, would

Alcibiades speech in the

tom between

now come

forward to accuse

Symposium poignantly

Socratic ideals

me and exact

captures the

and the glorious rewards

a penalty. (33cd)

way young men might be

of the state. Alcibiades never

chaiges Socrates with cormpting him, and no follower apparently ever has.
In
of Socrates associates

supporting

me now,"

sit

in support of

him

at the trial.

Socrates asks at 34b, "except that

fact,

many

"What reason could they have
it is

right

and

just.

.

of

.?"

2.2.5 Penalties

After Socrates

him

is

convicted and a penalty of death recommended, the court allows

to propose a counter-penalty.

As with

the rest of the proceeding, Socrates takes this

opportunity to further plead the case of philosophy. The tone

is set

when he

rhetorically

asks what price he should pay for being different:

What do I deserve to pay or suffer because through

life I

yet did not concern myself, as the multitude do, with

and public honors and other

money

office, or the secret societies
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did not keep quiet, and
or property or militaiy

and

political clubs

cropping up in the City, believing that
temperate a

This

IS

man

to enter

upon these

things

I was really too reasonable
and
and survive? (36bc)

a statement about the proper objects
of our pursuits

objectives

commonly chosen by the

and a not-so-subtle dig

at the

multitude. Socrates' project has been
to exhort his

fellow citizens to care for more important
things:

I

undertook to pemuade each of you not to care

for anything which belongs to you
caring for yourselves, so as to be as good
and wise as possible, nor to
care for anything which belongs to the City
before caring for the City itself, and so
too with everything else in the same way.
Now what do I deserve to suffer for being
^
this sort of man? (36cd)

before

first

Socrates decides that he should suffer a "good thing,"
something fitting for a good

man who

has served his city well:

victors. After all,

in truth" (36d).

instructive. Socrates' "crime"

fit

meals

at the

Prytaneum as are offered Olympic

he says, the Olympic victor can only make people "seem happy"

he makes them "happy

then should

free

is

The contradictory nature

in fact a service, as

the crime. Public subsistence

w'hile

of this suggestion

he says explicitly

would help Socrates

at 36c.

is

His "penalty"

in his mission as the

god's gift to the city.

Despite

its

subtle logic, the

eyes and snickers from the gallery.

first

To such

choose instead a penalty
perhaps? But why should I live
office as the Eleven? (37bc)
Shall

Socrates

is

I

suggestion no doubt elicited

I

little

more than

rolled

indignation Socrates responds:

know very

well to be evil? Imprisonment,

in prison, a slave to

men who happen

to

occupy

the god's slave and he cannot betray that master by becoming a slave to some

temporary government. As the Leon of Salamis story shows, governments are temporal
while justice

pay

it.

is

When

fine for him,

eternal.

Socrates adds that a fine amounts to prison since he

his allegedly corrupted followers later

he accepts

this

empty punishment since
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come
it

to his aid

and

is

unable to

offer to

pay the

does not conflict with his mission

and money has no value
which

at best offers the

to those lacking virtue anyway.'®

The next suggestion

prospect of being driven from other

his philosophic activity; at

womt he would be

cities since

is

exile,

he would continue

forced to keep quiet and so

abandon

his

pious mission;

say that to do so [keep quiet] would be to
disobey the god. and therefore I
cannot do it, you will not believe me because
you will think that I am being sly
and dishonest [that is, an eiron]. If on the other
hand I say that the greatest good
tor man is to fashion arguments each day
about virtue and the other things you
hear me discussing w'hen I examine myself and
others, and that the unexamined
life is not for man worth living, you
will believe what I say still less. I claim
these
things are so Gentlemen; but it is not easy to
convince you. (37e - 38a)
If I

Indeed the jury
death. Death

would be

would be judged

who

justly,

is

not convinced and so Socrates resigns himself to the
prospect of

a kind of exile

— one that

resembles a deep sleep, or one where he

then allowed to compare his

also received unjust verdicts (40e

-

life

to those of

demigods and heroes

41b). Socrates speculates that he

continue elenchus (without being prosecuted for

it)

examining Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer.

in the

"It

may be

able to

land of the dead, perhaps

would be inconceivable

happiness," he concludes. At the end of the Apology', Socrates makes a telling
request of
his friends that confirms his belief in the value of the elenchus:

When my sons
exactly as

I

are grown. Gentlemen, exact a penalty of them; give pain to them
gave pain to you, if it seems to you that they care more for wealth or

an3hhing than they care for virtue. And if they seem to be something and are
nothing, rebuke them as I rebuked you, because they do not care for what they
ought, because they think themselves something and are worth nothing. And
should you do that, both I and my sons will have been justly dealt with at your
hands. (41e

-

42a)

Socrates' final exhortation to carry on his mission for the benefit of his sons

heeded by Plato perhaps more than any other man present
sense in which Socrates considered

^®Sec Kierkegaard (1989,

all

at Socrates' trial.

Athenians his sons (31a), and a sense

p. 195).
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There
in

was
is

a

which

Plato brought countless generations
into the family by continuing
Socrates' mission
hteraiy form. Plato's Apology' does
indeed

tell

the stoiy of an accusation

and

m

a defense,

but the accusation was that Socrates
charged Athens with being lazy of
mind, shallow of
pnnciple, and misdirected in aim.

The defense was of philosophy

deficiencies. Treat poetry, prophecy,

and divine proclamations

Acknowledge your own ignorance with

Aim

for

an ideal of

concerns.

13

respect to virtue

virtue, justice, piety,

Awaken, acknowledge,

as an antidoic to these

as riddles, says Socrates.

and pursue wisdom

relentlessly.

and courage that transcends the worldly

aim: this

is

Plato's educational project.

Socrates; Ironic Moral Hero of thp

As

a

companion piece

to the Apology, Crito continues the historical
thread of

Socrates' execution while accentuating

and enforcing the educational lessons

former work. Socrates faces a serious dilemma and his
methods for solving

it

of the

are displayed

in contrast to

popular ideals. There

appearances.

A moral decision is logically derived from agreed-upon principles.

is

a clear rejection of popular opinion

an imagined dialectic between Socrates and the personified laws
a difficult situation.

From

it all,

is

and
Finally,

used to reason through

Socrates emerges as an ironic hero: one

who can

formulate, derive, and act on moral principles even in the face of death; and one who, by
fleeing his punishment,

The philosopher-hero

231

Does S pcrateg

would turn out

of the Apology^

Practice

What He

to be

is

what he was unjustly convicted

seen in action in Crito.

Preaches?

At Apology 32a Socrates recognizes that the men of Athens
deeds more than words. In

”For the importance

Crito,

of being.

in his jury

esteem

Plato offers Socrates' deeds as proof of his integrity.^^

of action vs. theory see

Laches 180

87

-

181.

Whatever the

historical

of Socrates' action

unquestioned

- that

reality.

conclusion in an

dubious support

accuracy of the dialogue's arguments and
conversations, the

It

jail

-

is

could be said that Plato exploits the historical
force of

effort to

for

he did accept poison rather than escape
from

fact

enhance

moral lesson. Admittedly, death may seem

its

an argument.^'* In accepting

his penalty,

's

like

however, Socrates ironically

proves his innocence and so highlights the injustice of
his conviction. Ultimately the
victim

is

Athens, not Socrates.

The most

directly educational of Plato's early dialogues,
Crito gives a step by

step illustration of practical problem solving. In contrast
to tradition

and

sophistic

opinion, Socrates practical actions recognize virtue as the greatest
good rather than

money,

glory, or reputation.

narrow

line Plato

w'hile instilling

The

must walk

conflict betu^een virtue

in his efforts to discourage

an appreciation

and law

in

Crito illustrates the

dogmatic adherence to doctrine

That the conflict emerges as a puzzle

for absolutes.

keeping with Plato's educational technique and indicative of his belief that

it

is

in

needed

discussion.

What we see

in the Crito

is

an intellectual approach to a

real-life

approach would have surprised the ancient Athenians much more than
Socrates' position

is

it

dilemma. This
surprises us.

a reasoned one that avoids both the self-serving relativism of the

masses (as represented by Crito) and the unquestioning obedience of the personified

Laws. Plato does not

offer a formula for action in the Crito,

memorized and adopted. Such
rejects

any formula handed

Kostman (1984)

to

a

move would be

him by

thinks that Plato

to be

hypocritical since Socrates routinely

his interlocutors.

makes a tacit

no new maxim

There are accepted principles,

criticism of Socrates’ decision to

go

to death in the

Crito by having him ignore key arguments. This position either ignores the fact that Plato continued to

endorse the themes propounded
Socrates

in

in

the later works as well.

the Crito,

or must

Remember

commit

also, that death
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itself to

the theory that Plato

was a key component

in

is critical

the heroic.

of

such as that of never doing

injustice, but Plato explains clearly
that these are derived from

discussion and never accepted dogmatically.
Dialectic

used in

is

at least three

ways

in the Ciito.

yielded the working principle of never doing
injustice.

Past dialectical exercise has

The opening

dialectic

between

Socrates and Crito transcends the emotion of the
situation and examines several proposals

m relation to accepted principles.

Finally, there

Socrates and the personified

of

has used on his

own

Laws

is

the imagined dialectic between

Athens which

to think through the situation.

is

represented as a method Socrates

The educational

force of the Crito

derives from the fact that these dialectical exercises
lead to concrete action.

2J.2 The Rejection

of Public Opinio n Despite the Pen;.lty

At 44bc, Crito
reasoning, however,

is

lets

loose an emotional exhortation to Socrates to escape. His

based on appearance and not

reality:

Quite apart from the loss of such friendship as I shall not find again, people who
t really know us will think I didn't care,
because I could have saved you if
only Id been willing to spend the money. Yet what could seem more shameful

don

than the appearance of putting money before friends? People won't believe that
you refused to escape even though we were eager to help. (44bc)^^
Crito's

concern with the opinions of strangers and the appearance of stinginess puzzles

Socrates,

who

But

replies:

Crito,

why should we be so concerned about what people [xcov TCoXXcav]
who are the ones worth considering will believe that

will

think? Reasonable men,
things

happened as they

Although Socrates

is

did. (44c)

not swayed, Crito's arguments were no doubt compelling to Plato's

original audience, since they represented

All translations of

Cnto

commonly held values and

arc by Allen (1984) unless otherwise indicated.
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beliefs.

Indeed

commitments

to friends

rests ultimately

and family remain

forceful arguments today.

on appearances and popular definitions of
what

is

But

concern

Crito's

shameful and bad:

Tm ashamed, Socrates, ashamed both for you and for
your friends, because it’s
going to seem that the whole business was done
though a kind of cowardice in us
It wall look as if we let slip
this final opportunity because of our
owm badness
and cowardice, whereas we could have saved you
or you could have saved
yourself if we were worth anything at all. These
things are bad and shameful to
both you and us. (45e - 46a)
.

.

.

The move Cnto makes here from appearing shameful
a confusion

common among ancient

to actually

Greeks.^' Plato presents

it

being shameful

reflects

as instrctive irony:

Socrates and Crito are shameful and bad but only in the
empty world of appearances.

Being a longtime follower of Socrates, Crito has no doubt rejected
public opinion
in the past.

of the

What

power

to

provokes him to espouse such reasoning

kill

men

in this instance

is

a recognition

over mere slander:

Surely at this point, Socrates, you see how necessary it really is to care about what
the people think. The very things now happening show that they can accomplish,
not the least of evils, but very nearly the greatest, if a man has been slandered
among them. (44d)

For Socrates, however, the threat of death
principles.

As

Socrates sees

affect the soul.

Having

it

,

not sufficient reason to act against his

is

the power to

kill

amounts

reiterated their agreement

to

no power

at all since

about the primacy of the soul

Socrates further points out that the multitude can't even

make

a

man

those, too, are conditions of the soul (44d). In a point parallel to

it

can't

at 48a,

wise or foolish since

Apology

29a, Socrates'

reasoning shows Crito's worry about death to be a false conceit; Crito thinks he knows

death to be

evil

when he

Dover (1974,
others than

its intrinsic

p.

doesn't.

226) points out that Arete wcis a quality valued more

for the

impression

value: "...the Athenians tended to use expression such as 'be seen

to...',

it

made on

'be regarded

and these expressions were also used where we would refer neither to conscience nor to reputation, so
'I wanted to be regarded as honest' is equivalent to our 'I wanted to be honest.’ In such
cases there wa.s no intention, of course, of drawing a distinction between disguise and reality; it was rather that
"
goodness divorced from a reputation for goodness was of limited interest.
as...',

that an Athenian’s
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Another aspect of popular morality that
Plato wants

Cnto represent

is

to reform

relativism. Again, Socrates
reminds Crito that they

and

therefore has

have discussed the

issue before.

Don t you think it s satisfactoiy to say that one
shouldn't
man but rather of some men and not others, and
belief of

The argument

men, but some

value the beliefs of ever>^
that one shouldn't value every

beliefs

and not others?

Isn't that right?

(47a)

against relativism, via analogy to an
athletic trainer, culminates in the need

to refer to a single entity in ethical
matters:

Then perhaps we shouldn't

give much thought to what the multitude
tells us
Perhaps we should rather think of what he will
say who understands’
mgs just and unjust — he being but one man, and the
very Truth itself.

friend.
t

my

(48a)

I

take this

sentence to be an ambiguous reference to the good,
the rational soul, and

last

The Greek 6

Socrates.33

eTtaicov,

the verb eTcaico which can

professor.

The

The

'he'

mean

who

'he

understands,' denves from

to bear, perceive, feel, understand, profess, or
be a

and 'man' Allen

antirelativistic point for Plato

making our

above translated

translates are in the

is

that there

is

Greek the ambiguous

a single truth

we should aim

article 6.

at in

decisions. Socrates then contrasts this principled aim with the
considerations

of the multitude:

But as

for these other considerations

you raise about the loss of money and raising
and what people think — Crito, those are really fit topics for people who
kill and would raise to life again without a thought if they could —
the

children
lightly

multitude, (48c)

Socrates emerges from the

even

in the face of

first

exchange as a man

impending death. Showing

that he

is

who will

stick to his principles

more than a

theorist,

he shuns

moral relativism and concerns about appearances even though the chips are down.

“Translations vary greatly. For example, Grube says,

and

injustice, the one, that

one

authority,

who

is,

and the

".

.

but

what he

truth itself." Trcdennick. translates,

represents actual truth."
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".

.

will

say

who

the expert

understands justice

in right

and wrong, the

We must consider carefully whether this thing is to be

always have been the

sort of

man who is persuaded

on

done, for I am now and
only by the argument which

reflertion proves best to me, and I
cannot throw over argument I formerly
cepted merely because of what has come;
they still seem much the same to'^me,
an I honor them as I did before. If we can't
find better ones, be assured that 1
will
t give way to you, not
even if the power of the multitude were
far greater than it
children with its threats of confiscation,
bo^ds, and
death. (46bc)

The pnonty Socrates and

Crito have placed

on reason and aigument

stay intact despite Crito's barrage of rationales
for abandoning

Mundane

objections aside, Socrates can

now apply his craft

them

are defended

at the last

and

minute.

to the problem at hand.

2J.3 Moral Decision Derived from Principle
I

have emphasized that Plato wanted to establish fixed
principles that could guide

moral deliberation even while maintaining a questioning
stance. The Crito provides a
textbook example of this process. At 49-50, the principle
that one ought never do
injustice

is

introduced. Plato makes

deliberation, yet must be agreed

it

clear that this principle

was derived from

past

upon once again by the two men.

Is the doing of injustice in no way honorable or good,
as we have often in the past
agreed, or have those former agreements been cast aside these last few days?
(49a)

Admittedly Socrates' tone
principle in light of

its

is

somewhat

sarcastic,

but he doesn't rule out questioning the

consequences. This differentiates Socrates' approach from the

traditional unquestioning acceptance of authority or myth. Socratic principles are always

subject to revision based

on

rational grounds.

Crito then acknowledges that "not returning injustice for injustice" follows
logically from the principle, despite

returning an injuiy for an injustice

incompatibility with the

what "most people

is

also ruled out

initial principle.

think."

on the

The popular

basis of

its

practice of

logical

In the space of a few lines, a logical principle
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has been denved and used to strike

pnnciple and keeps

it

open

down

a popular one. Socrates sticks to
his

to evaluation even as

it

initial

proves incompatible with popular

notions.

At 49e, Socrates gives Crito a second chance
doesn’t truly believe

I

principle prevents
to see all of

2.3.4

its

Crito’s

it.

Crito

is

Crito

is

is

Mo ral Decision Derived from
Socrates next demonstrates

~ with

he

shows that the principle

I

it’s

don’t understand.

(

50a)

not surprising that he can’t see

how the

not asking Socrates to go back on the principle, he just

He

if

at a loss:

for

appeal for escape,

consequences.

performing a dialogue

and

answer what you ask,

can't

Given the passion of

back away from the principle

Crito holds his ground. Socrates then

it.

entails that he not escape from jail

Socrates,

to

fails

asking for help.

Imagined Dialprtir

how he extracted

himself.

He

himself from a similar aporia by

personified his opponent, the laws of Athens,

then imagined a conversation between himself and the Laws.^^ Beginning at
50a, he
reenacts this dialogue for Crito, exhorting

exhortation

is

to "look at

both specific and general. Specifically, he

understand the problem
that moral

him

if

it

is

this

way." Socrates’

saying that Crito will better

he hears the imaginary conversation. Generally, Plato

is

saying

dilemmas can be profitably solved by imagining a conversation between

opposing viewpoints.
Socrates’ internal dialectics are referred to
dialogues.^^ Far from a

means

and performed frequently

for self-assurance, Socrates’

in Plato's

imagined dialectics sport

” Following Kraut (1984), I will use the capitalized 'Laws' to refer Socrates’ personified character;
lowercase laws represents the actual laws of Athens.

”Sec for example: "The many"
Apology 21b, and Sophist 263e.

in

Protagoras,

"The house guest"
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in

Hippias Major, and comments

at

opponents as
of

Athens

hostile

and challenging

The

life

makes

dialectic

By

From

is

when

at

Socrates' point of view,

that clear. This contrast identifies
the

The

interlocutors.

reveal their conceptual distance from
Socrates

acceptance of death a "pretense."

Cmo

as his real

Laws as

Personified

52c they
it

is

Laws

call his

anything but. The

a true opposing viewpoint.

honest and effective.

personifying an inanimate thing, such as a set
of laws, Socrates makes them

into his principle of doing

personified

Laws go

far

harm

to

- now the Laws

no one

beyond the

fit

are someone. In addition, the

letter of written laws.^® In this

way

Plato can criticize

the legal conception of impiety that convicted Socrates
while esteeming law in general.

For Plato, personifying the laws

is

a

way

of encouraging Athenians to interact with their

laws as they would with people. Plato wants citizens to respect
the laws and other
sources of principle, but not to accept them unquestioningly.

You

Homer,

can't question

the Gods, or the laws directly, but you can adopt a questioning
stance by personifying

them and performing an imagined
There

is

my thesis that

dialectic.^^

a point in Socrates' conversation with the

Plato

is

espousing educational reform

Laws which may seem

in the Crito.

to rebut

At 50de, the Laws

get

Socrates to endorse traditional Athenian education:

"Did we

when we

who

Fd

"Con-ectly",

At

first

are the laws established for that purpose prescribe incorrectly

directed your father to educate

in

music and gymnastic?"

glance, this passage seems to be an explicit Socratic endorsement of traditional

Greek moral

training.^®

While the passage does show

’*See Kraut (1984, p. 82): ’'What the

Laws can see through the
”See Hippias Mwor 365cd.

said and the

’'See Kraut (1984, p.308):
far

you

say.

from hostile.

He

thinks that

it

Laws say

in

that Socrates accepts music (which

the Crtto includes

much

that

no law of Athens ever

city's errors."

"More

generally, Socrates’ attitude toward traditional

contains serious errors, and that

conventional paidaa to be a benefit so great that

it

it

is

Greek moral

training

radically incomplete; but he also takes

secures his loyalty to Athens even to the point of death."
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is

included memorization of poetiy) and
gymnastic as a good educational foundation,

it

does not imply that he consideis them
to be good moral training.”
Such an admission

would be incompatible with

Socrates’ pcisistent criticism of the
poets, rhapsodes,

even military commanders as adequate
teachers of moral technique."'
that he

makes no

reference to his training in music

It is

and gymnastic during

and

also notable

his

moral

deliberations in the Crito.
In addition, Socrates' conversation with
the

obedience to the law

in a

way that sheds

and the doctrine of persuade
the

Laws

or

light

obey which

on

Laws does

his actions.

The

parent-child analogy

are brought out in Socrates' conversation
with

are the subject of a lively scholarly debate.'*^

way of bringing oneself under laws

explore the limits of

What

they show educationally

that allows the citizen to take

an

is

a

active, questioning

stance while upholding proper respect. Having failed
to persuade the jury of his

innocence, Socrates goes on to

show

his respect for the

law by accepting

its

penalty.

does this despite the injustice of the penalty. By emphasizing Socrates’
respect
in the Crito,

Plato

is

for the

law

not trying to compensate for the lawless image Socrates presented at

his trial. Rather, Plato

make

He

is

showing a new way

to

approach the laws and a new way to

principled decisions in moral dilemmas that upholds one’s respect for law without

forcing dogmatic acceptance of

2.3.5 Socrates:

An

Ir onic

it.

Moral Hero

SuF>erficially, the Crito looks like a lesson in not standing

does and he

dies.

But Socrates'

attitude

by

principles: Socrates

and statements hang a question mark over that

” Kraut (1984, p. 309) reinforces his contention that Socrates considers these "moral training": "As the
Crito shows, [Socrates'] doubts about the unteachabiiity of virtue cannot be interpreted as an expression of

contempt

for conventional

methods of teaching. He accepts unjust treatment from Athens

partly

values the traditional moral training the city gave him."

^These

issues will be addressed directly in chapters 3, 4, and 5, above.

^'See Kraut (1984); Panagioutou (1992); BrickJiouse and Smith (1994); Reeve (1989).
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because he

interpretation

and cause the audience

to ask themselves

why

Socrates, despite his

execution, seems like a hero in a sea of
wrongdoers. In fact, the message
subliminal.

The Laws make

it

is

not so

clear at 54cd:

You now depart, T you depart, the victim of injustice
at the hands of men, not at
the hands of us who are the laws. But
if you escape, if you thus
shamefully return
injustice for injustice and injury for injury,
if you trespass against
your compacts

and agreements with us, and work evil on those
you least ought - yourself, your
friends, your Country and its Laws -- we
shall be angered at you while you live
and those our brothers who are the Laws in the Place
of the Dead will not receive
you kindly, knowing that you undertook so far as in
you lay to destroy
us.

It is

Socrates' piety that allows

him

to accept the penalty for impiety.

observes (1984, p. 24): "To disobey the god's
impiety, according to Socrates,

command would have been an

and since impiety

is

{Euthyphro 12cl0-d4), giving up a philosophical
injustice."

Were he

injustice

life

As Kraut
act of

toward the gods

would have been an

act of

Socrates does what he believes to be just despite the legal consequences.

to disobey the

as a corrupter of youth.

law and escape, on the other hand, he would prove himself guilty

As

the

Laws contend:

Again, you would confirm the opinion of your judges and lead them to think they
rendered judgment justly, for a corrupter of laws may surely also be thought, and
emphatically, a corrupter of young and ignorant men. (53c)

Plato must separate Socrates from a purely negative skeptic who, as Kierkegaard puts
"cuts

down

positive.'^^

the trees" of consciousness, then abandons the youth, never offering anything

Purely negative interpretations of Socrates contrast sharply with the character

'^From this comment and Kierkegaard’s statement

we do

it,

at

(1989,

p. 196):

"We

find nothing in all of this, but

most consistently sustained irony that lets the objective power of the state breakup on the
rock-firm negativity of irony. The objective power of the state, its claims upon the activity of the individual, the
laws, the courts - everything loses its absolute validity for him. He divests himself of all of them as imperfect
forms; he nses ever more lightly, sees it all disappear beneath him in his ironic bird’s-eye view, and he himself
hovers over it in ironic contentment, borne up by the absolute self-consistency of infinite negativity." I can only
conclude that Kierkegaard must either ignore the Crito (he makes only two references to it, both of which
ignore its arguments), or stipulate that its attitude about laws is drawn from Plato and not Socrates.
find a
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who

in the Crito

abides by principles derived from past
deliberation and uses specific

techniques to resolve a matter of
In Cnto, Plato

have collapsed

They assume

will

you

about

future

But as

The
his

Crito

and ask what he

discuss, Socrates?

will

makes

their

do with

of his philosophy

his

life:

(

offer

53c)

Athens, and even those of us in the

look to Socrates as an example:

arguments of yours about justice and other virtues

--

what

will

to us then? (54a)

it

clear that Socrates

had the courage and

integrity to

heroism meant acceptance of unjust death. With the Apology and

establishes Socrates as a

end of Socrates'

would

argument as a reductio.

What arguments? The ones you used to
worth for men along with

custom and the Laws?

for those

mean

rest

justice are of highest

for themselves, for all the citizens of

who would

they

had Socrates escaped, the

how virtue and

prescriptive

Then they ask

that

and death.

house of cards. The Laws present

Socrates' escape

What
here,

like a

shows

life

life;

new moral

hero, albeit an ironic one.

with appropriate irony, he has begun
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at

be a hero, even
Crito.

if

Plato

Plato starts his work at the

the end.

CHAPTERS

awakening the mind in
and 07^^

and

subtle criticisms of popular
values

educarionwhrieoffenngPhriosophyasananridote.
Criticism mtensifies. In

distinguishing

knowledge
virtue

is

its

In

.nd

system of memorization and
recitation from the practical
use of
Rato’s enthusiasm for a technical
conception of

then carefully refined in HIppias
Mnor where the
neutrality of poetiy

a conception of the

good man

and

clarify his

half of the dialogue

that distinguishes moral
qualities from practical

conception of

illustrating the failure of

first

and the second half subtly

popular ones. These dialogues play a
foundational

because they

,h.s

Plato illustrates the shortcomings
of poeric education,

characteristic of a

shows the moral

and

arote, the

role in Plato's

establishes

and

educational project

accepted goal of education, while

music and sophistiy to achieve that
objective.

E n ga g ing the Mind:

Interpret;»ti n n vs. Exhihitirm

(ru

power, like the power in a stone which Euripides
^
ubbed the Magnesian', but which most people
call the 'Heraclean'. This stone,
you see, not only attracts iron rings on their own,
but also confers on them a power
by which they can in turn reproduce exactly
the same effect which the stone has,
so as to attract other rings. The result is
sometimes quite a long chain of rings and

scraps of iron suspended from one another,

all

of

them depending on

their power. (533de)^

While Plato has emerged from
deep respect

that stone for

history as a harsh critic of the arts. Ion reveals
a

for poetry. Plato's criticism

is

aimed rather

at poetry's traditional role in

education and the rhapsode Ion's belief that his knowledge
of Homer gives him practical

knowledge or a techne. Ion attempts to

know something, what
All

it

is

to

revise

popular ideas about what

have a techne, what

is

is

to learn

and

the difference between exhibition

Ion translations are by Saunders (1987) unless otherwise noted.
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it

and explanation, and how the kaloa [to
koXov, beauty,
judged. Guthrie (1975, p. 211) called Ion
"a lighthearted

fineness] of something

little

is

piece" better enjoyed

than taken seriously. Part of Plato's message
in the Ion, however,

is

designed for enjoyment must be taken seriously
for the effect they

may have upon

audience.

The power of the

to be

that even things

divine Muse, described above in the Ion

's

famous

their

ring

analogy, must be critically examined as part of a
serious analysis of the role of poetiy in

education.

2A1

Appearance

vs.

That the /on

Abil i ty;
is

The Rhap sode and

Hk

AnHi^nr^

educational and not merely aesthetic criticism

is

evident from the

passage where Socrates relates his ring analogy to the audience
or student:

Well then, do you realize that your spectator is the last of those rings
which I said
received their power from one another, under the influence of
the Heraclean
steno? The intermediate one is you, the rhapsode and actor; the first is
the poet
himself. Through the agency of all these the god draws the souls of
men wherever
he wishes, by hitching one man to the power of another. An immense chain of
dancers and teachers and assistant teachers [5i5otaK(xXcov Kai \)7Co6i6ocaK(xXcov]
dangles down, as if from that stone -- all dangling sideways from the rings in the

suspended from the Muse. One poet depends on one Muse, another on
Our description of this is 'he is possessed' - and that's pretty close,
because 'held' is just what he is. (535e - 536ab)

series

another.

Two things should strike the attentive reader in this quotation. The first is that

Socrates'

use of the word didaskalos [SlbocaKoXoq, teacher] to describe members of the poetic
chain.

More

is

going on during the performance of poetry than entertainment. The

process of learning, performing and experiencing epic poetry, as

was an

integral part of ancient

comment

The

showed

in

Chapter

Athenian education. Second, one should note

that the people in the chain are "possessed"

of the muse.

I

Socrates'

and "held" by the magnetic power

intense emotional identification with poetic stories
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1,

made them

effective

as education but Plato worried
that

educational purposes, at

least,

muse. The image of the rings
critically

examine poetry's

it

discouraged individual reason and
judgment. For

the audience should be released
from "possession" by the

not an indictment of poetry per se,
rather

is

As Protagoras 325e - 326b made

for the

inadequacies of poetic

clear, a large part of a

young Athenian's

education consisted in the memorization and
recitation of Homer. Ion
master of these things and so a kind of model
schoolboy.

Homer

in

Greek education, that he thinks

also conferred

upon him various

military better than

anyone

is

no wonder, given the

remember and

it

shows the
Ion

is

pitfalls of

admissions in argument.

is

Ion's failure

In contrast to characters such

always a pleasant and willing interlocutor. His
air

failure to

head however

even an exemplary poetic education.

introduced as a winning and no doubt beautifully appointed rhapsode^

has just returned victorious from a competition
Socrates does

role of

Homer has

recite

follow the discussion's arguments does more than reveal Ion as a
comical

—

the undisputed

What's even more (comically) disturbing

own

and Euthyphro, Ion

his ability to

It's

is

practical skills, including the ability to lead Athens'

else!

to see the implications of his

as Cntias

helps us to

role in education.

Ion himself turns out to be a kind of poster
boy
education.

it

is

comment on

You know.

Ion,

Physically,

it's

rhapsodes'

many times

always

I've

fitting for

skill

at

Epidaurus.

One

of the

first

who

things

and beauty:

envied you rhapsodes your profession [xe^vriq].
in your profession [texvtl] to be dressed up

you

to look as beautiful [KoX^viaxoiq (paivecrGai] as

you can; (Woodruff

translation,

530b)

As might be expected,
represents the

common

Socrates'

ambiguous use of techne and kalon here

is

ironic.

It

use of words whose meanings Plato seeks to revise in the dialogue.

^Rhapsodes were renowned

for their beautiful robes.
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See Marrou (1956,

p.

49

-

50).

Ion's profession turns out not to

judge the good and bad

be a techne

at all

because he does not have the ability
to

in his subject. Ion's kalon,

meanwhile,

is

based on external

appearance, whereas Plato wants to reveal
kalon as a metaphysical notion connected
with the divine. Not only does Ion don a
beautiful robe,' he brags about
"dressed up" [KEKoapriKa; perfect active
of Koa^eco]

mam aesthetic thought in the

Ion can be found

Homer as

s

adornment of both himself and

the multitude respond best to kalon in

its

his subject serve

he has

well. In fact, Plato's

in his revision of kalon:

the physical beauty or pure enjoyment of art
does not exhaust

Ion

how well

it

shows

that

its value.'*

him

external manifestation

well, however, because

and Ion depends on the

multitude for his considerable competitive and financial
success. The rhapsodic

competitions Ion routinely wins were judged by a popular
vote of the audience which

Epidaurus, Ion's

latest victory in the dialogue,

numbered 20,000.^ Ion openly

at

credits his

success to his ability to attract the audience and engage them
emotionally with his

performance:

At each performance, I look down on them from up there on the platform as they
weep and look at me with dire emotion in their eyes, in amazement at my story.
You see, I have to pay a lot of attention to them -- since if I make them ciy I shall
laugh

all

the

way to the bank, whereas

if I

provoke their laughter,

it's I

who'll

do

the crying, for loss of money. (535e)

Ion takes his popular success to be evidence of a techne: after
their purses in a direct response to the pleasure

the audience opened

all,

and emotion he was able

to evoke. But

Socrates will divorce the criteria for techne from the ability to obtain an emotional

response or financial reward from the multitude

.

As Socrates makes

464ab, the goodness of a thing cannot be judged by appearances.

^NotcPlato's use of pha/nest/iaj, which can

mean

'seem' as well as

he beautiful with respect to his soul?
'For detailed account of this idea, see Moravesik (1982,
^See Robb (1994, p. 162).

outside, but

is
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p. 33).

clear at Goigias

A body judged

'look.';

most

Ion sec/ns beautiful on the

by the masses,

beautiful

[trezvtTrii;, expert,

Even

if

Ion's ability to

for

example,

may

not ,n fact be healthy.

It

takes a t.chn„es

craftsman] on bodies, namely a
doctor to judge a body's health.*

Socrates

is

not impressed with Ion's popular
success, he deeply admires

undemtand poefy. That

>s,

Socrates would admire Ion ,f he
in fact

understood the poet:

And how enviable

also to have

to immerse yourself in a great
many good poets
Homer, the best and most inspired of them,
and to have to get
his’
ought [biavoiav] and not just his lines!
For if one didn't understand what the
poet says, one would never become a
good rhapsode, because a rhapsode has to
be
an interpreter of the poet's thought [6idvoioq]
to the audience, and that's
impossible to do properly if one does not
understand what he is saying. So all this
^
IS worth envying. (530bc)

especially

Socrates' statement

is

a characteristic suppressed conditional.
Just as he generously

assumes that Euthyphro knows what piety
Socrates here assumes that Ion
Predictably,

it

is

or that

Laches knows what courage

knows Homer's dianoia

[Sidvoioc, thought,

fact is that Ion's

only of epideixis

and mimesis.

meaning

].^

will turn out that Ion does not. Socrates'
suppressed conditional, however,

does give us an idea of what a rhapsodic techne would
be,

The

is,

knowledge of Homer

is

if it

existed.

limited to his lines

exhibition, display] of those lines based

Ion's response to Socrates' conditional

between epideixis and episteme

— the

and he

is

capable

on memorization

compliment reveals

his confusion

kind of understanding associated with a techne

that yields the ability to judge:

Ion: True, Socrates, true.

me

At any rate, I find this side of my art [te%VTi(^] has given
and I talk on Homer better [KaXXiaxa] than anybody. Neither
Lampascus nor Stesimbrotus or Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor anyone

a lot of work,

Metrodorus of
else

who

has ever lived has had so

many

fine thoughts [K(xAdc<; 6iavoiot<;] to

Woodruff (1983, p. 7) makes a similar observation, noting that "no one who measures his success
merely by popular opinion, rather than the facts, can lay claim to a texiine, according to Socrates.”
^According to Liddell & Scott, dianoia is ( 1 thought, the intellect, or mind or (2) a thought, intention;
a notion, belief: the sense or meaning of a thing.
)
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as

fhf
trie

I.

.

.

I

Homendae crown me with

th.nk rve got to the point where
a golden crowm. (530cd)

1

desenre to have

Ion has clearly confused his performance
of Homer's poetiy with an understanding
of

Homer’s dianois.

Plato underscores this confusion by
emphasizing Ion's concerns with

appearance and victory

Homeridae, to

known

whom

(^kaJh'sta

means more

Ion compares himself, claimed to be
descendants of

for their ability to

expound

his poetry

evidence that rhapsodes like Ion (who
with exposition.

By

beautiful as well as better).®

is

and discourse on

unknown

The

Homer and were

his questions.'

There

is

no

outside Plato) combined recitation

linking himself with the Homeridae, Ion shows
arrogant confusion

about the educational scope and benefit of memorizing and
reciting Homeric poetry.

Exh

3. 1 .2

i

bit i on VS.

It is

telling that Socrates

Ion's ability as

which

is

Expert i s e; The Limi ts of the Rhapsode^s Art

deinos [5eiv6q,

opens

his initial line of questioning at

terrible, able, skillful].

531a by

The mixed meaning

referring to

of this word,

repeated four times by Socrates (531a2, 531cl, 532b4) during the opening

argument against Ion having a techne, contrasts sharply with the meaning of techne. Ion
remains unfazed by Socrates' choice of words, however;

knowledge of Homer's words makes him able

all

the while assuming that his

to explain even unfamiliar poets:

Soc.: Does your expertise (5eiv6<;) extend to Homer alone, or to Hesiod
and Archilochus too?
Ion: By no means -- only to Homer. That strikes me as enough.
Soc.: But is there any topic on which Homer and Hesiod say the same?
Ion: Oh, I expect there are plenty.
Soc.: So on these topics would you give a better explanation of what
Homer says, or of what Hesiod says?
Ion: On these topics, on which they say the same things, Socrates, I'd be
equally good in either case? (531ab)

’Compare Woodruff’s (1983) translation: "And that's the part of my profession that took the most
I speak more beautifully than anyone else about Homer; neither Mctrodorus of Lampsacus nor
Stcsimbrotus of Thasos nor Glaucon nor anyone else past or present could offer as mjmy beautiful thoughts
work.
about

I

think

Homer

as

I

can."

’See Guthrie (1975,

p.

200

-

201); Homeridae are also mentioned at Phaedrus 252b.
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Ion's response reveals

an important assumption

"saying the same thing"

memonzing the words
similarly

is

in poetic

He

education.

thinks that

equivalent to meaning the same thing
and so he concludes that

of one poet

is

sufficient for understanding

anyone who speaks

on the same subject. Ion doesn't merely
take himself to know what Homer
says

about chariot driving; he thinks he
understands chariot driving

itself

on the basis of

his

knowledge of Homer's words. Furthermore,
as long as Hesiod says the same
things Homer
does about chariots. Ion
that

when Homer says

is

as

much an

enough

to

know to

is

in

Homer. Never mind

"slacken the reins" he wants to keep the
horses on balance whereas

Hesiod's advice to slacken the reins
it's

expert in Hesiod as he

may be

in

an

effort to get

them

to accelerate; for Ion

slacken the reins.

Socrates next asks about cases where the poets
don't say the same things and Ion

again reveals the shortcomings of his ability;

Soc.:

Now then, in their descriptions of divination these two poets

sometimes agree and sometimes

differ. In either case,

who would give

a better

explanation of their words, you or one of the good prophets.
Ion: One of the good prophets.
Soc.; And if you were a prophet, then since you'd be
capable of explaining
the points on which the poets' statements agree, you'd also know
how to expound
those on which their statements differ, wouldn't you?

Ion; Obviously.
Soc.;

Then why on

earth does your prowess (Seivoq) extend to

Homer but

not to Hesiod or the other poets? (531 be)

Whereas Ion claimed he could explain any poet who

said the

same things

as

Homer on

given subject, he here admits that someone with a techne in the subject matter could
explain the poets' words both where they say the same thing and where they speak
differently.

Whereas Ion

identifies

expertise to himself, the prophet

comparison with his

own

is

with the text and attributes the author's apparent
separate from the text and judges

technical knowledge.
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it

as an object in

a

Socrates goes on to

judge

all

make

good and bad speakers

therefore limited to,

it

clear

now

that in contrast to a technites

his subject area. Ion's ability

i

who can

intimately tied to, and

is

Homer.

Soc.: So then. Ion, my dear chap, when
several people are discussino
nurnbcr, and one of them speaks best of all,
someone, I imagine, will know which

ot

them

this

Ion:

good speaker
I

is?

agree.

Soc.: Will that be exactly the

same person who
someone different?
Ion: The same, I suppose. (531de)

also

are bad, or

Socrates reinforces his point at 532e

-

533c with the examples of expertise

including sculpture, music, and even the judgment of
rhapsodes!
see his

own

knows which speakers

limitations despite Socrates' examples

in various arts

Ion, for his part, fails to

and continues to

insist

Socrates then applies the criterion that an expert be able to
judge

on
all

his expertise.

cases in his

subject matter to Ion's case:

So,

my excellent

equally in

fellow,

Homer and

we

shan't go

wrong

if

we

say Ion

is

an expert (6£iv6v)

in the other poets, seeing that

you yourself admit that the
same person will be an adequate judge of all who speak on the same themes, and
that almost all poets do take the same themes to compose on. (532b)
Despite his apparent acceptance of the argument. Ion

he dozes

off

when

talk turns to

resists this

any poet besides Homer.

conclusion, noting that

Ion's fixation

on Homer, as

propagated by traditional education and his popular success as a rhapsode,

on the Platonic

tradition of epistemic

complacency

with his limited knowledge. Ion says straight out

at

is

a

new twist

in Socrates' interlocutors; he's satisfied

531a that knowing Homer and

nothing else seemed sufficient to him, echoing the idea that traditional poetic education

was

sufficient training in morality.

Ion

justifies his

superiority. This

is

an

concentration on

aristocratic tactic.

Homer by an appeal

to Homer's authority

Although Plato disdains appeal
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and

to authority.

Ion's real mistake here

himself.

IS

At 531d

-

is

over-identifying with poetry

and

attributing Homer's expertise to

532a, after Socrates makes the point that
the expert on a given subject

the only one qualified to judge

who speaks well and who poorly on

Ion justifies his expertise by pointing out
that

Homer

is

that

same

subject,

the best of the poets. Ion doesn't

think he needs to judge the good and bad
speakers on a subject since he already knows

who the

best speaker

is.

But Ion has decided that Homer speaks the

as warfare and the relation between

those things from

Homer to

expertise, his acceptance of

Socrates,

and

men and

gods, having learned

begin with. Ion has no independent

Homer's authority

is

all

on subjects such

he knows about

way of judging Homer's

unquestioning.

on the other hand, won't even accept the word of god without

his questioning of Ion has revealed that a
technites in

judge the good and bad in that
l^hing

best

judged and consider

it

in

field.

To be

any

field

question,^®

must be able to

a judge, one must separate oneself from the

comparison to some body of knowledge. Epic poetry and

moralistic stories were effective as moral education precisely
because they encouraged

students to internalize and identify with them (see sec. 1.1.3). Ion, a
product of this
tradition, refuses to separate himself from his subject

can merely exhibit

It's

it.

Ion's limitations at the

end of

and so he cannot understand

it,

he

this section are clear:

obvious to everyone that you are unable to speak about Homer with

skill and
knowledge [xexvTI Kai etucrxfmxi] - because if you were able to do it by virtue
of a skill, [xe^vn], you would be able to speak about all the other poets too.

(532cd)

3.1.3 Inspiration vs. Interpretation:

In his

of

Homer as

first

The Knowledge

group of arguments, Socrates

a techne,

which implies

of the Poet

rejects Ion's

memorization and mimesis

that poetry does not lead to episteme (the

‘°See his response to the Delphic oracle at

Apo/ogy 21a
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ff.;

see also sec. 2.2.

knowledge associated with tcchne
But Socrates

is

)

and cannot, by

not adding insult to injury

when he

itself,

prov.de a complete education.

places Ion with poets and the

Muse

in

a "mindless" chain dangling from the
god:

Similarly, the

men

is

poets recite
inspiration

Rather he

is

Muse

makes some men inspired, from whom a chain of
other
catch their own inspiration from theirs.
For all good epic
that splendid poetry not by virtue of a
skill, but

strung out
all

herself

who

in a state of

and possession. (533e)

identifying poetry's connection with the divine,
something he repeatedly

descnbes as kaJon (533c7, 534a2, 534b8. and 534d8).
a frenzied Bacchic dancer

is

nothing to be ashamed

as a result of divine inspiration, however,
to

"know

poets,

thyself." Plato's criticism

and anyone

else

who

is

is

of.

Being a poet,

a rhapsode, or

even

Thinking yourself knowledgeable

a clear failure to

heed the Delphic instruction

designed to discourage this false conceit

believes that poetic inspiration gives

him or her

in Ion,

practical

knowledge.

At Apo/qsr 22c, Socrates includes poets

wisdom have been proven hollow by
else

his questioning.

list

of those

He adds

whose reputations

that practically

for

anyone

could give a better account than the poets of what they themselves had produced.

Socrates explains this

gift

in his

phenomenon by the

fact that poetic genius

is

inspired, a temporary

from the god during which the poet actually leaves his senses.” The reason that

others could better explain poetic "genius"

able to evaluate

it

is

that they are separate from

as an object, just as Socrates evaluates

Plato's educational point in this

a distance with a fully engaged

Apology passage

mind

is

all

it

and

therefore

thoughts that occur to him.”

that poetry should be evaluated from

rather than internalized

and

identified with

emotionally.

"For more on poets leaving their senses see PJ7aexIrus 245a and Laws 719c; diviners are said to leave
Timaeus 7 le - 72b; an interesting anomaly given that divining is considered a tedme here.
"Sec, for example, Chanwdets 173a.

their senses at
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The long discussion
534b. Socrates makes
divine,

his

which

is

own human

it

more or

of poetic inspiration in

clear that poetry gains
less

its

Ion serves a similar purpose. At

value from

its

connection with the

complete depending on the extent to
which the poet leaves

senses:

A poet, you see, is a light thing, and winged and holy, and

cannot compose before
he gets inspiration and loses control of his
senses and his reason has deserted
him.
No man, so long as he keeps that, can prophesy or
compose. (534b)
Socrates takes the results of his earlier argument
(532c

-

533d) as evidence

for the

mindlessness of poetic inspiration. Poetic
composition must not be a techne because,

if it

were, the poets' expertise would not be limited
to one topic on a subject, but they
would

be able to expound on other relevant topics as
well (534c). Note that this account of
poetic techne has nothing to
alliteration. Plato's

says

It IS

do with

educational concern

not at issue here. In fact,

composition

is

aesthetic qualities of verse such as rhyme, meter,
or
is

with what the poet says;

Phaedws 245ab

how

beautifully he

suggests that poetic skill in

worthless in comparison with divine inspiration.

The

inspired poet

is

superior because he aims not for the aesthetic pleasure of
his audience but rather to
deliver a divine message through the

weak medium

of

human

language.

At 534de, Socrates presents the example of Tynnichus the Chalcidian, an
otherwise bad poet

who wrote one great poem

[^|Lir|ve'uq, interpreter,

mouthpiece]

as proof that poets are a

hermeneus

for the gods:

more than anything, then, I think, the god is showing us, so that we should
be in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from
human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but
In this

representatives [^|Lir|veT|q] of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them. To
that, the god deliberately sang the most beautiful lyric poem through the

show

most worthless poet. (Woodruff translation, 534e)
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Ion declares that Socrates’ words
"touch his soul" and agrees that
poets present

[^ptlvenciv] the god
poets' representations.

s

message and the rhapsodes then represent
[^pTlve\»exe] the

"So you turn out to be representatives of
representatives

[eputivecov ^privfi?]," concludes Socrates.
"Quite

right,"

Ion replies (Woodruff

translation, 535a).

At the conclusion of

this exchange, Socrates

changes gears and gives Ion a familiar

Socratic warning:

Hold on a minute,
whatever

In so

Ion,

and

tell

me

this

— and do

may ask you. (535b)

I

many words,

Socrates

is

asking Ion to say what he believes

pertinent in Ion's case since the rhapsode has so

from those of the poet. At a similar juncture
specifically requests that

be frank about answering

Homer be

left

much

—

a request especially

trouble separating his

own

beliefs

Hippias Minor (365cd), Socrates

in

out of the discussion since

question him about the intentions behind his words.^^

it is

impossible to

Throughout the dialogue Socrates

himself has displayed an impressive ability to recall and recite Homer, but
he has always

presented the passages for intellectual analysis rather than for the pleasure of his

audience. Getting Ion to make a similar intellectual separation
direct

admonishment

to Ion to

answer

Socrates asks Ion about his

Homer. Ion agrees
over to the Muse.
explains

Still

at

not easy; hence his

for himself.

own

state of

mind while giving performances

535b-e that his best performances come when he

As with

why human

is

the poets, the transformation

is

is

most

of

fully given

not always complete, which

imperfections creep in to the supposedly ideal message of the god.

there emerges from Socrates' discussion of inspiration a kind of inverse relationship

For similar passages, see Protagoras 347e, and
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MenolXA.

between the production and performance
of poetry on the one hand, and
the engagement
of the

human

intellect

on the

removed from the human

other.

intellect,

It

seems as though the best pcetty

while the

human

is

the farthest

intellect functions best

when

removed from identification with poetry.”
Note that such a principle does not
denounce
the value of poetry
its

itself,

own problems when

the music off while

rather

solidly

homework

it

suggests that the

grounded
is

human mind

own

in its

functions best

at

solving

world. Like a parent’s decision to turn

completed, the judgment

not an aesthetic one but an

is

educational one.

Given

Plato's concern with the

emotionally identify with the

text,

tendency produced by poetic education to

one should not overemphasize

poetic inspiration as mindless. This

is

exactly

what Ion does

at

his characterization of

536d when, despite

his

admissions that Socrates' account of inspiration "touched
his soul" and that he himself

deeply identifies with the characters
state of

in his recitations,

he

resists

madness during performance.^^ Socrates never implies

the idea that he

is

in a

that inspired poets,

rhapsodes, and their audiences behave like stark raving lunatics.
Rather, he emphasizes
the fact that inspiration touches us on an emotional rather than
intellectual level, evoking
the sort of responses appropriate not to actual situations but rather to
fictional ones:

Well then. Ion, take a man dressed up at a feast or festival in elaborate clothing
and golden crowns. If he has lost none of these things, but nevertheless breaks out
in tears, or

thousand

if

he gets into a panic

in spite of

say he's in his

standing

when no one is denuding him
senses at that moment? (535d)

friends,

among more than twenty
him any harm, are we

or doing

to

'^That Plato believed the gods to be truthful can be seen at Apo/ogy 21b and RepubUe 382c.
Woodruff (1982, p. 146) claims that Plato's "radical conception of inspiration" is ridiculous because the poets
exhibit none of the unanimity and clarity he attributes to the gods. At
719c, Plato blames poetic
contradictions on conflicting characters given to him by the Muse.

be

in

‘^Woodruff (1983, p. 8) agrees with Ion's resistance to Socrates' account of inspiration since Ion would
when he recites Homer; if it were true, which he plainly is not.

ecstasy
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Since poetiy was memorized and recited
in an
well in their
as

it

own

particular situations,

takes them out of themselves

to engage the intellect the

inspiration

way

it

it

teach

should be clear that

and out

is

effort to

to help people to act

it

fails

as education insofar

of their situations. Plato's
educational goal

engaged by a craftsman practicing

and memorization disengages the

intellect

and

his techne.

Poetic

therefore fails as education.

Techne. Ixigni. and Fpistt-mf^

3.1.4

Whereas

earlier

arguments established that the memorization and
recitation of

poetry, even at Ion's level,

is

not a techne, 536d

military science cannot be learned from poetry
thesis

may be laughably obvious

this very

to

modem

-

541d shows

and then

that valid technai like

transferred to real

The

first

move

skills

five fingers

given to illustrate

on a hand by

this

made

its

necessary to follow an argument.

Plato makes in this section

is

While

equip

failed to

it

is

to establish at

537d

technai are distinguished by having have separate fields of knowledge

example of number

life.

readers, the practice of poetic education

assumption. Furthermore, as Ion so comically displays,

students with the mental

is

is

virtue of the

how both

same

skill

Socrates and Ion

- skill

in

that separate

(

episteme

know

An

).

Socrates has

number. The thing to note here

the separation of the object and the body of knowledge in the example. Socrates' and

Ion's

knowledge of number

they don't

know that

by contemplating

his

is

abstract

and based on other experiences and examples

Socrates has five fingers because he says so or

hand

--

From the previous conclusion

'^Number

is

skill.

that having a techne requires a person to have a

knowledge and the recent inference that

also given as an

so, or just

they apply outside knowledge of number to a particular

object (Socrates' hand) by virtue of their

particular field of

Homer says

—

example of knowledge

Ill

at

53Id and

different technai

in

Hippias Minor

at

have

367a.

different fields of

knowledge, comes the new claim that
anyone

given techne will not have
province. That

is,

full

knowledge of the words or deeds that

one won’t be able to judge the good and
bad

established earlier. There

is

admits that some passages from

The

Homer

idea

is

reinforced at

are best judged

such as charioteers, doctors, fishermen, or prophets.
point to a corresponding passage in
"I

Ion’s

538b

-

ability

remember, and

by experts from the relevant

When

Homer which would

to

know

every bit of

by having Socrates

--

Homer by

fields

Socrates asks Ion at 539e to

best be judged

heart. Plato

recall nearly all of

has forgotten something, but

that’s the real

previous argument

by a rhapsode.

problem.

What

it is

forgetting

for their

mocks

mnemonic

Ion's alleged

the obscure Homeric verse quoted

not words.

Ion has foigotten

is

Words

are all he can

the implications of the

he has failed to understand the meaning and intention of the words

gone before, even while he remembers the words themselves. What

Homer is he capable

of judging, given this limit

At 540b, Having admitted

be said by men and women,

know

on

his intellectual

that the rhapsode

judging passages about their particular

sufficient to

was

539d when Ion

anogant comment prompts Socrates to joke that Ion must be

in the dialogue. Ion

that have

its

maintain he [the rhapsode] judges everything, Socrates"
(539e).

and Ion claims

mnemonic

within

in one's field, as

something (539e). The joke ironic since rhapsodes were renowned
abilities

lie

not possess a

an interesting move here that shows
professional knowledge

to include the ability to judge words.

Ion replies:

who does

slaves

skills.

the right words, even

if

power? Words.

must defer to professional experts

Ion claims that he knows what

and freemen,

part of

rulers

and

may

in

suitably

subjects. Again, he thinks

he lacks the appropriate technai.

Socrates

promptly forces Ion to admit (540b-d) that he wouldn’t know the proper words

for a

steersman, doctor, cowherd, or spinning-woman. But Ion surprisingly maintains that he
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it

would know the appropriate words

difference between the professions
of general

because

he’s the best

Greek rhapsode

he’s the best

Homer as

so far as to insist that there

and rhapsode (540e

Again, the comic absurdity of Ion's claim
the memorization and recitation of

He goes

for a general.

is

-

is

no

541a) and that

Greek general as well (541b).
tempered by the

fact that

Greeks used

a central part of moral education.
Ion

probably picks military science while conceding
other technai because Homer was the
traditional authority

on

militaiy matters in Ancient Greece.^^

aristocratic education for future generals

Homer.‘«

Socrates' argument

relevant tec/me

subject.

that he

)

showed

was

that

Furthermore, the accepted

precisely the memorization

knowing how

to

do something

allows doctors and charioteers to judge what

Knowing what Homer says about

knows how

to

do the

activity.^’

knowledge of Homer gives him the

and

recitation of

(i.e.

having the

Homer says about

that

a subject, however, does not allow Ion to
claim

Ion goes wrong not only by assuming that his

practical skill of a general, but also

by identifying

himself so closely with the poet and his text that he has
no objective basis on which to

judge

any

subject.^®

These are

Plato’s central complaints

about the traditional use of

poetry as education.

Conc

l

us i on;

By the end
their

meaning

The P ro p er Use
of dialogue the

for Plato’s

audience,

of Poetry in Education

words epidends and kalon should have expanded
if

not for Ion himself.

But really. Ion, if there is truth in your claim that it is thanks to skill and
knowledge that you have the ability to praise Homer, you’re not playing fair with
"For Homer's authonty on military matters see Aristophanes' Frogs 1032ff.
**The general Laches displays his knowledge of Homer at 191b.
those

‘’Woodruff (1983, p, 10) says the conclusion that poetry should be judged by different standards from
use in more ordinaiy' life, "that, for example, what a general should say in a real battle is different from

we

what a general should be made to say in a poem about a battle" would have been a novelty in Plato's time.
“The main thrust of Plato's argument against poetry in education at NopubJicIII 392 - 398 is that the
young should not be allowed to play the part of bad characters; to identify with them; we may read about
TTiersites, but not act as Thersites.

See also Urmson (1982,
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p. 128).

me You

assure

me

that

you know a

many fine things about him, and you
undertake to give an exhibition
( epidevds ) of them, But you're deceiving
me and
you're nowhere near giving me
an exhibition.
great

(541e)*

In .he

opening of the dialogue

a,

530d, Socrates ashed Ion

for

an epideixis of ,he poe.s.

During the dialogue, however, the
meaning of epidends has shifted from
the mimetic
exhibition of Homer's words, of
which Ion
of Homer's dianoia, of

Kalop

too,

,s

eminently capabi, to an edrfymg
explanation

which Ion has proven

shows

different

to be entirely incapable.

meanings on the

lips of

Socrates and Ion at the

conclusion of the dialogue:

Soc.: However, if you do not possess
skill (xexviKog, but it is because
of
divine dispensation and because you
are possessed by Homer that you say
a lot of
tine (KaAxx) things about that
poet, in a state of ignorance, as I said
was your
condition, then you are not unfair
(o\)8ev otSiKeTq). So, choose which alternative
you prefer; to have us think of you as an unfair
fellow, or as a divine one?
Ion: There's a lot of difference, Socrates:
it's a much finer (Kd>Aiov)
^ thing
^

to be thought divine.
Soc.:

Well then,

as a eulogist of

Whereas Socrates

grant you this finer (KdcA,>^iov) status in our eyes.
Ion:
are not skilled (xexviKOV), but divine.
(542b)

let's

Homer you

associates kalon with the divine nature of poetry
(he uses

in describing divine inspiration:

with public admiration.

argument, but because

being divine not because he understands the

"more beautiful"

{kaWon

)

to be thought divine. Plato sees

kalon as a metaphysical rather than aesthetic quality which, as
part in determining arete.

four times

533e7; 534a2; 534b8; 534d8), Ion associates kalon

He chooses

it is

it

I

show

later,

plays a large

Socrates battles the popular tendency to regard kalon as an

external appearance throughout the early dialogues.

The expanded meanings
remind us that Ion

is

of kalon

and epldena's

not a rejection of poetry perse,

traditional use in education.

The magnetic power
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at the

end

of the dialogue

but rather a rejection of poetry's

of the poetic

muse contains divine

kahn

but

it

also puts students into an emotional
rapture that discourages critical

intellect necessary for true

epidcMs. The

wtth epic heroes that people

like

result is

such complete emotional identification

Ion actually believe themselves to be
capable generals.

At Protagoras 313d, Socrates worries about
sophists who take the various subjects
knowledge from

whether the teachings

judgment of

it

offer

them

for sale to

is

who

have no way of knowing

or

though rhythmic enchantment without providing
the means

any of

its

critically,

has an important role in

evident from Socrates' impressive familiarity with
and constant use of

Ion and nearly every other dialogue. Plato rejected poetry,
and Homer

of

him to be

a general

how the Athenians

based on the Iliad

is

552

-

in

Homer

not so absurd in light of Herodotus' (VH, 161) explanation

claimed the high

(2,

it

in particular, as

the moral authority and educator of Greece. Ion's
claim that his knowledge of
qualifies

for

messages.

That Plato believed poetry, approached
education

people

will be beneficial or harmful to the
soul. Poetry presents a similar

sort of danger, selltng rtself

critical

and

city to city

of

command

in

an expedition against the Persians

554). Plato disdained the Greek tendency to isolate the

words and deeds of epical characters from context and use them as moral maxims and

He

justifications.

wrongdoing
5e

-

at

specifically criticizes use of mythological examples to excuse

Republic 377e, and 391d, Laws 941b, and

as

I

show

later,

Euthyphro

6ab.^^

Furthermore, by pointing out Ion's dependence on public approval and subtly
criticizing his

consequent emphasis on producing pleasure

us that the poet's motivation

moral edification.

To

is

reminds

likewise the pleasure of his audience rather than their

the extent that there

^'Similar observations arc

for his audience, Plato

made by Vcrdcnius

is

a techne of poetry or even rhapsody,

(1949,
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p.

262).

it is

aimed

at creating a

work or performance

that will be pleasurable to the
audience. Since

Plato does not believe the production
of pleasure to be intrinsically
good for mankind,

he considers the poetic and rhapsodic
techna! of
IS

valuable just because of the divine
message

finally accepts being divine rather

makes

than

skillful

It

would seem

that poetiy

carries over from inspiration.
Indeed, Ion

(542a)

-

but only because he thinks

it

for a better public image.

Plato rejected the belief that
skills of his characters, just as

The antecedent
fact

it

value.“

little

Homer understood

- an

of Socrates' conditional statement that
a rhapsode

is

would be

clearly denied

great

if

he

by the account

in

of

account which also reveals that the poet himself knows
nothing of the

divine intentions behind his
aretes, imitators of

art.

At Republic 600e, Plato

calls poets

mimetai eidolon

images of excellence, and he claims (602b) that the poet
produces

these imitations ignorant of

the poet

and technical

Socrates rejects the belief that Ion
understands Homer.^^

understood the dianoia or intention of the poetry

inspiration

the virtues, vices,

how they are good

or bad. Indeed

it is

only to the extent that

relieved of his understanding that the divine message can
get through:

is

That

s

why the god

relieves [poets] of their reason,

and uses them

as his ministers,

he uses soothsayers and divine prophets -- so that we who listen to them
may realize that it is not they who say such supremely valuable things as they do,
who have not reason in them, but that is the god himself who speaks, and
addresses us through them. (534cd)
just as

Poetry's divine kaion establishes

scheme as a guiding
from

it.

difficult

light

its

place in the early Platonic educational

whose vagueness demands the

Timaeus 9d shows how accurate imitation and
if

not impossible.

What

the

Muse

tries to

critical intellect to derive benefit

articulation of divine things

communicate through the poet

is

is

^^Moravcsik (1982, p. 32) makes a similar observation.
”Sce Guthrie (1975, p. 209): Plato thought Homer’s role as educator "was spurious, because in fact
Homer and the others did not understand the technical or other principles underlying the actions which they
describe; and many of their stories, even of the behavior of the gods, were the reverse of morally edifying."
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something powerful, but not directly observable
or describable
poetry can do

is

give us a glimpse of divine ideals

applying our cntical
ff.,

to consider

it

intellect.^^

a riddle

for

human

and encourage us

to aspire to

Socrates’ response to the divine oracle at

and question

its

beings.

meaning, serves as a model

What

them by

Apo/c^

for the

21a

proper

educational approach to the divine element in poetry,
paradox, puzzles, and irony.^^

Understanding the divine message encoded

human

intellect

and a

critical

in inspired poetry requires

approach to verse

— the tools

an independent

and approach displayed by

Socrates throughout the early dialogues. In /on, Plato
criticizes traditional poetic

education for

tendency to magnetically attach the student by the emotional
inspiration

its

of the muse, effectively paralyzing the intellectual tools
necessary to gain a real benefit

from poetry's divine message.

3.2

The

N ature

Finally

I

of a

Wiseman

in

Ffippins

went to the craftsmen.

scarcely anything,
(kcxAxx). In this I

Minor

was aware

that although I knew (ETCiaxafxevcp)
would find that they knew (e7CiaTanevo\)(;) many fine things
was not mistaken: they knew things that I did not, and in that
I

I

respect were wiser (aoq>d>xepoi). But, Gentlemen of Athens, it seemed to me that
the poets and our capable public craftsmen had exactly the same failing: because

they practiced their

own

arts

(xexvav)

well, each

deemed

himself wise

(cTOtpcoxocxoc^) in other things, things of great importance. This mistake

their

obscured

wisdom. ( Apology 22cd)

Hippias was renowned as a sophist, not a craftsman, so
that this passage from

Apology

refers to

it

may seem

at first

glance

a different class of Socratic interlocutor.

Likewise, Ion was a rhapsode and not a poet, but Socrates' examination of him was an
indirect examination of poetry in

its

educational

role.

Plato never depicts a conversation

^^For a detailed account of the instrumental value of poetty see Moravesik (1982).
^^Vlastos (1991, p. 171) similarly concludes that "there can be no conflict between Socrates’
critical reason wherever it may lead and his equally unconditional commitment
obey commands issued to him by his supernatural god through supernatural signs. These two commitments
cannot conflict because on/y by the use ofh/s own critical reason can Socrates determine the twe meanjng of

unconditional rccidiness to follow
to

any of these signs

"

(Italics his).
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between Socrates and a cobbler,
doctor, or blacksmith

(or poet, for that matter),
but he

does depict several conversations
between Socrates and sophists.
Perhaps

this

can be

explained by Plato’s educational
concerns in the early dialogues
and his belief that
sophists taught
called arete,

technm and not

Since excellence in vanous technai
could be

sophists often claimed to teach arete.

believed to be the goal of education

mnemonics,
mistake,

or

was

upon them.

is

even argument. The sophists’ big mistake,
analogous to Ion and the poets’

to believe that their excellence in
particular skills conferred moral excellence

My analysis of the

Hippias Minor begins with a discussion of
how Plato

technai to be morally neutral. Next.

I

to

wisdom while showing poetry and

show how Plato attempts

category for the edification of his readers.

By showing that

to distinguish a moral

technical knowledge cannot

Hippias Minor seeks to turn Athens’ educational

memorization and

^.1

that Plato

not gained through excellence in
oratoiy,

compares Socratic and sophistic approaches

yield arete.

But the moral

effort

from

its

focus on

skills.

Opening: Portrait of a Wiseman

The opening

of

Hippias Minor

invites

an interesting comparison between

Hippias and Ion. Hippias has just presented an epideixis but, unlike
Ion’s epideixis

which was a performance of

poetry, Hippias has

included information from other poets besides

away

spoken

Homer

critically

about poetry and

in his speech. This fact tells us right

that Hippias has achieved the separation from his subject matter

and the

comprehensiveness of knowledge that prevented Ion from legitimately claiming a techne.
Socrates asks Hippias to comparatively judge characters in the Iliad and Odyssey.

Such

critical

judgment was taken

in

Ion to be a hallmark of techne. Right from the

118

beginning, Hippias

is

shown

to possess the

tec/me that Ion lacked.

What

Socrates will

proceed to show are the limits of even
the greatest and most vematile
tccfwkes around.

The conclusion

of Hippias' lecture apparently finds
Socrates in a rare state of

speechlessness:

Why are you silent, Socrates, after Hippias has given
such an exhibition
(em&l^afievot)]? Why don't you either join us
in praising some point or

other in

what he said, or else put something to the test
if it seems to you
anylhmg was not well said - especially since we
who most claim to have a share
in the practice of

The

philosophy are

now left

to ourselves? (363a)^^

exhibitions of sophists, like those of rhapsodes,
were famous for being engaging and

impressive.

educators

They had

who

As I explained

to be.

attracted customers

in chapter 1, Sophists

were freelance

by impressing pupils and parents with

their skill

and

wisdom.^^ The epideixis might be a sample lecture
that expounded some particular point
or a improvisational question

and answer

anything they chose.^® Hippias

which

carried off prizes at the

greatest

number

lecture from

Socrates,

for his exhibitions,

Olympiad (363d) and saw him claim

of technai (368b-d).

to be wisest at the

Protagoras 315c describes Hippias delivering his
are diametrically

opposed from those of

expresses his confusion and asks Hippias to teach him clearly what was

said in the epideixis

see,

:

when you were

bit lost, since I didn't

for

which audience members could ask

was apparently famous

an elevated throne. Such methods

who

You

(like Ion)

session in

delivering your lecture to the

want

one thing, and also

I

to question

thought

my

you

crowd

of us indoors,

— there were so many people

I

got a

in there,

questions would have interrupted your lecture

But now that there are fewer of us, I ask you, at Eudicus' instigation,
what you were saying about these two men. On
what grounds were you distinguishing them? (Waterfield translation, 364bc)
[eJCldei^ei].

to explain [6l5(X^ov]^^ clearly

^‘AJI

Hippias Minor translations are by Smith (1996) unless otherwise noted.

^^Sce Marrou (1956, p. 49

-

50)

^®Sce Hippias Minor 363d, and Oorgjas 447c.

” didaskon

is

the aonst imperative of

didasko, "to teach."
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Hippias replies that
Hippias uses forms of
as

"it

this

it

would be deina [8eivd]

word deinos [6eiv6^,

would be strange behavior" (Smith

if

he refused Socrates' request.

terrible, able, skillful] to

translation) or

"it

say such things

would be monstrous"

(Waterfreld translation) at 363c, 364d,
365c, and 375d (see also Hippias
Major 292c).
Socrates mimics him at the end of the
dialogue, saying
as for Hippias

if

he can't help to

free

it

would be

for us as well

us from our dilemma (376c). Alert
readers will

recognize deinos as the word used by
Socrates to describe Ion's ability, which
specifically

shown not

to be a techne at 531a, 531c,
532b,

and

in his

is

conclusion

at

541e.

Plato seems to be using the word's dual
meaning of skillful and terrible to point up
limitations in both men's ability. Ion's ability

technai do not amount to arete.

It

was not quite a techne and Hippias'

wouid be monstrous

answer Socrates' questions (363c) when Hippias
(364d). Likewise,

it

of person (365c); or

do

it

would be
if

those

involuntarily (375d).

strange

if

It is

Hippias were not able to

gets paid for teaching others to

the truthful

who commit

if

man and

the

liar

do so

were the same kind

injustice voluntarily are better than those

precisely Hippias' confusion of techne

and

arete,

who
the

insufficiency of his wisdom, that causes these "monstrous"
conclusions as well as his
inability to

answer Socrates' questions. Hippias says

things were true and Socrates concludes that
"skill" leave

it is

it

would be deinos

if all

these

deinos that the limitations of Hippias'

us in such confusion (376c).

After Hippias expresses his preparedness to answer Socrates' or anyone's
questions, Socrates sarcastically compliments his confidence with the kind of suppressed

conditional he used in Ion to indicate the subliminal subject of his inquiry:

temple

What

mind you're in, Hippias, if you go to the
Olympiad so confident about your soul's wisdom [Jcepi xfji^
aotpiav]! rd be amazed if any of the athletes of the body goes there

Soc.:

a godlike state of

at every
eii;
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to

y-

itryou:imd“c,r'' "
^in^„
since

I
I

u'^"
f
began I*taking

anyone supenor

If

to

™= <0 be in that state of mind, Socrates.
Ever
part in the contests at the
Olympic games,
f. i
I nave
have

me

in anything.

(

never met

354 a)

Hippias truly had the kind of supreme
wisdom that would enable him to answer
any

question, even about the most important
things (see

would be

in a

godlike state. That

is,

Apo/qs^ 22cd quoted above), he

he would have the kind of knowledge
appropriate

to gods. Hippias brashly reveals
his overconfidence by claiming this
godlike state to be

reasonable.

It is

Delphic oracle's

man

is

a great dramatic

moment when Hippias simultaneously

command to "know thyself"” and

challenges

all,

it

is

a

wisdom.

to his

has already been shown that Hippias takes his
popular success
--

wisdom.

-

Olympic

as evidence of his godlike

How the multitude can judge godlike wisdom is left conspicuously unanswered,

For Socrates, godlike wisdom would indicate arete in
or her to act justly without

indicates a wealth of technai

fail.^^

and the

more of an expert [CTOtpGyxaxoq]

at

For Hippias,
ability to

more areas of

win

in

possessor and enable

contests.

When

wisdom

he claimed to be

expertise [te%vcx<;] than

between arete and techne to be a hallmark of the
with Hippias' comportment

its

in contrast, his godlike

Hippias surely counted arete in his bundle of technai.

explicit

proclamation that no

monument

contests in oratory were judged by a vote of the
audience^^

him

heed the

wiser than Socrates” by declaring that he's
never met anyone superior to him in

anything. Socrates cleverly replies that Hippias'
fame
After

its

fails to

anyone (368b),

Plato took such confusion

sophists,

and

illustrated the point

both dialogues bearing his name and with Protagoras'

comparison of arete and techne

at

326e

-

328b. While Socrates

may have

’“Sprague's translation of Charmjdes notes (n. 45) that this Delphic inscription probably meant
like "realize your mortal condition."

something

“‘See Apology 21a.
“See Waterfield's notes in Saunders (1987a, p. 275).
“See chapter 4 and Socrates dream at Cliarm/dcs 173a-d.
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believed arete to be analogous
to a techne. Hippias Mtnor
shows that he was able to
distinguish between moral

was

and technical

skills

while Hippias, the prototypical
sophist,

not.^'*

22

2l

The Moral Neutr a lity

of Pn^tr^;

There follows an exchange (examined
closely
liippias claims that

Homer made

Achilles

in the section 3.3.1)

[^laxoq,

best, bravest, noblest]

Odysseus polutropatos, the superlative of
poIuTropos [TCO^lmpoTCoq,
versatile, wily].

Hippias then says

how Homer intended

concludes, based on that interpretation, that

the

liar

and

well-travelled,

his use of those

Homer thought

during which

words and

and the

truthful

man

to be different kinds of people. Socrates'
response to Hippias' confident explanation of

Homer's dianoia

is

a characteristic request to his interlocutor
to "say what you believe":^®

Well, let's leave Homer out of this, since it's
impossible to question him about his
poetic intentions in these lines; but you can
answer for Homer as well as yourself
since you're obviously undertaking the responsibility
of doing so, and you agree
with Homer's words as you see them. (Waterfield
translation, 365cd)

’

Here, Socrates criticizes Hippias' failure to question the
words of the poet, while

pointing out to the audience that he

is

examining Hippias and not Homer. As with Ion

at

535b, Socrates uses the "say what you believe" question to separate
the opinions of the
interlocutor from those of the poetic source

discourages.

Socrates

still

— something traditional

poetic education

allows Hippias to answer for Homer, as long as he agrees with

the poet and takes responsibility for his answers. Notice, however, that Socrates
says

Hippias agrees with what he, Hippias, takes Homer's words to mean. Socrates

is

asking

Some commentators, including Irwin (1995, p. 68-70) believe that Socrates equates arete and
which causes them problems in interpreting
Please note that an
between
tech/ie and arete is very different from the sophistic belief that arete is a techne or is derivative
of technai.
tec/we,

^^Interlocutors are supposed to say what they truly believe, not to give the opinions of another. See.
example, Protagoras 347b, Euthyphro 9d, Crito 49c, Ion 535b. Sec also, section 4.1.1.
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for

Hippias to defend his interpretation of Homer's
words since that interpretation

is

importantly different from the poet's meaning,
whether Hippias thinks so or not.
It

soon becomes apparent that Hippias' interpretation
of Homer's words

self-serving.

When

different from the

Socrates asks at 365c whether

liar,

Hippias

replies,

Homer thought

"How could

asks Hippias whether he agrees with the poet, he
declares that

were otherwise.

hasn’t occurred to Hippias that he

Hippias’ agreement

selected

and

truthfulness.

interpreted

It is

no

is

Homer

to

if it

this

overidentifies with the

be an obvious

fact.

Hippias

specifically to support his thesis about liars

surprise, then, that at

the thesis he attributed to

Socrates

and Homer may disagree on

based upon what Hippias takes

Homeric verse

When

would be demos

But unlike Ion who always agrees with Homer because he

matter.

text,

It

it

man

the truthful

he not, Socrates?"

is

at 365c.

and

366a Hippias personally commits himself to
Rather than honestly asking what Homer

meant, Hippias assumes that the poet agrees with him and exploits the verse
to support his
personal belief. Hippias views

Homer as an

ally in his attempt to

win an argument, not as

the inspired bearer of a divine message.
After a brief argument against Hippias’ thesis, Socrates trots out some Homeric

passages supporting his side of the argument (370a

-

371c), the latter of which

unfamiliar even to Hippias, the great memorizer. This

is

is

part of Socrates’ "sophistic"

behavior that bothers some commentators.^^ The educational point of this competitive

exchange of poetry, however,

is

to

show the moral

be wielded to support either side of the argument

neutrality of the text itself

.

~ that

it.

For a review of the issue, see Santas (1979,

p. 6).
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can

Unlike Hippias, Socrates uses verse as

a tool to better understand the argument, while the sophist decides on his thesis

deploys the verse to support

it

and then

Hippias' response to Socrates’
Homeric counteroffer

looking at the passage wrongly
(370e).

The

Getting your opponent to see things
your

does

It

lead to truth?

relativism

-

One

right

is

a protest that Socrates

way, of course,

is

way may be great method

is

Hippias’ way.
of persuasion, but

of Plato’s key complaints about
the sophists

was

their

the lack of standards beyond victory
and popular approval as criteria for

success. Socrates approaches poetry in
an honest attempt to understand the nature
of
lying

and truthfulness and he follows the argument
wherever

seems to wander away from
an opportunity
his point

and

for victory

resists

common

it

leads

- even when

it

assumptions. Hippias approaches the discussion
as

and adulation; he

interprets the text in a clear effort to
support

the argument's propensity to deviate from
his thesis. Socrates’

approach

is

honest inquiry, Hippias’

exchange

is

that the poetry itself cannot answer their moral
question.

is

stubborn defense. The larger point of their

Homer can

tell

us

about Achilles and Odysseus, but to learn about arete we
must inquire.

32.3 The Moral Neutrality

While the exchange
shows the moral
technai.

nf

of quotations between Hippias

neutrality of poetry, the argument itself

Socrates

first

establishes (365d) that

Next

it is

agreed that

shows the moral

liars, literally

lying, false, saying things that are not true],

ability].

and Socrates

liars are intelligent,

men who

have a dunamis

at

364c

-

370e

neutrality of

are

pseudes

[8\)va|Liiq,

power,

knowledgeable about what they are

doing, and wise about their subject matter (365e). The astute reader will immediately

suspect that Socrates

body

of

is

here establishing lying as a kind of techne.

knowledge that he uses

for action in a particular field
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— the

The

liar

has a relevant

liar is skilled.

The

readers suspicions’ are immediately
confirmed beginning at 366c

known technai such

lying to

Eveiy time a techne
to be

Its

as calculation, arithmetic, geometry,

mentioned

is

preeminent practitioner.

He

is

in this section,

other fields of expertise (367e

epitomy of

all

craftsmen

when

-

Socrates compares

and astronomy.

Hippias acknowledges himself

the most experienced calculator of

best arithmetician (366d), a leading
geometer (367de),
all his

when

368a).

It

and even

becomes

better at

all

(366c), the

astronomy than

clear that we’re dealing with the

Socrates reveals that Hippias has billed himself
as the

"wisest of people in the greatest

number

of crafts" (368b). This claim

well-known story of how' Hippias once appeared

at

is

supported with a

Olympia having single-handedly

crafted each of his personal items from his sandals
to his ring

and

poems and

of course his

speeches (368bc).

For each of Hippias’ original technai, Socrates gets him to
admit that his expertise

makes him not only the

expounder of those subjects but also the best

best

Socrates then asks whether the same

isn’t

liar

about them.

true for all of the sciences [e7Ci(Txe|icov].^^

Hippias expansive familiarity with and possession of technai make him an ideal
person
to

answer

this question, but

the best expert

distinction

is

he admits

not also the best

at

The

liar.

agent’s technical ability to

lie,

The point

and

is

that technai

^^From epistcme
^®This claim
of the

argument

dunamis

).

is

is

—

a

argued

mitigated

word
in

techne

in

which

argument turns precisely on a

of truth

and falsehood

telling.^®

As

out and the argument deals only with an

left

the argument

all

can’t think of a

validity of this

between the moral and technical aspects

long as moral questions about lying are

(

369a that he

is

valid

and

its

conclusion uncontroversial.

sciences are morally neutral, just like poetry.

specifically used to describe the

body of knowledge pertaining

to technaj.

section 3.3.2. Several commentators have noticed that the appau'ent invalidity

when a

distinction

is

See, for example, Weiss (1981) and

made between the
Mulhem (1968).
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character

(

tropos

)

of a

liar

and

his ability

Why does Plato care to point out that poetry and
IS

tcchnai are morally neutral?

It

important to him because he's interested
in education and Plato's
conception of the goal

of education, arete,

is

anything but morally neutral. Whereas
Plato showed that Ion

could not learn morality (or techne
laundry

list

from poetry, he

now shows that you

could learn a

of technai from sophists like Hippias
without ever approaching arete in

You might even be

moral sense.
of technai.

)

and

Hippias, the greatest of the Greeks at the
largest number

be unable to discern the moral dimension
of lying from

still

its

its

technical

dimension.

2i2 A

The

I nte nt i

Once

on

B e hin d

Socrates has

Hippias'

shown

the

liar

and the

truthful

man

to be similar in a technical

sense, Hippias counters that Odysseus differs from
Achilles in terms of the voluntariness

of his actions (370e).

The subsequent passage

identifies intention rather

than

skill

as the

harbinger of the moral quality of an action and so raises the
educational question of

how

such intentions are determined. Plato's key complaint about the sophists
was that they
offered practical techne without providing

any

ideal

toward which to aim those

skills

other than popular and political success.^^

The

sophistic conception of the

466b Polus defines power

as something

good

is

good

for

characteristically self-serving.

him who has

it.

At Goigias

Hippias, too, takes his

competitive and financial success as evidence of his goodness. At 369c, Hippias reveals
his criteria for

goodness and wisdom while stating the goal of

So now,

if

you wish,

evidence, that
liar,

Fll

Homer made

^’Pcnncr (1992,

p.

If

them without

raising

Achilles better

(oc|Lielvco)

offer

than Odysseus and not a

many

137- 138) makes a similar observation, concluding

means

in their

much

and worse (xeipw)
counter arguments to mine to the

latter deceitful, a teller of

you wish, you may then

rhetoricians purport to put persuasive

argument with Socrates:

prove to you by sufficient argument, based upon

whereas he made the

than Achilles.

his

lies,

that:

'The sophists and

student’s hands to achieve whatever goals "seem best" to

any questions about what people take

126

to

be their ends."

effect that the other

which of us speaks

is

better (d|.ietvcov). That

Hippias thinks that the audience

who wins the

way, these people here

will

know

better (d|Lieivov). (369c)

will

detemnne not only who

argument, but also which

man

is

right

ameinon [apEivov,

is

about Homer and

better],

the comparattve form of agathos, the
adjective corresponding to arete.
definite moral overtones, as Hippias

first

two uses

of

it

make

Ameinon

It is

is

word with

a

clear.

Plato delights in making Socrates resemble his
interlocutor in

skill

and

tactics

while preserving their crucial differences. Just Socrates
challenged Ion with his

memorization and performance of Homer, the philosopher
matches Hippias' knowledge of
poetry and employs a few of his sophistic techniques.

Hippias that the experts are also the best

366c

liars at

When
ff.,

Socrates needs to

he uses a spoonful of

help the conclusion go down. Playing up Hippias' superlative
expertise

show
flattery to

in arithmetic,

Socrates asks him to answer "with the same nobility and grandeur"
questions that
establish the best arithmetician also to be the best liar about
arithmetic (366e). Although

Socrates flatters Hippias in order to encourage him to accept the argument,
he does not

pursue the argument merely to win a

new batch

of customers or an eristic moots contest.^®

Indeed Socrates' dogged pursuit of the argument
anxiousness to conclude

it.'*^

of "flattery," therefore,

unsophistic after

is

^“Friedlander (1958, v.

I,

p.

Socrates' goal

is

is

in

sharp contrast to Hippias'

the truth of the matter about lying; his use

all.^^

155) points out that "what

r£idic«illy

separated [Socrates] from [sophistic

was the final goal he aimed at: even when Socrates adopted Sophistic ways, when — as in the Hippias
Minor - he was knowingly deceptive, he still aimed at the truth of the matter."
^‘Observes Weiss (1981, p. 301): "Though the Socrates of the Hippias Minor has been accused of

eristics]

deceit and sophistry, he has surely been unjustly maligned. Twice in the argument Hippias prematurely
concludes that voluntary adikountos are superior, but neither time does Socrates let it go at that.
What we
witness here is Socrates continuing the dendius until he is satisfied that the conclusion has adequate support
.

.

from the argument, not being content to merely 'trap' Hippias."
^^For more on the distinction, see Dover (1974, p. 230): "Modern convention makes it a little hard for
us to tell the difference between 'showing admiration' ( tJiaumazdn ) for a person and 'flattering' him
( koJakeudn ), but the distinction was clear enough to the Greeks and lay essentially in the fact that the ko/ax
"
'flatterer', 'parasite', hoped for personal, individual gain, where ais admiration was disinterested.
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,

Socrates also manages to weave
a critical obsetvat.on about
Htppias' goals
his

speech praising the sophist’s incredible
display of handicrafts

tells

how he

Olympia. Socrates

at

overheard Hippias describing his
"great and enviable wisdom”
by

array of handicrafts he

was displaying

mto

listing the

at the competition:

nd what seemed to everyone most unusual
and an
^eatest wisdom (aotpioo;) was when
you said that

exhibition (CTiSeiY^a) of the
the belt you wore around your

expensive Persian ones, and that you
had plaited

y^LTrcil
This simple observation shows

was

craft item that

this

how wisdom, for the sophists, could

beautiful in appearance.

The

simultaneously accept and determine the sophistic
multitude admire what

good

is

or

is

a thing

good

be demonstrated by a

fact that "eveiyone" is

kind of techne and wisdom rather than the
moral sort reveals
criteria for

just

what

it

how
is

concerned with
the multitude

good.

Do the

because the multitude admire

it?^^

Plato later makes no secret of his disdain for
polymaths, people claiming a wide
variety of skills

that they

seem

and

knowledge.'*^

What

to be designed solely to impress others.

a sophist's success in attracting students

such drive

for

a technites.

and earning a

though,

is

Of course, impressing others was

to

living.

skills,

But Plato suspected that

popular approval and financial reward actually corrupted Hippias'
status as
Socrates mocks Hippias' well

mocked Ion s mnemonics
inability to

bothers him most about Hippias'

remember the

Soc.:

known mnemonic technique

at 539e, to contrast the ability to

logical

Even
I

Soc.:

I

don't think

it's

remember words with

[further deliberation] won't help, in

his

if

Fm

my opinion. But you
Hippias.

right,

what you're getting at, Socrates.
suppose you're not using you mnemonic technique
don't quite see

called for. (Waterfield translation, 369a)

'’This question reflects a central issue in Euthyphro,

"See, for example

369a, as he

consequences of an argument:

should remember what the argument entails
Hip.:

at

Laws

see section 5.1.

81 lb and 819a, and PJiaexiws 275ab.

128

--

you obviously

Indeed, Hippias' mnemonics help him
to appear expert on
the dedicated specialization of
a true technites.

«

many subjects

Since public approval

while lacking
is

the goal of

all

Hippias' efforts, his achievements lack
principle and diminished in Socrates'
eyes.

Technai aimed to please the multitude are
necessarily disjoint from the Platonic
conception of arete which requires one to aim

2.2.5 Contrast i ng

Attit u d es

To whatever extent

towards

Socrates resembles a sophist in Hippias Minor
(Aristophanes'

Clouds shows how much he did
examine

how Plato

in his contemporaries' eyes),

it is

most instructive to

contrasts Socrates with his interlocutor. Socrates

comments and do things

in the dialogue that reveal veiy different

Given that the sophists were Socrates' and

surpnsmg that the contrast
At 369bc,

at a particular ideal.

in their

and Hippias make

approaches to wisdom.

Plato's greatest rivals as educators,

it's

not

approaches to wisdom takes on educational overtones.

just after Socrates has argued that the liar

and

truthful person are

one and the

same, Hippias complains about Socrates' method of questioning:

Oh, Socrates! You're always weaving arguments of this kind. You
is the most difficult part of the argument and
fasten on to it in
minute detail, and don't dispute about the whole subject under discussion.
Soc.: Hippias, I don't dispute that you are wiser than I, but it is always
my
custom to pay attention when someone is sa)dng something, especially when the
speaker seems to me to be wise. And because I desire to learn what he means, I
question him thoroughly and examine and place side-by-side the things he says, so
I can learn. If the speaker seems to me a worthless person, I neither ask
questions
nor do I care what he says. This is how you'll recognize whom I consider wise.
You'll find me being persistent about what's said by this sort of person,
questioning him so that I can benefit by learning something. (369b-e)
Hip.:

pick out whatever

.

It's

obvious that Socrates' nit-picking rather cramps Hippias' grandiose

the details, Hippias' goal

is

to

make an

style;

damn

impressive showing that will win over the

^^Scc Marrou (1956, p. 55):

"It is known from other sources that Hippias taught a system of mnemonics
imposing learning meant no more in practice than providing the orator with the
minimum amount of knowledge necessary to enable him to pose as an expert without ever getting caught out."

and some think that

ail

this
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audience. Beyond that, however,
th.s passage brings up an
interesting question.
really at stake here? After

What

Hippias complains that Socrates won't
dispute the "whole

subject under discussion," Socrates
replies that he doesn't dispute
Hippias' wisdom.

Hippias'

As

is.

I

wisdom the

subject under discussion?

suggested in the

last section,

competitive game, a contest to see
strides

From Hippias' point

Hippias takes

of view,

Is

probably

it

this conversation with Socrates
to

who is wiser (369c), into which

be a

Hippias confidently

undefeated (SaScd)/^
Socrates,

by

contrast, says he

be a good student and

wants to learn from Hippias

listen to the lecture.

What does

- although

he refuses to

he hope to learn? One of Hippias'

technai ? They are never discussed in depth.
Hippias' famous system for mnemonics?

didn

t

It

help Hippias to remember the consequences of
his reasoning (369a). They are

discussing the difference between Odysseus and
Achilles, but Socrates makes
he's not interested in learning

about Homer (365c). The question

better of these

two characters? The question

best? Hippias

and Socrates

of

is

not simply,

what makes a man good,

are discussing arete,

Apology 22d. But Hippias views

ability to

is,

is

a thing of great

clear that

who

is

the

better, the

importance

arete in terms of his reputation for

win the argument, while Socrates views arete

it

in the

words

wisdom and

as a concept to be explored.

Why does Socrates think he can learn from Hippias by bombarding him with
questions?
gain

It

seems reasonable to go to Hippias, a wise man by profession,

wisdom - but Socrates remains

that Socrates

is after, it is

Do you

see that

ignorant.

a higher form of

Fm

It

turns out that

wisdom with

telling the truth, Hippias,

questioning clever people? This
other respects Fm pretty useless.

is
I

it's

Fm

not Hippias'

wisdom

different criteria:

when

I

Fm persistent in
my only good point:

say that

probably [Klv6\)ve\)C0j

mean,

in order to

ignorant about the

way things

in

are,

'‘Dewey (1993, p. 43) says the sophists’ used argument and discussion for "downing the other man,
which was the thing in the Sophists which Socrates always reprobated.
But Socrates and Plato really had the
.

idea of intellectual intercourse

where

all

.

the participants were equally concerned to arrive at the truth. "
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whose wisdom is famous and vouched
becomes evident, because we disagree

for by all ,he GrTeL
my gnorl e
on almost eveiythmg. X^at
greX nroof of

«i<h experts? (Waterfield translaLn,

3^°bc)”“
Socrates’ disagreement w-ith the
experts

examines men whose wisdom

is

is

proof of tii^a,^ ignorance? Notice
that he

"famous and vouched

tor

by

all

the Greeks."

It is

the

multitude with their fickle disfnbution
of fame that determines the wisdom
of Hippias and
others. Socrates disdains

such

criteria,"

he wants to

know

Socrates says that he doesn't dispute
Hippias’ wisdom, he

"the

is

way

is

ignorant, he

As
still

It

is

using his

own

higher

When

Socrates says

criteria.

turns out, Socrates doesn't seem to learn
anything from Hippias at

vacillating

on the matters discussed

When

using ’wisdom’ in Hippias’

sense and essentially saying that he doesn’t
dispute Hippias’ fame.
that he

things are."

all;

he

is

at the dialogue's end:

However, as I said before, on these matters I waver
(7C>va.vo5^al) back and forth
and never believe the same thing. And it's not surprising
at all that I or any other
ordinary person should waver (TC^^vaaGai).
But if you wise men (aocpoi) are
going to do it (TcAxxvfjcreaGe), too — that means something
terrible (6eiv6v) for us,
if

we

can't stop our

wavering

(7i?td.vTig)

even

after

company. (376c)
Smith notes that the primary use of the verb pJanan
it

in the

is

"to

wander" but that Socrates uses

middle passive form which indicates an inability to make up

can't help but

which

is

we've put ourselves in your

mind. The word

evoke the description of Odysseus as poJutiopos. the main meaning of

"much-travelled or wandering."

Add

poJymuthos and Odysseus the polutropos,
wild horses roaming everywhere. The image
sophists' relativism

See

his

also, for

and the

example,

last

to this the connection

between Hippias the

and you end the dialogue with an image
is

of

appropriate to Plato's criticism of the

sentence shows his disdain for them as teachers.

184c-e; and

Cnto 47a

ff.

^'Socrates accuses Hippias of behaving like Odysseus at 370c. Hoerber (1962, p. 131) also
connection.
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makes the

The
is

final

aporia of Hippias Minor

is

much

as

about the nature of a good man. While
Plato doesn't

a confusion about education as

it

offer answers to either question,

co-ptic clues are sprinUed around
the dialogue. First, Plato

makes

it

clear that Hippias’

infallibility is a barrier to his
learning." In contrast to the sophist's
boast that his

has never been matched (364a), Socrates
identifies humility as his

own

wisdom

greatest asset in

learning:

ut, astonishingly, I

enough

who

to learn, so

answers me.

I

have this single good point, my saving grace:
I am humble
probe and ask questions, and am extremely
grateful to anyone
always repay my debts by never passing the
I

lesson off as a

my own and so denying the fact that I have learned
something. No
cleverness of my teacher as I explain what he
taught me. (Waterfield

discoyeiy of
I

extol the

translation, 372c)

Hippias

is

so convinced of his supreme knowledge that
he thinks he

is

beyond

His incredible knowledge doesn't even make him
a good teacher, however.
IS

learning.

When

Hippias

ready to abandon the discussion in frustration over
Socrates inability to recognize the

obvious, Socrates asks him to continue for everyone's
benefit:

So please be nice and don't refuse to cure my soul. You'll do me a
much greater good if you give my soul relief from ignorance, than if you gave
my
body relief from disease. But if you wish to give a long speech, I tell you in
advance that you wouldn't cure me, for I couldn't follow you. If you are willing
to
answer me as you did just now, you'll benefit me a great deal, and I think you
Soc.:

yourself won't be harmed.

Eud.:

By

all

means

sake of what you said

Socrates

is

.

do otherwise, Hippias. For our sakes and for the
answer what Socrates asks you. (372e - 373d)

don't

earlier,

here asking Hippias not to teach him by applying

applies his techne to cure a patients body.^® Nor

some techne,

would Socrates

as a doctor

learn from

an

^’observes Perkinson (1980,

p. 10): "First, human improvement can take place only if man is fallible;
improvement. And if man is fallible, then he can never know what the good is, so
the only way he can improve is by discovering or uncovering his own mistakes, his own errors, and then
eliminating them. Therefore, rather than skepticism and nihilism, Socrates' negative approach leads to
infallibility

leaves no

room

for

optimism ajid progress."
^“Indeed Socrates says things elsewhere that suggest he thinks teaching
soul. See, for

example, Charmides 155b

ff.,

especially 157bc.
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is

a kind of doctonng of the

epidebns.

It is

the process of questions

and answers

that benefits

all

parties concerned,

including the audience of the dialogue.

The nature

of the wise

independent of their approval

man

is

for his

to impress the multitude, but
he has

own improvement. As

effective teacher, nor a potential achiever
of arete.

moral ideal separate from popular success, nor
his
wise

man

such, he

is

no

criteria

neither an

Indeed, he acknowledges neither a

own

The wisdom

imperfection.

turns out to be shallow. In the Hippias
Minor, as

I

show

of the

in the next section,

Socrates' questions reveal a confusion about the
moral dimension of the

good man and a

lack of fixed standards for judging his goodness.
These are the shortcomings of sophistic

education and challenges for Plato's educational project.

3t3r

Thg Nature

of the

Good Man

Perhaps the best evidence

in

for the

ffjppias Minnr
educational value of Hippias Minor

is

the

testimony of Plato's great student, Aristotle. Aristotle mentions
Hippias Minor
specifically

and shows elsewhere

explicitly, in the dialogue.

that he learned the lessons implied by, but not stated

At Metaphysics

A 1025a2-14

Aristotle calls the

Alinor "misleading," but he does not mean that Plato was trying to deceive
Rather, the dialogue

its

misleading in a provocative

way that makes

its

his audience.

readers

wonder why

conclusions are so counterintuitive. Aristotle goes on to explain that the moral

character of a false

is

is

Hippias

man must

be distinguished from the ability to

tell lies.

even more clear in Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle judges

intentions behind their

lies,

liars

The

distinction

on the basis of the

rather than their capacity for lying:

not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the choice; for it is in virtue of his
state and by being a man of a certain kind that he is a boaster. (1127bl2-16)^^
It is

^‘AII Aristotle translations are

by Ross (1984), unless otherwise indicated.
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The second thing
a state of character

makes

Aristotle learned, a kind of
corollan- to the

and not

a rechne.

first, is

At Kcon,ache.n BMcs
1129a6-17

that

is

Aristotle

this point in discussing
justice:

We see that all men
i^sposed to

do what

mean by justice
is

that kind of state which
makes peoole
and makes them act justly and wish
forwhaUs just;
that state which makes them act
unjustly and

just

^ ^
wish lor
h r"”
what
IS unjust. Ut us too,
then, first lay this down as a rough
sketch
same is not true of the sciences and the
faculties /acW as of states
[
For it
]
seems that the same faculty or science
deals with contraries; but a state
of
character which is one of two contraries
does
produce the contrary

The argument

that practitioners of

given at H,pp,as Minor 366e

-

and

can produce contrary

is

must be

in order to avoid the objectionable
conclusion of the argument. Later in the

Nicomachean Ethics.

Aristotle distinguishes phronesis
[(ppovtiatg, prudence, practical

wisdom], something specifically connected to

from techne

arete,

But further, while there is such a thing as excellence
such thing as excellence in practical wisdom

in art

{phronesis

willingly

IS

[

iochne

The argument
It is

].

];

:

[

techne

and

],

in art

there

he

no

is

who

errs

preferable, but in practical

the reverse. Plainly then, practical

376b.

results

369a. Although justice in particular and
arete in general

are not explicitly distinguished from
rechne in the dialogue, such a distinction

made

results

wisdom, as in the excellences {aretai he is
]
wisdom is an excellence f arete ] and not an art

(ll40h21-25)

that he

who errs

willingly

is

preferable

clear from his writings that at least

indirect educational

is

found

at

Hippias Minor 369d

one student of Plato,

-

Aristotle, got the

message of Hippias Minor.

The Moral Category
It

has been suggested that the Hippias Minor

Plato because the fallaciousness of
Plato's stature could possibly have

its

arguments

is

not be an authentic work of

so obvious that no philosopher of

made them. The
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may

fallacy Plato

is

most often accused of

making

is

equivocation. Several of the argument’s
terms shift

in

meaning from one

part of

the argument to the next. Aristotle
noticed the fallacies and his reference
to the work

testimony to

modem day

its

authenticity.

readers,

is

think that every other student of Plato,
including his

I

was intended

- and

to see the fallacies too

Aristotle did, that moral character as
arete of the soul

is

to

ieam from them, as

crucially distinct from practical

technai and success or popularly-determined
excellence.
It

doesn’t take a philosopher of Aristotle’s
caliber to notice the ambiguous use of

agathos [dyaeoi;, good, (Homer) brave, noble,
morally good], even
speech

at

in Socrates'

363ab, where he says that Eudicus’ father thought the
Iliad a

Kda.?aov, comparative of kalos]

poem than

the

Odyssey

just

finer

[

because Achilles

{ameinon, dpeivcov, comparative of agathos] man than
Odysseus. Notice that
quality of the characters that

makes one poem more

first

kallion,

a better

is

it is

some

beautiful or fine than another, rather

than the aesthetic value of the verse. Notice also that being
a "better man" has a moral
connotation here that will be absent

when

’better’

and

’best' are later

reference to techne.

Socrates' question to Hippias about

aweinon

a question about

is

as

much

interpretation of

aiistos

The breadth

[dpiOToq]
of possible

bravest, noblest, or even

the

word

"best

and

in its

Hippias defines agathos as

replies that Achilles

is

it is

about

is

his

is

aiistos

meanings

for agathos.

is

polutropos.

however, allows aiistos to mean best,

most virtuous. Smith (1996,

There

and Odysseus

the superlative of agathos and therefore connected to arete.

Homeric sense of

bravest."

meaning vague

which character he thinks

Homer.

At 364c, Hippias

Now

how

discussed in

is

n. 3) theorizes that

military rather than moral excellence

Hippias

and so

is

translates

no reason why Plato wouldn't intentionally leave the

here, however.

It is

characteristic of the dialogue that Socrates
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using

and

it

Hippias use the same words while
having different meanings and
often no clear
definitions in mind. Indeed, this
lack of clear def.nit.ons

is

one of the

faults of the

sophists that Plato challenges in
his educational project.

The word Hippias uses
the superlative of po/utropos

Odysseus

in the

opening

to describe

f

Odysseus

at

364c, polutmpotstos.

tcoXpTpoJCOg] the word used by

line of the Odyssey.

attitude into account, noting that
while

Homer to

Again, Smith (1996,

Homer seems

word, Hippias seems to have the word's
sense as

to

simply

describe

n. 4) takes Hippias'

mean "much

"shifty, vematile,

is

traveled" by the

and

resourceful

m

mind," Hence his translation: "wily," The
broad meaning of this word, however, even
confuses Socrates

who asks

po/utropos to pseudes

Hippias to explain (364e).

[vt-eu8f|i;],

Hippias proceeds to connect

usually translated as

"liar,"

which means

"false" or

"saying things that are not true" (365b).“
Citing a passage in which Achilles calls Odysseus
polumachan, Hippias

concludes:

In these lines he clearly

simple,

and Odysseus

Now polumachan
synonym

each man,

of each

wily {polutropos

means

[7ro>.\)pfiXT)v]

is

making

a phrase

refer to a

poJui£opo?

in

shows the way

]

man, that Achilles is truthful and
and a liar pseudes ]. (365b)
[

resourceful or inventive

and

is

a possible

of polutropos in the latter's non-moral sense. Hippias'
conclusion, however,

suggests that he

can

is

a moral

judgment on the men. He

which suggests

character. Indeed, the

man's character or temper and so

it

is

talking about "the

Greek word tropos

way of

[xpoTCOc^]

seems reasonable that Hippias takes

to refer to Odysseus' character.^^ Nonetheless, Hippias' interpretation of

The suggestion implicit in the term iiar’ that the telling of falsehoods is voluntary may also be present
the Greek, term pseudes. There would be an ambiguity similar to that we find in
comparing liar with its

definition as

someone who

"This connection

tells

falsehoods. See Weiss (1981, n. 4).

observed by Mulhern (1968), who claims that Hippias wants po/ytropos to be a
tropos or distinguishing characteristic of behavior equivalent to pseudas. Socrates, in contrast, treats
is
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po/utropos as practically equivalent
to pseudes seems quite a
stretch from Homer's use
of the word. In addition,

”

that polytmpos.

3 ,3t2 Being Good

pseudcs need not be

a descnptor of moral character

soon becomes cleat that Socrates
doesn't think

It

vs. Beinf?

p ood at

is

its

confirmed by the

Having claimed that Homer thought the

liar

correlates

way

and

-

are powerful, intelligent, knowledgeable,

366a).

The idea

that the liar

their moral character,

on an assessment of

odd conclusion
Hippias

is

truthful

truthful

their skill.

Hippias concedes that

in the things they

are opposites

When the two assessments

that a person lacking

it is

to be different sorts of

at 366a),

and wise

man

man

is

(i.e.

]

a

liar

(366b).

one w'ho has a dunamis

do what he wishes. By way

correct answers to mathematical problems.

Soc.:

qualities are based

are mixed, there emerges the

Then

at

),

of example, Socrates points

out that Hippias' dunamis in the techne of arithmetic allows him
to

\aristos

as liars (365d

however, and the discussion proceeds.

established that the powerful person

barring external impediments, can

liars'

wisdom and power could not be

this conclusion,

do

based on an assessment of

however, while Hippias' concessions about

unfazed by

Next

and

intentionally confused at the

is

the arguments root that confusion
out.

people (a proposition to which he personally
commits
liars

it is.

Sompthing

That the meaning of agathos and
beginning of the dialogue

any more

366d Socrates

skillfully give

asks;

Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best
which you are most powerful and wisest, that is,

in those things in

arithmetic?
Hip.: Best

[

aristas

]

also, for sure, Socrates. (366d).

poJytropos and pseudas as a dunamis, or power, rather than a characteristic.
'^Smith (1996,
like storytellers

n. 6)

notes that pseudcs means only saying things that aren’t true and applies to people
intent to deceive. He thinks the argument is about ability to speak falsely not

who have no

about the character issue of intention to deceive.
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There

is

that Wily

word ag^hos

again. In this passage,
Socrates asks whether being
, he

supreme practmoner of a grven
tecj,„e makes Hippias
pride, answers tha, he

is

"best."

Surely Hippias

to the rechne in question,
doesn't he?

He

undemands

little

that th,s "best" applies
only

realizes tha, being best
.r

different from being best in a
moral sense, doesn't he?

Remember

"best." H.ppias, with
no, a

someth.ng

is

Does he?

that Hippias took the lac,
tha, Achilles

is

truthful as evidence for his

being no, jus, a better speaker
or soldier or strategist than
Odysseus, Hippias took
Achilles' truthfulness as evidence
for his being a better man
than Odysseus.

Socrates points ou, tha, since
Hippias

is

best at arithmetic, he should
be most able to

ruth about those things. Hippias
agrees. Hippias' truthfulness
his being best and, since

than Odysseus, Hippias

make him

a better

man

Hippias

may

Now
tell

thus connected with

is

cites truthfulness as the reason
Achilles is a better

man

very well think that his truthfulness
and technical ability

in a moral sense. After all,

Hippias boasted

364a that he has

at

never met anyone superior to him in
anything.
Next, Socrates shows that telling the
truth best must also allow Hippias to
best, since

he wouldn't involuntarily

Soc.:

Do you

tell

the truth while trying to

see, then, that the

lie

the

lie:

same person is both a liar and truthful
is no better than the liar? For,
indeed,

about these things, and the truthful person

person and the two are not complete opposites
as you supposed just

now
Hip.:

He does

not appear to be, at least in this

field.

In the face of this counterintuitive conclusion,
Hippias tries to limit

concedes the conclusion

for that particular field only.

Hippias turns out to be versed

in a host of different

But Socrates

technaL

(367cd)

its

is

scope.

in luck

because

Socrates simply repeats his

line of questioning in reference to several of Hippias'
other skills then asks
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He

whether he can

think of any techne or epfstewe in
which the

liars

and

truthful

men

are distinct.

Hippias admits that he cannot:
Well,

has been demonstrated that both lying
and honesty reside in the same
It follows that if Odysseus
was a liar, he is honest too, and vice versa
for
Achilles: they are not different from each
other, let alone opposite - they are
It

person.

alike.

The
reflects the

Now do you see?

(Waterfield translation, 369b)

burst of frustration with

response of

much

which Hippias responds

of Socrates' wider audience.

to this conclusion

The

frustration

is

no doubt

based on a

confusion between the moral and technical senses of
lying and truthfulness.^^ Socrates'
line of reasoning

is

sound because he does make the

and truthfulness purely
of technai.

character,

(

is

distinction; he speaks

about lying

in their technical senses as abilities belonging
to the practitioners

The conclusion, when read

as applicable to technai

supported by Republic 333e

Nicomachean Ethics 1129a6-17).

If it

-

and not moral

334c and was accepted by

Aristotle

seems surprising that the supremely wise Hippias

can t see the distinction, remember what Socrates said about sophists

in the

Apoiogy

:

they mistakenly thought that their technical wisdom extended to things
of "great

importance" (22cd).

G ood Action vs. Competent Action

:^3.3

Socrates next serves

and not Odysseus
aporia

up some Homeric quotations

to be pseudes.

He then

of his

own

that suggest Achilles

restates his question from a fresh state of

:

“Mulhem (1968, p. 286) agrees: 'The credibility of the paradox which this line of argument purports
— namely, that the same man is both false and true - depends throughout upon the failure to

to

establish

dissociate

dunamis

that this

their ordinary sense."

-

concepts from tropes - concepts."
^^Weiss (1981, p. 289) notes, in response to Mulhern, that Socrates accepts and uses pseudes in its
dunamis sense after 366b. Therefore, she concludes, "the assumption that edafhes and pseudes revert to
their tropes sense in the conclusion is not supported by the text, but seems to be based on nothing more than
is

She then notes

that

when

paradox of the conclusion vanishes.
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the words are read in their

dunamis sense the

[airopcov] as to

u hich

rm
of these

confused

two men was represented as better bv
thinking that both were "best
and bravest" andrtat it's hard to
discern wh“h is
better, with regard both to
lying and to truth, and to
virtue fdpetficl as well- f
^
m this also the two are quite similar. (370de)
Here, for the

first

time,

is

explicitly put forward as a
criterion for determining

the better man. While Hippias
seems to have had 3rete in mind

is

comments confirm the suspicion
truthfulness

men

that he

which he spoke of as

all

was somehow separating

abilities.

He now

which

along. Socrates'

from lying and

claims that in 3wte as well, the
two

are similar.

Hippias' reply reflects his continuing
frustration:
That's because

you don't look at it right, Socrates. When
Achilles lies, he's
portrayed as lying not on purpose but
involuntarily, forced to stay and help by
the
misfortune of the army. But the lies of
Odysseus are voluntaiy and on purpose

By

introducing the issue of voluntariness to the
argument, Hippias confirms that his

concern

is

Until he

makes a

with a moral rather than a technical comparison
of Achilles and Odysseus.
clear distinction

between techne and

arete,

voluntariness does not resolve his confusion about
agathos.

however, the addition of
Socrates points out

(371a-d) that Achilles said different things to different
people and even contradicted
himself in front of Odysseus, then asks Hippias whether
this

is

not purposeful:

It doesn t seem that way to me, Socrates.
Rather in these things, too, it was
because of his guilelessness^® that he was led to say something
different to Aias

Hip..

"This

IS

not easily

done according to Grube (1980, p. 217): 'The Greeks always tended to
identify the
word arete was used to indicate both a particular excellence and virtue in

useful and the good, and the
.

.

IS

.

Hence

general

the Socratic formula arose

a matter of knowledge' and then

Smith (1996,

n. 12) notes:

in

a perfectly natural way;

meaning was:

be good
"
a matter of knowledge'.

its first

'to

at

something

came to mean to be good is
"Two of the three surviving manuscripts of the Hippias Minor have the
"simplicity") here. The Oxford Classical Text (J. Burnet, ed.) follows the

it

’

word euetheias ("guileessness" or
other surviving manusenpt in printing eunoias ("goodwill or kindness").
I have departed from the Oxford
Classical text here, for it seems clear that Achilles vacillates so publicly only
because he is guileless. And
dispute between Hippias and Socrates is not about whether or not Achilles
whether or not he is straightforward and without guile."
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is

a

man

of goodwill

-

it

is

the

about

and

to Odysseus. But

when he

when Odysseus

tells

the same. (371de)

lies, it's

the truth, he always has a
purpose, and

Again, Hippias' explanation of h.s
tnterpre.ation shows that he

onto an ambiguous word. There

is

a clear distinction

The moral value

may be endearing

but

Soc.:

of honesty

forctng moral

meaning

between innocence and

incompetence. Being guileless or simple
hardly seemsa good
the better man.

is

depends on

its

criterion for proving Achilles

ends

-

on

principles. Naivete

a dubious virtue, as Socrates observes;

it is

Then

it

seems that Odysseus

Hip.:

Not

Soc.;^

Why not?

better [d^eivcov] than Achilles after

is

at all, surely, Socrates.

Didn't

it

emerge just

better [Pe5\.xio\)(;] than the involuntary
ones?
Hip.: But Socrates, how could those

now that

who

the voluntary

liars are

are voluntarily unjust,

voluntary and purposeful evildoers be better
[paxiot)q] than those
way involuntarily? (371e - 372a)

and

who act

are

that

This passage contains a subtle change in terminology
that suggests a further move

toward the moral realm.

ameinon

to

mean

Up to and

including this statement at 371e, Socrates has used

"better."^’ In his next

also a comparative of agathos

meaning

sentence he uses beltion [peXxicov] which
"better,"

is

but which generally has a moral

connotation. From this point on, ameinon and beJtion are
used interchangeably which
further confuses the moral
a point

drawn

about voluntary

and non-moral senses of agathos.

liars

By

using bettion to

make

being better than involuntaiy ones, Socrates seems to be

into the confusion as well.

To me,

Hippias, it appears entirely the opposite to what you say: those who harm
people and commit injustice and lie and cheat and go wrong voluntarily, rather

than involuntarily, are better [(3e>vXlo\)(;] than those who do so involuntarily.
However, sometimes I believe the opposite and I go back and forth about all this
"This was tracked and noted by Hoerber (1962,

p.

-

127)

"Hoerber (1962, p. 127) tracks the uses of comparatives awa/ion and heJt/on in the Hippias Minor
and suggests that one who errs willingly may be amanon (i.e. superior in craft, science or physical skills) but
not be/tion (i.e. in the realm of ethics); Hoerber concludes that it would be hard to prove that Plato had such a
distinction in mind, however.

141

plainly because

don't

I

er

know. But now

who do so

than those
‘"''“Ittntanly are

(372<S^
Socrates

is

confused because

he's

at this

moment

involuntarily.

a

I

fit

of lightheadedness has

blame the precedine

fhSe tho

more worthless than those who do
them

now making the same

voluntarily.

mistake Hippias made.

mixing the idea of morally better (indicated
by his use of Ae/tjas

)

preceding arguments, which focused on
technical competence and

He

is

with the results of the
left

out moral issues.

Socrates goes on to mix moral language with
technical examples in his argument
for the superiority of voluntariness

activities

374e).

-

The examples he uses

ate physical

such as running, wrestling, seeing, walking,
steering ships and playing musical

instruments, but the adjectives

example, at 373d,
while one

(373c

who

it

is

and adverbs applied have

agreed that one

who

runs quickly runs well and

clear moral overtones. For

runs slowly tuns badly and

is

a

is

a

bad runner,

good runner. The words used to describe

the running and the runner, forms of agathos and
kakos, are also used to describe the

moral nature of man.“ So when Socrates adds the even
mote moralistic words aischron
[aictxpov, shameful] and poneros [jcovqpot;, worthless,
morally bad, villainous] to
describe slow runner and his performance in a race at 373de,

it

becomes very confusing:

Soc.: So the good [cxyocGot^] runner voluntarily accomplishes
this bad
[KaKOv] and shameful [aiaxpov] thing, and the bad runner, involuntarily?
Hip.: So it seems at least.

one who accomplishes bad things [KaKOc]
more worthless [TCOVT^poxepOi;]^^ than one who does them

Soc.: In a race, then

involuntarily

is

,

voluntarily. (373e)

These are statements that

clearly

mean one

senses and something completely different

thing

if

if

the terms are taken in their moral

the terms are taken in their technical senses.

A

more appropriate comparative for physical supenority might be kwittan. Hoerber ( 1 962,
notes that Hippias misuses this word to refer to his Olympic success in non-physical competition.
“ Ponaros

is

also used in a

noun form

to indicate "villainy " at 368e5.
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p.

1

27)

It IS

instructive that Socrates here gives

body, since .snefe

is

examples of physical prowess, or
excellences of the

an excellence of the soul. Socrates
accentuates the contrast

at

374ab:

What about

in other physical activities?
Isn't the physically better
[pAtiaivl
person able to accomplish [Sbvaxai]
both sorts of things:

the strong

and

the

weak, the shameful [aicrxpot] and the
fine [ko^xx]? So whenever he
accomplishes worthless [jcovtipot] physical
results, the one who is physically
better [Pe>-Xltov] does them voluntarily,
whereas the one who is worse
[7COVT)6repO(;] does them involuntarily?
(374a
b)

The discussion then
that having voice, feet,

things

is

from physical activities to bodily organs and

shifts

and eyes which allow one

better than having organs

it is

agreed

to voluntarily accomplish worthless

which involuntarily function poorly (374d). From

bodily tools, the conversation then shifts to
practical tools such as boat rudders, bows,
lyres,

and

flutes,

and

it

is

agreed that the best sorts of these, too, are those that
allow

voluntary error rather than those that cause involuntary
blunders. Significantly,

examples pertain to
scope

is

activities of the

body

rather than those of the soul.

section are decidedly non-moral.

They

may be performed

and the

considered in this

are not the things of greatest importance that the

craftsmen mistakenly claim as part of their repertoire.
lyre playing,

activities

these

such, their

limited to the technical realm. Despite the moralistic
language used

popular importance of athletic and technical success, the

activity.

As

all

Technai,

including running and

well or poorly independent of the moral value of the

Accordingly, these arguments, like the

first,

are

sound only

if

interpreted from a

purely technical point of view.

13 A The Argument
At 375a there

Applied to the Soul
is

a subtle but significant

move from

the world of the physical to the

world of the soul. Socrates takes up the case of a horse which
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is

both a tool and an

ensouled bamg. Here
a better tool

we

and so with

“

Soc..

learn ,ha. the horse's soul

all

and not

,ts

physical qualities ntakes

i,

other animals:

With the

better horse's soul, then,

one would voluntarily do the

-

Lrii^^

wo’uid

do

Hip.: Certainly. (375a)

The
The

transition has here

better soul belongs to the beast at
this point, presumably because

good
that

been made to the idea that a better soul
makes

the extent to which

IS

temperament

is

it

human

-

soul

master.

may

lot of heart."

for

Modem tendencies to

prevent us from seeing Socrates' point here, but

are the ar^t3i of

its

soul.

\We are

and the moral dimension of what makes

At 375bc the argument

a beast

Anyone who works with animals knows

mannered, and "have a

qualities to animals

what makes a good animal
of the

its

what makes

more important than physical strength and
hence they look

animals that are willing, well

deny psychic

obeys

for voluntary acts.

finally takes

up the

a

now

inching into the realm

human

issue of the

being good.

human

soul explicitly.

established that craftsmen, such as archers and doctors,
have better souls

allow them to voluntarily act correctly or incorrectly in their

if

It is

those souls

craft

Soc.: As to the soul that plays the lyre and the flute better
and does
everything else better in the crafts and the sciences -- doesn't it
accomplish bad
and shameful things and miss the mark voluntarily whereas the more worthless
does this involuntarily?

Hipp.: Apparently. (375bc)

Now this apparent goodness of soul

is

only beneficial to the craftsman qua craftsman;

does not determine the moral intention behind the technical
Socrates

is

talking about a

good human soul

here, he
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still

activity.

So although

has not reached what he

it

considers the important aspect of the
soul:

be sound, remains on the technical

When
one

in

its

moral dimension. The argument,

to

level.^^

Socrates proceeds to conclude that the
best condition for our

which we voluntarily

if i, is

own

souls

act badly (375cd), Hippias balks
precisely because he

is

is

thinking of moral and not technical activity;

rn o

Would we
,

not wish to possess our

own

soul in the best

[peATiaXTiv] condition?
Hip.:

Yes

Soc.: So will it be better [PeXticov]
the mark voluntarily or involuntarily?

if it

acts badly

[KaKOupyfi] and misses

Hip.: But it would be terrible [5eiv6v],
Socrates, if those who commit
injustice [o5iKO\)Vxe<;] voluntarily are to be
better [(3eXxio\)c] than those who
it involuntarily!
Soc.:

But nonetheless they appear

do

to be, at least given what's been said.

(375cd)

Hippias finally puts his cards on the table here and makes
the move from

Whereas Socrates uses

a relatively generic term derived from

Hippias jumps to a form of adikos
Justice

is

[otbiKOi^, unjust]

perhaps the supreme form of arete

kakos

which has

for acting badly,

a definite moral tone.

in the Socratic/Platonic

scheme.

Socrates picks up Hippias' 'injustice' and runs through the argument with

noting that justice

is

a sort of

with the other technai
about.

power or knowledge,

like the lying, running,

or both (375d),

and geometry

craft to morality.

it.

He

begins by

which connects

justice

that they have been talking

This short argument concludes that:

Whenever [the soul] accomplishes shameful [aiaxpd] results, it
does so voluntarily, by power [bbvapiv] and craft [xexvTiv], and these things
Soc.:

appear to be attributes of justice, either both or one of them.
Hip.:

So

it

seems.

"in fact, the argument merely parallels the earlier argument about lying. Says Mulhem (1968): 'The
two senses of "voluntary" correspond exactly to the two senses distinguished above for each of po/utwpos,
pseudes, and dunatos //. When "voluntary" is taken to indicate what is in our power, it is used of a duna/ms
concept; when it is taken to indicate what we [normallyl wish or desire, it is used of a tropos concept."
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Soc.:

to

And

do something

to

do

injustice

is

to

do bad, whereas

to refrain from injustice

is

fine [koaoc].

Hip.: Yes.
Soc.t

So the more powerful [5vvaT(0T^a]
and

better [dpcivcovl soul

worthless [trovnpoc] soul

mvoluntarilyr''*'"'"’
Hip.: Apparently. (376a)

This argument depends on the conditions
stated at 375de that justice be a
power
(

dunarms

)

or

knowledge

(

episteme

),

or both.

But these words were

as qualities belonging to a practitioner of
a techne.

It

was Hippias

into the argument arriving at a conception
of justice as a

allows a soul to commit injustice voluntarily

-

as with

earlier

considered

that inserted justice

dunamis and techne

any other

craft.

that

This argument

takes another step toward unacceptability by
further confusing arete and techne.

doing of justice

is

certain acts, there

3.3.5

construed purely in
is still

no

its

the

technical sense as the ability to accomplish

conflict.

The Good Man
At 375b, Socrates makes the

radical shift from talking about crafts

the soul to the indisputably moral topic of the good man.

man

If

is

one

who

has a good soul and the bad

He

man one who

that doing injustice

is

bad

man does
-

it

involuntarily.

But

voluntary or not. So there

is

it

establishes that the

of

good

has a bad soul. Applying the

previous argument to this premise, he concludes that the good
voluntarily while the bad

and powers

man

was

does injustice

just established at

a clear conflict picked

376a

up by

Hippias and Socrates which disallows them from accepting the conclusion:

So the one who voluntarily misses the mark and does what is shameful and unjust,
Hippias -- that is, if there is such a person — would be no other than the good man.
(376b)
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There

is

much

speculat.on about

Hippias and to what extent.
are

m a genuine

aporia.

why this ccnclus.on

is

unpalatable to Socrates and

Some commentators have concluded

that Plato

This conclusion requires that Socrates
agree with

and Socrates

all

the

premises including the technical description
of the good man^' and the equivalence
of

techne and

arete.

The phrase

"if

there

is

such a person," however, suggests an

personally dissociate himself from the conclusion.^^

It is

effort

by Socrates

to

plausible that Socrates does not

agree with one or more of the premises, most
of which were suggested conditionally or
as
articulations of Hippias' position.

distinguish arete,

which he

power independent from

wisdom

or phronesis

and

or episteme

its

have been suggesting that Socrates wants to

sees as a moral quality, from techne,

morality.

and

I

its

I

which he

sees as a

take the fact that Aristotle clearly distinguishes moral

corresponding product praxis

from technical knowledge

product poesis at Nichomachean Ethics 1140b3-7 as evidence
that

he understood the Hippias Minor

's

educational lesson.^®

Indeed the argument

at

Weiss (1981,

p. 304) argues that: " Ho Agathos of the Hippias Minor is thus not the
standard
judged on the ba.sis of his actions. Since the agent in this dialogue is judged solely on
the basis
of his skill, things may be said with impunity about this man that could
not be said so freely about the ordinary
iio agathos.
We need only bear in mind that ho agathos here is 'the man skilled at justice’ - not the 'just
man.” Note that saying a man may be skilled at justice assumes justice is a techne.
“ Kraut ( 1 984, p. 3 1
3), for example, takes Socrates' dilemma at the end of the Hippias Minor to be
genuine because he attributes an equivalence between virtues and crafts to Socrates which implies that
the
voluntary wrongdoer in virtue must be better, just as the voluntary’ wrongdoer in archery is. Irwin
(1995, p. 70)

agathos

who

is

Socratic psychological eudaemonism makes it easy to believe that the logical possibility raised by the
Hippias Minor creates no difficulty for the identification of virtue with craft.
then the point of the Hippias
Minor is not to cast doubt on the identification of virtue with crafts, but to show that we must accept

says:

.

psychological eudaemonism.

.

”

‘"Hoerber (1962, p. 128) identifies this phrase ciper tis cstin otitos as a warning Plato uses to show
personal disagreement with the premises being discussed. Other uses of the phrase include Euthyphro 7d, 8e
and Gordias 480e.

Hoerber (1962, p. 127, n. I) notes that Play employs poiein and ergazesthai in Hippias Minor,
avoiding pratteih throughout. These verbs are distinguished at Charmidos (162a, 163e-d in order to
)
differentiate tcchnai

and

Contrast Irwin
Aristotle

when

thinks virtue

is

( 1

ethics. This suggests that Socrates doesn’t think he's discussing ethics in Hi. Mi.

995,

p.

71

)

who

says that Socrates has a chance to

Critias distinguishes poeiosis

and praxis

a techne. Irwin takes Aristotle’s comments

at

at

make a

Channides 163a

-

c,

Nicowachean Ethics 1 140b21 (quoted above)
wisdom in he sees Hippias

as criticism of Socrates' failure to distinguish productive knowledge from practical

Minor and Charniides

as errors on Plato’s part.
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distinction similar to

but he doesn't because he

;

Gojgi^s 460c

ff„

which

Hippies Minor 366c

parallels

the basis of the premise that justice
Justice, at least as Socrates

is

ff„ lacks

soundness precisely on

a techne.

and Plato normally describe

it,

does not allow the

cntenon, denved from the nature of techne,
of voluntaiy incompetence.

techne allows

own

for his

practitioners to produce contrary results,
as Aristotle noticed,'" justice

its

A doctor may purposely misdiagnose an ailment or perform

does not.

financial gain

Minor conclusion

and he would

still

man who

stated that the

good at the doing

is

The

actions.

technical

is

some other

is

But while medicine

no

common

or analogous to a techne,

a

their

and goals behind the

for personal gain.

The

a key point about the relationship between arete

and

is

quite different, however.

for Plato's educational project. In the first place, arete

techne,

is

different, in terms of

than the self-serving removal of a healthy appendix

The Hippias Minor makes

man

must mean being

what makes those actions and hence

an inflamed appendix

relative justice of the tu'o surgeries

techne

It

principle that determines the intention

lifesaving removal of

skill,

just,

The Hippiss

voluntarily unjust must be the good

of just (and therefore also unjust) things.

techne and a doctor's actions are often

unnecessaiy surgery

be practicing his techne. "

(376b), but being good in this sense can't be the same
as being just.

practitioner just

While a

may be

a species of

but there are crucial differences between arete and

technai such as medicine, running, and ship-building. At the minimum, a

person with arete does not do unjust or morally shameful things voluntarily whereas
practitioners of technai

may

skillfully

apply their technai to misdeeds. Socrates' famous

was noticed by Santas (1979, p. 152); Justice
Nicowachean Ethics 1 129a6 - 17, quoted above.

**This

Contrast Tiles

( 1

984,

p.

53)

who

is

argues that a doctor

financial gain is not, in Plato's view, acting as a doctor.

I

compared

to techne at

who does unnecessary

Gorgjas 464b
surgery for his

-

466a.

own

think that Plato recognizes that the doctor’s medical

techne does not affect the moral aspect of his action, but you can hardly say that in doing surgery, necessary or
is not using his medical skill. Plato’s point is that the moral element present in the intention
behind the action is separate from the technical skill and must be developed separately.
not, the doctor
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dem^lo!

then, might be the only distinction
between

to avoid the

IS

at stake,

A corollaiy to Socrates’ denial of

however.

intimately connected to knowledge

is

We know from

ignorance.^^

Ion 536e

separate bodies of knowledge.

-

in

541a that

Chapter 4) arete requires a knowledge of good and

performance

in

and poetic
develop

s

skill.

his belief

done out

of

and involve

then, will be

By all

counts (as

I

Whereas technical

evil.

does not automatically imply
in

it.

educational point in Ion and Hippias Minor

training, rather

arete.

to arete,

is

accordance with that knowledge, knowing the good does
imply acting

accordance with
Plato

will heal a patient,

is

are separate

The knowledge corresponding

knowledge, such as knowing what

akrasia

and so wrongdoing

separate from the knowledge corresponding to
any particular

show

needed

Hippias Minor's troublesome conclusion/^

More
that arete

and

But having a

as Hippias does (368b)

- does

knowing Homer allows Ion
by learning technical

not to eliminate practical

such training must be accompanied by a separate

Practical technai,

service of the good.

is

practical techne

-

arete,

Athens

will

be put

in the

indeed having a boatload of them

not guarantee the just use of such

to lead

skills or

when accompanied by

effort to

skill

anymore than

Arete cannot be acquired simply

into battle.

by memorizing words. From the poets and the

sophists,

then, a student might learn skills that yield popular approval and political and financial
success.

Money can't buy

confusing

literary

and

arete,

however, and anyone

who

offers

it

for sale is

mistakenly

practical skill with moral excellence.

'^Guthrie (1975, p. 198) concludes that the Hippias Minor

Socratic denial of akrasia. See also Penner (1973a, p. 135)

necessary for understanding

how

is

a reductio argument defending the

who concludes

that Socrates' denial of akrasia

virtue can be a techne.

"See, (or example Gorgias 460b-d, 509e and Protagoras 345c, 360d.
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is

CHAPTER 4

A NEW VIEW OF ARETE

IN C/MRAfTDES

AND LACHES

When my sons are grown,

Gentlemen, exact a penalty of them; give
pain to them
gave pain to you, if it seems to you that
they care more for wealth or
anything thari they care for virtue. And if
they seem to be something and are
^ rebuked you, because they
”
do not care for what they
U
themselves something and are worth nothing.
And
should you do that, both I and my sons will
have been justly dealt with at your
^
hands. (
41e- 42a)
exactly as

It is

forget

I

telling that Socrates

wanted

his sons to pursue only aicte

about appearances, and to abandon complacency

inquiry and examination might achieve that end.

- and that

As I argued

in

[dpexfl, virtue], to

he thought his style of

Chapter

1

,

awte was

the traditional goal of education in ancient Greece
and Plato accepted that goal. His

conception of what arete was and

how it

could be achieved differed significantly from

the tradition, however, and in Charmides and Laches
these differences boldly emerge.

Having established

in

Hippias Minor the difference between being good and being good

at something, Plato here shows
glory, success,

how true

and popular esteem

distinguish arete from

its

arete must be distinguished from the fame,

traditionally associated with virtue.

mere appearance leads Plato to

The

drive to

intellectualize, unify,

and

ultimately to idealize the quality as a kind of health of the soul. This revised
conception,
in turn,

4.1

demands a novel approach

to education.

Resh aping Conceptions of Arete
In the

in

Charmides and Laches

Charmides and Laches, Plato challenges

inward instead of outward

in its

seach for arete.

traditional education to look

The various

interlocutors,

who

here

represent traditional conceptions of arete, tend to confuse the appearance of or

reputation for arete with

its

actual presence in a person's soul.
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The kaion [to KOt^v,

beauty] associated with the handsome youth
Charmides, for example,
his physical appearance, breeding,
his soul.

It is

and

social

manners than on some

the connection between arete and to kaJon,
agreed

based more on

is

intrinsic quality of

upon by

allows Socrates to reveal arete as an invisible
quality of the soul. Arete

by the approval and honors of ones

4J..1

Looking

for Arete

i

each of

whom

Some

of both

criticize traditional

of Plato’s strongest tools in this criticism are his characters,

a dramatic prophecy of collapse. Plato

and

is critical

exhibits

its

flaws as well as his

not only of the

in the dialectic, but also of their personal

revising definitions. Laches, Nicias, Charmides,
Plato's

confirmed not

by the divine judgment of the gods.

Laches and Charmides

represents a particular tradition

approach and perform

that

n All the Wrong Places

The opening sections
conceptions of arete.

peers, but

is

all,

most famous interlocutors and he

flaws revealed by Socrates' examination.

and

way these
methods

Whether

in

characters

for gaining

Critias are, in addition,

ties their future failures in life to

own

some

and

of

the character

or not these meetings or conversations

ever took place, the reality of their possibility cannot help but enhance Plato's point.
Critias

and Charmides'

terrible future as

members

of the Thirty Tyrants

have been known to Plato's original audience and hangs heavy over

would

their discussion of

temperance. The traditionally aristocratic tendency to preserve appearance and
reputation above

all,

deters Critias

required to cultivate arete.

and Charmides from the kind of soul-baring inquiry

Charmides,

allegedly possesses, thinks only of

in his attempts to define the

how others

sophrosune he

see him. Critias proposes definitions he

thinks that Socrates will praise, rather than accounts he takes to heart.

whether Socrates agrees with

his proposal, Socrates
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reminds him:

When

Critias asks

.we are not investigating what

.

.

I

think but rather what you

now

say. (163e)‘

Likewise in the Uches. Nicias
commences his examination by offering
what he
takes to be Socrates'

own definition

(194d); this after Lysimachus opened
the dialogue by

deriding such behavior:

Now there are some
^

u
would
Laches

1

who make

fun our frankness and

if

^ ®hot at

‘

hear and say something different
from their

own

anyone asks their
what the other man

opinion. (178ab)

the best of the interlocutors at giving
his true opinion, a reflection
perhaps of his

is

courage

’u
like
to

people

m inquiry.

Once

refuted, however, he

is

seized by the desire for victory and

scrambles belligerently to avoid losing face
in front of Nicias and the others
(194ab).

A popular way to preserve one's reputation in a discussion with
dissociate oneself from the propositions
he refutes. This
refute

commonly-held

but

also

It

Socrates

phenomenon allows

is

to

Socrates to

or traditional opinions in the course of
examining a single person,

shows the ancient Greeks'

acquired through poetry,

inability to separate their

own

views from those

literature, or sophistic indoctrination (see
sec. 1.2.1).

At 156a,

Socrates asks Charmides whether he will take his
advice with or without permission.

"With

it,

of course," Charmides replies, laughing. But
Charmides' friend, Critias, turns out

to be a regular idea-pirate.

When

Critias betrays himself as

source by saying.

its

Charmides mocks

Critias

with a definition's

failure,

Do you suppose, Charmides, that just because you don't understand what in the
world the man meant who said that temperance was 'minding your own business',
the

man

himself doesn't understand either? (162d)

These words are soon proven to be hypocritical when
definition

Critias himself fails to explain this

and others he borrowed from Hesiod and the

'All translations of

inscription at Delphi. Laches'

CJiamudes and Laches are by Sprague (1992) unless otherwise noted.
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first

definition, likewise,

was borrowed from

The problem with

this system of

poetic education

-

make an opinion

truly one's

answem

and

Nicias' ideas

come from

Socrates

Damon by way of Prodicus (197d).

(194d) and

for

poetiy,

is

tha,

i,

fails to

own.

borrowed wisdom

demand

-

which was a hallmark of

the evaluation and renect.on
necessaiy ,o

-^ocrates asks his interlocutors
to look inside themselves

(159a, 160d), or at least to thoroughly
question any opinions they acquire

from so-called experts. Therefore,
he challenges Nicias' pack

rat

approach to knowledge,

which involves picking up ideas from various
wisemen and adopting them without
question or reflection. Socrates

is

so annoyed by Nicias' unquestioning
acceptance of

ideas that he asks directly whether
Nicias has

any views of

Do you agree with this or have
agree with this one. (198c)

Socrates: ...
Nicias:

I

Nicias' docility

It

others, but

This criticism

knowledge turns out to be
reliance

on

seers

man (^Apology

a

t5rpically

you never take a good look

profitably turned back

is

you some other view on the subject?

21e)

Socrates' insistence

- but

it

on

won't help him

Nicias accuses Laches of an external focus at
200b:

me that you're behaving in

strikes

own:

may make him popular - remember that

examination and inquiry made him a hated
to achieve anete.

his

was

human way ~ you keep an

at yourself.

on Nicias

eye on
(200b, Watt translation)

himself. Reliance

on

external sources for

Nicias' critical failing, historically as well as in the dialogue;
his

a notorious cause of his downfall at Sicily.^

Once

Nicias has

distinguished knowledge of the fearful and hopeful from technical knowledge,
Socrates

asks Laches whether he understands. Laches replies prophetically:

Yes

I

do

whom

"

it is

being a

he

is

calling the seers the courageous.

better to live than to die?

seer, or,

^See Thucididcs

(vii,

if

you

Because

What about

who else

you, Nicias

--

will

know

do you admit

are not a seer, to not being courageous? (19 5e)

50); this point noted by

Sprague (1992,
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n.

57) and Devereux (1977,

p. 134).

for

to

Laches' shortcomings in the
dialogue

reflect his

personal shoncomings as
well.

Recall that Laches counted the
.mntensity of the odds to be
faced rather than the nob.lity
of the goal in judging the
courage exhibited in action. His
eventual death on the
battlefield at

Mantinaea was no doubt atfnbutable
to that

"courage" Laches shows in inquirj-

is

sort of courage. Similarly,
the

based not on the desire

lor truth, or the

good, or for

3rete as Socrates hopes, but
rather "an absolute desire for
victory [<paoviKta]”(194a).
Predictably, Laches becomes
combative in the argument
sees

hope

little

for victory over Nicias(197e).

in the retreat

Socrates emerges the more andteios
again.

Plato’s criticism of the aristocratic,
poetic, military,

Laches and Charmides can be generalized

appearance of arete with
that arete

was

its

It is

as an accusation of confusing the

skill

And the

how it

By

is

The

didn't always

was more

that wins hollow prizes such as wealth, esteem,

traditional approaches to education.

revising the idea of

man fame

sophists learned that there

elections. This indictment of traditional conceptions
of arete

to

and

also an indictment of

revising the popular idea of

what arete

is,

Plato

might be achieved through education.

Lest this effort to keep

it

attitudes toward

presence in a person or action. The aristocrats
failed to see

represent his most admirable choices.

interlocutors,

it.

neither transmitted genetically nor manifested
in a man's beauty.

arete than the technical

in the

Socrates' revised

and sophistic

poets and warriors failed to see that the actions
that brought a

is

when he

from Delium. Here

conception of arete that accounts for his
continuous display of

arete in

disinterested

At Symposium 221ab, Alcibiades

compares Socrates' andmiu favorably
to Laches'
pursuit of arete.

and then

up appearances seem outrageously hollow behavior

for the

should be remembered that most Ancient Greeks would have considered

Laches' battlefield valor, Charmides physical beauty, Lysimachus' wealth,
Melesias'
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athletic skill

a

and

combmation

Critias' political

promtnence to be

real signs of

of factors including the
aristocratic tradition,

Athens’ dependence on the
military for

This was due to

democatic

sumval.^ -ftere was

rts

’

little

or

reforms,

no

and

distinction

between a public reputation of .ne/c
and some internal quality that
produces virtuous
behavior.

Accordingly, traditional education
focused on the military,

rhetorical skills that cultivated
the reputation for a^,e.

By
reality

the time he wrote the Republic,

Plato was

political,

and

rather than the soul.

still

fighting the battle

between

and appearance:

tehew tThe
belreve
to be so, even

rf

they aren't really

so,

and they

act, acquire,

"hat they
and form xheit

satisfied to acquire things he merely
believes
to be to'
good, however, but everyone wants
the things that really
good and
drsdarns those that are merely believed
to be so.

uk

(Grube translation, 505d)

One need

not look further than

and Plato thought the

Examining the

4,1.2

In chapter 1,

tradition

and Chumides, however, to see where
Socrates
wrong and

set

out to revise

Arist ocratic Ideal of

1

good].

Charm,

in

explained the aristocratic belief that arete

that manifests itself in a man's physical
beauty.

[KO^oq, beautiful or

it.

fine],

An

but kaJos tekagathos

Ka/os and kagatkos

are

words

aristocratic

is

a product of breeding

man was

[KoXoq xe KayaGo^,

specifically

not just kalos

beautiful

connected with

and

They were

even combined to form a single word, kaJokagathia
[KoXomyaGia] which described a

man who was both good

to look at

and manifested

his

goodness

in action.^

^Sce Sprague's (1992) character descriptions.
'For more on these issues see sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 above, and Dover,
(1974,
continued existence of a Greek city-state depended ultimately on the

military qualities of

.

.

It is

not surprising, therefore, that an archaic

confined

itself to

tactics, organization,
^

Lysis

is

mode

of indicating that a

two aspects
and

man was

of his character, his valor on the battlefield and his
other matters relevant to war).”

said to be such at Lysis 207a.

^Sec Dover, (1974,

p. 41).
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all

p. 161):
its

that a

wisdom

The

in

"The

adult male citizens.

man

should be

discussion (sc. of

anstocratic theory that
of the

was transmitted

^j^re

genetically receives a

Uches. however, when Lysimachus
laments

inherit the

of their fathers (179a

ff.).'

that he

blow

at the

and Melesias have

In the Charmidcs.

opening

failed to

however, Charmides’

beauty and breeding are taken to
be indicators of his amte:

his
hrs

contemporanes rn beauty of form but also in
you have the charm; it was temperance,
wasn't

Charmides not only outstrips
this very thing for which you
sot

it?"

"Yes, indeed

was,"

it

I

said.

fU most
the
temperate young man of the day, but that
he
everything else appropriate to his age."

reputation of being
is

second to none

in

Charmides, that you should be superior to the
rest in
I don't suppose that anyone
else here could so
readily point to two Athenian families
whose union would be more likely to
produce a more aristocratic lineage than that from
which you are sprung. Your
ather's family, that of Critias, the son
of Dropides, has been praised for us by
II
all

such things,

T
I

replied, "because

Anacreon,, Solon, and

many other

else called happiness.

It's

poets for superior beauty, virtue, and eveiything
the same on your mother's side. ." (157d 158a)
.

Whereas

Critias takes

Charmides' "reputation" for sophrosune [aco(ppoa\)VTi,

temperance, self-control]

-a

form of arete

- as clear evidence for his

possession of

it,

Socrates description of Charmides' uncle's "reputation"
for aiete makes no such leap.

For while Socrates admits that Charmides has inherited
physical beauty, he adds:

But

if,

you have a sufficient share of temperance and the other
mentioned by your friend here, then your mother bore a blessed son
dear Charmides. (158ab, italics mine)

in addition,

attributes

you,

my

The dialogue

will

show that Charmides indeed may have the kind

identified with a reputation for

it,

if

sophrosune

Charmides he won't need to be "charmed" by Socrates, but
is

very

much

in

sophmsune

but he has not inherited the intrinsic sophrosune

Socrates cares about. At 158bc, Socrates asserts that

that he

of

in

at

is

present in

176b, Charmides admits

need of that charm.

'Sec also Protagoras 319e where famous fathers have
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failed to

pass their arete to their sons.

Charmides' response to Socrates'
question about whether he
thinks himself
temperate shows straight

away that he

ts

most concerned about appearances
and the

judgments of others:

with the

many

others to

appear
apjL?dttestfut
distasteful. So
It

I

whom, by

his account,

d“ 't?'
“hhow I am
don
t know

I

appear to be tempemt;

to answer. (158d)

looks as though Charmides habitually
offers whatever answer

Now he’s in a pickle because he doesn't want to

BuHf

is

most pleasing to othem.

contradict those to

whom

he appears

temperate and doesn't want to appear
immodest by praising himself. Charmides
looks

around

at the others in deliberating
his answer, rather

than looking inside himself,

Socrates therefore exhorts Charmides to
look inside for sopAjvsune and after
initially

shying

away he

reluctantly defines

it

as quietness (159b)

commentatois have recognized as traditionally
agreement that sophrosune

is

aristocratic.*

-a

definition

Having secured the boy’s

ksjos (159c), Socrates proceeds to apply
Charmides'

definition of quietness to various physical
activities such as writing, boxing,

to

show

(159d).

that such bodily things are actually less
kalos

The argument then

progresses toward the soul

when done
and mental

and running,

quietly or slowly

activity,

with Socrates

concluding:

And,

further, in the operations of

quietest

who
and

man,

I

appears to

thought and in making plans, it is not the
and the man who plans and finds things out with difficulty
be worthy of praise but the one who does these things most easily

think,

quickly. (160ab)

See North (1966 p. 156), who calls Charmides and Critias' definitions "the four traditional
See also Watt (1987, p.l83), and Santas (1973, p. 107), who concludes: "Plato is clearly taking
on
a venerable tradition and trying to show, as he does in many early dialogues, that the
traditional definitions of
,

definitions."

the virtues are inadequate."
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Bu,
fact

is

the

man who

to be t^los.

and

therefore praiseworthy,
always
/s in

worthy of praised Charmtdes.
react.on to the conCus.on
that cu.chness

admtrable than quietness
choice of term here
implies danger

is

is:

telling

and indeed

[..vboveuet,

because

there

ts

W.../

also

means

it

ts

more

seems so](160b). Plato's

to run a risk or hazard:

danger in what Channides
agrees

to.

it

In "decid.ng” that

quickness makes an action
admirable. Charmides and
Socrates admit that the
external
appearance of an action reveals
its worth or beauty
( tok.Ion ). Socrates’ admonition
at

160b that the conclusion applies
only

"as far as this

aigument

is

concerned" hints that

they might do better to
begin again with another
definition of sophnx,une.

Again, he

exhorts Charmides to "look
inside yourself with greater
concentration" (160d), but

Charmides' next definition, that
of modesty,
peers. Again,

anete

it

fails

is

also based

upon the perceptions of his

to transcend the aristocratic
identity between the reputation
for

and the actual possession of

The focus then switches

it.

to Critias

with the next definition for
sophrosune

,

who, though he denies

it,

supplies Charmides

minding one's own business.

Critias, too, is

more worried about how he appears
before Charmides and the group,
than what he can
learn from Socrates:

Now Cntias had clearly long been champing at
am

himself

up

until then,

and

this

was the

the bit in his eagerness to impress
last straw. I

think

it's

absolutely

heard his

answer about self-control. So Charmides,
who did not want to explain
the answer himself, but to have
Critias do it, kept tiying to provoke
him and
pointing out that he had been refuted.
This was too much for Critias. It appeared
to me as though he had got irritated
with Charmides, just as a poet might do with
an actor who treated his poetiy badly. So
he gave him a look and

what you

said

think,

'Is

that

Charmides? That if
don't know what on earth the man
meant who said that doing one's own job was
self-control, he doesn't know
either?' (Watt translation, 162cd)
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Socrates thus lures Critias into the
argument by exploiting his
reputation.

Though he

own

is

excusable because of his youth, but

the more experienced Critias should
be able to explain the saying.

- which will

in saving his reputation

be examined

in detail

below

-

his pride won't let

But since
of the

him admit

is.

In the ensuing

is

clearly

more interested

He changes

when he

his definition

reaches a state of

it:’

[Critias'] consistently

company and he did

ealing with the question
predicament. (169c)

4«l t3

Critias

than discovering what sophiosune

repeatedly In an effort to avoid Socrates'
objections, and
apon'a,

concern for

doesn't really expect Critias to have
the answer, Socrates adopts a

popular voice and says that Charmides'
ignorance

conversation

aristocratic

Exanuning the Hero c
i

~

I

high reputation made him feel ashamed in
the eyes
not wish to admit to me that he was incapable
of

had asked him, he said nothing

Military Ideal of

Just as the well-born Charmides'

Amt^

in

clear but concealed his

rjirht^f:

definition of

sophiosune

reflected a

traditional aristocratic account, the definition the of
the virtue andieia

[dv5peio,

first

manliness, bravery, courage] offered by the famous general.
Laches, reflects traditional
poetic and military values.

Where Charmides and

behavior and acceptance. Laches

is

Critias

were concerned with social

concerned with military behavior and victory. Laches'

basic failure to differentiate between arete

and

its

external appearance, however,

is

nearly identical to the opening account of Charmides.

Laches, a general renowned for his valor on the battlefield, declares that he has no
difficulty saying

...

if

a

what courage

man

is

is:

willing to remain at his post

and

enemy without running away, then you may

to defend himself against the

rest

assured that he

is

a

man

courage. (190e)

’

Santas (1973,

p.

108) notes; "Critias,

it

seems,

will
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say anything to get out of trouble."

of

Th,s definition

ts

a

fair

paraphrase of the poet Tyrataeus,
a favorite of the Spartans

Laches professes to admire
(182e

At

ff.).

whom

12, 1-18, Tyrateus connects
.r.,.

With battlefield valor, and
specifically with the ability to
stand one's ground. Similarly,
the Iliad, a hero best
proves his arete by standing
firm against the enemy.'"

reputation earned by such
battlefield heroics that counted
as

and reputation

for ara,e

was perhaps the greatest thing

nearly anything to preserve it."

On this traditional

a

one's peers or one's government.
For example, an epigraph

who fell
aaete

at

Potidaea states that "having placed
their

m return."'^

words of

Uches

the

is

have; he

would do

something granted by

commemorating the Athen.ans

onto the scale, they received

Furthermore, those whose battlefield
heroics were preserved in the

a poet achieved a kind of
immortality."

fails to

lives

was

in the poet.c trad.tion

man could

view, a:^re

It

in

Given

distinguish courage from a courageous

all

of this,

man who

it's

not surprising that

has behaved a certain

way

in battle.^^

In addition to

its

poetic inspiration, Laches'

fii^t

definition reflects the importance

of observable heroic actions in determining
arete in a warrior society. Nicias' speech
at

182a

reflects the practical

emphasis on military

skilled soldiers in 5th century Greece.

to the survivalof the state

spmtual courage or by

and so he

is

and the

skill

political

importance of

A man who stands his ground in battle is essential
considered virtuous, whether the act was caused by

his boots being stuck in the

same from the outside and has the same

mud. Either way the

effect for the state. Likewise,

act looks the

it is

only because of

Socrates deeds on the battlefield at Delium, which
Laches experienced firsthand (181b),
that the general

is

willing to talk to

'“Sec Snell (1982, p. 171

"See Beck (1964,

-

him about aiete

:

174).

p. 56).

'^Sce Nchamas (1985, p. 300).
‘“Sec Snell (1982, p. 164).

"A

point noted by Stokes (1986), and Sprague (1992, n. 37).
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Now

have no acquaintance with the
words of Socrates, but before
have had expenence of his deeds,
and there I found him a pemon
p ak fair words and to indulge in eveiy kind
I

now

I

believe

pSLd

of frankness.

So

if

I am in sj^pathy
with the man, and 1 would submit
by such a person with the greatest
pleasure.
(188e -

abi ty too,

.

Since ^rere means excellence, a
man’s proficiency on the battlefield
criterion for his overall excellence
in a warring world. In

Uches emphasizes a

bemrexamtaed

to

189a)

.

ideal of ^rete.

lo

he^possesses this

man's usefulness in

is

a reasonable

accordance with the Homeric
battle, capacity for action,

and

earned reputation over any internal
qualities he might possess.*^

The mistake

that Laches

and the

militaiy-poetic tradition

mistake that Charmides and the aristocratic
tradition
purely external conception of

in battle

is

made - they

limit

is

parallel to the

themselves to a

Before citing a military instructor's failure
in battle

as evidence for his lack of 3/cte,

conduct

make

Laches says outright that

what "makes

it

his obscivation of the man's

possible" to judge his arete (183c).

It is

not

surpnsmg, therefore, that Socrates accommodates
Laches' insistence on action-evidence
his objection to the

Although

retreat.

history has

definition

to be successful in battle.

retreat at

Delium the

himself in a pickle.^*

bring popularity,

it

by pointing out that

city

was not always

See Snell (1982,

“a

others

disaster (181b),

had

Laches

that while quietness might

Under

Socratic examination, both

men

are

of aiete.

All this concern about reputation

it

if

lore,

Laches discovers that boldness may lead to a

kalos,

by their traditional conceptions

talking with Socrates,

would have avoided

Delium was a

hymns and

Having pointed out that

Whereas Charmides learned

reputation for courage by sacrificing victory.
failed

his heroic action at

retreating soldiers are rarely glorified in battlefield

shown them

emulated Socrates'

now finds

first

and appearance not only

deters people from

also leads to an avoidance of apoiia once the conversation has

p. 158).

point not explicit in the text, but noted by

many

161

in

astute readers including Santas (1971, p. 185).

begun. After learning that Lysimachus valued
his friendship with Socrates' father
precisely because they

had never disagreed (180e), Nicias

about Socrates' habit of interrogating men about

compelled to warn him

feels

their personal lives

(187d

ff.).

Being

reduced to aporia in front of an audience can
easily damage a man's reputation.^^
Nicias
thinks that

it is

worth putting up with Socrates' treatment anyway,
and he

mocked by Laches
So

it

summarily

for trying to hide his perplexity:

me

looks to

when

is

as though Nicias

he's talking

is not prepared to be a gentleman
and admit
nonsense: he's twisting and turning to hide the fact that
he's

baffled [ocTCopicxv].

You and

could have twisted in the same way just now if
we were contradicting ourselves. If we were
arguing in court, there'd be some excuse for such behavior, but
when we're having
a friendly conversation like this, why would anyone waste
time dressing himself up
with such
{Laches, Lane translation, 196ab)

we d wanted

Critias, too, refuses to

his prosecutors

I

not to look as though

make

admit his aporia

At Apology 23de Socrates claims that

at 169c.

false accusations precisely in

they are avoiding aporia.

Such

key obstacle to the pursuit of

resistance

an

effort to

"not seem at a loss;" that

shows how overconcem with apperances

is

is,

a

aiete.

4J,4 Craftsmen. Wisemen and the Kalon Connection
In both Charmides
or soul.^®

As

I

showed

and Inches,

later definitions

connect arete with the mind

in chapter 1, Socrates shared his intellectualism with the sophists,

but differed from them sharply on the role of the intellect in aiete.
belief that arete

was

intellectual excellence led

Socrates' account of arete

‘^This

is

is

1

teachability

is

to assert that

it

could be taught,

much more complex. With

were so important; see chapter

sophists'

his

1.

10) notes that in "Socratic and Platonic attempts to define the virtues: there

discernible in the

properties of the soul."

Socrates

its

part of the reason eristic skills

‘“Santas (1973, p.

movement

and

them

Whereas the

list

He also

from definitions
claims (p.

1

in

terms of behavior or conduct to definitions

18) that "in the second round of

examining his own favorite doctrines."

‘“Sec Jaeger (1939, p. 292).

162

\

in

is

terms of

LacJics and Charmides

]

a

examination of intellectualist
definitions of .retc

Ch^rmidcs and Uches. Plato

in

differentiates the doctrines of
rival soph.sts while
exploring the

consequences of Socrates’

views.

At Apology 30ab, Socrates exhorts
people to

care, not for

money or body,

but for

^retc of the soul. Accordingly.
Plato faulted the sophists lor failing
to distinguish .rt-re

from technical

skills

which, though designed to achieve
reputation, wealth, or

success, lacked the absolute
conception of moral

good and

political

evil required lor true

a^te.

Nicias echoes the sophistic connection
between practical skills and arete at
182bc,

he theorizes that instruction in armored
fighting

enhance

hts appearance).

will

make a man courageous (and

There are repeated attempts

highlight the difference between arete

when

Chaimides and laches to

in the

and techne. each

of

which turns on the

requirement that virtuous action be kalos.

When
cases,

Socrates asks Laches to expand his account
of courage to non-militaiy

Laches comes up with a definition of andreia
as endurance (192bc). Socrates

then gets Laches to commit to the principle that
andreia
revise his definition to

phronimos [(ppovipoq,

is

kalos and pushes him to

wise, prudent, thoughtful] endurance

(192d), since foolish endurance could not be kaJos.

Laches proceeds to claim that the

actions of a prudent investor, doctor, or soldier do not
represent andreia, whereas those
of people

who

persevere despite their lack of relevant skills

Santas (1971,
these examples

my own

is

p.

an analysis of the agent's values. To put a

these agents just as he judges soldiers

is

exhibit andieia.

194) noticed rightly that what Laches misses

argument, what Laches misses

inept diver

do

is

in his

similar point in the terms of

the internal criteria for to kalon.

— on the external

somehow more andreios than

judgment of

He judges

appearance of their actions. The

the skilled one because, other things being

163

equal, he faces greater odds.
Bu,

Cher th.ngs

are

..r equal. At 192e, Socrates
asks

whether wise endurance encompasses
knowledge of

Uches only considers

"great

and small" things.^ But

"small" things in h.s judgment
of the examples; he focuses
on the

particular tcchnai of the agents

and ignores the gmater

issue of the nobility of their

goals.^^

At 192cd,
IS

this fact that

pointed out explicitly that andmfa

it is

upon

at 193d. This is

morally different from the investor

who

raises

unskilled diver, to use Santas'
(1971) example,
IS

kahs

because Laches ignores the internal

which the kaJon of the action hinges. The
investor who

child's hfe

a noble or

thing.

It

makes Laches' judgment of the examples
inconsistent with the conception

of and,.ia agreed

is

is

certainly not foolish

act of endurance wise

knowledge which

~

as

is

money

raises

to feed

who plunges

and docs not lack

arete.

criteria

money to buy more

on

slaves

hungiy children. The

into a well to save a

drowning

The knowledge that makes an

not the craft-knowledge Laches recognizes,
but a higher-order

we

shall see in the next section

- may be exactly the

amte

Socrates exhorts others to pursue.
In Chaimides,

Cntias

fails in

a similar

way to

distinguish technical from moral

knowledge. In his Hesiod-based distinction between
working and doing (163bc),
recognizes that actions "accompanied by the admirable

(

tokalon

)" are

Critias

favorably

distinguished from others. His faulty interpretation leads
him to a strange conclusion:

yiastos (1994,

13-1 14) takes Socrates' distinction between great
and small things to separate
"If it had dawned on Laches that the goods such people
[doctors, divers, generals,
count as anything but 'great,' [hence moral] he would have seen that
p.

1

practical from moral goods;

etc.] can procure would
his proposal that
courage is wise endurance was proof against the counterexamples
To miss this cue [When Socrates says
knowledge of all things, great and small?'] was to betray that he really did not
understand the import of 'wise'
in wise^cndurance
in thinking that he did know, he was self-deceiv^,
a victim of the conceit of knowledge."
Gould (1987, p. 273) points out that "the ambiguity over the syntactic role of "wisely"
(or "unwisely")
- whether, that is, it modifies "persevering" or "(p-ing" - is evident in the
Greek
:

The ambiguity eludes Laches, however,

text [at Laches 192e]
as docs Socrates' point about persevering. Thus, in the ensuing

examples, Socrates speaks of cp-ing as what is done (un)wisely, because that
and Socrates is, after all, drawing out the implication of Laches' definition."
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is

how Laches views

the situation

We ought to represent
Peop

^e result

e.

sense calls the

f

we must suppose that Hesiod and any
man who minds his own business temperate.
(163c)

In this sense, being temperate

Cntias
agent.

fails to

On

[Hesiod] as thinking that only
things of this sort
is

amounts to disowning one's bad

see that the Jr^/on of an action
depends

Critias'

if

Lachean emphasis on

its

failing to look inside,

of their temperance.

internal state of the

action.

good things (163e) looks more

Socrates suspects that Critias

The

illustrative

shows that the

of an action

beyond technical knowledge. Socrates explains

what

make

body healthy

making the body healthy

is

is

men would

is still

then be ignorant

example, which closely resembles an example
put to

the agent

a

actions. Like Laches,

on some

however, and asks whether temperate

at 192e, again

will

man

judged to be bad.

Cntias' next definition of temperance
as doing

Laches

other

account, actions happen, are judged
externally for their success or

popularity, then disowned

promising despite

belong to

that

depends on something inside
that a doctor's

knowledge of

not necessarily accompanied by knowledge of
whether

actually the right thing to do.

Then sometimes," I said, "the doctor doesn't know himself whether he has
acted beneficially or harmfully. Now if he has acted beneficially,
then, according
to your argument, he has acted temperately. Or isn't
this what you said?"
"Yes,

it is."

"Then

seems that on some occasions he acts beneficially and, in so
is temperate, but is ignorant of his own temperance?"
"But this," he said, "Socrates, would never happen. ."(164bc)
it

doing, acts temperately and

.

Critias'

that he

argument

may have

entails judging the doctor's action externally because

of

good man's

money from

it.

allows

acted beneficially by mistake. From the outside there's no

distinguishing between Dr. Frankenstein,
will save a

it

life,

If pill

and Dr.

who

Jeckyll,

administers

who

pill

administers

x because he believes

pill

it

x because he makes a

lot

x works, both doctors seem to have been temperate; but only one
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was

actually JcaJos.

If

the

Dr. Frankenstein's action

pill fails,

was

to kalon, while Dr. Jeckyll simply blames
his mistake on Mr. Hyde.

be begging the question of whether the kalon
intentions, but Critias'

combined with
that he

vehement

that

it

Socrates

may

here

an action depends on values and

refusal to accept the

his Hesiod-inspired

and Socrates agree

in

accompanied by

still

consequences of

view that to kalon

is

essential to

his

argument,

sophmsune, shows

does.

After Nicias enters the conversation with his definition of
andreia as knowledge
of the fearful

arete

and hopeful. Laches proves

and techne by pointing out

that he

still fails

to see the distinction

that technical experts like doctors

between

and farmers know

the fearful and hopeful with respect to their crafts (195ab). Plato
reiterates the distinction

once more by having Nicias

reply:

He thinks

a doctor's knowledge of the sick amounts to something more than being
able to describe health and disease, whereas I think their knowledge is restricted to

Do you suppose.

just this.

than his

illness,

when a man's recovery is more to be feared
know this? Or don't you think there are many cases in

Laches, that

the doctors

which it would be better not to get up from an illness?
But do you grant this
knowledge to the doctors or to any other craftsmen except the one who knows
what is and is not to be feared, who is the one I call courageous? (195cd)
.

The

distinction

finally

is

order knowledge

is

4,1.5 Discovering

made

and where

To Kalon

clear,

.

.

and the discussion moves on

to ask

what

this

second

to be found.

it is

in the

Soul or Mind

Socrates gives the clear impression that he was swimming upstream in trying to

persuade Athenians that arete

I

is

part of the soul at

Apology 30ab:

go about doing nothing but persuading you, young and

or

money

in place of, or so

virtue does not

much

as, excellence

[

arete

come from money, but money and

public and private from virtue.
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all

]

body
you that

old, to care not for

of the soul.

other

I tell

human goods both

Both the Uches and Ch^rmides
associate their
good and

When

evil,

which

respective virtues with

in turn requires the seat of

to be

knowledge of

none other than the

soul.

N.cias connects andr^ia to
knowledge at 194d (a connection
subsequently

attributed to his association with
sophists at 197d), Socrates asks him
what the subject of
this

knowledge

is.

Nic.as says the fearful

and

the hopeful (195a),

and proceeds, through

an exchange with the still-confused
Laches (195a-e), to distinguish
from the technical knowledge of the doctor.
Nicias

knowledge, and therefore courage,

is

that "those

whom

then forced to admit that such

retorts at

197c that Nicias

everyone agrees to be courageous" in

But Socrates has already established that popular
agreement
(184e). Decisions should be

made on

to a formidable

and

is

the advice of an expert,

rare sort of

wisdom:

In Charmides, Critias' journey toward the

when

the failure of "minding one's

to shift into intellectualist

own

mode and

is

no

if

just trying to

basis for decision

one

is

to be found, or

evil.

knowledge of good and

evil

offer

"knowledge of oneself" (165b), then
Critias derives

leads to the hypothesis that sophrosune

it

inscription:

Again, the agreement that episteme [eTaaxfipTi, knowledge, science]

must be knowledge of something precipitates the question of what

know,

begins

business" and "doing good actions" inspires him

"knowledge of oneself" from an overly-confident interpretation of the Delphic

knowledge.

on

and hopeful

knowledge of good and

"knowledge of knowledge" (166c) as definitions of sophrosune.

"Know thyself."

many

fact merit the distinction.

principles derived from inquiry. Hence, Nicias'
knowledge of the fearful

amounts

knowledge

veiy rare and distinct from the boldness
of

men, women, children, and animals. Laches

deny

is

this sort of

When this

account

is

is

its

subject here

is.

This

a science of science or knowledge of

construed as knowledge of what one does and does not

proves the useful point that such knowledge
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is

essential to education (172b).

The account

problematic, however, because

is

knowledge. Finally that object
idealized "knowledge of good

Whether

or not the

is

it

fails to

supplied at 174b and the definition

and

sophrosune, or even arete in general,

techne distinction that Plato defends

it

does supply the missing link

in the

is

-

Charmides and Laches. The Ion shows

Charmides and Laches show

that

a second kind of science or knowledge that transcends

technical knowledge. Sophists (like Hippias)
to or even equivalent to rhetoric,

fail

said in chapter 1,

failure to recognize the

in the arete

knowledge that allows them to accurately evaluate and
judge

what makes an action kalos

I

revised to the

evil is a satisfactory definition of

particular instances of their craft. Earlier examples
in

an absolute. As

is

evil."

knowledge of good and

that experts have the sort of

provide fora distinct object of

who

believe that aiete

is

to distinguish this second criterion,

a techne similar

which provides

what irked Plato most about the sophists was

moral neutrality of their

art.

They could impart

skills

their

but not

arete because arete requires a recognition of good and evil independent
from the
externally determined success or failure of a

4. 2 In tc l lcctua lizi ng.

Uni fying

,

man and

his actions.

a n d Idealizing Arete

If we know that we can improve someone's eyes by adding sight to them, and we
can, moreover, cause sight to be added to that person's eyes, clearly we know what

and we could advise people on the
if we didn't even know what sight

sight

is,

You

see,

and easiest means for acquiring it.
is, or what hearing is, then as doctors
we'd hardly be worth consulting for advice on ears and eyes and the best way of
acquiring sight. ( Laches 189e - 190a, Lane translation; Socrates speaking)
best

Because Plato accepted arete as the proper goal of education, he needed to
distinguish his

own

coception of

it

from the traditional conceptions he rejected. As this

Loaches passage makes clear, Plato believed that the

question of

how education

first

step toward answering the

might achieve arete was getting a grip on just what arete
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is.

Indeed,

it is

Plato's novel conception of arete that
shapes their novel approach to

education. Amidst the critique of tradition in
the
a

new conception

power
and

of arete that agrees with the tradition
insofar as

of the soul. Plato takes that

insists that

4. 2.1 Arete

power to be an

as Intellect ual: a Property nf

I

intellectual, unified, ideal,

however,

argued that the connection between arete and to kaJon

actually less radical than

agreement, even

takes arete to be a

Psych e

identified the seat of arete as the soul or

is

it

there emerges

must be developed inwardly rather than the opposite.^^

it

In the last section

This move

and Charmides,

it

psyche

may

among traditionalists, that

[\l/\)Xri,

at first

soul,

mind,

seem. There was

intellect] of a

fairly

man.

wide

particular virtues such as sophrosune

and

andreia were qualities of the soul. Dover (1974, p. 166) points out that a
reference to the

psyche

of a

eupsychia

man

could be taken as a specific reference to his courage and that

— the state of having a good soul -- was synonymous with

second definition of andreia as endurance of the psyche, then, was quite

Even the

aristocrats,

who took physical

particular virtues such as

beauty to be a sign of

admitted that

arete,

body and soul

at

with the tradition in viewing

as a

agrees with Socrates at Hippias Minor

dunamis
375d

ff.

[St) vaiiiq,

that justice

is

power,

was

“The inward
good

Laches 189e (quoted above), uses

approaich

seems

in in

ability].

tune

Hippias

a dunamis of the soul.

Republic IV defines dunamis as a that which enables us to do what we
like

Critias

154d.

In addition to believing arete to be a quality of the soul, Plato

doing (477bc) and,

traditional.

sophrosune were primarily qualities of the psyche.

takes Charmides' beauty to be of both

Laches'

andreia.

are capable of

vision as an example. Simply

to separate Plato from Aristotle, as well. Aristotle believed that habitual

action cultivates arete in the soul. For Plato, the direct development of the soul results in
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good

action.

put. .....

is

something

Socrates agree at 160e

"But,”

-

I

pemon

in a

tha, produces

good action

- as

Chann.des and

161a:

said, "didn't

we

agree just

now

[KOC^v] thing?"

that temperance

was an admirable

"Yes, 'we did," he said.

follow that temperate
^ thing be

Ot course not."

all this

depends on the
arete

is

arete,

is

men and good

lies

a

good

thing."

actions cannot be judged by
appearance.

it.

The

crucial

An

action's

component

goodness

is

wisdom, and

reinterpreted as a distinctly intellectual
quality.
criterion for arete that Plato
intellectualizes

harmony between a man's deeds and words. Laches,

there be

it is

serious disagreement about the

an invisible quality of his soul.

invisible intentions motivating

One traditional

man on

good that does not produce good
men*^"

cohesion, however, there

nature of 'good.' For Plato, good

A man's goodness, or

are good?"

“ '^P^tance an admirable thing, but

"U^eeT
Lurking behind

men

for

is

the stipulation that

example, judges a good

the alignment of his logo, ptoyoi, words,
explanations] and eiga

[^yo, works,

deeds, actions]

You
real

see, whenever I hear a man talking about
goodness or any kind of wisdom
man, that is who lives by his principles ~ Tm overjoyed
because,

~a

I can see that
But it pains
me to hear someone who is quite the opposite, the more eloquently
he seems to
speak, the worse it becomes, and then it looks as
though I hate discussions.

the speaker

is

in true

with his words and that the two go together.

.

.

{LacJies 188c-e, Lane translation)

Laches

is

willing to talk with Socrates based

Delium (181b), and he recommends
proven themselves

"SecO' Bncn

in

on the philosopher's

specifically against military instructors

war (183c). Socrates points out

(1971,

p.

battlfield ei^a at

305).
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that

who

haven't

harmony between words and

deeds

is

also required in argument,

m battle,
163b),

however (193e). Laches’

like Critias’ limitation of

fails

to actions later

limitation of

judged to be good

to actions

(

Charmidcs

to capture the full implications
of anete as an intellectual
dunam/s.

Plato's account, arete engenders

external judgments

good action (barring physical impediment)

and circumstances,

just as perfect vision allows us to
see

the thought behind an action that counts;
not

it's

On

regardless of

what

is.

external manifestation.

Socrates reveals the potential scope of
this intellectualist account of aiete

he descnbes a "dream"

knowledge
therefore

(

no

in

which temperance

It is

rules

and everything

when

done according to

is

Charmides 173ad). In such a world there would be
no deception and
conflict

between appearance and

safety,

and even the quality

known

as well, since impostors

of

reality,

which would

vastly improve health,

consumer products. The future could be confidently

would be weeded out from the

class of prophets

and

seers:

Now, I agree that the human race, given this, would do things and
live as
knowledge directed -- because self-control would mount guard
and wouldn't let
ignorance creep in and be a partner in our work. But that
by doing things as
knowledge directed we'd do well and be happy, that is something we
can't as yet
be sure

of,

On

my dear Critias.'
the other hand,

form of success,

(Watt

Again,

we have

if

'

he

said, 'you won't easily find

you disregard doing things

knowledge

any other complete
directs.'

translation, 173cd)

a double-edged "agreement" between Socrates and his interlocutor.

his response to Socrates'

doubt about whether

this

happiness, Critias equates happiness with success
quality

as

— and so

In

dream-world would guarantee

-a

relativistic

he misses the idealism of Socrates' account.

and externally judged

Arete,

in the real

world as

well as the ideal, must be an intellectual quality of the soul that produces good action but

Eq'a

is

commonly used

to refer to battlefield actions, according to Liddell
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& Scott.

does not guarantee public approval,

political

power, or even personal

profit.

Arete

is

an

internal, intellectual ideal; a quality of
the invisible psyche.

4.2t 2 Arete as Unified

Plato

s

unification of 3rete

was a

logical

outgrowth of his

the accepted association between ^/ere and
psyche.

Memorabilia

(iii

9.4), Socrates' refusal to

draw a

his

own

interpretation of

According to Xenophon's

distinction

sophrosune, or any other of the virtues, surprised many.^^

popular conceptions of the virtues and

strict

between wisdom and

Plato bridges the gap between

intellectual conception of

them by having

Socrates exhibit both dimensions of the virtues in question in
Laches and Charmides.
Socrates displays the traditional conception of sophrosune

emotional response to Charmides' beauty

sophrosune described

at

at 155c.

167a by acknowledging

He then

when he

controlls his

exhibits the intellectual

his ignorance

and continuing the

investigation at 165bc. Critias, in contrast, nearly halts the dialectic by refusing to
admit

ignorance at 169c; his reputation for sophrosune
exhibit the virtue in

its

intellectual dimension.^*

is

brought into doubt by his failure to

In Laches,

having exhibited the traditional ideal of andreia on the

and pursuing inquiry

in discussion, he also

shows the

We said we were to show endurance.
search and

show some endurance,

So,

in case

if

Socrates

battlefield.

is

recalled as

By admitting

intellectual courage

you don't mind,

let's

ap>oiia

Laches lacks:

stick to the

Bravery herself pokes fun at us for not

Gould (1987, p. 276): "Relativism, the view that moral claims express only individual or collective
preferences rather them true propositions, rears its head early in the Laches when Lysimachus expresses the
democratic opinion that a majority vote can decisively settle a question of moral education. Lysimachus'
suggestion implies the view, repugnant to Socrates, that there is no truth or falsehood about ethical matters.”
“The exact relationship between arete and wisdom in Plato is the subject of much scholarly debate,
and too complex a question to consider here. With respect to the Charmides and Laches, Irwin (1995, p. 39
40) notes that "Socrates never so

much

knowledge

Devereux (1992,

is

open

to objection."

as hints that the identification of temperance with
p.

767) suggests that

in

the Laches,

some

sort of

Plato softens Socratic

own no/7- intellectualist conception of virtue."
”See Dover, (1974, p. 125).
“Courage is connected to knowledge of knowledge in Apology "For to fear death. Gentlemen, is
nothing but to think one is wise when one is not; for it is to think one knows what one does not know." (29a)
intellectualism as a "first step on the path towards his

:
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-

bravely searching her, when
perhaps endurance
194a, Lane translation)

bravery after

is

-

While the

great warrior

succumbs

relentless in his pursuit of truth.

give

up

until

I

all.

(

to the heat of irrtellectual
battle, Socrates

At EutJ,jT,Aro 15d he declares:

"I shall

Laches 193e

,s

heroically

not willingly

learn."”

In both

L^cAes and Charmides, the

particular virtues of

sophivsune and

andreia are eventually equated with
the knowledge. Again, the
stipulation that good
action be kalos forces the connection
between

and sophrosune

are kaJos,

and knowledge; because andivia

they must partake of wisdom.

cannot be judged externally. At Chamndes
159c

-

But the wisdom

160d, Socrates shows that the

appearance of an action does not necessarily
indicate arete
thing might be just as kaJos as a quiet
one.

wisdom

is

required to distinguish

intellectualization

Then

If all

and unification

virtues are kalai,

in the agent, since a

quick

Laches 192cd, the presence

of

kalos from shameful endurance. The
of arete transforms the

traditional 'praiseworthy' to something internal

noble.

at

of an action

and

and being kaJos

meaning

of kalos from the

invisible like 'independently fine or

requires

wisdom,

just

how different

can

the individual virtues be?

42.3 The Educational Impact

of th e Unification of Aret^

But our king Zalmoxis,' he said, 'who is a god, says that just as one should
not
attempt to cure the eyes apart from the head, nor the head apart from
the body,

so

one should not attempt to cure the body apart from the soul. And this he says is
the very reason why most cases are beyond Greek doctors, that they do
not pay
attention to the whole as they ought to do, since if the whole is not in good
condition,

it is

impossible that the part should be. Because,' he said, the soul
'

“Allen translation. See Gould (1987,
endurance, which

is

n. 2):

is

"Most scholars discussing the Laches take 'kartena' as

an acceptable translation. But

I think 'perseverance' better (even if inexactly) captures
suggests an active rather than passive state."
^“Temperance is described as kalos at 160b, 160d, 160e, 169b, 175b, 175e. Courage is also repeatedly
described as kalos in Laches, for example at 192c. This connection is also noted by Santas
(1973, p. 113).
^‘A transition Sprague deftly reflects by translating
as 'admirable' in the Charmides passage,

the meaning of the dialogue, as

and

'fine

and noble'

in

the

it

Laches passage.

173

the body are to be heathy;

°'
(

This piece of wisdom, ostensibly
reported by Socrates from a
Thracian doctor,

shows the educational importance
of unifying the
the virtues led to their close
association with

when

wisdom and

the health of the psyche.

But

Socrates shows in both Leches and
Chermides that technical expertise does
not

affect the

kalon of an action, both dialogues
anive

describe the

wisdom

relevant to arete.

unification

is

almost inevitable.

By

down

to the

whole

isn't in

knowledge of good and

evil to

same

sort of

knowledge, their

implication, the other virtues arc similarly

connected.^ The pedagogical point for
Plato
training for particular virtues, but

at the

Since both andreia and sophrosene
are

products of the psyche, and both boil

the

virtues. Socrates- intellectual.zation
of

is

that moral education should focus
not on

on the the improvement of the psyche as

good condition then the

part can't be.

A rete

a whole.

If

turns out to be the general

well being of the soul.
In both

Laches and Charmides, the

general examination of virtue

by

itself.

This progression

his dramatic characters.” In the Laches,

investigated as a

window to

investigation of a single virtue leads to a
is

not unexpected, either by Plato or

the stated goal

is

arete (179d); andreia

is

that whole:

my good friend, let's not look at [ arete ] as a whole straight
might well be a rather lengthy business. Let's examine part of it first
of
all and see whether we're in a position to
know about that. We'll probably find
this makes our inquiry easier. (Lane translation, 190c)
Well, in that case,

away -

it

“The exact relation between the virtues is another hot scholarly topic which I needn't delve into
here.
Sec, for ^example: Devereux (1992), Ferejohn (1982), Penner (1973b
1992b), and Santas, (1971
1973).
Irwin ( 1995, p. 35):
In both the OhBmi/des and the Laches the discussion settles on one particular

&

virtue

because

it

seems the best way

to

&

answer a more general question about what makes a person good.
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"

S.milarly,

every

Channides

Cher vrriue

. said

arete,

virtue,

less

their places in

war and

virtues to each other.

apona

andreta
all

is

The educational

for

(181e,

the whole complement of them.
politics,

The ttJon connection

final

be no, only ,he

of the

Wisdom

Laches

is

merely one virtue

n,os, .empera.e,

potnt Plato wants to

such as temperance (154d), or trammg

such as military training

much

Cri.ias to

as well (157d).

appearance of a single
virtue,

by

but erete

is

tf.)

the

make

is

that the

for a particular

does not even produce the relevant

Rghting skill and

fighting

words have

cultivated in the soul.

linked 3retc to knowledge
is

bu, superior in

common

and hence

quality that binds

all

links individual

virtuous action."

The

caused by an apparent conflict between
the idea that

among many, and

the fact that their definition of

it

implies

the virtues:

Socrates: Then does a man with this kind
of knowledge seem to depart
from virtue in any respect if he really knows,
in the case of all goods whatsoever,
at they are and will be and have been,
and similarly in the

w

case of evils? And
as lacking in temperance or justice and
holiness to whom
alone belongs the ability to deal circumspectly
with both gods and men with
respect to both the fearful and its opposite,
and to provide himself with good
things through his knowledge of how to
associate with them correctly?
Nicias: I think you have a point, Socrates.

do you regard

that

man

Then the thing you are
a part of virtue but rather virtue entire.
Socrates:

Nicias:

So

Socrates:

it

now talking about,

Nicias,

would not be

seems.

And we

have certainly stated that courage

is

one of the

parts of

virtue.

Yes we have.
Socrates: Then what we are saying now does not appear to
hold good.
Nicias: Apparently not.
Socrates: Then we have not discovered, Nicias, what courage
is.
Nicias: We don't appear to. (199de)
Nicias:

Nicias admission that discovering the whole of arete
part

is

a failure, can only be a

symptom

when

they were only looking for a

of his docility (see section 4.1.5).

^'Sce Dcvercux (1992, p. 786).
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Whether Plato

took ,he connic, ,o be a true
™paase,«

exchange has on h.s readers. The
a,^te

is

k3l3 and hence wise

Identification

crafts did not

among

in

effect

is

pedagogically less impcnan, than
the effect th.s

seems to be that

if

you buy the argument that

a general sort of way, you are
committed to some sort of

individual virtues.’‘ Just as Hippias'
being good at

make him

a good man, training in

such as battle and manners

skills

all

A healthy soul, however, engender good

will not yield arete.

of

Knowledge CorrespnnriR

distinction

Hippias Minor

is

tp

we must

between technical and moral knowledge that
Socrates made

reiterated in the

Chaimides and Laches. Unlike

in

Aristotle, Plato

By sticking to

terminology, however, Plato kept his philosophy
accessible to the kind of

popular audience he hoped to influence
distinction

good and

that

Arrtc?

never used technical terms to distinguish the two
sorts of knowledge.^^

common

is

the virtues at once by seeking to
improve the soul.

4i2.4 What Son
The

varied

associated with particular virtues

action on the battlefied as well as in
argument. Ultimately, the message

work on

many and

between the lower

evil is as clear as

Charmides 173a-d

it

clarifies

in the early dialogues.

level technical

needs to be

in

Furthermore the

knowledge and higher

Charmides and

level

loaches.

knowledge of

Socrates'

dream

in

the hierarchy implying that moral knowledge would govern

the production of crafts, improving

life

by giving us the

ability to discern

good eiga from

evil ones.

The knowledge
moral knowledge, but

Santas (1971,

it

p.

of

good and

leaves

evil, past, present,

much

to be desired

and

future

is

a neat description of

by any industrious student wishing

to

202) does.

’‘Irwin (1995, p. 43), Fcrcjohn (1982, p. 18),
reach some form of this general conclusion.

Dcvcrcux (1992,

p. 786),

and Santas (1971,

’’Vlastos (1994, p. 116) believes that this might have hampered his discussion of them.
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p.

202),

all

achieve
offer

Although he was probably struggimg
with the question

it.»

some elaboration on what moral knowledge

Knowledge

knowledge

of

is

Well then;

I

proposed

said,

'tell

I

itself
of Itself

and

is

in

himself, Plato does

and Charmides.

first:

me, what do you say about self-control?'
knowledges is the knowledge both
^

of the other knowledges.'

^ knowledge of ignorance too,’

I

asked,

'if it

knowled'^e?^*'*
'Yes, certainly,' he

-

a

knowledge

of

plied.

sdf-controlled
u
what
he

is

man

alone will

know

himself and be able to examine

knows and what he doesn't, and he will be capable
of looking at
other people in the same way to see what
any of them knows and thinks he knows
if he does know; and what,
on the other hand, he thinks he knows, but
does not.’
No one else will be able to do that. In fact, that is being
self-controlled and
self-control and knowing oneself - knowing
what one knows and what one
doesn't. Is that what you are saying?'
in fact

'Yes,'

This account

knows and
doesn't

eveiy

is

clarified to

doesn't

(

mean

know, but

know (170d;

craft, this

he replied.

Charmides 166e

that moral

rather, that

see also 170a, 167a).

knowledge

of ignorance

is

-

167a, Watt translation)

knowledge wouldn't be knowing what one

one knows and more importantly that one
In contrast to sophists
just the sort of limited

who claimed

to

know

knowledge Socrates

admits he has in Apology. Here Socrates exemplifies arete
construed epistemologically
as well as arete construed in

— an

its

conventional dimensions as andreia, and sophrosune

important combination for convincing Plato's skeptical audience.^’

The importance
individual

is

of

the only one

knowing that one

doesn't

who can know that

know and

the added caveat that each

about himself should be obvious to any

reader of Plato. Laches recognizes the likelihood that false conceit can

laughingstock (184bc), but to Socrates,

its

potential to stifle social

it

fails to

.

is

advancement

is

much

"It is easy to explain why "knowledge of good and evil" is not a satisfactory
provide a usable standard for making practical decisions."
"Penner (1992b, p. 25 - 26) notes that ".
Socrates’ thinldng that courage is the science of goods and
no impediment to his claim to know (about goods and bads) only that he knows nothing. "

’'Kraut (1984, p. 260):

account of virtue:

bads

make one a
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less threatening

wisdom

than

its

guarantee to

stifle intellectual

growth. False assumptions of

eliminate the motivation to inquire; they are fatal
to philosophy.

knowledge, as Socrates points out

at

Charmides 172b,

eliminating their resistance to inquiry.

possession of knowledge, to put

it

The knowledge required

it

skill)

men to

learn

to judge one's

in the Ion's terms of technical

the most valuable sort of knowledge (and

Could

will help

Knowledge

knowledge,

for ancte ? Certainly, philosophical investigation

moral knowledge arrived

evil.

at in

suppose that Plato thought

it

by

own
is

perhaps

a person could have.

be that the humility inherent to philosophical investigation

one s knowledge of good and

of

is

the preferred

mode

Since knowledge of good and evil

is

Charmides (174c) and Laches (199c),

for

is

necessary

developing

the description of

it's

reasonable to

promising. Furthermore, the dialogues establish that this

moral knowledge does not have a concrete subject as technical knowledges such as
medicine, basket weaving, and generalship do. The object of moral knowledge

and

abstract.

and

future (198

The Laches
-

199).

establishes that

The Charmides

it is

beyond time

establishes that

it is

is

ideal

restraints of past, present,

a knowledge, not of

all

other

knowledges, but of the one thing that can't be removed from other knowledges (174bc).

The knowledge
is

of

good and

evil differs radically

from

mundane technical know-how,

yet

essential to the virtuous practice of all skills.

4.2.5 Arete as an Ideal

Plato hints throughout the Laches and Charmides that arete

unobtainable

ideal.

If Charmides indeed had arete he would be a

(154d). Since the courageous

man without

man must have time-independent knowledge

and hopeful, Nicias could only be describing
agrees,

may be an

would surpass the knowledge

a
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of the fearful

god (196a). Such knowledge,

of every living

man

equal

Critias

(174a). Furthermore, Nicias

admits, such a

could

mau would

have evety virtue and not just
one (199e).

be then? Besides the example
of Socrates,

on evety

level,

It

who

is

Plato offets another clue to the
nature of aKte

seems as though no claim about the

yields arete in Charmides,

Will

"Oh

drawn

.

sort of quality

to represent

ame

the health analogy.

idealistic nature of

from a comparison to the ideal of
health. In searching

What

moral knowledge

tor the sort of

is

far

knowledge that

Socrates asks Critias:

be the one by which he knows checker
playing?"
" he said.

it

for heaven's sake,

Well, the one by which he knows calculation?"
"Of course not."
Well, will it be that by which he
"That's better," he said. (1 74b)

And

knows health?"

next Critias proposes the knowledge of
good and

evil.

When making the

point that

moral knowledge must not be based in time in
Laches, Socrates explains:

For instance,

in the case of health, there is no other art
related to the past the
and the future except that of medicine, which, although
it is a single art,
surveys what is, and what was, and what is likely
to be in the
,

present

future. (198d)

Even

at

Meno

72de and again

at 87e, health

The health analogy neatly

of arete.

is

used to describe by analogy some aspect

describes Plato's revised conception of arete.

Health can be thought of as a dunamis. since a healthy body
produces good physical
action the

way

arete produces good moral actions.

intellectualization of arete,

the psyche.

The

literal

sophron (temperate)

is

psyche seems capable

since the image of health

translation of

to be of

sophrosune

sound or healthy

See Snell (1982,

had

is

itself

traditionally

to Socrates'

been applied to

sound-mindedness; to be

mind.'’*

Furthermore, a healthy

of yielding each of the virtues in the relevant situations, barring

physical impediment.

A

The analogy lends

p. 162).

point noted by Santas

( 1

973,

p. 112).
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The health analogy

also captures the unity of the
virtues.

healthy appendages and organs but
diseased legs

not

fit

may be

"healthy" in

it

also implies a unity; a

not live

up to the

incorporate

all

may

ideal of aKte.

body with strong arms and

some manner of speaking or to some

the ideal of a healthy body. Similarly,
a soldier

from a pos.tion of weakness

A healthy body entails

degree, but

it

does

who boldly challenges an enemy

be described as courageous on some
account, but he will
Training for amte, like training for
health, must

aspects of the soul;

u have probably heard about good doctors,
that if you go to them with a pain in
the eyes, they are likely to say that they
cannot undertake to cure the eyes by
themselves, but that it will be necessaiy to
treat the head at the same time if things
are also to go well with the eyes. And
again it would be very foolish to suppose
that one could ever treat the head by
itself without treating the whole body.
In
keeping with this pnnciple, they plan a regime
for the whole body with the idea of
treating and curing the part along with the
whole. ( Chaimides 156b)

So

health, like arete,

attainment.

No human

virtuous. Health

is

being

is

an acknowledged ideal that

is

optimally healthy any more than any person

something that admits of degrees and

it

resists definition

and
is

perfect

optimally

appears that Plato wants

arete (and knowledge) to be ideals that admit of degrees.
Perfect knowledge of good and
evil

would

yield perfectly virtuous behavior, but

When

knowledge.

knowledge

-

knowledge,

Socrates claims ignorance, he

like

the individual.

it.

is

referring to the

perfect

absence of such perfect

not to the absence of any knowledge whatever. Assuming that one has
such

assuming that one has perfect health,

disease. Health, like knowledge,

to pursue

no human being has such

is

can't help but lead to neglect

and

something that demands constant work on the part of

A doctor can't transmit health to his patient, he can only help the patient

Socrates

is

portrayed as a kind of doctor in the Charmides (155b, 158e), but

he can't transmit arete to his charge. Arete

is

a unified, intellectual ideal that must be

discovered, judged, and cultivated within oneself.
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4,3

I n tSc^arcb

of Kducatinn fnf

The unexamined

life is

not worth living for

An

understanding of Plato’s revised view of

Socrates,

and

man
Apology 38a

its

implications for

education shows Socrates’ most famous
quote to be an educational statement.
turns out to be an ideal approximating
the timeless knowledge of good
and

knowledge

can’t

be transmitted by a teacher, since no
mortal can reduce

evil.

Such

to a

it

transmittable formula, and the gods choose
to communicate in puzzles. Even
people

exemplify

awtp

like those

who exemplify

health, cannot pass the quality

dear mhentors. Education that has anete
as

wisdom and

to pursue

it

its

relentlessly; in short, to

friends not to teach his sons arete,

{Apology 41e-42a). The way to

to their

most

goal must be an exhortation to love

examine one’s

life.

but to see that they care for
care for arete

is

it

to tend one’s soul

look inside and cleanse their souls of inconsistent or
unexamined
that there can be a teacher of Plato’s revised arete,

Socrates asks his

above

perfection through inquiry. Socrates’ mission, his
service to the god,

4, 3,1

on

who

Socrates

is

all else

and

was

to pursue

its

to get others to

beliefs.

To

the extent

the model.

Finding a Teacher of Arete

At Laches 184e, Socrates

rejects the idea that the best education

can be chosen

through a democratic vote and proposes instead that they search out an expert on arete

:

So, what we should do now, first of all, is consider whether we have among us an
expert in the subject we’re discussing or not. If we have, we should take his
advice, albeit his alone,
for

somebody

else. (

At Charmides 169a, a
tell

whether a thing

is

and ignore other people; and
Laches 185a, Lane translation)

similar search

knowledge

—a

is

proposed

skill

for

if

we

haven’t,

"some great man"

we should

who can

look

instantly

Socrates points out that he docs not have and
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suspects

may

not

exist. In

(89e

rejected as teachers of

arete to their

own

an expert on arete

96a), sophists, successful citizens,

because they can’t agree among
themselves,

sons,

is

-

and hold

Plato’s

way

based

in

of

showing that

The
of the

is

learned.

One improves

is

one's soul

Arete resembles a techne

in that

something achieved through reflection

by looking inward, not outward.
Lysimachus

reputed to have been given the best education
his city could provide

94a), yet he has failed to emulate the arete
of his father

will never

to transmit

cannot be learned the way a

early Socratic dialogues are filled
with failed teachers of arete.

Laches

{Meno

is

knowledge, but moral knowledge

rather than instruction.

fail

are

internally inconsistent views.
This fruitless search for

conventional techne, such as shoemaking,
It IS

and poets

become

a

good man. The great men

of

and worries

Athens were notorious

that his son

for failing to

transmit their virtue to their sons;^^ Critias and
Charmides are examples of that failure.

Furthermore, technical experts

engender the corresponding

may transmit

arete.

their skills to students, but the skill fails to

While Nicias

believes that military training will

produce andreia (182c), Laches points out that these military

trainers not only fail to

exemplify andreia themselves in battle, they avoid the true
military experts in an
cultivate the false appearance of complete

knowledge (182e

doesn't yield performance, but in fact

makes

since people are more critical of those

who smugly claim

Given Laches’ mistrust of

their

military trainers,

cowardice

it’s

-

effort to

184c). Their "expertise"

all

the more conspicuous,

knowledge.

not surprising that he objects to

Socrates insistence that they start their educational investigation by looking for an expert

among themselves and
What’s

their teachers:

that, Socrates? Haven’t

become more

you ever noticed

that in

some matters people

expert without teachers than with them? (185e)

^^Sce, for example,

Laches 179cd and 180b; note

Thirty Tyrants (Sprague 1992, p. 14, n.3).

182

also that Nicias' son Niceratus

was executed by the

Socrates replies that he has; indeed he
takes pains in his speech at 186
distinguish between learning a thing from
a master

and discovenng

it

187 to

-

He

for oneself.

quips that he would have liked to have studied
with the sophists, but couldn't afford
Nicias

and Laches had the means

of arete than he does.

to

pay

for instruction, so

Of course, the dialogue shows

Socrates' idea of arete

they should have a better idea

just the opposite to

distinct from particular skills or crafts,

is

it.

be the case.

and so

demands

it

a different sort of teaching. Protagoras tells
Socrates that his search for a teacher of arete
IS

folly since arete

is

taught, like language, by everyone in the

®tit Socrates argues that

Charmides,

Critias,

popular conceptions of

way

as represented by

Laches, and others, are incoherent. Socrates'

themselves show he rejected arete in
his

arete,

community { Protagoras

its

trial

and conviction

popular definition, since he refuses to talk or pay

out of his indictment and he hasn't the "courage" to escape from

Socrates does exemplify arete in

its

ideal definition

admits his ignorance and pursues wisdom

--

relentlessly.

jail.

insofar as a mortal

He

But

man

can.

also exhorts others to

He

do the

same, as a service to the God. In this way, he has so carefully tended his soul that he
utterly fearless of divine

judgment

is

after death.

Plato views education for arete as a lifelong process for which Socrates

is

the

exemplar and greatest advocate. People don't learn the meaning of arete from Socrates

and then become moral men. They

learn to love arete

and

its

manifestation in wisdom,

then, through constant examination of these things, they reject mistaken beliefs and

constantly climb closer to the ideal.^^ In both Charmides (161a) and Laches. Socrates

quotes the Odyssey

's

claim that a needy

^^Seeskin (1987, p. 144)

makes a

man

should not be modest, and in both cases he

similar point.
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interprets neediness as a lack of 3rete

and knowledge. The solution

to this neediness

is

not money, but investigation:

What I don t

advise

we're in now.

And

that

we

allow ourselves to remain in the same condition
finds it amusing that men of our age think
fit to go
back to school, I think we should appeal to Homer who
said that 'modesty sits ill
upon a needy man'. Let's not take notice of what anyone else may
say, and let's all
cooperate in seeing to our own needs as well as the
{Laches 201ab, Lane
is

if

anyone

translation)

A similar need for the extended pursuit of
Charmides (176ac). Ideal arete

is

arete

neither a

is

skill

expressed at the closing of the

nor a formula to be learned; rather,

it is

a goal to be pursued.

443.2

Arete

Is

Not Transmittable

Plato makes
rules,

arete.

it

clear in both

and even words of wisdom

Inches and Charmides that

are teachable

stories, facts, skills,

- but they don't yield

moral knowledge or

Despite being a paidagogos of Charmides, Critias denies having given him a

definition of sophrosune.

"What
heard

.

difference does

it

make, Socrates," said Charmides, "from where

I

it?"

"None at all," I answered, "since the question at issue
but whether what he said is true or not." ( Charmides 161c)

is

not

who said

it,

This exchange serves as a quick reminder to the reader that while definitions and formulae

may be taught and

learned, the

wisdom

investigation. Plato's association of

imply that arete can be taught

—

that

is

arete

is

a product of personal

and epistemc [knowledge,

as Socrates observes at

Meno

science],

seems to

87c. Here, however,

Plato wants the reader to question the missing middle term: the popular assumption that

184

all

forms of episteme can be taught/' All

they

know what
You

can't

be

arete

can't teach

arete.

is, let

we know

alone that they can teach

that

no one has shown

is

painstaking pursuit of knowledge, yet he regards

But, astonishingly,

I

enough to

I

learn, so

is

the necessaiy
like a

it

that

it.

Socrates’ transformation of this message

knowledge. Socrates' avowed ignorance seems

When

is

what you don’t know; but what you know

you think you know. Admitting ignorance

who

so far

in a conventional sense

simple: you can't learn

first

step on

dubious product

what

any path toward

for

such a

as a crowning achievement:

have this single good point, my saving grace: I am humble
probe and ask questions, and am extremely grateful to
anyone

answers me. {^Hippias Minor 372c, Waterfield translation)

Socrates exhorts his interlocutors to look within themselves, they
think they're

fishing for bits of knowledge, whereas Socrates expects
such inquiry to yield

opinions that wilt
It is

when exposed

unfounded

to the light of examination.'^

through the process of such examination and reflection that barriers are

lowered and progress

is

made toward understanding the

true nature of things. This

process cannot begin, however, until opinions are articulated and laid on the table, as
Socrates exhorts Nicias to do in Laches

The hopelessness
bravery

is,

of our predicament

receives the

if you tell us what you think
and you'll also confirm your own
words. (194c, Lane translation)

is

obvious; but

you'll get us out of this hopeless state,

thoughts by putting them into

The opinion

:

that Nicias then offers

same examination

all

is

borrowed from Socrates himself. Nevertheless,

others do.

The

authority of the source

is

it

irrelevant.

The argument would be of the form: Arete is episteme, episteme is teachable, therefore arete is
Nehamas (1985, p. 299) points out that there was a question about whether sophia could be taught,
just as there was a question whether arete could be taught. See: Dissoi Logoi (6.1). See also Protagoras
361a, and contrast Euthydemus 282c.
Hence Socrates does not teach arete by holding back answers he knows, as the slave boy passage of
X\\t Meno may seem to suggest. See Kraut (1984, p. 299).
teachable.

'‘Socrates later compares this process to that of a midwife; see especially TTieaetetus

185

148e

ff.,

210b-e.

Reflection excludes the unquestioning
adoption of opinions from an outs.de
source while

eliminating the internal barriers of false
conceit.

Socrates’ Skill as a

In fact

have never been a teacher to anyone. If, in
speaking and tending to my
found anyone, young or old, who wished to
hear me, I never
be^udged him; nor do I discuss for a fee and not
otherwise. To rich and poor
alike I offer myself as a questioner, and
if anyone wishes to answer,
he may then
hear what I have to say. And if any of them
turned out to be useful men. or any
did not, I cannot justly be held responsible.
To none did I promise instruction and
none did I teach; ( Apology 33ab)

own

The

own word

I

affairs, I

fact that the

Greek word didasko [6i6d(TK(0, to teach]

'didactic' provides a helpful hint as to

teacher. Didactic speakers are preachy.
their

so

audience and they

it's

resist

They

why

is

the origin of our

Socrates should deny that he

try to foist specific lessons

and

ideals

is

a

on

questioning. Poetry provides a didactic form of education,

not surprising that the poets were called the teachers of
Ancient Greece (Liddell

Scott).

When

Socrates denies that he

is

a teacher, he

one who transmits knowledge.'*^

ideal of a teacher:

is

denying that he

When

fits

Charmides and

&

the popular

Critias

demand

explanation of one of his theories, Socrates proposes an examination instead:

is that?' he said. 'Explain! We too want to know what
you mean.'
Tm sure Fm talking nonsense,' I said. 'All the same, one must examine any

'How

thought that occurs to one and not dismiss it without due consideration,
even a little respect for oneself.' Charmides 173a, Watt translation)

if

one has

(

Socrates

arete.

may be an

Socrates

is

expert with a skill to teach, but that

an expert

at inquiry, at searching for

skill

and

his expertise are not

wisdom.^®

^^For a similar view see Kraut (1984, p. 10)

^'Santas (1971, p. 181-2) says that "Far from abandoning the pursuit for an expert (at
90), Plato proceeds, through Nicias

and Laches, to establish Socrates credentials

the nature of courage."

186

[as]

Laches 186

an expert

in

-

a search for

It is,

manifested.

after all, in this search for

A description

wisdom

of the temperate

that Socrates' arete

man

in

is

most notably

Charmides seems

to describe

Socrates' mission:

So the
what he

self-controlled

man

alone will

know

himself and be able to examine

Imows and what he doesn't, and he will be capable
of looking at
other people in the same way to see what
any of them knows and thinks he knows,
if he does know; and what,
on the other hand, he thinks he knows, but
does not
No one else will be able to do that. In fact, that is being
self-controlled and
self-control and knowing oneself - knowing
what one knows and what one
doesn't. Is that what you are saying?'
'Yes,' he replied. (166e - 167a, Watt
translation)
in fact

Of course, Socrates doesn't possess knowledge
know, but he does possess

Whether

skills that

of

what he and others know and

enable him to examine both himself and others.

or not the elenchus can be considered an
integrated techne,

specific criteria while performing the elenchus

knowledge. Socrates
interlocutor

(i.e.

insists that the beliefs

Euthyphro

Laches 199e). He wants

9d).

He

which represent useful

examined be

truly those

to disprove

and only

all

them

(i.e.

He

tests for

espoused by the

relevant examples

Laches 190e

Insofar as Socrates "teaches" he examines opinions

same.

Socrates honors

requires that belief sets be internally consistent

definitions to cover

beyond using counterexamples

don't

has a reputation for examining others' ways of

-

and

(i.e.

isn't

191e).'*^

and exhorts others

to

do the

living:

You

don't appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with
Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he
began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on

being led about by the man's arguments until he submits to answering questions
about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived
hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don't realize that
Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail.
{Laches 187e - 188a)

^’similar criteria are noticed by Santas (1971, p. 122).
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But Socratic conversation

is

best seen as a kind of team effort to
understand

and

clarify

the nature of existence by examining particular
lives and beliefs (see chapter
5). Just as
the intellectualization and unification of the
virtues allowed Socrates to learn about
arete by examining

its

parts,

examination of individual beliefs and

lives

sheds

light

on

the ideal dimension.*® Socrates' examinations, like
Plato's dialogues, are not only for his

own

sake, or that of the interlocutor, but rather for the
benefit of everyone:

How can you
doing

believe,

'

I

exclaimed, that
'

if

Fm trying my hardest to

refute you,

Fm

any other reason than that for which Fd investigate what I say myself!
You see, my great fear is that I may sometime not notice that Fm thinking I know
something when in fact I don't. And this, I tell you, is what Fm doing now:
looking at the argument mostly for my own sake, but perhaps for the
sake of my
friends as well. Or don't you think that it is a common good for
almost all men
it

for

that each thing that exists should be revealed as
Watt translation)

it

really isT (

Charmides 166de,

Cryptic Expressions: Clues to the Discovery of Ar^tp

What can we make of the

fact that arete doesn't

seem able to be put into words?

Socrates gets Laches to agree that knowledge must be expressible in words.:

Socrates:

We say then. Laches, that we know what

Laches: Yes
Socrates:

we do

And what we know, we

Laches: Of course.

must,

at

it.

Both interlocutors then

194b that he

unable to pin

it

still

thinks he

down

“See Penner (1992,

I

suppose, be able to state?

190c)

Charmides also admits that he should be able
possesses

it is.

say so.

fail

to define

sophrosune verbally

if

he

to find acceptable definitions. Laches proclaims

knows what andreia

is,

but can't understand

why he

is

in words.**

p. 145).

knowledge on the basis of the fact
But is the ability to
articulate knowledge really a Socratic criterion for it? Perhaps the reason virtue (and hence knowledge) can’t be
taught is that it can’t be reduced to a universal formula to be passed on; it must be discovered individually.
Vlastos (1971b,

that the bravest

p. 15)

disagrees with Socrates' idea that virtue

man he knows cannot

articulate the

knowledge behind
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is

his courage.

That Socrates reduces

his interlocutors to a loss for

of progress because the inarticulability of
something

nature as an ideal.

When

words should be seen as

may be an

ironic sign of

Socrates refutes Critias' claim that sophrosune

what one doesn't know, Platonic scholars may be disappointed
because

its

a sign

true

knowing

is

that principle so

closely resembles a central tenet of Socratic philosophy:

We made that terribly generous concession without even considering the
impossibility of a man's
for

we allowed

would be

knowing in some sort of way what he does not know at
knows what he does not know, and yet I think nothing

stranger [o^coywrepov] than that.

The word Plato uses
unutterable.

that he

here, alogoteron

The words, taken

(

Charmides 175c, Watt

all;

translation)

[aXoyayxepov], could mean either "irrational" or

make no

at face value,

sense.

they

Still,

may

represent a

kind of unspeakable truth.
Socrates describes Charmides' statement that sophrosune

minding one's own

is

business at 161c as ainigmati [aiviypaxi, enigmatic, riddling, cryptic], which

is

the

adjective from the verb ainissomai [aiviaaopai, to speak darkly or in riddles, to hint],

and which

The

is

also used at

Apology 21b and 27de

to express a dark

meaning

or riddle.

imperfect, hanitteto [fiviTTexo] appears again in reference to the saying at 162a.

The noun ainigma [aiviypa] then appears
attention to

some dark

truth in the statement.

as a definition of justice at

As I showed

demand

162b. Clearly, Plato

is

"Doing one's own job"

drawing our

is,

after all, offered

Republic 433a.

in section 1.3.4,

what

When the obvious

investigation.

at

attracts Plato to these

ainigmai

interpretation of 'minding one's

is

that they

own

business'

has failed as a definition of sophrosune, Socrates comments:

he propounded this as a deliberate puzzle [aiviypa] for
us, for no other reason than that he thought it would be difficult for us to find out
what on earth doing one's own job is. ( Charmides 162b, Watt translation)
Well, as far as

I

can

see,
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Here, he sarcastically assumes that the
riddler (Critias) knows the meaning of
his riddle.
Socrates himself

is

straight answer.

Good

often misinterpreted as being exasperating
in his refusal to give a
riddles,

however, hint

at

an answer that evades

articulation; threby

acting as vortexes to the world of the inarticulable
ideal.
Critias interprets the

god speaking

as the

Delphic inscriptions

"Know thyself" and "Be

cryptically, ainigmstodesteron

self-controlled"

[aiviypaTCoSeaxepov], as a prophet

would:

So

this

is

way men

how the god

speaks to the people

do. At least, that's

what

I

who enter his temple, and not in the
man who dedicated the inscription

think the

intended by the dedication.
self-controlled."

Or

rather,

He says to whoever enters nothing other than "Be
he expresses himself more cryptically, as a prophet

would, because his inscription implies as I maintain, "Know yourself" and
"Be
self-controlled" are the same thing, though one might perhaps think that
they are
different, as I believe, the people who dedicated the later inscriptions
"Nothing in

and "A pledge is the next thing to ruin." actually did. In fact they thought
that "Know yourself" was a piece of advice, not a greeting from the
god to the
people entering. ( Charmides 164e - 165a, Watt translation)
excess"

Since the exhortation

"Know thyself" was

hubris,^^ Critias' interpretation of

reveals a disturbingly

Socrates,

by

it

smug attempt

originally believed to be a

warning against

as a "greeting" equivalent to "Be self-controlled"
to wield the divine

words

contrast, heard the divine proclamation that he

for his

was

own

benefit.

When

wisest of men, he

puzzled over what the words could mean and then began an inquiry that lasted the
his life

rest of

(^Apology 21b).
Cryptic statements are treasures that are easily abused. The belief that they hold

truth

in

is

not confined to Socrates and Plato. At Protagoias 339-347, there

which Socrates

interprets part of a

poem

is

long passage

that Protagoras takes to be contradictory.

Socrates takes the apparent contradiction to have a deeper message and points out that
brief statements, like the
” See Snell (1982,

one they are discussing, were the

p. 179).
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characteristic expression of

philosophy among the ancients (343b). Accordingly,

how an

at

Meno

95-96, Socrates shows

apparent poetic contradiction holds some cryptic truth.
The poem says

one

at

point "The good will teach you to be good," then says
that "never by teaching will you

make

the bad

man

good." There

read as good people, there

good inside people
Lysis,

is

an ambiguity here

is

a contradiction.

If

in the

"the good"

indirectly teaching others, the

first

is

sentence.

rather the

two sentences can be

If

good

"the good"

is

or the

itself,

consistent.

In

too, Socrates interprets cryptic sayings:

'Well then,' in
cryptic

my opinion,

Lysis, this

way [aiviTTOVxai]

that like

is

is

what people mean when they

say, in their

friend to like: friendship exists only

between good men, whereas the bad man never achieves true friendship with
either a good or a bad man. {Lysis 214d, Watt translation)
In both

Charmides and Laches

seers or prophets are put forth as possible

examples of arete because they have knowledge of good and

have access to the divine realm of
in the

mantic

(173c). Next

know-how

arts assures that

it is

humans would

deny that

excessive reliance

fearful

this

on

evil.

more

correctly, they

dream, the elimination of deception

on knowledge and never ignorance
is

arete

would not be the technical

Laches recognizes immediately that

and hopeful,

may be

it is

only the seers

if

who will have

andreia

it

is

(195de).

the
Nicias

the case, and indeed his eventual death was blamed on

seers.

Divine words should induce us to

m 3hh

or

of an artisan but rather the transcendent knowledge of the seer (174a), or of a

knowledge of the

the

act

agreed that the knowledge that

man who knows good and

doesn't

ideals. In Socrates'

evil,

better than Epimetheus,^^

taking forethought for his

life

reflect.

Socrates says he liked Prometheus in

and so follows

his lead

and

investigates as a

means

of

{Ihotagoras, 361d). Socrates reminds Nicias, just as Plato

”Epimcthcus opened Pandora’s box because he
Prometheus had warned him.

failed to reflect
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on whether the

gift

might be

evil,

as

frequently reminds his audience, that
as guidance in our endeavors

we must

and not be

reflect

led blindly

upon the

riddles of prophets for use

by hasty assessment of

their

proclamations:

And I suppose that both of you could bear witness that, in
the case of the affairs
of war, the art of generalship is that which
best foresees the future and the other
times - nor does this art consider it necessary to
be ruled by the art of the seer, but
to rule it, as being better acquainted with
both present and future in the affairs of
war. In fact, the law decrees, not that the seer should
command the general, but
that the general should command the seer.
{Laches 198e - 199a)
Charmides' soul must be cured by the "charms" of the
Thracian doctors of the god
Zalmoxis, which are beautiful words (156d

-

157a). Likewise, our

own

souls respond to

the beautiful words of the divine in the form of cryptic expressions
and riddles. The

paradoxical and aporetic conclusions of the early Socratic dialogues
should not be seen as
failures but as cryptic

charms that induce us to inquiry by hinting

at the truth

within

them. The gap between our acknowledgment of ignorance and the truth
encrypted

in

divine riddles can only be bridged through personal investigation and reflection.

^,5

The

Pursuit of

Wisdom: Education

as Philosophy

Plato's intellectualization, unification,

for

new

goal in

glory.

attitudes

itself,

No

and idealization

of arete create the need

toward any education designed to produce good men. Arete becomes a

rather than a quality that produces the conventional goals of wealth

longer

is

and

arete something one inherits at birth or gains through technical

instruction. Idealized arete

is

something one pursues throughout one's

life:

the

perfection of one's soul. Accordingly, the group of people seeking arete in Charmides

and Inches runs the gamut from the youthful Charmides and the adolescent sons
Lysimachus and Melesias, to the seasoned generals, Nicias and Laches. Part
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of

of Plato's

point in these works seems to be that the
pursuit of

(i,e.

education),

is

a lifelong

journey.

The dialogues

suggest there

was popular

resistance to the idea that adults should

continue learning. At Euthydemus 272c. Socrates
describes

how he

disgraced his harp

teacher by being ndiculed for tiying to learn at an
advanced age. His solution

persuade other old

men

to join

him

in his lessons. Plato

is

to

saw a connection between the

adult resistance to education and an unwillingness to
risk one's reputation by admitting
ignorance. Indeed

it is

precisely Socrates' conviction of his ignorance that
motivates

to seek instruction, despite his age.

At Euthydemus 293b, he wiyly explains

sophists can demonstrate that he possesses knowledge, he
won't have to learn
It is

not surprising that established

appearance of wisdom are loath to have

men who have

that

if

him
the

it.

painstakingly cultivated the

their reputations shattered

by being reduced

to

babble by Socrates. Happily, Laches displays true Socratic courage by submitting
himself
to the philosopher's questioning despite their differences in age

and fame (189a). Nicias

also professes his willingness to risk criticism, citing Solon as moral support:

enjoy [Socrates'] company, you see, Lysimachus, and I don't think there's
an>dhing wrong in suggesting that we haven't acted properly in the past, or that
we're not doing so now. On the contrary, you're bound to be more careful about
your way of life in future if you don't shrink from his treatment, but believe, as
Solon said, that it's right to go on learning as long as you live. ( Laches 188a, Lane
I

translation)

All the same. Laches can't resist

mocking

reprimand him: "Well

let's

relatively tender ages,

Charmides and

instruct

Nicias' ignorance,

and

at

195a Socrates must

him instead of making fun of him." Even

appearances that hampers their search

Critias demonstrate

for

wisdom.
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at their

an overconcem with

An unending education

is

the only sort possible for an ideal like
Platonic arete

that simply cannot be transmitted or learned
conventionally. Bodily health, likewise,

something pursued but never possessed. Socrates' language
is

is

reflects the belief that arete

pursued, and not acquired from a teacher. In
Euthydemus. for example, the implicit

goal

is

not to give a

man wisdom

things. Socrates says that he

wisdom and

him

to love

and pursue these

hopes the sophists can persuade Cleinias to practice

virtue, not that they

Then put

or virtue, but rather to get

can somehow give him those things:

off the rest of

your display to another time and give us a demonstration
one thing: persuade this young man here that he ought to love wisdom
and
have a care for virtue, and you will oblige both me and all the present company.

of this

(275a)

At 278d, the verb

is

"devote himself

to," at

283a, "practice"

is

used again.

It is

arete that should be the goal of education, not the wholesale acquisition of

Of course "love
lies

of

wisdom"

is

just the literal translation of

the love of

it.

philosophy and herein

the most basic explanation for Plato's connection between philosophy and education.

Since Early Greeks equated happiness with advantage and fortune,
that Socrates should exhort people to love
trying to

offer

change

wisdom

rather than wealth

believed that

between

from the tradition

wisdom

lovers.^^

and

he was

glory;

wisdom

greater, so

he

will

isn't

(^Euthydemus 288de). Socrates even

rather than physical beauty should be the ultimate attraction

He confesses

interested in Protagoras'

Friend:

in the

wisdom than

And

opening sequence of Protagoras, that

he's

more

in Alcibiades' beauty:

this stranger struck

you

as such a

put him above the son of Clinias in that respect?
^'Scc Snell (1982, ch. 8).

“See

not surprising

their conception of happiness. In fact, Socrates claims that

advantage eventually and that wisdom can only make wealth

really departing

it is

also Lysis 222ff.
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handsome person

that

you

Must not perfect wisdom take the palm for handsomeness?
Guthrie translation, 309c)

Socrates: Yes.

{Protagoras,

Again, the contrast boils
I

down

to a conflict

between

reality

have argued that the traditional values of the

and appearances.

aristocrats, poets, warriors,

sophists failed to distinguish between true arete, which

is

always tala, and

its

and

external

manifestations in physical beauty, military victory, or political success. In
Laches and

Charmides. Plato shows arete to be a unified, intellectual, ideal that cannot be
transmitted or even articulated.

knowledge.

And

he

He shows the

difference

between technical and moral

offers Socrates, self-avowedly ignorant yet divinely proclaimed the

wisest of men, as a prototype "teacher" of his revised ideal arete.

In the end, though,

Socrates does not teach arete, philosophy does. At the closing of Euthydemus,
Socrates exhorts Crito to educate his boys not by looking for a philosopher to teach them,

but by reflecting upon philosophy

Then

don't

itself:

do what you ought not

but pay no attention to the
good or bad. Rather give serious
consideration to the thing itself: if it seems to you negligible, then turn everyone
from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you to be what I think it is, then take
heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and yours, as the proverb says. (307bc)
to, Crito,

practitioners of philosophy, whether
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CHAPTERS
EDUCATIONAL AIMS IN EUTHYPHRO AND LYSIS
I

have shown that Plato accepted

he established
techne,

body

it

as a moral quality

would allow

its

- an

and how

intellectual excellence of the soul
which, like a

possessor to identify and judge right and wrong
actions. The

of knowledge required for arete

knowledge proper

as the proper goal of education,

was importantly

to craftsmen. JCnowledge of

different from the technical

good and

evil is at best elusive,

perhaps

unachievable, and certainly not teachable in any
conventional sense. The question thus
arises:

what

will the goals

Euthyphro and Lysis
might take and further

S. l

The Nature

is

of an education

offer important insights into the

aimed

at Platonic arete

shape that moral knowledge

Need

for

Moral Directinn in

a dialogue about philia [(paioc, love].

Specifically,

human

love for the gods

of aim.

How do we decide what shape our expressions of phih'a

and the gods' love

of

human

it

discusses

beings, but the general issue

for the

gods

is

part of arete,

larger issue of

and

how we

the discussion of

how we aim to

direct our pursuit of arete.

true judge of piety,

on the

basis of his

What the

one

Since

please the gods sheds light on the

Euthyphro claims to be an expert on

knowledge of poetry and myth. Socrates

hopes that he can get a definition or standard
defense in court.

is

will take?

How can we know what they want? How could they want anything we can give?
piety

be?

clarify the goals of Plato's educational project.

of and

Euthyphro

and methods

for piety

dialogue shows, however,

from the expert that will help his

is

that

no man can be the ultimate

judge of what the gods love. Nevertheless, Euthyphro continues to prosecute his father on
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behalf of the gods, while Socrates decides
that the gods and not the jury will
be his
ultimate judge.

^

.1

The PubiQU^i
FutJjjphro

Ftnsuits of Futh yphro and
is

set

on the porch of the King Archon's court

before prosecuting and Socrates before defending.
Despite

and imagery
pursuits

of the dialogue conjures

and the goals we aim

for in

up the scene

When the

all

it

is

Euthyphro pauses

legal setting, the

The Euthyphiv

of a hunt.

our actions; as such

education. Euthyphro, Meletus, and Socrates are

its

as

language
is

about

a dialogue about ethics

and

hunters pursuing different objects.

primary meanings of ancient Greek legal terms are included

in the translation, a

matter-of-fact conversation about Euthyphro's presence
at the court reveals the greater

scope of the dialogue;

Soc.;

Are you pursuing/prosecuting [blWKeic;]

or fleeing/defending

[(pebyciq].

Eu.: Pursuing/prosecuting [AicoKCO].
Soc.:

Eu.;

What/whom [Tiva]?
Something/someone [ov]

[5v6kcov]" (3e

On

-

I

am

the one hand, popular opinion finds

prosecute his

own

father in the

again thought

mad

to pursue/prosecute

4a)‘

name

of piety,

it

astounding that Euthyphro would

on the other hand, Plato

finds

it

astounding

that

Euthyphro pursues sinners while neglecting the very principle on which he bases

own

actions. Like Socrates' prosecutor Meletus,

things for granted

and directed

his attention

pursues piety and justice themselves.

He

Euthyphro has taken the most important

toward human

battles. Socrates,

Socrates redefines ethical activity as the pursuit of moral wisdom.
Euthyphro

by contrast,

seeks a definition or paradigm of piety that can

be used as a standard to judge individual cases (and possibly earn

‘All

his

translations are by Allen (1984) unless otherwise noted.
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his acquittal, 5c).

Given

this

underlying theme, Euthyphro’s surprise at
finding Socrates

at the

King

Archon's court and Socrates' vehement confirmation
that he would never be there to
indict another (2a)

public

life.

becomes more than

The idea

a

minor point about Socrates being out of place

of Socrates as a legal prosecutor

is

absurd precisely because he lacks

the prerequisite for charging another with
impiety: a definition of what piety

Euthyphro's confidence in his knowledge of piety

swim

against the tide of accepted custom and

have lucked into finding an ideal teacher.
Socrates' pursuit of moral

wisdom,

to always act piously in the future.

it

is

practical

Socrates

is

him

will a true

it,

account of piety

for definitions

in later dialogues, in the

satisfy

him and

may take on

Euthyphro

its

and normative.^

glad to have found an expert like Euthyphro in part because he

seriously doubts that his

own

accuser has sufficient knowledge of piety to justify his

Meletus' description as young, not prominent, and without

much

when he

suit.

of a beard (2b) suggests

both the likelihood of ambition and the unlikelihood of knowledge. There
Socrates' irony

Since

Socrates seems to

to defeat the charges against

Although Socrates' quest

more metaphysical and ontological significance
purpose

duty to enforce

Not only

will allow

is.

so great that he feels compelled to

is

filial

in

is

no mistaking

describes the charge:

Charge? One that does him credit, I think. It is no small thing for him, young as
he is, to be knowledgeable in so great a matter, for he says he knows how the
youth are corrupted and who is conupting them. No doubt he is wise, and
realizing that, in

my ignorance,

I

corrupt his comrades, he comes to the City as to a

mother to accuse me. (2c)

Euthyphro's claim to knowledge

is

taken more seriously. Like Socrates, he challenges

popular opinion and acknowledges the depth of wisdom required to pursue the case:

^Several commentators, including Allen (1971, p. 320), Guthrie (1975, p. 121), and Robinson (1971),
have acknowledged the ethical focus of Socrates' search for a definition in the Euthyphro. Even Aristotle
Metaphystes I, 987b ) points out that Socrates' search for universals concerned ethical matters. For a

(

contrasting view, see White (1976, p. 11).
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Soc.; Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro,
the majority of people must be
Ignorant of what is right. Not just anyone
would undertake a thing like that.
must require someone quite far gone in wisdom.

It

Eu.: Very far indeed, Socrates. (4ab)

Euthyphro's seriousness contrasts with the
youthful Meletus,
accuses
to

at

Apologyr 24c of dealing frivolously with serious
matters,

and pretending to

trial,

that political stature
to

is

care for things he never cared about.

the laws,

Assembly.

.

.

trial,

is

silent at first,

the audience, council,

other things); the implication

it.

is

Critias,

Socrates

then he points to

members

them

of the

(as with horses

that Meletus cares only about the multitude

The multitude improves youth, the multitude judges

political

When

is

everyone except Socrates. Socrates replies that Meletus does not care
about

the youth, or about a single expert being best at improving

in

men

Euthyphro 2c suggests

Apo/o£[F 24de.

at

the improvers of youth, Meletus

(500) judges present at the

all

lightly bringing

Meletus' effort to impress the multitude

critics.

confirmed during Socrates' cross-examination of him

name

Socrates

the true object of Meletus' hunt; in prosecuting
Socrates, he hopes

win popular approval and eliminate

asks Meletus to

whom

power, so the multitude

is

and most

and

his status

piety, the multitude confers

the proper object of Meletus' attentions as

it

was

for

Charmides, Hippias, and no doubt countless other Athenians.
Euthyphro, by contrast,

and derides Meletus'

suit as

an

is

refreshingly skeptical about the

effort to slander Socrates in court,

are so easily "misrepresented to the multitude" (3bc). That said,

self-assured than Meletus in his

knowledge

—

power

of the multitude

where

religious matters

Euthyphro

is

no

less

indeed he distinguishes himself from the

multitude precisely on the basis of his knowledge;

Soc.:

know

But

in the

so accurately

how

name

of Zeus, Euthyphro,

do you think you yourself

matters stand respecting divine law, and things holy and

unholy, that with the facts as you declare you can prosecute your

without fear that

it is

you, on the contrary,
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who

are doing the

own

father

unholy thing?

Unfortunately, Euthyphro's condi,
tonal statement turns out to
be ttue: he doesn’t
matters respecting divine law with
complete accutacy and so he

much

different from the majority of

all,

Socrates has

from Euthyphro just what piety

is.

much

not of

use or

men.

For now, however, Socrates
face value. After

is

know all

is

prepared to take Euthyphro's claim to
knowledge at

much

to gain both in court

And

and

in life

if

he can learn

indeed, Euthyphro bases his claim to

wisdom on

extensive familiarity with the poetic myths
and legends which were widely accepted as

standards for piety.' The conventionality
of Euthyphro's wisdom did not
guarantee public

acceptance of him as a religious expert, however.
At 3e

-

5a Euthyphro acknowledges that

the multitude have no respect for his expertise
and that they laugh at him
tell

the future (3c).

at least

He must

when he

tries to

also have provoked laughs from Plato's
original audience, or

doubts about his wisdom, when

While Plato plants the seeds

for

at

3e he

foretells Socrates' acquittal.

Euthyphro's eventual refutation, Socrates sets up

the standards for a proper knowledge of piety.
Euthyphro encourages Socrates'

rigor,

acknowledging the importance of accurate knowledge and even turning
the tables and
pointing out that justice must be valued above custom and
opinion:
laughable, Socrates, your thinking that it makes a difference whether or
not
the man was a relative, and not this, and this alone: whether his slayer
was
It is

justified. (4b)

For Socrates, there

is

only one thing to do with someone

thing he has spent a lifetime searching

after:

^See section 5.1.2 below and Weiss (1986,

p.

who

claims to

know

the very

ask him for instruction. At ApoJog}^ 26a,

438
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-

450).

Socrates exhons Meletus to associate
with him and teach him rather
than prosecute him.

Socrates responds to Euthyphro’s claim
to

my gifted

Well then,

L I,

Mimes

is

gnd Mor a

l

ity:

friend,

I

had

know the
best

holy and unholy likewise:

become your

S ocrates’ Request

pupil. (5a)

for a Definitinn

Socrates has a very clear idea of what he
wants to learn from Euthyphro: he wants
a universal definition that identifies holy
and unholy actions as such:

So now in Zeus' name, teP me what you confidently
claimed just now that you
knew: what sort of thing ao you say the pious and
impious are, with respect to
murder and other things as well? Or is not the holy,
just by itself, the same in

And

eveiy action?
Itself,

the unholy, in turn, the opposite of

and does not everything which

is

to be

all

the holy

unholy have a certain

- is

not like

single

character [i5eav] with respect to unholiness?
(5de)

Whatever
of forms,

in

relation this use of

it

here communicates a very definite idea of the kind
of knowledge to be sought

an educational pursuit of

Socrates

is

[i6ea, form, character] has to Plato's eventual
theorv'

,3/ierc.

By

asking for a single character or idea that

making a strong ontological statement about moral

challenges the relativism of the sophists.^
present in

all its

instances,

further that the holy

is

that quality

qualities that sharply

His question suggests that piety

and constant, the same

in all

its

piety,

is

instances.

By

is

a universal,

6de,

we

find

which (an instrumental dative) holy things

are

This ontological sketch of piety allows a definition to be used as a standard or

holy.^

paradigm

for

determining what things are and aren't holy.

Socrates' interest in universals

is

As

merely part of his ethical (and educational) project.

'Sec Section 1.2.3 above and Guthrie (1975, p. 124).
is made by Allen (1971, p.321), reprinted
analysis see Guthrie (1975, p. 121).
^This grammatical point

^

character

Metaphysics
(

definitions.

M

.

See

also:

in

Allen (1984,

p. 30).

For a similar

Ross translation, 1078b 17 - 19: Socrates occupied himself with excellences of
) and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal
Metaphysics I 987b.
,

tas hathikas aretas
.

Aristotle confirmed,^
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Euthyphro has a ve^- simple answer
to Socrates' question:
"the holy
doing now," prosecuting (pursuing)
murder, temple
the fact that Socrates

is

trying to learn

theft,

what the holy

is

and the

and

like.

what

Keeping

how

therefore

is

in

I'm

mind

to be holy,

Euthyphro's reply suggests that
Socrates imitate these holy actions.
The imitation of

examples was a time-honored prescription

showed

chapter

in

Indeed Euthyphro

1).

lor

moral behavior

in

Ancient Greece (as

I

offers as justification for his
behavior the

behavior of gods in poetic myth, adding
that other people have accepted
his proof:

ow Socrates,
ave offered
off

someone

examine the oroof

I give you that this
before to other people to show that
it
guilty of impiety, no matter who he

is

it

is

a dictate of divine law
established right not to

I

let

happens to be. For these same
people worship Zeus as the best and most
righteous of the gods. They agree that
father

angry

had

in turn castrated his father for
similar reasons. Yet me they are
father for his injustice. So they
contradict

at for indicting

my

they say one thing about the gods and
another about me. (5e

The

He

deficits of a poetically

based education are apparent

has failed to separate himself and his situation
from the story

Euthyphro apparently sees no relevant differences
between

in

themselves:

-

6a)

Euthyphro's "proof."

in several

ways.

his prosecution of his father

over the (apparently) accidental death of a slave,
and Zeus’ putting his father in bonds for
the swallowing of his sons.^ Not even the minor
distinction that Zeus

Euthyphro a mortal can shake him
Given Euthyphro's

concessions that holiness

later

concerns man's seance to the gods,

amounts

of his conviction that the

it's

unclear

is

how

myth

a god

and

justifies his action.

a part of justice and that holiness

his "expertise" in holiness

(which

to familiarity with myth) can justify a clearly secular case
involving man's

relationship to man.

Even

if

one ignores the point that the behavior

about holiness (as Euthyphro claims they do) can hardly serve as a
’Robb (1994,

p.

Wei.ss

( 1

986,

p.

of gods

reliable

171) says Euthyphro’s argument by loose analogies and metaphor

orally conditioned mind."
®

is

449

)

makes a

similar point.
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is

who

model

disagree

for

typical of "an

imitation, Euthyphro's failure
to

"know

himself" as different from
the gods

is

difficult to

swallow.

Socrates chokes on Euthyphro's
reply immediately, mocking
his arrogance:
I

wonder

if

why I am

this is

says such tlnngs,

I

End

tt

being prosecuted, Euthvphro because
diff.cul, to accept? Perha^^
Sit why

pi” Sa™T

anspess. But as it is, if even you who
know such things so well LceSt them
people like me must apparently concede.
What indeed are

ourselves agree that

we

we know nothing of them.

Perhaps Euthyphro buys into the ecstatic
model of Greek

can achieve divine or nearly divine

status,’ but his

to say.

religion in

which human beings

achievement of that status

knowing stories and myths about the gods.
Socrates

Se who'

(6ab)

is

based on

believes that the gods are wholly

moral,^° but he seriously questions
the validity of the myths:

Do you

believe that there really

battles,

and other

war among the gods and terrible enmities and
our poets tell, which embellish other
things sacred
to us through the work of our capable
painters, but especially the robe covered
with embroidery that is carried to the
Acropolis at the Great Panathenaea? Are
we, Euthyphro, to say those things are so?
(6bc)
is

sorts of things

Socrates' repeated question about whether
ws? can judge stories about the gods

challenges his interlocutor to include himself

he believes the

stories

and

offers to tell

multitude doesn't know. But Socrates

he
to

is

asking w'hether

Euthyphro

to

human

among

mortals, but

Euthyphro

even more wonderful and amazing things that the
isn't

asking to be amazed by stories about the gods,

beings have a basis for believing such stories.

doubt the truth of the

replies that

stories, his

own

It

never occurs

divine status, or the justification

the stories provide for his actions.

Morgan (1992,
character of the
of a

to

life

ritual

p. 232) thinks that Plato accepts the ecstatic model, but "he replaces the
emotional
process with cognitive content. For Plato, that is, a life aimed at salvation takes the
form

of rational inquiry, a philosophical

life."

Sec ApoJog^v 21b and Phacdo 62d - 63c. MePherran (1985, p. 231 believes that Socrates' refusal
)
see the gods as quarreling and imperfect makes them more rather than less believable;
he thus differs from

the Sophists atheism and the "amazing" accounts of traditional gods.
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Even

If

Socrates were to accept the truth
of Euthyphro's stories, he
cannot accept

Euthyphro's offering of instances to
be imitated as moral wisdom.
Socrates wants an

independent standard

Do you

for behavior;

recall that

hmgs which

I did not ask you to
teach me about one or two of the
are holy, but about that
characteristic [eI8og) itself by

things are holy? For we agreed. I
think, that it is
unholy things ate unholy and holy things
holy.
.

character [l6eav]

is,

so that

I

may

look to

it

all

holy

by one character fiSeal that
Then teach me what this very

.

.

and use

it

as a standard by which,

ould those things which you or someone
else may do be ot that
them to be holy, but should they not be of
that
s

sort,

Again, Socrates’ ethical goals should be
emphasized.

many

which

He

deny

rejects

it.

sort, I

may

affirm

(6de)

Euthyphro's offer of myth

as alleged instances of holy behavior to
be imitated because of doubts about the validity

of moral justification

Scholars

by analogy;

who worry that

definition

is

in this case, Euthyphro’s equating
himself with Zeus.

Socrates has committed himself to the circular
notion that a

necessaiy to determine instances^ miss Socrates’
moral objective which

requires only that the definition be sufficient
forjudging instances.^^ Belief in an ethical
ideal

above and beyond poetic myths and popular opinions

is

central to Plato’s

educational project and the object of Socrates’ pursuit.

ixl .3 First Definition;

The Case

Having been exhorted
Euthyphro says

at

hated by the gods.

to

of th e Missing Standard

produce a standard definition from which to judge

6e that the holy

He

is

what

is

dear to the gods and the unholy what

piety,

is

then confirms the earlier agreement that the holy and unholy are

not the same but opposites. From this

it

follows that the same thing could not both be

"For example: Robinson (1953,

p. 53), Geach (1966, p. 371), and White (1976, p. 21).
"Artfully explained by Santas (1979, p. 1 17) and Benson (1990, p. 34 - 35). Ferejohn
(1982, p. 16)
points out that Socrates did not require the definiens and definiendum to be interchangeable. Beversluis
(1974)
claims that Socrates cannot coherently refuse examples as a response to the "What is X?" question and then

use counterexamples to refute definitions. If the purpose of Socrates "What is XT' question is to discover a
standard for action or judgment, however, examples won't do because Socrates wants to know how the formula
or standard that determined the example, and counterexamples will do because they nullify the reliability of the
standard. Allen (1971, p. 323) also acknowledges that the search
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is

for an ethical standard.

loved and hated by the gods,
a consequence that conflicts
with Euthyphro's earlier claim
that the

gods quarrel and disagree. Socrates
suggests that such disagreement
would

indicate the lack of a standard:

disagreement which causes enmity
and anger about
^
I
about
a
question
nnumber, about
I
whch of two sums is greater, would our disagreement of
cause us to
become angry with each other and make
us enemies? Or would we take
to
counting in a case like that, and quickly
settle our dispute?
Eu.: Of course we would,

mv

•

f

r

Soc.:

would take

to

So

too,

if

we

disagreed about a question of the
larger or smaller

measurement and put an end to our
disagreemenfquickly?

’

we

about heavier

^

and lightoT
Eu.: Certainly.

But what sort of thing would make us
enemies, angry at each other
it and are unable to arrive
at a decision? Perhaps you cannot
say oilhand, but I suggest you consider
whether it would not be the just and
unjust, beautiful and ugly [Ka>vOV Ktti
aiaxpov], good and evil. Are not these
the things, when we disagree about them
and cannot reach a satisfactoiy decision,
concerning which we on occasion become enemies
- you, and I, and all other
men? (7b -d)
Soc.:

if

It

we

disagree about

should be recalled that Socrates

disagree at

disagree

6ab and elsewhere

when they

resists

Euthyphro's claim that the gods quarrel and

in the dialogues. In this passage

he emphasizes that

men

lack referent standards and points to ethical matters as
a place where a

lack of standards leads to disagreement and enmity.
Turning back to the issue of enmity

among the gods,

Socrates concludes that if the gods were to disagree,

similar reasons (7d); but his

doubt about the antecedent

it

would be

of this conditional

is

for

clear.

In the subsequent exchange, Socrates tries to defuse Euthyphro's
poetically-based
belief in

enmity among the gods with rational argument. Euthyphro's quarreling gods

must disagree about what

is

just, beautiful, ugly,

good and so

forth.

Like men, they must

lack standards for these things. Since gods must love what they think good or just, the

same thing could be loved by some gods and hated by
205

others.

That would mean that

a

single action, such as
Euthyphro's prosecution of his
father, could be loved
by

Hephaestus but hated by Cronos and
Uranus making

it,

on Euthy-phro's

Zeus and

definition, both

holy and unholy. Euthyphro's
reply that surely none of the
gods would disagree about the
holiness of his prosecution
(pursuit) misses Socrates' logical
point.
that

right

Euthyphro thinks

and wrong,

just

his case uncontroversial,'-

and unjust, are not even

reliable

The problem with enmity among the gods
a lack of

knowledge of principles

about what

is

holy as

it

could

in

gods

who

makes no difference

occasionally disagree about

when they happen

that

is

It

it

to agree.

indicates a lack of principles or

that could just as easily result
in mistaken agreement

disagreement.” Men, Socrates points out
during his

response to Euthyphro's objection from
8b-9a, don't disagree about whether a
has done wrong should be punished for

But

I

it.

man who

.

imagine that those who disagree - both men
and gods, if indeed the gods do
- disagree over particular things which have been
done.

isagree

They

given actions, some claiming they were done
justly others unjustly. (8e)

Since

men

and,

if

they disagree, gods lack a standard for justice
which enables judgment

of particular cases, they can

Euthyphro holds
erodes beneath him.

He

no

fast to

is

better claim Euthyphro's suit pious than

any action

at all.

conviction in his rightness, even while his logical ground

sure that his prosecution

is

holy, there could be

disagreement about that. But Socrates points out that even

him that

differ over

if

no

Euthyphro could convince

the gods believed Euthyphro's father's action to be wrong,
Socrates would not

all

have learned more about the holy. From an instance, he could not derive
the standard.

Euthyphro then
unanimity

is

tries to

doomed

if

define the holy as what all the gods love, but this appeal to

the gods

still

lack a standard.

A jury could unanimously convict a

Benson (1990, p. 31 - 32) is right to worry about Beversluis, Santas, and Nehamas' claim that
knowledge of the principle is necessary only for discerning controversial cases. Since what makes a case
controversial

is

popular opinion, the lack of controversy

‘^A similar point

is

made by Weiss

(1986,

p.

is

441)

206

no better reason

for action than popular approval

is.

defendant w.thout refemng to any
type of standard that would be
useful

rn

judging other

cases.

^

Miss i ng Para dipm s and Wanderinp Wnrrj^

.4

Although Euthyphro's appeal to unanimity
doesn't solve the basic conflict,

it

unanimous perhaps

itself

it

could by

does give Socrates an idea.

god-loved (10a

it is

The

ff.).

If

the gods' love were always

provide the standard. This possibility

m a discussion about whether the holy
because

in uncontroversial cases (like
his)

is

loved by the gods because

considered

holy; or holy

overall significance of this exchange
to the dialogue

again, to emphasize the importance of
independent standards

is,

it is

is

and the

distinction

between human imperfection and divine power.

The

part of the

first

argument addresses one of Euthyphro's misguided

assumptions about the holy, namely that a thing

The

linguistic distinctions

made

reveal the nature the holy's

And

so

there

is

it is

is

holy precisely because the gods love

here are more natural to Greek than to English,^^
but they

dependence on the gods' love

true here as

loving by those

it.

it

was

who

before:

love

for its holiness:

not because a thing is being loved that
because of the loving that it is being

it is

it; it is

loved. (10c)

This distinction presses Euthyphro to give up the idea (no doubt derived
from his amazing
stories

about the gods) that the gods' love might be capriciously based on arbitrary

preference.^^

fact

by

itself

If

chocolate

is

the favorite ice cream flavor on

make chocolate good and

vanilla

bad?

Is

Mount Olympus, does that

holiness

is

to be conferred

upon

Cohen (1971, p. 168 - 169) offers an edifying interpretation the argument distinguishing active from
passive and inflected passive participles which yields the following conclusion: 'The fact that someone loves x
is an informative and logically sufficient condition for x’s being called a loved thing; but
the fact that x is a loved
thing does not explain why someone loves x. It cannot be anyone’s reason for loving x that x is a loved thing."
'

Allen

97 1

323): "The definition [of piety as what is loved by the gods] still proceeds in a sense by
group of individuals - things, actions, persons (7a) - marked off from the rest by being
loved by the gods. And it is the individuals, not their distinguishing mark, which are identified with holiness. "

example:

it

( 1

,

p.

specifies a
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acs

or persons by the arbitrary
preference of inrperfec. gods?
Having elrmina.ed the

possibility that the

Why

arises:

The

gods love the holy simply because

it

loved, the crucial question

is

do the gods love the holy?

rejection of the possibility
that the gods' love

the Idea that they disagree
about what

is

holy, projects

supematurally perfect and rationally
moral.''
Socrates’ agenda to discover

some

is

arbitrary, like the rejection
of

an image of gods

This rationality and unanimity
forwards

characteristic of actions that

compels the gods to love them; some
standard or ideal beyond
so

lOd, Euthyphro agrees that a thing

at

loved.

is

loved because

it is

makes them holy and
arbitrary preference.'*

holy, not holy because

This statement conflicts with his
proclamation that the holy

gods, because what

because

it is

is

dear to the gods

holy (11a). The passage

is

is

who are

is

what

is

it

it is

dear to the

so just because of their love while
the holy

a bit of a toungue-twister but

And

is

so

points up. like the

Other arguments, a need for an independent
standard of holiness.

The problem with Euthyphro's claim
the gods

is

that

it

that the holy

IS

holy because

eliminates the possibility of an independent
paradigm.

a paradigm not only suggests moral
relativism,

knowable

is

at all. Socrates

it

- even

and the gods'
"

one that

See Vlastos

( 1

,

99 1
p.

,

p.

is

1

lack of such

is

seems to doubt whether humans can ever know
holiness, but he

knowable only

perfect adherence to

Vlastos (1991

The

loved by

destroys the possibility that holiness

certainly not a relativist and, in this dialogue,
the push to confirm

holiness

it is

it,

to the gods

the statement,

"If

-

is

strong.

some paradigm

Given such

a

for

paradigm

the gods love something, then

it is

62).

165) makes a similar point: ”[At EutJiyp/iro 10a, Socrates] is assumine.
that what
on what they, or anyone else, feel about it, than does the nature
of fire

piety IS depends no more
depend on
what anyone, god or man, happens to think that fire is. Piety,
and by the same token, every other virtue, has an
esserice of its own which is as normative for the gods as it
is for us: if determines what is virtue in their
case as
strictly as it does in ours. " As Cohen
( 1971, p. 159) notes, this is also a rejection
of authority; Euthyphro can
appeal to the gods authority but they must appeal to some rational
standard. See also

Burnyeat (1971,

does not
the

two

Cohen (1971, p. 174) shows that although Socrates equivocates on the meaning
commit the fallacy of equivocation in his argument. It is Euthyphro who fails to

sorts of ’because’

and so draws the

faulty inference that god-loved
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is

p.

221).

of hot/ (because), he

distinguish between

equivalent to ’pious’.

holy." can stand. Serious
doubt about Euthyphro's knowledge
of the paradigm also

stands.

Even though human

access to the paradigm,

it

ability to determine holiness
is restricted

can shine over and guide moral
education

The denouement following the argument
confirms
compared

to

Daedalus

who made

Then apparently

my venerated

main

a north

like

star.

thrust. Socrates

is

statues move:

[Kiv5t)ve<)Co],

ancestor,

its

by our limited

my friend, I am even more skillful

inasmuch as he made only

IxeYViivl than

own works moveTher^
seems riot only make my own move but
other people's too. And certainly
the
most subtle feature of my art is that I am
skilled [ao(p6(;] against my will.
For
I
rea
his

I’

y want arguments to stand still, to stand fixed and immovable.
I want that
more than the wealth of Tantalus and the
skill of Daedalus combined,
(lid)

Words move and make no

What

Socrates has done

is

sense unless there are standards, definitions,
to
to destroy Euthyphro’s

smug

illusion of fixity

tie

and

them down.
certainty.

Likewise, Socrates' argument that reverence
entails fear attacks Euthyphro's confidence:

For

you did not know the holy and unholy with certainty,
you could not
possibly undertake to prosecute your aged
father for murder in behalf of a hired
man. You would fear to risk the gods, lest your action
be wrongful, and you would
be ashamed before men. (15d)
if

Euthyphro's lack of fear can only indicate a lack of true
reverence. There

is

a certain

humility required before the gods and also before knowledge;
Euthyphro has confidently

claimed piety and knowledge yet remained unfazed by his inability
to show
Next, the holy

is

either.^®

intimately connected to the just and the significance of the

dialogue for the discussion of snete, and therefore education, becomes
apparent:

Soc.: If the holy is part of the just, it would seem that we must find out
what part of the just the holy is. Now to take an example we used a moment ago,
if you were to ask what part of number the even is, and
what kind of number it is,
would say that it is number with equal rather t han unequal sides. Do you agree?
^"MePherran (1985, p. 234) sees the connection between humility, piety, and philosophical activity:
"This active humility and caution are called for, since as Socrates’ practice of the destructive mode of
the
elenchus has repeatedly demonstrated {^Apology 21b - 23b), that men are constantly in danger of supposing
they have certain knowledge of both divine and

human

improvement. Euthyphro serves as a paradigm case of

matters, and that they are thus in no need of
this danger.
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"

I

Eu.: Yes,

I

do.

me what

part of the just

id not to indict
gs are

Here the holy

is

related to the just

and compared

tellingly to

me

is

holy, so

for impiety,

pious and holy and what are

mathematics which makes
,

distinctions by dear paradigms

and

definitions.

Again Socrates asks Euthyphro

him, and again he requests instruction
in the form of a definition.
definition in a practical situation

- to defend

He

to teach

plans to use the

himself against the charge of impiety.

5J.5 The Pos s ibility of Moral Expertise

The

Idea that Socrates seeks a definition of
piety to be used as a craftsman uses his

- to make judgments

technical knowledge

ff.

where Euthyphro

The pious take

about instances of his

calls piety ministering to the

care of the gods the

is

beneficial

-

-

but

it

supported

is

gods and so compares

way horsemen and huntsmen

animals. Piety, like these technai,

art

it

at

to a techne.

take care of their

differs in that

it

cannot actually

improve the gods. Euthyphro then refines

his idea of ministering, calling

gods (13d). Keeping a techne analogy

in

mind, Socrates compares such service with

service to a physician

at helping

which would aim

him

readily definable products,

in the name of Zeus, tell me: What
produce, using us as servants? (13e)

amazing

worth recalling

stories

a service to the

farmers,

and generals

all

have

Euthyphro cannot name the gods' product.

Then

It's

it

or her to achieving the goal of

But while doctors, shipbuilders, house-builders,

health.

12e

at this

about the gods'

is

that fine product

which the gods

juncture that while Euthyphro's memorization of

likes

and

dislikes has left

him without an idea

of their

product, Socrates' contemplation of the god's riddle has sent him on a definite mission to
serve the god.

At ApoJog}' 23a, Socrates says
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specifically that he questions those he

thinks wise "on behalf of
the

help the

God and

prove

God" and when

i
It

seems to him that they are not
wise,

Indeed, Socrates’ examination
of Euthyphro

it."

parcel of his senrice ,o ,he
god.

Does

mean

this

,ha, Socrates can

name

is

"I

and

part

the gods' product

whereas Euthyphre cannot? No,
nccessanlyd* Socrates se„es the
god by investigating
the oracle's proclamation
that he

w.ses, of men, by maintaining
h.s humility despite that

ts

proclamation, and by refuting others
so that they

may achieve

a similarly wise state of

acknowledged ignorance.^ Socrates'
mission encourages others

The one product
The

that the gods need

human

details of Socrates' mission

approached before wandering

may

help in achieving
provide a

off (see 14c), but

it's

due

is

to

"know themselves."

beautiful

to the point

human

souls."

Euthyphro

impossible to say w-here Socrates

thought him to be headed. Euthyphro's
actual path leads him to another
definition of the
holy as knowing

model

IS

how to say and do acceptable prayem and

analogous to a techne

judge particular instances

-

;

piety

in this

is

knowledge of how

and give
for

I

it

to the

to pray

gods

and

"rightly."

has been found.

for civil courts.

wony about

Socrates quickly shows (14c

ff.)

natural

may be
The

indicative of Plato's belief

initial

promise of this definition

a lack of moral standards.

that Euthyphro's suggestion that piety

sacrifice boils

down

to a

knowledge of how

Moral terminology has crept back

in.

is

to ask from

though no paradigm

How do we know what they need? How could they need

anything

McPherran (1985, p. 228) says that with respect to Socrates' question about the product
of the eods:
we cs/7/iot k/iow (other than that it is good)."
Socrates seems to see philosophy as a pious act at Apology 29e - 30b,
36c, 38a.
See Taylor (1982, p. 113): Plainly the gods don’t need human help in creating
and maintaining the
world, assuming those to be divme tasks. But there is one good product which
they can't produce

submit, that

without

to

case prayers and sacrifices. That this late
definition

was an improper subject

soon gives way to the familiar

Again the

some body of knowledge which allows us

could not cover Euthyphro's prosecution of
his father
that impiety

sacrifices (14b).

human

assistance, namely,

good human

souls.

"
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from us (15a)?

than wha,

is

Euthyphro counters that we must
give what

beneficial,

Euthyphro seems

and again he associates

satisfied to

this

have completed the

Socrates, for his part, reacknowledges
his aporis

is

acceptable to them, rather

with what

circle

is

loved by them.

and ended up where they

started,

and suggests they begin the

investigation again:

ZZ

certainty, you could not
i
possibly undertake
to prosecute your aged
father for murder in behalf of
a hired

rZ

Zu
ow

kn°''

Socrates

T""

before men. But as it
with certainty what the holy is and

is right,

and

The two men’s
Euthyphro has no true

no

hurries off fearlessly

more

because

not. (15d)

is

devoid of

as a popularity contest judged

what they
is

like,

and

fear,

he's so sure that

he

is

Socrates, by contrast,

by gods

who have

are irrational, even "amazing,"

an expert on these gods because he knows
in the stories' validity.^'

he distinguishes himself from the multitude as the
gods'

Euthyphro accepts the conclusion that the holy

for a definition of piety

and so he declines

is

his prosecution.

about them than anybody and has every confidence

His reverence
favorite.

on

behavior and preferences. Euthyphro

stories

it is

desire to find standards to justify
his actions, because he doesn't

particular standard, disagree about

in their

what

be wrongful and you
confident that you think you

different perspectives are indicative
of their respective pursuits.

Euthyphro sees piety

exist.

am

Euthyphro does think he knows what
the holy

Socrates' invitation

think they

is, I

is

what

is

dear to the gods

dear to them. He's free to pursue ... his father.
is

dissatisfied.

and yet they stopped

The discussion repeatedly showed the need
short of finding one.

Weiss (1986,

The idea

that

we must

p. 451 ) connects the gods' enmity with the importance of poetry:
"Gods who disagree
have no absolute standards or who do not strictly adhere to objective principles,
and who
are therefore susceptible to human influence. With such gods,
it becomes important to become thoroughly
versed in legends about them so that one may please them and prosper,
and it makes sense to speak of a man,
like Euthyphro, being an expert on holiness.”

are gods

who

either
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leam what

is

dear to the gods by uncritically accepting
dubious stories that come

through poets and rhapsodes (see section
3.1)
declares that he will not willingly give

by Euthyphro

up

moment when

at a crucial

is

hardly satisfactory for Socrates.

he learns (15d) and yet he

until

feels

filtered

He

abandoned

Meletus’ suit threatens his mission. Socrates'

discussion with Euthyphro does not reveal the
substance of a moral definition or

paradigm

for piety,

but

it

points

up

their existence

moral education. In the end, Euthyphro
refuses to

abandon

his pursuit of

flees

wisdom

and importance as guiding objectives

wisdom

in

to pursue his father while Socrates

in order to flee unjust prosecution.^^

5.2 Educational Relationships

The Euthyphro and Lysis
the gods love

and the

latter

way, rather the Lysis

is

human

love.

about philia, the former concerns

The two dialogues

are rarely connected in this

conventionally compared to Plato's later dialogues on love:

Symposium and Phaedrus.
Euthyphro than the

are both dialogues

later

I

submit that the Lysis has more in

common with the

dialogues on love because the phiiia considered here

intimately connected to questions of education, teaching,

and Euthyphro explore the phiiia appropriate

and the pursuit

to the pursuit of aiete,

is

of arete.

which

is

Lysis

the

phiiia inherent in the word 'philosopher.'

5,2.1 Philosoph y. Friendship,

and the Pursuit

A few scholars have recognized
Socrates' accusers;

Knowledge

of

Wisdom

Lysis' brotherhood with Euthyphro as a reply to

one that answers the second charge that he corrupted the youth.^^

is needed to justify Euthyphro 's and Meletus’ suits. See Benson (1990, p. 36 - 37)
was no doubt encouraged by debate about Lysis authenticity and dating, which
peaked among nineteenth century German scholars. Ast aind Socher rejected it for its sophistry and eristic.

of piety

^‘This interpretation

Others placed it before Socrates death. Eventually, Taylor (1948) cited Aristotle’s references to Lysis as
evidence for its authenticity, which is agreed upon by nearly all 20th century scholars. See also, the appendix.
”TTiese include Bluck (1949) and Levin (1971).
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Indeed the Lysis' iusx half
(203a

212a)

-

should speak to a boy. The
context

between and man and
'Weir

I

a

boy with

is

,s

offered as a demonstrat.on
of

sunousis.

a traditional

how a man

educational relationship

definite erotic overtones.^®

said 'what an absolutely
noble

Hippothales.

Come

and splendid love it is you've found.
a demonstration [e7ri8ei^ail
of what vou've
want to find out whether youlTi
l;';!

on, give

giving these fellows here.

I

me

lover

[mi6iKCOV], TO

Eventually,

it

is

Socrates

who gives

his face or to others.

(204e

the demonstration to Hippothales
and a crowd of

others, but his demonstration does
not

conform to the conventional idea of
sunousia.

Socrates' demonstration questions
the goals

and pursuits not only of the boys

Lysis and Menexenus, but implicitly
those of the

Hippothales, the sophist

Ctesippus, Lysis' parents and paidagogoL
and even the poets and purveyors of proverbs.
I

have argued that the Euthyphro

is

a dialogue

concerns the pursuits of educators; specifically,

The

first

words Socrates hears

coming from." The

making

first

straight for the

became the schools

it

in the dialogue are

thing Socrates says

Lyceum (203ab).

of Plato

about individual pursuits. The LysE

and

It

is

questions the goals of those pursuits.

"Where

are

you

off to?

that he's on his

way

from the

may

Where

are

you

Academy and

only be coincidence that these

sites later

Aristotle, respectively, but at the dramatic time
they

were

gymnasia and no doubt known as philosophical hangouts.^®
The Lysis compares the
philosophical pursuit with the aims of traditional educators.
It is

an interesting feature of Lysis that Socrates both asks

for

and

offers a

demonstration rather than a definition of (what amounts to) teaching.
Eventually the

Marrou (1956,

p. 29 - 30) says that Sunousia "was to provide classical education with its
material
method. For the men of ancient times this type of love was essentially educative: kai
cpjxarej^pa/dcuan -- "It’s aim is to educate" - as Plato says (at Symposwm 209c)." See
also chapter 1.

conditions and

its

All translations of Lysis are by

Watt (1987) unless otherwise noted.
For more on the connection between gymnasia and philosophy, see chapter
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1.

-

"What

IS it?”

question will be asked of

in the spirit of

'friend' or friendship’,

Eutfyphro, Uches. or Chamides.

but even then,

The L}sis

is

it

is

not asked

not a definitional

dialogue in the conventional sense
of an attempt to define one of
the virtues. Those
dialogues sought a paradigm or maxim
that could serve as the knowledge
technical conception of virtue. In the
Eurhy-phro,
a definition of piety, he could use
that

actions

and even

knowledge

if

Euthyphro could be prosecuted

The conventional model

he learns a

false

Laches or Charmides.

The repeated

no

Lysis,

is

Socrates could learn

judgments about

Euthyphro

standard for piety from Euthyphro,

better in

which an expert

Euthyphro than

failure of "experts

on

it

did in

virtue” to transmit their

most willing Socrates cannot help but create doubt about
whether
at all.

or ever has been

one

may be analogous

Arete

not learned like one. Accordingly Socrates

that he

reliable

of a teacher-pupil relationship in

can be learned by conventional means
it is

make

if

is

virtue

to a techne,

but

analogous to a teacher, but he denies

in the conventional

(^Apology 33ab). Even in

where Socrates admits expertise of the subject and actually volunteers

to judge

Hippothales' w^ork,^^ the philosopher refuses to teach his knowledge to the
others.

Teaching, friendship, love, and philosophy

all

seem

to be rolled together for

Socrates, w'ho reveals the scope of his analysis of friendship not least by referring
to his

pupils as "friends.” Throughout the earliest dialogues, but in the Lysis particularly,

Socrates seems to be rethinking the educational relationship.

dialogues over

who

is

the teacher and

^'Hippias, by contrast, could teach
Ion’s mistake

was

of a

for corrupting the old.

transmits his knowledge to the student fares

to a

to

clear that

component

to defend himself in court against
the charge of impiety. At

5a-c, Socrates even jokes that

knowledge

was

-

in failing to differentiate

who

the student

tcciwdj; his mistake

is

The confusion

in itself instructive. Socrates'

was equating those tedwai with

between the arete of Homer's heroes and

”Sce Lysis 204bc and Syniposiu/n 177d.
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in these

his

own.

arete.

instruction” of others
like

philosophy

itself

is

always coincidental with his

own

seems to be a kind of hunt. Socrates

pursuit of wisdom. Education,
isn't

even the undisputed

leader of this hunt, "the questioner
must follow the answerer wherever he
leads." he

Euthyphro

at 14c.

Socrates docs have an idea of the
direction he wants to travel,

however, and he does

tiy to get others to

The Lysis opens with
his

own

pursuits

you

a

little

when Hippothales

As
are

I

help him find the path.

debate about direction." Socrates

busy following

is

begs him to detour:

approached them, Hippothales spotted me and
Where are you coming from?'

said, 'Socrates,

off to?
^

^

Academy and going straight

to the

replied

'You should come here. he said,
be worth it, you know.' (203ab)
'

us?

If

'straight to us. Aren't

where

Lyceum,

you going

'

I

to join

It'll

education and philosophy are some kind of a hunt,

it is

already clear that the objects of

that hunt are different for Socrates that they
are for Hippothales. Socrates

the

tells

young men, although Hippothales

than to the Lyceum.

When

is

not pursuing

says he should be heading straight to them rather

he says that the detour will be worth

it,

there

is

a double

meaning. Hippothales thinks Socrates will enjoy the physical beauty
of the boys, but
Socrates enjoys their souls

- via

inquiry

-

rather than their bodies. Hippothales

and

Socrates are described as hunters, respectively, at 206a and 218c. Whereas
Hippothales'

quarry

is

the boy Lysis, however, Socrates

Love
for Lysis, in

or philia

is

is

tracking the truth about friendship.

the central motivation in both kinds of hunt. Hippothales' love

accordance with traditional sunousia,

as the erastes

and Lysis the paidlka.

is erotic.^^

Hippothales

is

referred to

There are clear contrasts between Hippothales'

eros for Lysis and the simpler philia shared by Lysis and Menexenus. Socrates exhibits

P/iae^ws, likewise, opens with Socrates asking Phaedrus where he has come from, and is heaidcd.
1 19 - 120) points out that erotic terminology is used to describe Hippothales’ love.

^'Watt (1987, p.
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phiha

as well, but

interlocutors,

who

it is

a phiJia primarily directed at

wisdom and only secondarily

at his

help him to pursue that primaiy goal.
Socrates' philia for wisdom

is

so

strong that he often wears out his
interlocutor: "Since you seem to be
lazy and soft." he
tells

Euthyphro

at 11c, "I will

come

At 193e. Socrates exhorts Laches

phiha then
"I shall

is

to

your aid and help you teach me about the
holy."

to display courage

and endurance

in inquiry. Socrates'

inherent in his being a philosopher and his
commitment

not willingly give up until

Whether

learn,"

I

he declares

at

unquestioned.

is

Euthyphro 15d.

or not Socrates' philia can be clearly
distinguished from that of the

others, the objects of his philia most certainly
can.^^

The problem

is

not so

much

the

general object of the others' desire, but rather the
inadequacy of understanding on which

they base their particular
of the youths has his

context) which boy
beautiful

own

is

opinion about

tis

for

ho kaios

example,

[xiq

and

certainly

it's

pointed out that each

6 Ka?ioq] which can mean

most beautiful, or more generally, what

a most laudable goal

is

At Lysis 204b,

desires.^'

is

The

the beautiful.

one of Socrates' own. What

is

(in

fine or

disturbing

here, aside from the fact that the youths are confining their
pursuit of beauty to beautiful

boys,

is

beyond
boy

that

it

doesn't faze

them

in the least that they

their emotional preferences.

Hippothales

his favorite, perhaps because he has

is

his choice.

While beauty

is

no

is

have no single conception of beauty

even reluctant to

definite idea of beauty

tell

Socrates which

by which

to justify

a laudable goal, the youths are so busy pursuing beautiful

boys that they end up ignoring the beautiful
allows one's desires to be seduced by

itself.

Losing sight of one's higher goals

mundane goods

like

wealth, fame or political power.

p. 51 and 1964, p. 92 - 104) attempts to define' Socrates pJii/ja as educative.
^*See Gould (1963, p. 63): "[Socrates] had a unique vision of the disastrous inadequacy of the

^^Friedlander (1958,

understanding on which most
yet here

we are,

most of

men base

their desires.

us, drifting straight

toward

it

Unhappiness is (by definition)
lemmings to the sea."

like
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that

which

we do

not want,

It is

his

unique aim, the abstract idea of moral

arete,

that determines Socrates'

educational method. The Bathyphro
and other dialogues make clear that insofar
as

conventional teaching

measurement, even

is

possible,

eristic

standards for arete.

it

offers standards; so the teaching
of mathematics,

argumentation

The educational

directed pursuit of arete.

is

project, then,

Socrates then

Lysis,,

Socrates

is

is

is

a not a teaching of arete but a

Plato offers dramatic evidence,

that Socrates’ pursuit of the greater ideals
of
arete.

But there are no readily available

possible.

the paradigm of

revealed as a

human

new kind

if

not argument, for the theory

has resulted in Socrates exemplifying
arete that Plato offers to his readers. In

of teacher: an ideal guide

and companion

in

the individual pursuit of arete.

^2

Rgsemblances among Socrates Sophists, and Pederasts
.

One need

not look beyond Aristophanes' CJouds to realize that the
charge of

corrupting the youth was based on a perception of Socrates as
a teacher. Indeed

Aristophanes portrait seems to be a caricature of every misguided educator
known to

Athens, rolled into one and given the name

’Socrates.’

Plato certainly

felt

that Athenian

worries about sophists, pederasts, and traditional educators were well-founded.

wanted to distinguish Socrates from these people, however, and

He

ultimately, he did

it

by

distinguishing Socrates’ aims.

Sophists were the object of

much
upon

much

admiration (see Hippias Minor

ire in

Athens (see

how people

felt

their personal values. Anytus’ complaint in the

Meno 92b ff.) and also

about them depended laigely

Meno

is

to the tradition of education via sunousia within a small social
fact that

many sophists were

based on their challenge

and

familial circle.

foreigners exacerbated his worry, but Socrates

excluded from the charge and

in fact

Anytus participated
218

was not

in Socrates’ indictment in

The

399bc. Indeed Socrates' challenges to
familial educational authority

in

Lysis range from

hypothetical questions about Lysis' parents'
love for and control over him (207e
to a physical battle with parentally-appointed
guardians at the

Even

-

21 Oe),

end of the dialogue.^^

m Plato's decidedly positive portrait of Socrates, there is something

to

make

parents

uneasy.

At Metaphysics

V 1004b22

philosophy but that they
purpose, or plan in

purpose or aim

is

differ in proairesis

always different, not

and

eristic

but rather on what can be

probability through thick

it is

right is easily,

biou [TCpoaipeaiq

pio\)], the choice,

least in its

argument

depth and

— skills

fixity.

The

sophists

focused not on Socrates' ideal of what

to

appear plausible. "Never mind the truth

and thin

in

every kind of speech"

Euthydemus
and

false or true,”

teaching his students to

good or

sophism closely resembles

made

derision in the Phaedrus.

whether

Aristotle says that

Despite Socrates' manifest resemblance to the sophists,
his

life.

specialized in rhetoric

is,

ff.,

is

is

a sophistic

said to be able to refute

right.

maxim

cited with

any argument

Aristotle derides Protagoras at Rhetoric

make wrong appear

~ pursue

1402a23

Socrates' ignorance about

for

what

is

but mistakenly, confused with the sophists' dismissal of the

objective existence of such concepts. For the sophists, standards for good and bad

rest in

popular opinion: the vote of the jury or the adulation of an audience. These were the
things that brought wealth

^''Bolotin (1979, p.

Socratic education,
p.

it

is

85

-

and power.

86) argues that Socrates encourages rebellion

why

not difficult to see

198) says that Athenians

saw

Euthydemus 272a.
Dover (1971, p. 55 56)
Lysimachus

viii.,1

1

in

Lysis: "Given this aspect of

corruption of the young."

Robb (1994,

translation.

cites several

ascribed to Antiphon, a fifth-century exercise
ingenuity.

it

Socrates' method as a threat to the established social power of boys’ parents.

Phaedrus 272de, Hamilton
-

parents might consider

says: "and

I

in

examples

of sophistic relativism, including the Tetralogies,'

presenting both sides of a case with equal conviction and

thought that they were simply philosophizing about the case and

putting the case for the opposite." Isocrates xv, 15 faces the accusation 'that
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I

can make wrong appear

right.'

Those who joined Socrates
his

m rejecting sophistic relativism typically did not

acknowledged ignorance about the true
nature of the good. Rather they
looked

poetry and myth for paradigms and
precedence for action. Euthyphro, as
section 5.1., weaves an analogy
between his

own

I

showed

share

to

in

case and one drawn from epic. Ion.
too.

takes his memorization of Homer's
poetry to be an inventory of his
personal values and
skills (section 3.1).

again, his aim

is

Socrates

is

given to the analysis of poetiy and
proverbs as well but.

different from that of the literary
traditionalists.

Well, Euthyphro, should vve examine this
in turn to see if it is true? Or
should we
et It go, accept It from ourselves
or anyone else without more ado,
and agree that a
thing IS so if only someone says it is? Or
should we examine what a person means
when he says something? (9e)

Euthyphro and Ion accept the

superficial

as moral authority.^^ Socrates,

by

analyzed

contrast, treats

in the process of trying to

authority.

meaning

of poetry

and prophecy,

treating

them

words as puzzles to be questioned and

understand the greater ideal that

is

the true

Poets, like Socrates, are guides along the path toward
wisdom:

think

we ought

to follow the path which we turned along before,
and look at the
question according to the precepts of poets, who are, so to
speak, our fathers and
guides in wisdom. (213e - 214a)
I

In the language of Lysis,

when

it is,

literary traditionalists

at least in Socrates' eyes,

mistake literature for the ultimate good

merely instrumental to that goal.

Part of Socrates complaint about sophists, traditionalists,
that their aims are ultimately self-serving.
activity

is

criticizes

and even pederasts

is

Their educational activity, like their personal

designed to bring pleasure, glory, or wealth to themselves. At 206a, Socrates

Hippothales' aim in pursuing Lysis:

See Robb 1994, p. 170) and Despland (1985, p. 22):
mean what they mean.
[words] have a sort of divine sanction
(

.

.

^^See section 5.3.4 and Euthyphro

disagreement with the poet

who was

12a,

'Traditionalists hold on to the

where Socrates uses

logic

and counterexamples

unwilling to insult Zeus, since "where there
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view

that

words

or absolute authority."

is

fear there

is

in his

also reverence."

'

boy you’re talking

of, what you've said and
sung of him will
eulogies in honor of you as victor,
in that you got

hrfno“v““'’l

®

iT
°u
^
be slips through your fingers, the
greater the eulogies
von'
ve pronounced on your boy have
y
been, the greater will the blessings
of beauty
^
and goodness seem to be of which you've
been deprived, and so you'H^eem
ridiculous. Any man who knows
what’s what when it comes to love,
my friend,
does not praise the boy he's in love with
until he's caught him. (205e 206a)

Besides showing that Hippothales

is

interested in his ovvm social

benefits rather than the welfare of the boy,
this passage

the pursuit of wisdom.

If

wisdom

of Ignorance will be all the
until you've

more

is

and probably sexual

makes an

implicit statement about

pursued with an eye to personal

difficult

and disappointing.

achieved your goal before you claim

its

It is

gloiy,

much

an admission

better to wait

benefits. Socrates fixes his gaze

on

the ultimate goal and avoids both distractions
of intermediate benefits and the temptation
to claim

knowledge by

virtue of

an incompletely understood authority.

5 .2,3 Friendship in Education
Socrates' view of the teacher-student relationship

is

necessarily affected

by

his

unconventional view of worthwhile pursuits and his rejection of conventional
authority.
Since Socrates rejects

all

authority except the absolute authority of the good

educational relationships will recognize only that authority as well.
point

is

made

that tutors

(

paidagogoi ) and teachers are

social standing. Socrates, however, considers himself

no authority based on
authorities

of social hierarchies. His

(209a),'*^

first

is

Lj/s/s 208c, the

Lysis' masters despite their lower

At 212a, he

their experience. Lysis,

treats the

by contrast,

reason for not having freedom

is

that he

is

is

boys as

very conscious

not of legal age

but he soon admits that his restrictions are based on a lack of knowledge (209c).

^’Bolotin (1979, p. 123) notes that

(Solon)

his

one of the boys (223b) and claims

age, knowledge, or social status.

on friendship based on

At

itself,

parallel to Lysis' initial reliance

ancestral authorities

who

.

.

.

Mencxenus’ "unquestioning trust in the Athenian poet and lawgiver
his parents' "wisdom" and love. The poets are themselves

on

have "legislated" our most comprehensive opinions."

221

Socrates’ rejection of conventional
authority (including poets, parents,
social

standing, and popular success),
enhances his focus on the authority of the
good with
respect to

which we

are all deficient in our knowledge.
Socrates treats Euthyphro,

Hippias, and other alleged experts as
authorities until he realizes that their
expertise about
arete

other

is

just that

human

- alleged.

In the absence of such an expert,
teacher, student,

and

all

beings have an equal claim to authority:
none. They are friends.

Another educational convention Socrates

rejects

is flattery.

Flattery aims at

pleasing rather than understanding and, at the
same time, artificially quells the natural
desire to be good.

them.

be of

An
little

At 14b, Euthyphro confuses pleasing the gods with
being of

educator whose aim
service to them.

is

to entertain

The problem with

may

service to

likewise please his or her students but

flattery is that

it

discourages people from

understanding and refining their desires by giving them what
they think the want. At
Goigias 463b
healthy

when

ff„

Socrates calls rhetoric a form of flattery which makes the
soul seem

in fact

it is

not.

Accordingly, while Socrates admits

beauty makes him deserved of the
KOtyocGoc^,

aristocratic title

is

206c that

Lysis'

kalos te kagathos [koc^6(^ ts

handsome and good], he hardly assumes

Hippothales, on the other hand,

at

that the

boy has achieved

arete.

so busy praising Lysis that his flattery has

stunted the intellectual growth of them both. Hippothales
since he constantly sings poetiy praising Lysis. Ctesippus

is

thought a fool by his peers

mocks him:

How isn't it ridiculous that a man who is a lover and thinks of virtually nothing
but the boy he's in love with should have nothing original to say that even a boy
himself might not come up with? (205bc)
Socrates warns Hippothales that his flattering verse can't be good poetry

poet himself (206b).

When

everyone meets

at

206e
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ff. it

if it

becomes obvious

harms the

that the

situation

IS

doing no one any good. Lysis

is

descnbed as being

whether to go and talk to Socrates.
He looks around
preserve an unaffected appearance
keeps

hides in the crowd, afraid to even

in

a loss" [littopEt] about

obvious cunosity, but his desire
to

him from the inquiry

annoy the boy much

"at

less

at first.**

Hippothales

challenge him

in discussion.

Socrates’ rejection of the conventional
educational staples of flattery

and authority

points to the overarching need for
humility in the pursuit of wisdom.
Socrates
for his personal

21b,21d,22d;

disavowal of knowledge, examples of which
can be found
C7ct^v>x 506a, 509a;

at

insincere,*’

than Aristotle recognized Socrates’ disavowal
as having greater implications
for Socrates himself Topics
(

acknowledged ignorance as an
fact that

famous

Mt/ro 71b; Euth}-phro 15d; and Hippias
Major

304b. While some commentators have taken
this disavowal to be

knowledge than

is

none

less

for

183b7-8). The fact that Socrates saw his

essential asset in his search for

he spends most of the early dialogues trying to
get

wisdom

is

confirmed by the

his interlocutors to progress to

the same level.

An

assumption of wisdom represents the

failure to appreciate

wisdom's stature as

the ultimate authority and goal and, worse, destroys the
desire to pursue that goal by
creating the false impression that

it

has been achieved. "As

because of your wealth of wisdom," charges Socrates
his interlocutors in

an

effort to bring

them

at

to the point

I

said,

you

are lazy

and

Euthyphro 12a. Socrates

soft

refutes

where they can begin leaming,^^ to

makes a similar analysis of Lysis’ behavior here.
Beck (1964, p. 192) and famously, Robinson (1953, p. 8

^’Bolotin (1979, p. 79)

'^For example,

- 9). Santas
(1979, p. 70 - 72)
rebuts Robinson with the help of Vlastos (1991 p. 84) who marvels at how
Socrates' disavowal, "may be
voiced at the conclusion of an entirely successful elenctic argument in which Socrates
has to all appearance,
proved his thesis to the hilt (cf. Got^tas 508e - 509a)." Irwin (1995, p.
28) says Socrates' claim to human
,

wisdom may simply amount

to a claim that he recognizes that his convictions do not really count as knowledge.
See Dewey (1993, p. 42): {The} beginning of learning {is} a consciousness of ignorance which
follows upon convictions of inconsistency or self-contradiction, and which proceeds through
particulars to the
discovery of the universal or unity which alone can give consistency of meaning." Burnycat (1971,
p. 13) claims

that Socrates’ refutations are designed "to free the other person’s

him trying the Socratic approach to the problem

at

hand."
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mind from the mistaken

beliefs

which stop

help them ,o appreca.e w.sdom
as a form.dabie and
compellmggoal and. hopefully, ,o
get

them

to join

him

in the pursuit of

it.

When

Lysis admits his ignorance at
210d,

Socrates considers his demonstration
to Hippothales on

complete.

He has achieved

how to speak

to the

young

his goal as a teacher.

This Socratic image of teacher
as generator of ignorance

is

an ironic

reversal of the

conventional model of teaching as the
transmission of information from the
knowing
teacher to the unknowing student.
Meno's characterization of Socrates as
a torpedo fish
that infects others with

its

ignorance (80ab) seems

much more

appropriate than calling

Socrates a teacher. Given the nature of
the Socratic pursuit of arete, however,
difficult to see

how any other sort

it is

of teacher could help. In the absence
of knowledge that

can be transmitted, ridding someone of the
obstacles that keep him or her from
knowledge
IS

perhaps the greatest service a teacher or friend
can do;

among

friends. Lysis

wants Menexenus

I

said,

a kind of love to be spread

have Socrates' benefit as well:

what you've been saying to me to Menexenus too.'
tell him that, Lysis. I'm sure you
were paying

'Socrates, say

So

to

it's

'You can

close

attention.'
'I

certainly was,' he replied.

'Well then,'
it

all clearly,

and

if

I

remember it as well as you can in order to tell him
any of it, ask me again the next time you run into

said, 'try to

you

forget

me.'(211ab)

When

Lysis insists that Socrates speak to Menexenus,

who

is

described as eristic

or combative in argument, Socrates tests Lysis' motivation
by asking whether he hopes

Socrates

u ill make

Socrates to teach

a fool of himself w'ith

Menexenus

Socrates retorts that

Menexenus

of his teacher, Ctesippus,

There

is

a lesson,

is

Menexenus (211bc).

presumably the same lesson he

a "formidable opponent"

who soon

Lysis replies that he wants

after interrupts

and asks

and points out the presence
to join the conversation.

a sense of challenge in this scene; the rivalry between Lysis
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just taught Lysis.

and Menexenus

reflects Socrates' rivalr>^

with the sophists/' There

is

telling

the extent that he wants to better or
embarrass his friend, he
self-centered sort of love.

Ignorance, he

is

To

behaving

the extent that he wants

like a true Socratic friend

ambiguity in Lysis' request: to
is

showing a misdirected and

Menexenus

acknowledge

to

and aiding Menexenus

in his

his

own

pursuit of the good.

Much
competition

is

made

among

essential part of

of the rivalry in Lysis

and Menexenus' friendship and indeed

friends can easily degenerate into a shortsighted
battle for esteem.

an educative friendship, however,

himself. Again, the distinction
better than they were, not to

is

become

At 207c, Socrates brings out the

I

looked

'We

at

for

both friends

better than the other friend.

which they measure themselves should not be each
arete.

challenging one's friend to better

based on aim. The goal

is

An

is

to

become

The standard

other, but rather

against

an objective ideal of

friends' rivalry:

Menexenus and

said,

'Menexenus, which of you

is

the elder?'

disagree about that, he replied.

Would you

dispute which of you

is

the nobler, then?'

I

asked.

'Of course,' he said.

'And the same goes

for

They both laughed

at that.

'Anyway,

I

shan't ask

which

is

the more handsome.'

which of you

is

the wealthier,'

I

said, 'because you're

friends, aren't you?'

'Of course,' they replied.

'And friends are supposed to have all things in common, so in that at least
there will be no difference between you, provided you're telling the truth about
your friendship. (207c)

Friends are supposed to have

compete not only about which
settle

is

all

things in

common, but

Lysis

and Menexenus

more handsome, but also about things that seem easy

to

such as age and wealth. Socrates laments that he doesn't get the chance to ask

which

is

more wise or

"Who may

just,

but his

be represented by the

final

eristic

comment seems

Menexenus and
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best applied to those

his contentious teacher

Ctesippus (see 204c).

charactenstics rather than easily determined
worldly qualities like age, looks,

monetary wealth.

If

Lysis

and Menexenus

are truly friends in the educative,
Socratic

sense, they will have the ultimate goal of
apete in common.''®

there will be

achieved

it

With

respect to arete,

no difference between them; they will both acknowledge

and

will share their pursuit of

and

it.

that they have not

In this sort of friendship, competition and

cooperation coexist in the effort to achieve an external
goal, the same

way teammates

share the goal of winning a game.^®

5,2.4

The Ro

l

e of

P hilia

in

Kducation

Having reworked the educative relationship into a kind of
examines

how

philia operates in this relationship.

He

friendship, Socrates

begins by asking Lysis about his

parents’ love. Lysis agrees that since his parents love him, they
must

happy
he

as possible,

and he agrees that a man

desires. This naive

isn't

happy when

want him

he's not

to be as

allowed to do what

conception of happiness as doing what one desires prompts

Socrates to challenge Lysis with the following:

'Then

your father and mother love you and desire your happiness,
absolutely clear that they must do their best to make you happy.'
if

it's

'Of course,' he said.

you do what you want and don't scold you at all or stop you
from doing what you desire.
'Heavens, no, Socrates, there are lots and lots of things they stop me doing.'
'So they

let

(207e)

This exchange involves some exaggeration and feigned naivete on Socrates part, but the
issue hits veiy close to

home

for Lysis

and the other boys

present, piquing their interest in

the relationship between love and discipline.

'“McTighe (1983, p. 70) claims that the condition of friendship at 207cl 1 expresses doubt about
whether the proverb is true, not whether the boys are telling the truth. He attributes this to an error in the text.
But they also
’’Jaeger (1943, p. 58 - 58) recognizes that friends "need one another for mutual benefit
strive to attain the same ends and therefore compete with one another."
.
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.

.

This discussion

is

easily interpreted as a challenge
to the sovereign authority of
the

parents over their children, and in a sense,
issue,

however,

is

what you want. More

happiness

any

is

desires,

him

if

your parents love you, they

and loving someone

is

let

him

is

real

initial

will let

you do

drive the chariot,

work the loom and

never seriously challenged; what

— when

is

desiring their happiness, then (since Lysis’

doing whatever one wants. Discipline

sort of friend

The

accurately, however, the conditional says
that // happiness

parents love him) they should
parents' love for

reject arbitraiy authority.

the aim or purpose of discipline.
Superficially, and from Lysis’

point of view, the conditional seems to
say:

doing what one

does

it

is

is

questioned

in order

-

the value of the goal, what one wants,

Lysis initial explanation for his lack of freedom

is

is

so on.

Lysis’

the idea that

for parents, teachers, or

is

questioned.

based on law; he

is

age. Socrates points out that legally inferior slaves are
given freedoms he isn't

not yet of

and

eventually Lysis connects freedom to knowledge:

So, Lysis, what on earth can be the reason for their not stopping
you in
those cases, whereas they do stop you in the ones we were speaking of just now?
'I

suppose

it's

because

I

know about

’

those things but not the others,’ he

replied.
'Well,' I said, 'Excellent! So your father is not waiting for you to come of
age to trust everything to you, but on the day he considers that you know better
than himself, he'll trust both himself and his property to you.'
'I

The

expect

so,'

he

familiar platonic interplay

said.

(209bc)

between knowledge, happiness, and the proper aim

soon gives way to an issue always lurking the shadows of these discussions; the

between

real

knowledge and the appearance

and even the Great king
seemed

to

of Persia

would

of

trust

it.

Lysis goes

them with

on
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conflict

to say that his neighbors

their affairs "as long as

him more expert than they" (210a). Having already considered the

emphasis on seeming over being, the examples used

in life

we

sophists'

in this passage reveal serious potential

for abuse.

Shoveling

salt into the king's

soup or putting ashes into rather than
around

his

son's eyes could be the actions of
sham-experts, or just as easily, true experts
with dubious

So while technical knowledge may

goals.

for

what

good and

is

evil is

inspire trust, a

knowledge

of or at least respect

necessary to truly merit trust and freedom.
At this point,

Socrates exchanges the phrase "doing what one
desires" for "doing what one wishes."^'

The

latter locution is reserved for

^2,5

The

Pursuit of

those

who

are knowledgeable about

what they want.

Wisdom

Socrates closes the discussion with an ambiguous statement
that accommodates
various interpretations and challenges readers to find the
right one:

you become wise, my boy, everybody will be a friend to you, everybody
will
be close [oiKeToi] to you, since you'll be useful and good; but
if you don't, neither
your father nor your mother nor your close kin [oiKCioi] nor anyone
else at all will
'So

if

be a friend to you. (210d)

If

Lysis

becomes wise

his utility;

if

(or at least appears so) in a technical sense, others will love

not, even his parents will reject him.

would not be

a friend

if

From the

the skills he claims are not real

ultimate aims aren't truly beneficial. Philosophically,
that he recognizes his ignorance, he

becomes akin

if

or,

his relatives, since

interprets Socrates

on a more

loved by everyone. Even this

which

his physical beauty

he

is

more importantly,

is

and

a notable

his

Lysis becomes wise to the extent

no help on the path

To

the

and kindred

to the good. Lysis

to

no doubt

knowledge as an opportunity to be

advancement from

Lysis' previous state in

social stature sufficed to attract friends.

It is

a mistake,

I

"The King, compelled by his beloved heir's illness and by his
must trust someone to cure his son. It is possible, then, that he might leave his son
the hands of a quack. Or what is also possible, the physician might use his skill to take the boy's life."
^‘Noticed by Bolotin (1979, p. 91).
^"Bolotin (1979, p. 95) sees the danger:

own Ignorance
in

if

to everyone pursuing the good.

superficial level, seeing

for

king's point of view. Lysis

extent that he fails to recognize his ignorance, however, he will be a friend

no one, including

him

of medicine,
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think, to interpret this passage as a claim
that a man's utility in an educative
friendship

depends on
If

teachers,

his

having some piece of knowledge that he can
pass on to his beloved.^^

Plato were to

make

and pederasts do, what could be the

repeatedly

made

knowledge

sexual,^' not to

to transmit.

That

useful service: he challenges

them

or deter

reciprocal currency of exchange?

It is

clear that Socrates rejects the traditional
rewards offered to educators,

whether financial or

relieves

arete his educational offering, just as
sophists, music

of the false

them from the

channeling his desire

mention the

said, Socrates

them

to

aim

fact that

does provide his fnends/students with a most

at

knowledge,

and inconsistent assumptions

true path.

To

Lysis,

he disavows having any

he has

for friends into a pursuit of

just

virtue,

and the good, and he

that artificially

shown

quench

their desire

the importance of

knowledge.

Socrates goal in educative friendship has been to cajole his interlocutors
onto a

path aimed

at

knowledge of the good and

to admit their ignorance.^''

And

is it

He

to motivate

them

in the pursuit

by getting them

achieves that goal with Lysis at 210d:

in fact possible, Lysis, to pride oneself

on things which one has

not as yet any knowledge?

'How could
'And

if

it

be?' he asked.

you need a

teacher,

you do not as

yet possess knowledge.'

'True'

'So

you don't pride yourself on knowledge,

if

you

are in fact without

any as

yet.'

'Heavens, Socrates, he said,
'

When

I

'I

heard him admit that,

don't think so'

Hippothales and almost put my
tongue to say, 'There, Hippothales, that's how
I

looked

at

it. It was on the tip of my
one ought to talk to one's boy, making him humble and unaffected,
making him conceited and spoiled.' (210de).

foot in

”Watt (1987,

p.

120 -121), Dover (1978p. 202

as the traditional benefit to the student

”For Socrates’

in

-

203

),

and Versenyi (1975,

p.

not, as

you do,

197-198) cite knowledge

sunousia.

money, see EutJnphro 3d; of sexual favors, see S}’wposjum 216c - 219c.
"[Socrates'] two methods, of love and education, are in fact the same.
Aiming at turning the beloved into a seeker and a lover, a knower (of himself) who will love and pursue rather
than neglect his natural object {phusei oikewn ) of love, this method of starting the beloved on the right rocid
tow'ard self-improvement is simply the Socratic method of education."
refusal of

^Wersenyi (1975,

p. 197):
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And

so Socrates’ demonstration of a
proper educative friendship ends in
Lysis’ admission

of Ignorance and, therefore, in his
acceptance of the pursuit of

fnends. Socrates’
Lysis; to get

him

own

philia for

to seek

Now Lysis joins

wisdom has

knowledge as

his goal rather

model

him

rather than of

to instill a similar philia in

than simple admiration.

Socrates as a friend, an equal in deficiency
with respect to the

good. Flattery and authority are rejected
traditional

inspired

uisdom

of education fails

when

in favor of humility. In

Euthyphro, a

the preeminent expert on piety was unable
to

transmit his knowledge to the eager student
Socrates. Simultaneously, the educative
friend Socrates tries to direct Euthyphro's

aim from winning popular approval

understanding the wishes of the gods. Euthyphro refuses
to disown

knowledge and join Socrates

in his pursuit of

hand, does admit his ignorance and
his soul

toward

its

is

in court to

his poetically

based

something greater.*^ Lysis, on the other

thus released from worldly concerns and free to aim

perfection in the good.^^

He

is

now like

Socrates, an ignorant pilgrim in

search of the good.

Love and Pu rsuit

5,3. Dirgct i ng the

I

have characterized the

and demonstration
pursuit of the

first

of

Wisdom

in

part of the Lysis

r,vsis

(203a

21 Id) as an exploration

of educational relationships in their Socratic permutation as a joint

good that occurs as

friendship.

The the second

dialogue begins with Socrates describing the object of his

Ever since

-

"philosophical"^^ half of the

own

pursuit:

was a boy

I

I've always desired to acquire a certain thing. You know
people desire different things: for example one man desires to

how different

^Taylor (1982, p. 1 13): "For a good human soul is a self-directed soul, one whose choices are informed
of and love of the good. A good world must contain such souls and hence if the beneficent
divine purpose is to be achieved, human beings must play their part by knowing (and hence loving) the good
and acting in accordance with that knowledge. True Jiosiotes, the real service of the gods, turns out to be

by

its

knowledge

nothing other than aivtc

See also Dover (1974 pages 250 - 254)
Lysts is also a Greek word meaning a "releasing," as from chains.
Arnim divides Lysis at 21 la into a "protreptic" introduction and a "philosophical" main body.

“Bolotin (1979,

”Von

itself.

p.

66) notes that

230

S'"

ifferent to

This declaration

and backward
in the

is

those things, but

(21li)

some

for the dialogue

because

sense, the friend that Socrates seeks

is

it

looks forward

the student/partner

educational relationship just described.
The contrasting examples of horses and

and honors.

in other sorts of

who

Just

ambiguous. There

or

intentional

and

what

hunts

-

pursuits aimed at worldly objects such
as trophies

this friend Socrates seeks

is

remains provocatively

the abstract "certain thing" which could easily
be the good, and the

is

definite plural "fnends"

^, 1

dogs; another, gold; another,
honors. I'm quite
do passionately love acquiring friends.

an appropriate turning point

at once. In

dogs are useful

IS

I

which

clearly suggests other people.

I

submit that the ambiguity

resolution the objective of the remainder of the
dialogue.

its

Teachers, Friends and the Objects of frive
,

The Lysis

often described as a definitional dialogue about
friendship, but there

is

are significant differences

starters, friendship is

temperance

are.

achievement of
philia

is

between

it

and Euthyphro. Channides. and Laches. For

not traditionally considered a part of arete as piety, courage,
and

This
arete,

is

not to say that friendship plays no role in the acquisition and

friendship

was

a characteristic of the virtuous

essential to the Socratic pursuit of arete as

man

in

Homer^^ and

I

have described

it.

instrumental role of philia in the pursuit of arete

may

help to explain

why Socrates

not specifically ask what friendship

how

Whereas

is,

but rather

I'm so far from acquiring

man becomes

one

to acquire

[a friend] that

the friend of another. That's what

I

I

does

it:^^

don't even

want

The

to ask

know how one

you about,

in

view

of your experience. (212a)

^®See Bolotin (1979,

p.

214).

^Guthrie ( 1975, p. 152) notes; "In contrast to the
Lac/ics, the relationship is not
described as that of form and instance at all, nor is the primary phiJon called the single form in all phiha by
which they are p/nJia ( Euthyphro ), or 'that whose nature runs through them all ( Laches ).”
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Readers should immediately find

it

odd

that Socrates says he has failed to
acquire

a friend. Socrates has plenty of friends
including Crito, Plato, Hippothales, even

dialogue's end, Lysis
'friend'

Lj^sjs,

and Menexenus themselves. Notice

not about 'friendship'.
it is

asked of

friend.'

To the
This

extent that the

by

also that Socrates asks about a

'What

is

X?' question

is

asked

confirmed by Socrates' concluding statement

is

that they have failed to find precisely

what

a friend

in

at

223b,

Admittedly, Socrates' treatment of

is.

the boys as experts on friendship contains some ironic
flattery, but readers should be

cautious about projecting their

own

sense of educational hierarchy onto the

already set up Lysis and Menexenus' friendship as conditional
(207c):

// the two are

friends in the highest sense, then Socrates can learn from
them. Furthermore,

if

they

three are to be friends in the Socratic sense, he must not set
himself above them.
bell

should ring in the minds of Plato scholars when Socrates confesses
is

ambiguous

Socrates has failed to acquire be knowledge of the good?

'friend'

The Greek words
beloved, what

is

objects of love.^°

one
as

who

The

first

loves"

ho phiJon,

[

pMi3

[(pi>.ia,

dear] certainly are

philosophical pursuit

favored in the

for his desire for

and lack

A louder

of knowledge. Mightn't the

love, friendship]

ambiguous enough

all

his distance from

the goal: Socrates

famous

Socrates

text.

and philos [(pRoq,

to cover

human and

friend,

abstract

possibility that this friend might be the abstract object of

is

allowed by a

shift in

word choice.

part of the dialogue, "the lover"

hoeron

].

Ho philos,

[

In the erotic terminology

hoerastes

was

]

identical with "the

favored in the second part, need not be the same

the active partner in a friendship.

The

adjective philon can

mean

not

only "friendly to" (active), but also "dear to" (passive).^^ So the good can be dear and the

'

‘“Robinson (1986) argues that Plato failed to acknowledge the complexity of phiha and so ended up
with a failed dialogue. Guthrie (1975, p. 137), Hoerber (1959, p. 18) and Levin 1971, p. 244) allow that Plato
'

(

did recognize the ambiguity of the word. See Hyland (1968) for a

"'See Levin (1971, p. 244).
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summary

of Plato's use of

pM/a

in

Lysis.

useful can be dear (210c), but

good

to hold

It

one need not be loved by the good or be

Indeed the

dear.

eristic

exchange

read as an attempt to answer the question

"What

216c to 221d can be made

at

is

a friend?"
[

phiJon

in

its

The
of

(pi>.fj;

ti estin

clear

To philon:

],

if

taking

passive sense as a goal or objective.^'

distinction

worms opened

Tiva

friendly to the

also

at

between human and objective friends squirms around

212a. Socrates asks Menexenus

when someone

loves something]

when

which

is

a

man

loves

in the

someone

the friend of which?

argument plays upon the active and passive senses of philos.

The

can

[Tiq

The

possibility that

one

could be hated by his beloved leads to requirement that both friends love
one another and
the conclusion that nothing that does not love in return can be dear to
what loves

From

this

we

learn that horse-lovers, wine-lovers,

cannot qualify as friends since the objects of

it.

and even philosophers (wisdom-lovers)

their affection don't love

them back.

Here Socrates sophistically plays on the scope of the word phiJia by using
examples of non-human objects of affection to
considering friendship

among human

Menexenus, however, he

among humans
212b

-

will

is

tacitly

reject a principle

beings. He's not merely being eristic with

comparing the two senses of the word, since philia

be crucially different from philia

for the

213d, for example, the possibility that the beloved

as a reductio to exclude the possibility that the lover

however, that

if

the beloved

is

reached while

inanimate, like

and so the objection disappears. Socrates

is

is

wisdom

good. In the argument

may

hate the lover

is

at

presented

the friend of the beloved. Note,
or the good,

it

cannot hate

its

challenging Menexenus to distinguish

lover

human

“Robinson (1986, p. 74) characterizes this passage as "an inquir>' into what objects are phila in the
sense of being valued or pursued or approved. I shall translate the question tj estw to phiJon; in this sense as
"what is the object of the pursuit," since this I think suits most of the examples Plato mentions. I hope to make
sense, then, of the rest of the dialogue by treating it d& discussing for most of the time no longer "what is
fnendship"? but "what is the object of pursuit"? Even though the terminology seems unchanged, the examples
discussed force us to read

it

in this

way.

"
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and objective
arete.

friendship, just as he challenged Hippias
to distinguish technical

The challenge

reciprocal nature of

applies to the audience as well,

human

friendship that they

abstract or inanimate thing like

The words

of the poet

fail

who

skill

from

should not be so wedded to the

to consider or value love for an

wine or wisdom.^^

and statesman Solon

dialectically established principle that philia

are juxtaposed against the

must be reciprocal

at

212e, and Menexenus

quickly defers to the traditional authority. This impasse leads
to the proposition that the

one who

is

loved, as

opposed

extended to enemies (w^hich

it

to the

will

who

loves,

is

the friend. But that principle,

seems can only be human) again leads

opposite position, that the one w^ho

That

one

lov^es is

mean, then, that we must

the friend,

is

to absurdity

when

and the

reconsidered:

what we allowed earlier in our
not his friend, and often of
W'hat is actually his enemy, when he either loves what doesn't love him, or loves
what actually hates him; and that a man is often the enemy of what is not his
enemy, or of what actually is his friend, w'hen he either hates what does not hate
discussion, that a

man

is

allow' exactly

often the friend of

what

is

him, or hates w^hat actually loves him. (213bc)

This statement recalls the discussion about Lysis' parents' tough love and reminds us that
a

man may

love the flatterer

hate the teacher
the point, a

whose

man may

who

in fact hates

love, like Socrates',

love

him but loves

his

makes him appear

and pursue an object

that

w'ill

a

money. Likewise, he may
bumbling

More

to

not bring happiness. Socrates

concludes the discussion of reciprocity with a question about a higher

'What

fool.

friend:

'if neither those w'ho love, nor those who are
both love and are loved are to be friends. Shall we say others
remain, over and above these, who become friends to one another? (213c)

are w'e to

loved, nor those

do

then,' I asked,

who

Scholars, including Aristotle (see Annas 1977, p. 534), Hoerber (1959, p. 22) and Bolotin (1979 p.
have tenaciously tried to preserve reciprocity in all friendship. Bolotin says the suggestion that friendship
is based on lack or longing eliminates the generosity and reciprocity associated with friendship. I disagree.
There is no human being who lacks nothing, and friends have various needs which can be reciprocally
addressed. Furthermore, those who think they know may be generous with their knowledge, but authority is not
1 1 ),

a beisis for friendship.
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To

this

Menexenus has no

un-teaching has
investigation

(peers),

left

idea

what

to say.

Another example of Socratic

his student at a loss for words.
Socrates questions their

and suggests

and of sophists,->

IS

of

that they consider the proclamations
of traditional educators
that like

,s

attracted to like (214ab). Socrates
questions Lysis

about the meaning of these words, wondering
aloud whether we

He

method

truly

understand them.

asking for analysis, not acceptance, of the
theory; treating the statement as riddle
or

enigma (214d)

— just

as he treated the god’s

words

at

Apolog}' 21b.

Socrates illustrates a conflict between the
myth that
bringing

men

together

and the phenomenon

of

God makes

bad men becoming

exacerbating each others’ badness. His solution
to the conflict
poetic/sophistic statement to

good men

[or

good

things,

is

friends

friends

by

and

to limit the scope of the

dya0oi]. He points out that

it is

the argument that yields their conclusion,
not the authoritative statement (214d). The
poets’

unanimity and hence authority

is

challenged again

when Hesiod

contradict the "like loves like" theory at 215c. Socrates
asks Lysis and

question and analyze Hesiod's claim (216a).

If

is

shown

Menexenus

of friendship

that like

is

among men who

to

the poets disagree, as Euthyphro’s gods do

(see sec. 5.1.3), they cannot be taken at face-value as
guides in the pursuit of

The theory

to

wisdom.

friend to like begins to erode with a worry about the utility
are equally good.

Are two people who are alike friends in so far as they are alike, and are two such
people useful to each other? To put it another way, what benefit could
two
things

which were

alike hold for each other, or

what harm could they do to each
do to themselves too? What could be done to them that
could not be done to them by themselves too? How w'ould such things be held in
affection by each other when they could give each other no assistance? Is it
other, that they could not

possible? (214e

p.

-

215a)

‘”’Our wisest men” who write about nature and the universe. It’s worth noting here, as Bolotin (1979,
128) does that "By using the neuter rather than the masculine gender, these writers indicate that the scope of

their assertion extends

beyond the human, or even the animate”
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The boys

agree that self-sufficient

men could

whether they have been wrongly conducting
Heraclitean idea that like
that "everyone

who was

is

not be friends and Socrates asks
again
their investigation.

greatest foe to like (215c)

ignorant

affection lor

felt

knowledge [tov eiSota]" (215d). This

line of

He

and supports

up the

brings

it

with Hesiod's claim

and loved the man who possessed

argument suggests

that opposite is friend to

opposite, a conclusion that opens them to the
wrath of the sophists (216a).
In the course of this final consideration of
the idea that opposite

opposite

(215d

-

216a), Socrates sneaks

inanimate qualities

away from human

like the wet, dr>% cold, hot, sharp, blunt,

friends

is

friend to

by switching to

empty, and

At 216bc

full.

Socrates introduces virtue-language into the discussion,
reminding readers of the scope of
friendship being investigated here and challenging them
to consider seriously the

dichotomy between human and objective

friends:

'Well, is the just friend to the unjust or the self-controlled
to the undisciplined or
the good to the bad?' (216b)

This

is

a provocative question because of

a just, self-controlled, or

goodness

(

arete

human and

).

good man and the

examples. There

abstract objects of love.

is,

telling

ambiguity between

abstract ideas of justice, temperance,

The

unjust, or here imperfectly just,

he should desire and love

necessarily a friend to the just

and

man

(if

it

—

but the unjust

such a perfectly just

man

exists

man should

man

is

be

not

anywhere but

in his

mind).
Socrates

investigation.

was

right at

213d and 215c

The problem was

not, as

it

to worry about the

may seem

‘^Gliddcn (1981, p. 45): "The use of the neuter here

The

is

This ambiguity parallels the argument's ambiguity with respect to

friend to the Just, that

own

its

have been, one of consulting the

instructive, as

it

often

is

which makes someone or something
thing must it be to be loved."

attraction of opposites concerns the character

character must one have to love, what sort of

is

to

conduct of the
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throughout the Lysis.
p/iiJos

:

what

sort of

wrong

authorities

among

problem of misconstruing

problem
or even

is

we

sort of thing

philosophers

it is,

since

and

and

as

anyone sharing that

may be

still

alike in their

Nor was

simply a

it

'similar' for 'identical'.^^

They

wisdom can be

sophists.

still

much

don’t

Rather, the

know what

a friend

is

a friend as Socrates can be.

take the model of philosophy as love of
objective

to be fnend of

They could

'dissimilar' for 'opposite'

that they don't understand their
object.

what
If

poets, statesmen, scientists,

wisdom and take

pursuit, the paradoxes resolve themselves.

Socrates

Two

acknowledged ignorance and shared goal of wisdom.

help each other to overcome their deficiencies,
not by

filling

them but by

asking questions, offering perspective, and exhorting
each other toward the mutual goal.
Likewise, a

man does

self-described wise

not love or desire anything he thinks he already
has. The

man

will not love

since he has nothing to gain from

it

wisdom, nor another man whether wise or naive,

or him.*^

The unknowing, however,

whether as an apprentice loves the shoemaker who passes on
philosopher loves wisdom because he recognizes

Thg Connections among Friendship.

5j3i 2

That the pursuit and goal

and

it

his craft, or as the

as something akin

move

at

in question has

216c, wherein good

is

which he

lacks.

and Philosophy

made

a steady progress from sunousia

traditional educational structures to philosophy in particular

Socrates'

love the knowing,

is

supported by

the stated goal and an intermediate state with

respect to that goal (and not the other friend)

is

posited:

“Watt (1987, p. 124) follows several commentators is characterizing the discussion of reciprocity (212 215?) as "mercilessly sophistic" and "eristic" since [Socrates] champions the first hypothesis and then its
opposite and then achieves refutation by forcing terms such as 'like' and 'unlike* to mean absolutely identical or
absolutely opposite rather than 'similar' and 'dissimilar'. Watt notes that such absolutes are unobtainable in the

human

sphere. Perhaps Socrates doesn't really have the

‘^Except possibly the glory, favors, or
p.

133

-

money

human sphere

134) notes: "Socrates' argument compels us to consider our

or imperfection as well as of our worth. [Since]
of their excellence alone.

Someone with many

in

mind. See also Hoerber (1959,

sophists and traditional pederasts seek.

men more commonly

human

As

friendships as a sign of neediness

regard the possession of friends as a sign

friends often believes himself for that reason to be a
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p. 23).

Bolotin (1979,

good man.

"

”1"
>ha' we’re even more mistaken,
the truth
s that what IS
'iMhatTh!!?
k a fnend is none of these, but that it
is what is neither good
nor bad
hat becomes, in some cases, the
friend [(pi/iov] of the good.
(216c)

Again, the mistake they’ve been making
of Ideals.

neither

He goes on

is

beautiful

is

loved." as "the beautiful

...

if

Itself,

anything

is

the friend"

and the

is

friend to anything [eiTcep xcp xi eaxiv (piXov],
it
that is the friend either of the good or of the

since nothing surely

would be a

of the neuter phiJon,

philosopher,

is

relevant here

this scenario

this intermediate state,

the ideal state of learning.

and hope. Keeping

which

It is

I

is

good, and each other

would

it is

who are

entail loving ignorance.

have described as the

intermediate in

its

state of the

combination of humility

at 218c),

we can

use the health analogy offered

understand the educational implications of the intermediate

Just suppose

is

Socrates' idea of arete as the health of the soul (confirmed to be

by a body-soul comparison

in Lysis to better

what

or thing loved, clearly transcends individuals
here,

good nor bad, loving the bad on
submit that

is

sort of thing

friend to the bad. (216de)

should. Since philosophers love knowledge which

I

that:

good nor bad

The wide scope

neither

love wnth love

to delineate three categories of things:
the good, the bad.

good or the bad to the bad, so he concludes

neither

it

human

good nor bad. He reminds us that previous
arguments ruled out the good being

friend to the

as

confuse

Socrates betrays his concern with goals
by beginning his explanation with
a

misquotation of the proverb: "What
(216cd).

in the inquiry is to

state.

we

take the instance of the healthy body. It needs no medical care or
assistance, since it is sufficient, which means that no one, when
a friend to a doctor because of his health. Is he? (217a)

any other form of
healthy,

Now

recall

is

from the argument that the self-sufficent

man needed no

to Socrates’ interlocutors' reluctance to explore issues they

the body, which

is

friend

and compare

assume themselves to know.

neither good nor bad, loves medicine and the doctor because of the
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it

If

presence of disease (217b). the corresponding
soul would love wisdom and a teacher

because of the presence of (acknowledged)
ignorance. The conclusion holds
'So, w'hat is neither

bad nor good becomes the

presence of The bad.
It

Once

possesses.

Its

any

friend

.

.

but obviously before

had become bad

it

we

longer, because

friend of the

good because of the
becomes bad itself through the bad

it

would

it

said

for both;

certainly not desire the good, or be
bad to be friend to

w'as impossible for

it

good.' (217c)

The

soul will love the

What

sets in.

sort of

good because

of ignorance, but

ignorance could destroy the love of knowledge?

Socrates biggest nemesis: conceit

— the

and win

None

despite

Well

its

me

let

other than Dr.

independent ontological

its

here distinguishes the appearance of knowledge (w^hich

their trust) from

total ignorance

ignorance of one's true state of ignorance.

The subsequent "presence" argument,
significance,

must do so before

it

may

fool others

true presence in a soul;

put

it

this way,'

Would

hair with white lead.

it

I

said.

then be

'Suppose someone smeared your
seem so?'

fair

w'hite, or just

'Just seem so',' he replied.
'And yet whiteness would be present

to

it?'

'Yes.'

'All the

w'hiteness

is

same, your hair wouldn't be any whiter at all as
it, it is not more w'hite than it is black.'

yet.

Though

present to

'True'

my friend, old age brings that same color to your hair, it
time the same sort as W'hat is present to it — white by the presence

'But when,

becomes

at that

of white.'

'Of course'
'Well, that

is

the question I'm asking you now.

to another, will w^hat possesses

only

if it is

what

is

present to

present in a certain way, but not

it

if it is

When

one thing

be of the same

is

present

sort as it?

Or

not?'

'The latter rather,' he said.
'So sometimes,

bad as

yet,

when bad is present, what is neither bad nor good
when it has already become bad.'

is

not

but there are times

'Of course.'

'When
makes

Bolotin (1979,

here above

all

on the manner
sufferer

is

with
of

it's

not yet bad, then, though bad

desire good; whereas the presence of

it

.

its

.

.

p.

151

)

agrees that this argument

the corrupting effect of

presence. Only

the host not bad

when an

evil

evil is

is

present

"
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present, this presence of
it

bad
bad

is concerned
docs take time, depends also and decisively

best analyzed in context: "Socrates

[which] while

itself.

is

bad which actually makes

in

it

such a manner as to appear as an

evil to

the

deprives
to

it

of both

its

desire

and

it

is

good7(2r7d"218lr'*°'^'

The connection between age and wisdom
concerning age and white

hair.

if

is

of

the thrust of this discussion

knowledge may

fool others, but

it

docs

the bearer believes appearance to be as
good as

knowledge, he no longer loves the good and

escape. This interpretation

much about

us

tells

The appearance

not constitute true knowledge. Worse,
true

feelings of friendship for the good,
because

its

is

stuck in his ignorance with no hope of

confirmed by the next paragraph:

why we'd say that those who are already wise, whether they are gods
or
men, no longer love wisdom, and that those who are so
ignorant that they are bad
do not love wisdom either, because no bad or stupid man loves
wisdom. So, we're
left with those who possess that bad thing,
ignorance, but have not yet been
rendered foolish or stupid by it, in that they still believe
they don't know what
they don't know. Consequently those who are still neither
good nor bad do, in
fact, love wisdom; whereas all those who are bad,
as well as all those who are
good, do not, because, as we decided earlier in our discussion,
neither is
That's

opposite
the friend of opposite, nor like the friend of like.
[So]
say that in the soul, in
the body, and any'where else it is what is neither bad nor good that
is the friend of
the good because of the presence of the bad. (218a-c)

We

.

.

Here philosophy, the love of wisdom,
a

man

defined as an intermediate state

in

which

recognizes the bad present in him: ignorance, and consequently loves and desires

the good: wisdom.^^
ignorant of his

wisdom

man

is

own

will not

The man

in

whom the

bad, ignorance,

is

ignorance will not love wisdom. Also the

so rampant as to

man

or

god who already has

be a philosopher; but does such a perfectly wise man exist? Every wise

Socrates encounters turns out to be wise only within the confines of his

man

self-conception; such a

better

fits

the description of the bad

man than

But what of those who have yet to be overcome by ignorance? They

are in

philosophic education, of Socratic doctoring, the benevolent goal of which

^’Versenyi (1975,

man’s consciousness of

p.

all

men

are lovers because they arc

belonging to their nature but not yet possessed.

"
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all

own

the wise man.

need of
is

to help

" the cause of love is
between the two poles of
love what they consider good - beneficial,

189) has a similar interpretation: Plato’s Lysis argues that

his deficiency; that

perfection (total deficiency and total self- sufficiency); and that
fulfilling,

make him

all

people recognize their ignorance and so love
wisdom
often hard to take, but both Lysis

and Menexenus admit

acknowledged kin of Socrates by the end

The Emergenc e

hunt within

hunting

his grasp.

It

satisfaction of a hunter

should be clear to the audience

for sexual favors, victory^ in

his quarry

still

and so become

who

has gotten the object of

now that

Socrates

was not

argument, or even the adulation of the crowd.
is,

w'rithes in his grasp

friendships aimed at the good will
at the

is

of the dialogue.

he was trying to understand what a friend

though

their ignorance

medicine

of an External Tde;^i

At 218c. Socrates declares the
his

faithfully. Socrates'

now

and

in this, great progress

and threatens

Rather

has been made

-

to bolt aw'ay. Objective

be showm to spawn

human

friendships also aimed

good.

Beginning

218d, the

at

external thing, "because"

emerges.

It is

friend nor

[

dia

'friends'

]

discussed seem to be exclusively

or "for the sake of

which"

then asked whether that external thing

an enemy.

is

[

heneka

]

human

while an

they are friends

also a friend (passive) or neither a

A doctor analogy is again used to illustrate.

One

is

a friend of the

doctor "because of" disease (bad) and for the sake of health (good). The conclusion
generalized

to:

'What

is

a friend (active;

body

or soul)

friend (passive; medicine, philosophy) for the sake of

wisdom) because

of

what

is

is

the friend (active) of what

what

is

is

is

a

a friend (passive: health,

an enemy (passive: disease, ignorance) (219a).

Notice that the "because of" factor (disease, ignorance)
the "for the sake of" factor (health, wisdom).

Human

is

diametrically opposed to

beings (body or soul) are neither

good nor bad. The discussion now focuses on the ultimate

friend for the sake of

other friends are friends. Accordingly, from 219c until 220e the friend discussed
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which
is

all

always

passive, just as

any inanimate

friend

must be. This passive friend turns
out

to be the

greatest sort of friend, however:

T f^tds
T
fl,

at ?u
thing tn
,

which

all

'hing that IS a
only; whereas what is really a
friend should be
those so-called friendships terminate.

name

in

(220a)

Enter the concept, central to Socratic
education, of instrumental and ultimate
objects of
love. Instrumental friends are stops
along the

way or even

allies in

the pursuit of the

ultimate frtend. Having established the
existence of this ultimate friend, Socrates
asks

about the good

in the

same

breath. This

is

a not-so-subtle hint at a not-so-surprising

conception of what the ultimate friend must be:

Well then,
friend. So,

This

mind

is

that's settled:
is

it is not for the sake of a
friend that what
the good a friend?' (220b)

comment

the sort of

his theory of forms.

It is

is

a friend

is

that tempts scholars to believe that Plato
here has in

important to realize, however, that the Lysis' proton

phiJon need not be a transcendent

ideal,

nor the only end in

itself.

The good can be the

ultimate friend in a formula describing the termination
of chains of instrumental goods,

without

its

fallacious

Both

fit

strictly

by

being the only thing loved for

scholars.^® Take, for example, our

some higher chain,

how’ever. Health

^°Anna.s (1977, p. 537

own

own

sake. She says that

-

it’s

two paradigm

later.

—a

consequence deemed

cases: health

and wisdom.

and termination points

Good

is

all

538) claims that

it

it

in

in their

itself in

with respect to the body and therefore the

instrumental bodily goods such as doctors and

is

a fallacy to assume that there

disputable whether Aristotle commits that fallacy

but fairly clear that Plato commits

the single good

sake

and wisdom need not be instrumental to The Good

ultimate friend for the sake of which

Its

its

into the formula of friendship as ultimate goods

respective chains. Health

Lysis 219d. She

later

acknowledges

reply that Plato has a certain kind of desire in

is

in

just

the

one thing wanted

for

Mconiachean Ethics,

that Plato distances himself from

mind here, the kind found in the phiHa
component of philo.sophy and so doesn’t think he’s covering all Wpes of phiha here. The desire for food, for
example, cannot be reduced to the same desire for the good can it? cf. 221b and Versenyi (1975, p. 192 - 196).
I
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medicine, are loved.

fnend

for the

gadflies

Wisdom

sake of which

and argument

is

all

Good

with respect to the soul and therefore the
ultimate

instrumental goods pertaining to the soul like
Socratic

are loved.

Health need not be seen as instrumental to wisdom.
Socrates' willingness to
accept the death penalty suggests that philosophy
does not even require a body. This
appropriate because health
(i.e.

arete

)

is

goodness with respect to the body and wisdom

and so there may be many

chains of instrumental goods. Just how'

good cannot be the only thing loved
distinction as the

the

first

way the

Ai m i ng

for the

different ultimate

many such

good" need not be determined

related to "the

5-3-4

for its

good

is

good, how'ever,

Then

is

is

and how they

are

own

sake.

The good can
good can

still

retain

its

singular

direct our pursuits in

north star directs travelers wishing to reach home.

Good

:

Obstacles and Manifestations

something aimed

philosophy,

things there are

friend insofar as a concept of the

at in all

achieved. In the field of medicine,
field of

goods ending various

to rescue Plato from the objection that the

Plato's fondness for using the analogy of

that the

goodness

with respect to the soul. Other things might represent
goodness uith respect

to other dimensions

all fields,

is

is

if

we aim

if

at the

fact

our pursuits, rather than something specifically

we aim

good,

an archer may be explained by the

we

at the

try to

good,

we

try to

achieve health. In the

achieve wisdom. Our desire for the

created by the (acknowledged) presence of evil in

the good loved because of the bad?

Is

its

relevant form:

the following the case? Suppose of

we were speaking of a minute ago — namely good,

bad, and
what is neither good nor bad — two were allowed to remain and the bad were
removed and did not interfere with anything, body, soul, or the other things which
we say are in themselves neither bad nor good. Wouldn't the good be of no use at
all to us in that case, but have become useless? You see, if nothing harmed us any
more, we'd have no need of any benefit, and in this way it would then become
obvious that we felt affection and love for the good because of the bad, the good
being a remedy for the bad, the bad being a disease; and if there is no disease, a
the three categories

243

remedy

IS

not needed.

Is that

saklwdr

..sown

The image presented

the nature of the good?

here of neutral

human

and bad, reopens the important question
bad

that the

no bad,

is

a kind of friend insofar as

humans were

if

The good,

Is

it

"

perfect, the

beings between the polar opposites of
good

of motivation

it

and

utility.

There

creates our desire for the good.

good would be an object

in this hypothetical scenario,

because of the bad that

would be

of

no use

a suggestion

is

If

there were

of neither desire nor utility.

for its

own

sake.

If

we

recall

the educational theme of the dialogue and
especially the discussion showing the

importance of humility
simply does not

in

philosophy,

useless.

is

we acknowledge

There

it, is

will

soon

is

evil or

ignorance and for

a sense in

which

evil is

whom, therefore,

evil

"for the sake of

no

the good of

its

polar opposite: wisdom.

ignorance (the objective of Socratic elenchus)

friend provides the best explanation for Plato's

is

our friend: our ignorance, as long as

responsible for motivating us to pursue

This sense in which

heneka

realize that this hypothetical scenario

There are no perfectly good or knowledgeable humans.
There

exist!

person completely devoid of

wisdom

we

anomalous transposition

which" and dia ho "because of which" a

of the

friend

is

is

our

hou

a friend at

220e4. Here he says a true friend appears to be a friend "for the sake of" an enemy where

we

expect him to say "because of" an enemy.

is a friend of ours in which all others terminated - we said those
things are friends for the sake of something else that is a friend - is quite different

'So that thing that

from them.
a friend
it is
it

They've been called friends for the sake of a friend, but what is really
seems of the completely opposite nature to that, because we showed that

a friend

[

heneka, for the sake

would appear to be no longer

Scholars often call this anomaly a careless
himself.^*

To some

extent, the expressions

^‘See Shorey (1930),

who

of]

an enemy, and

a friend.

if

the

enemy were removed,

(220e)

slip, attributable to

a scribe, or even to Plato

have similar meanings and

their transposition

interprets the transposition as an attempt to produce aporta in
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Menexenus.

here should not cause too
'appears' in this clause

Perhaps Plato means

acknowledgment of

much concern/' On

a clue that

is

one

this reversal as a

evil

ignorance

pursuit of wisdom.'^ Indeed,

if

we

is

the other hand, the use of kindunei
for

risks error in

reminder that

taking the passage lightly.
in

as important as the recognition of the

If

that

enemy

examinations would just be a nuisance.
ignorance

is

good

in the

take the true friend in this passage to be
Socrates,

apparent that his elenctic examinations are performed

(acknowledged) ignorance.

philosophic education, the

for the sake of

producing

There

is

also an important sense in

it is

which

therefore benevolent.

interpret Socrates as a destructive teacher in search
of negative results.

is

is

(ignorance) were removed, Socrates’

our friend, and Socrates' production of

asking his readers to understand here

it

that Socrates' negative project

What
is

easy to

It is

Plato

is

essential to

producing the motivation requisite to the individual pursuit of wisdom.
not enough for Socrates to produce desire though, he must produce desire
for

It is

the proper objects, both instrumental and ultimate. Again he makes a
bodily comparison;

Well, anyway,

we do know this,

being hungry, though

Hunger and

thirst are evils in a

and drink which
likewise,

is

it is

that as things are,

sense

- deficiencies

in the

it

too. (221a)

body causing the

are, in turn, essential to the ultimate bodily

wisdom.

If

harmful shape; for example,

good: health. Ignorance,

one's goals are mistaken, however, one's desire

when one

”Watt (1987),

for

example,

calls

it

if

the hunger or ignorance

"rhetorical confusion"

especially close attention to the difficult question of

(

makes no

Iieneka

the attainment of

)

difference whether

getting rid of

some good

some

evil.

or the elimination

in

is,

may take

a

we

why

become overwhelming,

and translates haieka as "because

Bolotin (1979, p. 161) calls the usage "a deliberate anomaly, introduced

"it

which

pursues junk food or personal glory rather than

truly instrumental goods. Furthermore,

the sake of

desire for food

a deficiency in the soul that causes the desire for understanding,

turn, essential to

maintains that

be harmed by

is possible to

it

possible to be benefited by

the ultimate good

say that the good

is

is

in

loved." Versenyi (1975, p.l95)

loved because

(

dia

)

of

Good and evil being necessary correlates it is
"
of some evil — we regard as means or end.
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of."

order to awaken an

some

evil or for

irrelevant

which

-

the agent might gorge himself on worthless
food or information (remember the size of

Hippias' mental inventory^ thereby harming
the body or soul rather than helping

The problem with overconsumption
gives a false sense of satisfaction
returns the specter of the
to attain

it.

affection for nothing,

at

and so

self-sufficient

fact of his ignorance

it, i.e.

and

interrelation of bad, good,

because phili3 among humans

Is

what he

'I

still

it

is

that

is

it

So

nothing, so feels

who

takes himself to

a philosopher. His denial of ignorance
is

its fuel.

considered alongside the philis

man who

The

tragically destroyed.

and friendship becomes more complicated

possible, then, for a

desires

man needs

yet his desire

pursuit of the good, then, needs the bad to provide

The

knowledge

a friend to nothing. Accordingly, one

be sufficient in wisdom cannot be a lover of

does not change the

or

thinks he has knowledge and therefore loses his
desire

215ab, the

is

low quality food

where true nourishment has not been achieved.

man who

As was argued

of

it.

man

feels for

at

wisdom:

and adores something not

desires

221bc

to love

and adores?'

don't think

so.'

'So, it would appear that even if bad things have been destroyed, there
be some things which will be loved.'

will

'Yes.'

'But not

the bad were the cause of something being a friend.

The one
bad had been destroyed,
because once the causal factor has been destroyed, it would surely be impossible
for the thing of which it was the cause to exist any longer.' (221bc)

thing

It

if

would not be

a friend to the other, once the

has already been established that the bad (ignorance)

good (wisdom) and that

its

is

the cause of our love for the

removal would destroy that love (philosophy).

Lysis'

friendship with Socrates, on the other hand, has led to Lysis' admission of aporia and

hence his love and desire
light of

wisdom

what makes

life

for

knowledge. The bad things must be acknowledged

to shine through.

as

Maybe

humans worthwhile;

if

Socrates

we

is

also saying that our lack of

didn't lack
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it

we

for the

wisdom

wouldn't love anything.

is

important to recognize the difference between
the love of wisdom which

It s

requires

and

is

caused by the

evil of ignorance,

and love among philosophers which

based on that shared deficiency but not caused
by
cause of love, desire, originates in deficiency
deficient

(

endees

)

and one

is

(

it.

cndcia

deficient because

one

221d-222a makes

One

).

is

clear that the

loves only insofar as one

I

among sufficiently good people by

think the worry about friends needing to

friends' deficiencies

be

fill

requiring

mutual needs

is

some

their deficiency with respect to the

is

good? The friendship would

the Socratic educational relationship as

I

commitment

to the pursuit of

beloved; he
beloved.

wisdom, but each unable to

fulfill

222a does not know some matter of

knows himself and

He

why must

his

own

deficiencies

in

it.

have described

are friends, equal in their deficiency with respect to the

lover" at

utility in philia.

be based on

still

and student

The "knowing

seems to

well placed, but

deficiency, but the friends wouldn't look to each other to overcome

This

it

by one another? Mightn't friends be similar precisely

satisfied

is

deprived of or separated from what

belongs to one by nature. Scholars have objected
to this formula because
disallow friendship

is

it.

The teacher

good and

in their

the others' deficiency.

fact that

and recognizes

he can offer to his
a similar lack in his

helps his beloved to recognize that lack and to pursue the good with him. At

Eudemian Ethics 1237b23,

Aristotle

emphasizes the importance of reciprocity

friendship with the statement that wanting to be friends does not

more than wanting

to be healthy

with respect to the soul, that

is,

makes men healthy. But

make men

certainly

in

friends

any

wanting to be healthy

wanting to be knowledgeable and recognizing that you

are

^^Pohlenz and von Arnim led this revolt, ignoring the possibility that are no such perfectly good men.

Annas (1977,

p. 538) tries to reconcile Aristotle's insistence on friendship between good men by taking the
primary object of philia to be loved for its own sake "quite independently of the agent's seeing himself as being

in an undesirable state.
so it cannot be the case that philia requires there to be something bad because of
which the agent desires something good. Bolotin (1979 p. 225), however, says 'There is no evidence in the
Lysis for a kind of possible friendship which is wholly independent of human wants and needs."
.

.
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not,

as necessary a precondition for philosophy
as the desire to be well

IS

treatment. Likewise, philosophic friends must
share the goal of

teammates and training partners share
without being able to

fulfill

goals; they help each other

K

i

ndred So uls

in

The concluding

the

for

medical

way

toward a mutual goal

the goal for each other. Philosophic
education-friendship

based on a shared need among souls that are similar
precisely

^. 3.3

wisdom

is

Search of

in that

is

need.

Wisdom

section of Lysis focuses on loving one's

own,

or

more

literally,

the

object of love as something oikeios [oiKctoq. akin, belonging
to a household].

'So the thing
'I

think

'And

it

which

in

is

need

is

the friend of what

it is

in

need

of?'

so.'

finds itself in need of

what

is

taken away from

it.'

'Of course.'

would appear, then, Menexenus and Lysis, that the object of passionate
friendship, and desire is, in fact, it seems, what is akin [oiKetov].' (221e)
'It

love,

The idea

of love as a need for something taken

of recollection insofar as that object of love

is

away

is

consistent with Plato's later theory-

wisdom. The

similar to Aristophanes' description of eras at

criterion

is

Symposium 189c-193e. Many forms

love result from the type of deficiency suggested in this passage. Since

kindred in so

many ways, the

In the educative relationship

in their

question

I

arises:

which type

acknowledged deficiency with respect

health, Plato uses the concept to focus

Already
phi/os

in the first

two appearances

in the active,

and

therefore

"This noticed by Levin (1971,

of kinship

is

humans

of

are

most important?

have just been describing, philosophers are akin precisely
to the

Although the concept of kinship applies

and

also strikingly

p.

good

— that

is,

to love for inanimate objects like

on the relationship between human

of oikeios at 210d, the term

human,

their ignorance.

sense.^^

245).
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is

wisdom

friends.

associated with

The word oikeios

in its

most

traditional sense

implicitly

means kinship among family members but Plato
challenges

m the discussion about Lysis' relationship with his parents and

this

meaning

explicitly in

Socrates’ physical challenge to Lysis'
familiy-appointed guardians at the end of the

dialogue. Others, including the Stoics,
understood oikeios as the kinship

should

feel in

regarding themselves as

members

of an extended family

based on shared ignorance and pursuit of the good,
in this sense not only to Lysis

and Menexenus,

to his audience, those reading the dialogue,

Plato

s

desire to

next passage in which

'And

boys,’

I

said,

adore or love him,

'if

if

humans

Platonic kinship,

similarly expansive. Socrates

akin

is

as he affirms at the dialogue’s end, but also

and anyone

add philosophical kinship

human

is

all

else

who

pursues wisdom.

to traditional forms

is

suggested by the

friends are said to be akin with respect to their souls:

one r n desires another or adores him, he’d never desire or
he weren’t in some way in fact akin to the man he adored,
.

either in his soul, or in

some

disposition of his soul, or in his conduct, or in his

looks. (222a)

Hippothales’ delighted reaction to this conversation, which ends with Lysis and

Menexenus agreeing that

a true lover

(

erastes

)

should be loved by his boy, should not be

taken as a Platonic endorsement of Hippothales’ aims. Plato emphasizes that "the

genuine

lover,

though not the fake one [JtpoaTCOiflTCp]" should be loved.

audience should

realize,

even

if

Plato’s

Hippothales does not, that a genuine philosophic

relationship will take the form just demonstrated by Socrates.

The

flattery

and coyness

displayed by these two at the beginning of the dialogue should be replaced by a shared

acknowledgment
the

man

lacks

loves the

of ignorance

boy

for the

wisdom, and by sharing

and pursuit

of

wisdom, not gloiy or physical pleasure.

sake of wisdom, he
this love they

is

akin to the boy in the sense that he too

can better pursue

^‘Glidden (1981, p. 40) contrasts Plato's view with the Stoics, but on
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If

it

together.

my

interpretation,

it

is

not far

off.

This model of an educative friendship
resolves Lysis' dilemma between
loving

something
in

for

its

own

one friendship.

lover

sake and loving

it

Aristotle's resolution of the conflict

and beloved

are

think Aristotle's solution

friendship

is

to his

own

based on

is

desires

we both have

to reach the

summit

of a

common

others desire to be identical to our own, and

mountain we

at the

top of the

achieving

it,

all

the while

The requirement
specifically argued

own

knowing

by Plato, but

it is

hoe

my help

^^This interpretation

is

doubts: "While this defense
(in effect

)

is

Still,

we both

we may

you need water), and

we each

in

recognize the

an individual achievement

is

common

in

not

is

sense and by Socrates'

how humans

15a). In fact, the perfection of

in achieving.

but

hill),

must be achieved individually.

suggested both by

my

soul

could possibly

is

the one thing

Furthermore, since each of us has a unique row

no expert can be paid nor teacher found

in the perfection of his or her soul,

complete the unique project

making

-

I

Our

are climbing.

and encourage one another

behavior. Recall Socrates' question to Euthyphro about

the gods truly need

to

for us.^®

forw’arded by Annais (1977, p. 542
plausible,

it

all,

-

543)

shows up the strangeness

Plato’s primary object of love a person's

egoistic desires conceptually prior after
fact."

aid

that perfection of the soul

be of assistance to the gods (14e

to

that the goal

if

goal. In this case

we

of his friends.^^

My friendship with B may be

encourage one another, offer different perspectives (you look
as
help each other to attain a

which the

theoretically, to a case in

recognize that removing this deficiency must be done
individually.

many ways

different objects

a case in

and those

already implied by the Lysis.

based on a shared deficiency (not being

is

by allowing two

one and the same but can be extended,

which a man attaches equal importance

based on a desire

for its benefits

because

own

self,

who

subsequently expresses these

of Aristotle's approach

altruistic desires only enter in as

Perhaps combining humans and wisdom as objects of love, as

all

the same; in

Aristotle might well be thought to

in

my

make

a matter of psychological

interpretation of educative phiha,

softens the blow of pure altruism being excluded.
Bolotin

each of us,

is

(

1979,

p.

176) emphasizes the individual nature of our projects as well: "The real friend, for

'himself,' or himself as

he would be

if

he were free of

250

evils."

Friends akin in state and disposition of soul,
however, need not be so similar or so
different that they can't help

how

friends

may be

from being alike

similar

one another

and

still

to achieve individual goals/' In
order to

show

useful to one another. Plato distinguishes
being akin

222b:

at

what is akin is in any respect different from that which
is like, I think. Lysis and
Menexenus, we'd be saying something significant about
what a friend is; but if
what is like and what is akin are in fact the same thing,
'If

it is

not easy to reject the

argument, that like is useless to like by virtue of their being
wrong to allow that what is useless is a friend.' (222b)
earlier

and

alike;

it's

Since partners in a philosophic friendship recognize that
their souls need perfecting and
agree on the general shape that perfection will take, they
can exhort and encourage each

other in the process. Aristotle's

Nicomachesn Ethics

VII, 1

and

can contemplate others' actions better than we can our own; so

good

friends

whose

activities

is

if

the good

he could gain pleasure from contemplating,

that extent be lacking something w'orthwhile.

about whether there

IX. 9 claims that friends

a perfectly

I

man

lacked

would

his life

to

think Plato would disagree with Aristotle

good man, but

it's

useful to notice

how

both recognize

the importance of another perspective for enhancing one's self-improvement.
It's

not difficult to see

how

in a philosophic friendship,

neglecting your soul and point that out;

I

I

may

you

are

me. But

my

notice that

would hope you'd do the same

for

helping you to perfect your soul need not be dependent on your being able to help
perfect mine. There

is

a benevolent sense in

which helping another

nearly as great a service to the gods as perfecting one's

seems to recognize

this

own

soul

is.

me to

to perfect his soul

is

Socrates' mission

nuance. Socrates cannot perfect his interlocutors' souls

for

them.

”See Levin (1971, p. 24 6); "Affinity does not preclude mutual need. In fact, it was in the explanation
(‘pifjiuitna ou aj) r/jdeea J?ai (desire for what is lacking) operates as a cause of friendship.
that to
o/keion was brought into the discussion. For to o/kdan here means not only 'that which is akin by nature,'
but also, if the implications of possible synonymy with to endecs may be included, 'that which is one's own but

of

how

of

which one has been up

.

to

now

bereft.’"
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.

but he can help them to see their ignorance
and so
souls which, from the gods point of view,

own

soul. Socrates inquires after

interlocutors,

and above

all for

The concluding aporia

wisdom

them on the path toward

start

nearly as big a help as Socrates'

is

for his

own

better

work on

his

benefit, for the benefit of his

the benefit of the gods themselves.
of the dialogue

is

brought about by a recurring confusion

between interpersonal relationships and our personal relationship
with the good. Socrates
asks whether they should assume that what

should say that good

is

its

counterpart

rejected idea that the unjust

men

good

is

akin to everything, or whether they

akin to good, bad to bad, and neutral to neutral. The boys
opt for

each thing being akin to

as long as the

is

man

is

--

a choice that seems to

commit them

akin to another unjust man. But this

is

to the

a desired case;

recognize themselves as neither perfectly just nor completely unjust,

they are philosophically akin in that respect. Furthermore, the equation of
'good' and
'akin' leads to

the rejected case in which the good

a seemingly useless relationship even

their

own

men can be

only a friend of the good

ways

that

a friend

is;

man -

such perfectly good men actually existed outside
is

different from being alike

akin in their deficiency but not alike because they are deficient

is

in

must be remedied individually.

The Lysis ends with
what

is

minds. The temporary conclusion that being akin

well taken:

individual

if

man

the contradictory image of

avowed

friends

who

cannot say

they are philosophic friends to be sure:

and Menexenus, we've now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like
you, since these people will go away and say that we think that we're
friends of one another — for I consider myself one of your number -- though we
were not as yet able to find our precisely what a friend is, (223b)
'Lysis

me and

This apparent confusion
a friend of the boys

-

is

tempered by the

fact that the dialogue

not a teacher, not a sophist, not an erastes.
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has revealed Socrates as

While Hippothales

wants the boy's bodies, Qessipus
wants them to win atguments, and
parents and

paidag^oi want
gets

to control them, Socrates wants
to explore

them to admit

boys

their ignorance

and then goes on to

new

talk about love.

He

akin to the

The end of the Lysis suggests the dawning
of

philosophical friendship. Even Aristotle,

explanation of friendship, says at
those with

whom

who

diveiged from Plato in his

Eudemian Ethics K,

one has studied philosophy

.

own

that the best sorts of friends are

.

Plato's project for education in the early
Socratic dialogues should
It

is

first

acknowledgment of their ignorance and the
only sort of teacher they could have

in

since he aims at the highest goal:
wisdom.

a

wisdom with them. He

now

be in view.

involved a challenge to traditional values and
modes of education that focused on

awakening the Greek mind from
approval.

It

challenged

pursue

it

its

dogmatic adherence to poetic myth and social

reshaped the idea of arete as a uniquely moral
quality of the soul and

its

audience to acknowledge their deficiency with respect
to that ideal and to

in dignified ignorance. Finally, Plato’s project
redefined education as a lifelong

pursuit of

wisdom

that

needed

to be directed

traditional role of teacher in this pursuit

guide,

someone able shake people from

by a particular idea of the good. The

would be replaced by the
lesser pursuits

Socrates emerges from these works as the

and

new paradigm

direct

not in defending existing society, but in challenging
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them toward the

of a teacher-guide

himself exemplifies the arete desired as the object of education.

who dies

role of a friend

it

He

is

who

and
ideal.

has

a philosopher-hero

to be better.

APPENDIX
SELECTING THE DIALOGUES
Although

Plato's project for educational reform

this dissertation I focus

on the

is

earliest Socratic dialogues.

relevant to

all

of his writings, in

This appendix will explore

how

various characteristics of the Apology, Crito,
Chaimides, Laches, Ion, Hippias Major,

Euthyphro, and Lysis

tie

them

together.

The

works share

eight

similar lengths

and

subject matters, which suggests that Plato had a particular
audience and particular goals
in

mind while writing them. The dialogue form

setting

and characters

itself

and dramatic techniques such

as

also contribute to the educational goals of these works.

Throughout the early works, Plato employs a myriad of

tools in

an ingenious

effort

both to

educate and to change popular ideas about education.
Scholarship on Plato's educational theory has almost completely overlooked
the

Apology,

Cn'to,

Charmides, Laches, Ion, Hippias Major, Euthyphio, and Lysis.

‘

These

dialogues share several characteristics, however, that suggest they were written for an

educational purpose: they are

commonly identified

and Ciito end with the characters
all

as "Socratic;"^

in a state of perplexity

and so

all

except

Apology

are "aporetic;"

and they

deal with one or more of the interconnected and educationally relevant issues of

arete

virtue],

sophia

[CTOtploc,

wisdom], and technosune [Te%va\)vr|,

expertise]. Furthermore, the interlocutors represented in these dialogues are all of

educational concern. They range from the young and impressionable Lysis and

Charmides, to the resolute and dogmatic Euthyphro, to the Homeric rhapsode Ion and the
sophist Hippias, to the aging generals Laches and Nicias

(who

are called

upon

to give

educational advice to two concerned fathers).
‘a

rare exceptions

is

Teloh (1986)

who examines

the educational relevance of

^Sec, for example, Irwin (1995, p. 10) and Penner, (1992,
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p. 124).

Apology and Onto.

My calling these works Plato's earliest dialogues stems from

the statistical

tendency by stylometrists and scholars to place
them as such (see table A.l).^ While
general agreement about chronology remains
elusive, stylometric research provides
several

important clues as to

why and

statistical characteristic of this

A.l).'*
(again, see table

for

whom

group

Their length

*

and drama competitions,® but

it

more

is

Plato wrote these dialogues. The most
striking

their length; all are

may be an

under 20 Stephanus pages long

indication of time-limits placed on speech

likely reflects the short attention

span of the

intended audience.

The

fact that scholars

have tended to look beyond Plato's

dialogues for something more philosophically substantial to

earliest Socratic

chew on may just be another

clue that the works were written as part of an educational
project for an unphilosophical

and possibly antiphilosophical audience.

How many of those same Platonic scholars

were originally inspired by one of these short but impressive works? The thing
that most
distinguishes this group of early works

subjects

and

and characters

and

entertaining,

are popular

is

their accessibility to the untrained. Their

and recognizable,

their structure dispels false

their style

is

colloquial, humorous,

complacency while motivating and

encouraging further inquiry. Whether performed, recited, or read, these dialogues better

than any others

attract

an unsophisticated audience to philosophy the way Socrates lured

a crowd to his conversations in the Agora.

’Tabic data

is

derived from Vlastos (1992, p. 135),

Kahn (1981) and Brandwood (1992) who

summarizes the findings of Dittenbcrger, Schanz, von Amim,
*

CritJas,

at

1

1.2 pages, also

advanced audience.

I

I

am

the length description, but

my dialogues

and Ledger.
it

is

almost universally placed as late and

Meno at 23.3 pages and
excluding these on the basis that they seem to be written for a slightly more

shares few of the other criteria
H/pp/iLS Major at 22.9.

fits

,

Ritter,

do. Closer to fitting the criteria are

consider them to be very close

in

purpose to

my selection,

however.

'Ryle (1966, p. 39 - 40) points out Aristotle’s reference in Poetics VII, 6 to competitions regulated by
the water clock and suggests that such timing may explain the uniform length of certain groups of dialogues.
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Table A.l: Length and Chronology of the
Dialogues
Dialogue

# of pages

Kahn

Vlas-

Ditten Schanz von
Ritter
beiger
Amim

tos

Ledger

Early Socratic
(1)

Apology

19.7

1

1

1

1

9.5

1

1

1

4

Charmides

18.1

1

2

1

Laches

17.8

1

2

1

Lysis

14.9

2

2

3

Ion

12.2

1

1

1

Hippias Minor

10.1

1

1

1

Euthyphro

11.7

1

2

1

Hippias Major

22.9

2

2

Protagoras

39.4

1

1

Gorgias

61.6

1

Meno

23.3

Euthydemus

Crito

1

1

2

1

1

4

1

1

2

1

1

1

3

1

1

2

1

—
—

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

2

2

2

4

2

1

2

27.9

2

1

2

2

2

2

3

Republic

194

3

3

3

2

3

3

Phaedrus

39

3

3

3

2

3

4

Symposium

39.3

3

3

3

1

2

Cratylus

42.3

3

3

2

2

2

Phaedo

49.2

3

3

2

1

2

53

4

4

3

2

3

3

Parmenides

31.2

4

4

4

4

3

3

Philebus

43.2

4

4

4

3

4

4

Sophist

39.6

4

4

4

2

4

4

Statesman

43.2

4

4

4

3

4

4

53

4

4

4

3

4

11.2

4

4

4

4

4

236.8

4

4

4

4

4

Transitional
(2)

—

AEddle
(3)

2

3
3

2

2

Late
(4)

Theaetetus

Timaeus
Critias

Laws
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